DFC CO 15

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted]

1611
Ser N00L/074
30 APR 18

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] ltr 1611 Ser (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) [redacted]/037 of 28 Feb 18

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted]
To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-834)

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] USN

1. Forwarded, concurring with the recommendations of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] that CDR (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) [redacted] be detached for cause and that he not be required to show cause for retention in the U.S. Navy.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted]

Copy to:
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted]
CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted]

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Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and/or criminal penalties

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted]

1611
Ser (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] 058
19 MAR 18

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] ltr 1611 Ser (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted]/037 of 28 Feb 18

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted]
To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-83)
Via: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted]

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] USN

1. During review of the First Endorsement the following administrative errors were noted and corrected.

a. The First Endorsement was incorrectly numbered and renumbered pages 4 through 6.

b. The First Endorsement incorrectly references (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] ltr 1616 Ser [redacted]/037 of 28 Feb 18. This was corrected to accurately reflec (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] ltr 1611 Ser [redacted]/037 of 28 Feb 18.

2. Forwarded with no comment on the First Endorsement and no change in previous recommendations.

3. My point of contact for this matter is my Staff Judge Advocate, LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] JAGC, USN a (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted] c (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted]
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted]

Copy to:
CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [redacted]

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr 1610
Se (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 037 of 28 Feb 18

From: CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN
To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-83)
Via: (1 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(2

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1. I am submitting my statement only because this entire package will be part of my official naval record.

2. I am not writing to dispute the facts in the letter that this document is attached. I acknowledge the absolute responsibility of command and what our Navy and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) vested in me as the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and that during my tenure I lost the confidence of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to command (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

3. Ultimately, I was held accountable to meet historical precedent of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) when what I was assigned to do onboard (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was unprecedented.

a. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has been and still remains last (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) priority within (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) among (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) warships. As a result, as testified to by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) seven months after I took command:

"The crew on the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), for example, went over 48 months with -- before getting (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) because several delays, at least four different delays because of other priorities. And those other priorities start with our (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) which is our (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) carriers and then we get t (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

As a result, *"So if any of those get disrupted, a carrier goes along in one of our (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then we're gonna bump things like our (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) So that crew of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the CO (ph) took over at the start of that maintenance avail (ph), gave up command before the end of that maintenance avail (ph). And the crew, the entire crew, did not deploy. To someone's point here earlier, you cannot buy back that experience."*

This generated a culture onboard that divorced itself from ownership to cope with being last (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) priority that was felt the most by senior and middle level leaders onboard (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). This was confirmed by previous (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that read prior to taking command (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) The depth of personal career impacts to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) leaders as a result of the unprecedented (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was also unprecedented. After assessing the direct and secondary impacts of the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and its potential deepening cultural issues pushed to the crew as secondary effects, I knew even before I accepted command of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that it was going to be the hardest thing I had ever done. I made myself ready to accept this assignment and make decisions like I had in previous challenging assignment to this point -- make every decision for betterment

the crew under my care and make these decisions as if this were my last assignment in the world's greatest Navy so that there is no regret.

b. As a multiplying factor, continued emphasis of maintaining (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) boats continuingly ready for sea, from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) necessitated command level leadership aboard the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to manage increased personnel risk in middle level leadership positions. I assess that managing risk almost continuously strongly contributed to the large number of unplanned losses as system restorations and operations onboard increased. My assessment of poor middle level leaders was confirmed and documented by multiple external assessments and reported by me in multiple communications to the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of which I carbon copied my immediate chain of command each month to promote clear transparency of my gaps and struggles in middle level leadership. The heart of the multiple mentoring sessions to me was how to overcome struggles in middle level leadership at key leadership positions, not why I was deficient to recognize and overcome it. Continually recognizing it as a top concern, I repeatedly reported it as a top concern in correspondence as part of the external assessments while attempting to grow those personnel through multiple weekly interactions.

4. Personal accountability. Every one of the 4 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) incident reports (2 reports of which were submitted based on poor decisions and actions taken years before I took command but formally reported by me because it's the only right thing to do) I submitted after (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 2017 included actions taken at the command level for personnel accountability that I received little feedback on the depth of actions taken. Specifically, after the first (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) incident report, I went against my own assessment to take the Machinery Division Chief to mast for dereliction of duty, for increased accountability, based on received mentoring that I valued. Also, the larger number of unplanned losses from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was due to increased accountability at my level as part of additional actions following non-judicial punishment proceedings required to tenaciously and positively change the culture onboard that resulted from years of inactivity coupled with Sailors maturing onboard without sound deck plate leadership. While in command, I placed 18 Sailors under personal written plans for improvement from me for increased accountability, mostly officers and chiefs to improve the depth of strong middle level leadership onboard. 8 Sailors improved their performance because they followed their written plan, which took incredible investment personally for their success. Watching them improve was the best part of my command tour. One greatly improved to become my Junior Officer of the Year for 2017. 3 Sailors were removed from the command after not performing to standards, and the other 7 were still within their written plans at the time of my relief. I invested in each Sailor I could, such that their personal improvement would impact a significant group of junior Sailors positively and grow a tougher crew with sound military bearing.

5. As confirmed by multiple comments from the crew in the Commanding Officer's suggestion box, the crew understood my vision at the time of my relief on February 12, 2018 and they understood that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) required more time to achieve success based on the talent we had onboard (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) issues stemming from being the lowest (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) priority. This sentiment was formally supported by a senior naval leader (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) information that was gathered during a personal visit to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) just two weeks prior to my relief,

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr 1616
Se (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 037 of 28 Feb 18

"I am confident that our officers and Sailors will continue to find innovative ways to compensate for these shortcomings – or (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) one sailor who has spent the past four years and eight months on board pier-side looked me in the eye and said, 'I'm sticking around because I want to deploy. We are getting after any problem we might have because we are building a strong crew.'"

a. Every decision I made onboard (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was to build a crew from the ground up that has a safety first focus and execution of our responsibilities. Building a competent team anywhere takes time. Building it onboard (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) where cultural change is required after years of inactivity while developing strength in deck plate leadership takes even more time to confidently operate a (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) properly and safely.

6. I concur with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recommendation for no disciplinary actions taken against me as part of loss of confidence.

a. I concur with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recommendation to not show cause for continued service as I always have and will remain true to defend our Constitution.

b. I want nothing more than (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to return to sea and the crew confidently ready to deploy, far above my overcoming of the grief from being removed from command.

c. The challenges onboard (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were great, significant, and well documented with years of transparency with chain of command informed (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) based on how unprecedented it was. It would have been difficult for any commanding officer in that environment. I took on this challenge as my duty to our Constitution and made every decision only for the opportunity to grow the group of Sailors into a team ready to defend our Constitution at sea. Despite the challenges of my command assignment, many unprecedented, I would still gladly seize opportunities for further leadership and operational assignments if given such opportunity.

d. Lastly, in the event that retirement in the next 2 years becomes the best decision for me to positively contribute to our world, and for my family, I sincerely respectfully request that if my record has to come before a retirement grade decision board that I be allowed to retire in my current grade of Commander (05). This detachment for cause was neither for a willful misconduct, nor for any action that would damage the profession reputation of naval officers, nor was I negligent in my concern for the care of either my ship or crew. I have served honorably the last 3 years as a Commander and have done nothing short of give my best effort to lead Sailors throughout my Navy career. Regardless of this disposition from loss of confidence, I will continue to do my best to lead Sailors formally and be the best possible representative for Navy values in defense of our Constitution until my last day of naval service.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

15 MARCH 2018

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1611
Ser [redacted] 037
28 FEB 18

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS 83)
Via: (1) CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN
(2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(3) [redacted]

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN

Ref: (a) MILPERSMAN 1611-020

Encl: (1) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Letter of Instruction dated 22 Jan 18
(2) Acknowledgement form of 28 Feb 18

1. Per reference (a), I request that CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN be detached for cause from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) due to a loss of confidence in the officer's ability to safely and effectively hold the position of Commanding Officer.

2. CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) assumed command of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 2016 and has been serving in that capacity up until he was relieved on 12 February 2018.

3. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) exhibited a string of ship-wide failures over the last 10 months including multiple reoccurring deficiencies from exam to exam. This included: three failed Engineering Readiness Reviews (ISIC-level review; March 2017, November 2017, December 2017), delayed testing due to poor proficiency review for Hot Operations (August 2017), cancelled Diving Operations Readiness Inspection (DORI) due to crew not being ready, then a subsequent failed DORI (October 2017, December 2017), failed Anti-Terrorism Spot Check (November 2017), and two failed Pre-Critical Inspections (PCI) (ISIC-level inspection to prepare for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) January 2018, January 2018).

4. Additionally, CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was unable to effectively lead and train his crew. For example, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) accounted for 25% of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) unplanned Sailor losses. Constant needs on [redacted] required considerable [redacted] resources at the expense of other assigned units. CDR [redacted] failed to realize that properly executing the end of this shipyard availability safely and on time was key to reducing the stress of their extended shipyard period and improving their quality of service.

5. CDR [redacted] could not independently assess where his crew stood. His assessments were overly optimistic, and he did not employ methods to distill data into strategic direction. CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was required to submi[redacted] nuclear incident reports to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) since 31 August 2017, and one of those required resubmittal. Also, once an assessment was provided directly to

him from external agencies, he did not take sufficient action on the results. His corrective actions often lacked personnel accountability and typically missed the root cause by only citing more training as the corrective action. In some cases, the deficient results of major reviews were not even shared completely with the crew which limited improvement.

6. CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did not hold his crew sufficiently accountable to improve poor day-to-day standards. His Chief's Quarters was underperforming, and he failed to enforce the standards needed to move through (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) testing program. Despite (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) direction to the contrary, CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had not formally assessed (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) training since April 2017 and had allowed his crew to fall more than three months behind in required (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Training Exams. Additionally, his (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) long range and short range training plans expired prior to the last Pre-Critical Inspection and CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) required (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) direction to appropriately extend them. Missing a significant opportunity for self-improvement, CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did not make himself available in external training assessments done by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Deputies.

7. Initial indications were that training outside the engineering spaces were also not on track to reach and execute sea trials safely. CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) failed to properly qualify his crew, and the provisional qualification program that he is responsible for was consistently deficient. Despite repeated guidance from his Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC), CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did not hold his team accountable to make the changes required to comply with requirements. The combination of a poor training program and a failed provisional qualification program were assessed to have delayed the testing program by at least two months.

8. To correct these failures, a near constant (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) presence was required over significant periods for the ship to show progress. CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) himself received: (1) Direct written Executive Summaries and detailed reports on each failed Engineering Readiness Review. The last ERR out-brief included verbal counseling by the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the CO's stateroom following the report; (2) Weekly email correspondence directly with the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) as an opportunity to ask for resources and any additional help needed to succeed; (3) Consistent mentoring through in-person visits and phone conversations over 12 months from both the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and Deputy (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (4) In August 2017, CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had two weeks of daily mentoring calls with Deputy (b)(6), (b)(7) and weekly mentoring calls to the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (5) Face-to-face feedback from the (b)(6), (b)(7) and the Deputy (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on recurring deficiencies (March 2017, entire (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Triad was present).

9. Additionally, CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was provided a (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Letter of Instruction (LOI) on 22 January 2018 that laid out detailed plans to get the command safely through sea trials, see enclosure (1). This letter was delivered before the second PCI that concluded on 26 January 2018. The second PCI uncovered significant and continued failings by the command that had not been briefed to the ISIC. This inspection gave a detailed picture of an utter lack of crew and material readiness, and it showed that there were reoccurring deficiencies that were not addressed from previous assessments. Once the true depth of the problems came to light in the second PCI, the LOI was superceded by a loss of confidence in CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ability to command (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

10. Finally, every available resource was redirected to the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to set her up for success. The (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) #2 ranked Engineer was swapped from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (October 2017) to better support CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). The (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) staff conducted numerous peer-to-peer mentoring sessions on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and counterparts shadowed on the deck plates to provide in-the-moment advice on how to efficiently execute day-to-day processes.

11. An overall assessment of the situation led me to believe that commanding (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was beyond the scope of capabilities possessed by CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). I do not think that his failings amounted to a dereliction of duties, as his efforts were in earnest, but he lacked the depth of knowledge and experience to effectively lead his crew. I strongly believe non-judicial punishment would be an inappropriate avenue to address his failings.

12. I believe that there is a place for CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I recommend that he be allowed to find an appropriate staff position that does not place him in command.

13. I recommend that CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) not be made to show cause for retention in the naval service. I cannot, at this time, give a recommendation that CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) be considered for promotion to Captain. However, if he excels in whatever follow-on tour he is assigned to, I leave it to the discretion of his Commanding Officer to overturn my negative recommendation for promotion. CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is not currently on the promotion list for Captain.

14. I have given a copy of this request to CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and, by enclosure (2), have informed him that this request may be filed in his official record. He was also informed by enclosure (2) that he has the right to submit a written statement and has 15 calendar days, until 15 March 2018 to do so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

From: CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN
To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-832)

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN

1. On 28 February 2018 I received the letter requesting my detachment for cause and I understand the request may be filed in my official record.

2. I am aware of the contents of MILPERSMAN 1070-020 and I (do) ~~do not~~ desire to make a written statement.

3. I further understand that I have 15 calendar days from this date to submit my statement. If I make such election and then fail to submit a statement in that period of time, it will be treated as a waiver of that right. I understand that any statement I make must be couched in temperate language, be confined to the pertinent facts, and not impugn the motives of others or make countercharges.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Enclosure: (2)