AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
IDENTIFICATION
NO.

[redacted]

RECORDS CODE SHEET
NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

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ACCIDENT DAMAGE

	Pilot	Other Personnel	Aircraft
Fatal			
Non-Fatal			

ACCIDENT INJURY

	DAY	MO	YR
	17	10	84

FISCAL YEAR

Model Code

REMARKS, STATEMENTS
(Card No. 3)

File Number

(b) (6) [redacted]

YEAR
MONTH
DAY

TYPE

NUMBER

DAMAGE
INJURY

NONE

U. S. NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

NASC/sy
Ser 14/1235
12 August 1964

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST P3750.6 SERIES

From: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Training Squadron THREE

Subj: VT-3 AAR ser 6-61A concerning T-28C BuNo 140604 accident occurring 30 October 1963, pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

1. The subject report and all endorsements thereon have been reviewed. The Naval Aviation Safety Center concurs with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. This particular accident should serve as an excellent example of the reason why preservation of wreckage should be a paramount consideration. Any decision to move wreckage under the provisions of paragraph 39a of OPNAVINST P3750.6E must be made with full knowledge that subsequent investigative efforts to ascertain causative factors may be thwarted. In this mishap movement of the wreckage did thwart positive determination of causative factors. Such movement does not seem to have been warranted on the basis that traffic flow was being impeded on a military installation, especially in view of the fact that alternative exit routes were available.

3. The cause of this accident has been recorded by the Center as undetermined.

[illegible]
By direction

Copy to:
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Code 05
20 DEC 1963

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST 3750.6B

Forward
THIRD ENDORSEMENT on TRABON THREE serial 6-63A, concerning T-28 C, BuNo 140604, accident occurring 30 October 1963, pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Chief of Naval Air Training
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the Board and the comments and action indicated in the forwarding endorsements, subject to the following:

a. Do not concur in the recommendation that a T-28 OFT be made available for Training Command use. Emergency procedures taught by instructors in the T-28 have been successful for several years. As indicated by the Board, the student made a good emergency landing. Considering his altitude and the terrain beneath him at the time of his emergency, a minimum of time was available to do other than he did.

R. J. KEENAN, Jr.
By direction

Copy to:
CNAMUPRA
BUPERS (P-[illegible])
CO NAS PENSACOLA
[illegible]
[illegible]
CO [illegible] (4)

Code 05

13 DEC 1963

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on TRARON THREE, serial 6-63A, concerning T-28C, BuNo 140604, accident occurring 30 October 1963, Pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Chief of Naval Air Basic Training
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Chief of Naval Air Training

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report, forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board and subsequent endorsements.

2. Although life jackets were not required for this flight, it is noted that the lack of a life jacket did, in fact, influence the pilot's decision, thus removing one of the two options available. Current CNABATRA instructions require the use of life jackets when the flight will proceed beyond gliding distance of land. These instructions are under review for possible revision to include such situations as was involved in this accident.

D. W. Smith, Jr.

D. W. SMITH, JR.

Copy to:
CONNAVAVSAFCEN (2cc direct)
BUMEPS (F-12)
CO, NAS Pensacola
CO, VT-3
BUMEPS REP Jacksonville
BUMEPS REP Columbus

Co[illegible] AS /10171
4 Dec 1963

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on Training Squadron THREE Serial 6-63A, Concerning T-2BC BuNo 140604, Occurring 30 October 1963, Pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Chief of Naval Air Basic Training
(2) Chief of Naval Air Training

Subj: Training Squadron THREE Serial 6-63A; forwarding of

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST P3750.6E

1. Forwarded.

2. The wreckage was moved under the provisions of Ref. (a) para 39A. All responsibilities were fulfilled. No report of damage to wreckage inflicted during rescue and salvage was submitted as every effort was made to prevent further damage and no significant damage occurred. (Damage inflicted by fire-fighters was called to the attention of members of the Board.) All wreckage was carefully laid on a flat-bed truck and a dump truck, remaining on these trucks until removal was authorized by the Board.

F. F. SIDELL

Copy to:
NAVAVNSAFCEN (Zoo Direct)
[illegible] (F-123)
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] Teterboro
[illegible] Columbus
[illegible]

HANDLING REQUIRED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 66
OPNAVINST 5750.6F.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Training Squadron THREE Serial 6-63A, Accident Occuring 30 October 1963, pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Commanding Officer, Training Squadron THREE
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, Florida
(2) Chief of Naval Air Basic Training
(3) Chief of Naval Air Training

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded

2. Concur with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board.

3. An AMFUR recommending redesign of the lip mike is being prepared.

4. NAVCAD (b) (6) [redacted] had no previous accident or flight violations.

5. NATOPS Information:

a. No NATOPS requirement was a factor in this accident.

b. The NATOPS Manual was being complied with.

c. No change in the NATOPS Manual is recommended.

6. This report is not forwarded via the Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Auxiliary Air Station, Whiting Field, as the student was attached there for administrative purposes only.

[illegible]

Copy to:
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 1 — See OPNAVINST 3750.6A, Supplement

PART I GENERAL

1. Aircraft Model Designation	2. Serial No.	3. Date (Year of Mishap)	4. Bureau Number	5. Bureau Number
TRAKON THREE	6-63A	30150z(s) Oct	T-280	140604

6. Operator	7. Location of Mishap	8. Damage
Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center	050°/2mi. R/W 6-24 NAS	ALFA

9. Via	10. Time of Day	11. Time in Flight	12. Flight Code
CO, TRAKON THREE CO, NAS PENSACOLA CNABATRA CNATRA	Day	02+55	1D1

13. Cleared From	14. Type Clearance	15. Airspeed	16. Airweight
NAAS WHITING FIELD	VFR	145 (P)	7500

17. Cleared To	18. Elevation at Time of Mishap
NAAS WHITING FIELD	425 (P) Terrain 240' (E)

19. Short Description of Mishap

Controlled collision Ground following engine failure

20. List Model, Hull Repairs, Customer and Other Aircraft Involved (Name Operator of Other Aircraft Involved)

X	Y	Factor	Y	Factor	Y	Factor
		1. Pilot Error in Technique/Judgment		9. Serviced Personnel		17. Weather
		2. Pilot Deviation from Motor Vehicle Rules		10. Landing Signal Officer		18. Unknown Aircraft
		3. Pilot Inadequate Operation of Vehicle		11. Other Personnel (Specify)		19. Design Crew Equipment
		4. Pilot Other (Specify)		12. Supervisory		20. Design Other (Specify)
		5. Crew		13. Facilities (Runway, Overrun, Taxiway, Flight Deck)		21. Rolling/Pitch Air Deck Rough Seas
		6. Maintenance Personnel		14. Facilities (Arresting Gear, Landing Aids, Deck Size, Obstructions)		22. Material Failure/Malfunction
		7. Maintenance Inspection (Specify)		15. Other Equipment (Specify)	X	23. Undetermined
		8. Maintenance Other (Specify)		16. Facilities Other (Specify)		24. Other (Specify)

25. Pilot Qualification	26. Pilot Age	27. Pilot Rank	28. Pilot Rating	29. Pilot Flight Hours	30. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	31. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours	32. Pilot Duty Status
(b) (6) [redacted]	N/C	(b) (6) [redacted]	USNR	21		8NA	F/C

33. Pilot Qualification	34. Pilot Hours	35. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	36. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours
	190		

37. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	38. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours	39. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	40. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours
	8NA		

41. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	42. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours	43. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	44. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours

45. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	46. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours	47. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	48. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours

49. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	50. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours	51. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	52. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours

53. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	54. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours	55. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	56. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours

57. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	58. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours	59. Pilot Hours Last 90 Days	60. Pilot Hours Last 24 Hours

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 6

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

A. A/C HISTORY

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF OVERHAULS	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
8 Jan 1957	2587.4	2	6	447.9	NAS PNCLA	2nd CAL INTER	21.7	12

B. ENGINE HISTORY

1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1) 1820-86A	BL 520418	3411.0	5	YES	456.4	NAS PNCLA	2nd CAL INTER	21.7	12
(2)									
(3)									
(4)									

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURER'S PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OVERHAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	8. NXXXXX XXXXXXXXX
(1) CARBURETOR STROMBERG	PD-12K18 391496-13	2018.0	3	451.0	NAS PNCLA	YES	849146
(2) FUEL PUMP	PE2FR600CNSA	KNOWN 1081.1	1	1081.1	NAS PNCLA	YES	PEW 11398-W
(3) PROP GOV.	HS4G10-3	2207.1	3	328.1	NAS PNCLA	YES	WH72168
(4) MAGNETO	MJS-9C-301	1231.1 1194.3	4 2	456.4 456.4	NAS PNCLA	YES	2G-3759 2G-5779

D. MAJOR COMPONENTS REPAIRED OR REPLACED HISTORY

1. PARTS REPAIRED: PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE	2. PARTS REPLACED: PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED

E. JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (includes international accidents to prevent engine damage)

A. TYPE OF FLAMEOUT	B. [illegible]	C. [illegible]	D. [illegible]	E. [illegible]	F. [illegible] FLAMEOUT	G. FUEL FLOW	H. ATTITUDE
I. [illegible]	J. [illegible] ☐ AUTOMATIC ☐ MANUAL		K. [illegible]	L. [illegible]	M. [illegible]	N. [illegible] ☐ FRONT ☐ REAR	O. [illegible]
P. [illegible]	Q. [illegible]						

F. [illegible]

A. [illegible]	B. [illegible]	C. [illegible]	D. [illegible]	E. [illegible]	F. [illegible]	G. [illegible]	H. [illegible]
[illegible]	1A5	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			24(L) 72(L)
I. [illegible]	J. [illegible]						

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV FORM 5750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

Page 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5100.8, effective date

DATE REPORT 8/29/

5. CONTRACT NO. OR DATE	6. PLANE NUMBER	7. MODEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION OF RUN	9. LAUNCHING CRUISE AND CRUISE ARRESTER

C. STAPS 1-12

11. THIS REPORT MUST BE completed whenever (A) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment or (B) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidence of routine damage to cables, wires, and other equipment is not considered a malfunction.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTING: CONSTANT PRESSURE TOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WL 1554)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (For cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

D. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS RECORD CARRIER (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED (OPNAV)	2. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
4. NIGHT HOURS EXCEED SINCE DEPLOYMENT AUTHORIZED	5. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

E. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
Highscat	7	125/4	60	30	30.13

7. OTHER PERTINENT CONDITIONS (Include fog, haze, dust, sea state, density altitude, ground fog)

F. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PAGE	SECTION	ITEM	6. REMARKS	7. COPY DISTRIBUTION
				2CO NAVAIRLANT (CO DIRECT LAND)
				1CO SUPERS DIR OF LAND (Y-125)
				1CO BUREAU REP ENTERPRISE
				1CO BUREAU REP COLUMBUS
				1CO CO, NAS, PENSACOLA

8. DATE OF REPORT (YY MM DD)	9. TIME OF REPORT	10. DATE OF REPORT (YY MM DD)	11. TIME OF REPORT	12. DATE RECEIVED BY CNO
63/8/30				63 9 6 1800

VERIFICATION

13. NAME OF REPORTING OFFICER	14. NAME OF OPERATIONS OFFICER	15. NAME OF QUALITY CONTROL OFFICER
(b) (6) [redacted]	(b) (6) [redacted]	(b) (6) [redacted]
(b) (6) [redacted]	(b) (6) [redacted]	(b) (6) [redacted]
(b) (6) [redacted]	(b) (6) [redacted]	

PART V - THE ACCIDENT

A. On 30 October 1963 at 1207, six (6) T-28 aircraft launched on an authorized day navigation flight, piloted by five (5) students and one (1) chase instructor. The take-off consisted of a 500' interval between aircraft and then a running rendezvous made while departing South Whiting control zone.

B. Following a normal student day navigation flight, the flight arrived at NAS Pensacola for a touch and go landing. This was to satisfy the requirement that a student make a landing at a strange field.

C. Studio 231, BUNO 140604, piloted by NAVCAD (b) (6) [redacted] USNR was the number five (5) aircraft in the formation at NAS Pensacola.

D. The break-up by the students for landing over runway 6 at NAS Pensacola was normal. The approach and touch and go were uneventful but for the fact that the first three (3) aircraft had to wave-off due to other traffic.

E. Studio 231 made a normal approach and touch and go. He added take-off power and became safely airborne. After clearing all obstacles the power was reduced to 36" and 2400 RPM and the cowl and oil cooler flaps opened to the cracked position. The landing gear was raised when a landing could no longer be safely made on the remainder of the runway. The flaps were raised in one increment upon passing 350' indicated altitude. The climb continued and a running rendezvous was commenced.

F. At an indicated altitude of 400-450' the power plant of Studio 231 sputtered and ceased developing power entirely. No sump plug warning light was observed and the engine continued to windmill throughout the approach. The pilot recollects that engine instruments were normal up to this point. The pilot selected a golf course [illegible] for a [illegible] landing. His first thoughts were to ditch in the bay but due to the fact [illegible] he decided to make his emergency [illegible] the golf course.

[illegible] flaps were [illegible] to increase [illegible] in an [illegible] landing. [illegible]

Initial contact with the ground was made slightly fast with gear up and flaps down, speedbrake up, canopy closed, engine windmilling, and shoulder harness locked. The mixture, fuel valve, ignition and battery were not secured. After initial contact, the aircraft ballooned 20-30' and continued to float 179 yards down the fairway. At this point the port outer wing panel contacted trees 11' above ground and separated from the aircraft. Simultaneous contact was made by the starboard wing with a refreshment stand. Third contact was made by the port inner wing panel with a tree. Fourth contact was made by the starboard wing with a tree separating the wing at station 75. Fifth contact was head-on with a pine tree which was broken off 6' from the ground. The forward motion ceased with the engine turned end for end, prop resting against the forward edge of the fuselage, and the accessory section pushed up against a tree. (SEE ENCLOSURE (2) WRECKAGE DIAGRAM)

H. The aircraft forward section burned slowly with the pilot unconscious. The unconscious pilot was removed from the cockpit by golfers who observed the crash, prior to the arrival of the crash crew.

PART VI - DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT

A. The aircraft BUNO 140604 (2W-231) sustained ALPA damage.

B. See enclosure (1a-1n) wreckage photographs and Enclosure (2) Wreckage Diagram.

C. Description of damage

1. Initial contact came as the prop blades struck the ground causing [illegible] about 4 feet apart along a distance of 6 yards. This initial contact caused the prop blades to be bent back and sudden stoppage of the engine. The [illegible] was broken at this point, [illegible] speed of the aircraft [illegible] 110 to 120 knots.

2. [illegible] breaking [illegible] the aircraft [illegible] [illegible] ground [illegible]

At this point the port wing struck 2 trees abeam of the snack shack. The port wing separated from the fuselage in 2 pieces. The first piece separating at station 153.9 and came to rest at the foot of the tree. The remainder of the wing separated at the wing root as it struck the second tree and came to rest 10 yards from the point of impact. The fuselage and starboard wing remained intact after contacting the snack shack approximately 11' above its base and then continued ahead approximately 20 more yards where the starboard wing struck a tree 10 feet from the base. The starboard wing separated just outboard of the landing gear (station 75) and came to rest 38 yards from the point of impact. The fuselage continued forward 23 feet striking and severing a tree 10 inches in diameter 6 feet from the base. The fuselage continued on 32 feet striking the ground causing a gouge 12 inches deep and 9 yards long. The final resting place of the fuselage, engine and prop came 18 yards later up against a tree. The engine had separated from the fuselage and was lying with the prop which had separated from the engine. Approximately 2 minutes later the engine and fuselage became engulfed in flames causing severe damage to the front cockpit and forward section of the fuselage.

3. The total distance from where the aircraft first struck the ground to where it finally came to rest was 269 yards.

D. The engine and accessories were transferred to the overhaul and repair activity, NAS Pensacola, Florida for priority [illegible]. The airframe was sent to this [illegible] activity for salvage.

[illegible]

A. The aircraft [illegible] The reporting custodian was notified [illegible] The [illegible] and [illegible] by 1540(s) [illegible]

[illegible]

Detailed photographs of the power plant section were not taken. Detailed inspection by the AAR board and available specialists prior to the movement of the wreckage was precluded. The premature removal of the wreckage from the golf course hindered the efforts of the board and complicated the entire investigation.

B. PERSONNEL FACTORS

1. Pilot factors

a. When the emergency occured at approximately 400', NAVCAD (b) (6) [redacted] made a decision to crash on the golf course in preference to ditching in the bay. The reason he did not ditch was because he was not wearing a Mae West. (Mae West was not required)

b. The pilot did not attempt a normal airstart and he did not attempt to utilize the primer. He did not make an emergency transmission nor did he complete all of the procedures for a forced landing.

c. The aircraft was controlled satisfactorily during the emergency.

d. The board has considered the possibility of the student having inadvertently secured the engine in flight. There are three methods that were examined and all were discounted

(1) The mixture might have been retarded to the idle cut-off position thinking that the prop control was being moved, however it is felt that the immediate engine failure would have caused the student to replace the mixture to full rich instantly. It is also felt that the distance and time flown from the touch and go preclude this possibility. The [illegible] is reduced on [illegible] prior to raising the gear and flaps. There [illegible] the [illegible] or mixture just prior [illegible]

(2) [illegible]

(3) The magneto switch was considered but its position is removed from all other switches and controls and is extremely difficult to reach with the shoulder harness locked. It is felt that it would take a conscious effort to secure the magneto.

2. Maintenance, servicing and ground handling personnel are NOT considered to be a factor.

a. Fuel contamination was fully explored with negative findings.

3. Supervisory Factors, NOT considered to be a factor.

A. Material failures or malfunctions.

a. The engine, 3L520148, stopped developing power at approximately 400' of altitude after take-off following a touch and go landing.

b. A complete DIR was performed by the Overhaul and Repair Department, NAS Pensacola, Florida. This revealed no discrepancies which would have contributed to or caused engine failure or malfunction prior to impact.

c. The following items were examined as possible causes of the engine's ceasing to develop power.

(1) The parts of the main fuel line which were available were inspected for separation and/or breaks. No discrepancies were found.

(2) The defueling valve was properly safety wired in the closed position.

(3) The main fuel [illegible] was intact and clean.

(4) The position of the mixture control at the time of impact could [illegible] determined due to the [illegible] movement of the control rod [illegible] movement during rescue [illegible]

(5) [illegible] position [illegible]

[illegible]

PART VIII - CONCLUSIONS

1. The cause factor of this accident is undetermined.

2. That although the pilot, 1/C (b) (6) [redacted], did not complete the emergency check-off list, he did make a good emergency landing on the golf course.

3. That 1/C (b) (6) [redacted] facial injuries were a direct result of the sharp edge on the lip mike (see 1MR).

4. That the removal of the wreckage from the accident scene prior to the arrival of the A&R board hampered the investigation.

PART IX - RECOMMENDATION

1. That a T-28 CFT be made available for Training Command use so that complete emergency procedures can be practiced.

2. That the lip mike boom be redesigned, to remove sharp edges which tend to cut the face upon impact, in an attempt to preclude a recurrence of injuries of the type suffered in this accident.

(b) (5)

[redacted]


ARMY ROAD
60' 6"
PORT LANDING GEAR
COWL
TREE
ENGINE 165° RELATIVE TO FUSELAGE
83' 6"
STARBOARD WING
GOUGE APPROXIMATELY 12" DEEP
32'
TREE SEVERED SIX FEET FROM BASE
23' 6"
TREE THAT STARBOARD WING IMPACTED TEN FEET FROM BASE--WING TORN OFF
61' 8"
8' 8"
12' SQUARE SNACK SHACK IMPACTED APPROXIMATELY 11' FROM BASE
5'5" BETWEEN TREES
PORT WING SECTION WITH FULL AILERON TORN OFF AND RESTING HERE IMPACTED BOTH TREES 11' ABOVE BASE
269 yards
60°
179 yards

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

[redacted]

30 OCT 63

NAAS WHITING FIELD

[redacted]	(b) (6) [redacted]	LT	(b) (6) [redacted]	USN	NAAS WHITING VT-[illegible]
		[illegible]			
		ENS		USNR	NAAS WHITING VT-[illegible]
		[illegible]			
		A/C		VNAF	NAAS WHITING VT-[illegible]
		[illegible]			
		N/C		USNR	NAAS WHITING VT-[illegible]
		[illegible]			
		N/C		USNR	NAAS WHITING VT-[illegible]
		[illegible]			
		N/C		USNR	NAAS WHITING VT-[illegible]
		[illegible]			

FLIGHT PLAN

[illegible] 7-01

NAAS WHITING

NAAS WHITING

ROUTE TO BE FLOWN

ITEM	VEH	ALTITUDE	ROUTE	TO
	V	4500	[illegible]	MOBILE
	V	4500	[illegible]	GULFPORT
	V	4500	[illegible]	NEW ORLEANS
	V	4500	[illegible]	BATON ROUGE
	V	5500	[illegible]	McCOMB
	V	5500	[illegible]	HATTIES BURG
	V	5500	[illegible]	MOBILE BROOKLEY
	V	5500	[illegible]	NAAS WHITING

[illegible] 9 00 [illegible]

[illegible] 2455

N.R. N.R.

(b) (6) [redacted]

3 [illegible] 20 [illegible]

INSTRUMENT RATING

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (5)

[redacted]

FLIGHT TRAINING SUMMARY OF [redacted] (b) (6)

Training Squadron ONE

12 April 1963 thru 10 June 1963

T-34	24.5 Hours dual
	6.9 Hours solo
	31.4 Hours total
Pre-solo flight grade	3.02 Average
Precision flight grade	3.13 Above average
Average flight grade	3.08 Above average

Training Squadron TWO

11 June 1963 thru 20 September 1963

T-28	42.3 Hours dual
	16.9 Hours solo
	59.2 Hours total
Transition flight grade	2.90 Average
Precision-Aerobatic flight grade	3.07 Above average
Basic Instrument flight grade	3.12 Above average
Night flying flight grade	3.11 Above average
Average flight grade	3.05 Above average

Training Squadron THREE

20 September 1963

T-28	29.7 Hours dual
	10.1 Hours solo
	39.8 Hours total
Radio instrument flight grade	3.10 Above average
Formation flight grade	3.07 Above average
Average flight grade	3.09 Above average

T-28 and T-34 total flight time 130.4 hours (includes 2.3 hours in SUPO 140504 on 30 October 1963.)

NAVAL AIR FIRE/RESCUE REPORT ( ) NO TRANSMITTAL LETTER REQUIRED ( ) REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 11130-1

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	ON STATION / OFF STATION	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible] Chief, Bureau of Naval Personnel (Pers-[illegible])

SIR:	MILITARY COMMAND	[illegible]
	SIGNATURE	

EXACT LOCATION OF INCIDENT: [illegible]

TYPE OF INCIDENT				FIRE INVOLVED		ESTIMATED CASE			
TAKE-OFF	[illegible]	LINE OF LOADING		FUELING		YES	[illegible]		
LANDING		PARKED		MAINTENANCE		NO			
TAXIING		REFUELING		INFLIGHT		IMPACT IDENTIFIED	[illegible]		
OTHER (Specify)						DELAYED IDENTIFICATION			

CONDITIONS AT TIME OF INCIDENT

[illegible]	WIND DIRECTION	[illegible]	NATURE OF TERRAIN AT AND IN APPROACH TO INCIDENT: [illegible]
	WIND VELOCITY (MPH)	[illegible]	
	TEMPERATURE (°F)	[illegible]	

LIQUID FUEL QUANTITY

ESTIMATED ON BOARD BEFORE INCIDENT (lbs)	[illegible]	OTHER FUELS: [illegible]
ESTIMATED ON BOARD AFTER INCIDENT (lbs)	[illegible]	
ESTIMATED SPILL AREA (dia in feet)	[illegible]	

PERSONNEL RESCUE

NO. PERSONNEL ON BOARD AIRCRAFT	[illegible]	[illegible]
NO. PERSONNEL SURVIVED	[illegible]	
NO. PERSONNEL RESCUED UNAIDED	[illegible]	
NO. PERSONNEL RESCUED	[illegible]	

FIRE FIGHTING

FIRST SIGNAL OF ALARM USED			TIME RECORD	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	TIME ALARM RECEIVED	[illegible]
			TIME EQUIPMENT WAITED	[illegible]

STATION EQUIPMENT

[illegible]		[illegible]			QUANTITY EXTINGUISHING AGENTS USED		
					[illegible]	OTHER TYPES AND QUANTITIES	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

DESCRIPTION OF DIFFICULTIES IN FIRE CONTROL AND
EQUIPMENT DUE TO PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OR EQUIPMENT
AND/OR AGENT INADEQUACIES

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN EQUIPMENT
AND/OR PROCEDURES TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY


N
NOTE: TWO MILES FROM END OF RUNWAY TO FINAL POSITION OF AIRCRAFT
PATH OF AIRCRAFT
GOLF SHACK
WOODED AREA AROUND THIS POINT
POST WING
STARBOARD WING
TAIL

[illegible]

PRIORITY

(b) (6)

PRIORITY

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6)



ENCL (1b) to [illegible] 6-53A showing [illegible]
contact with [illegible] snack shack of [illegible]
SPECIAL [illegible] ACCORDANCE W[illegible]
PARA 66A [illegible] 6E



ENCL (Ec) to VT-3 Serial 6-63A showing contact of port wing with trees and port wing panel of BUNO 14[illegible], SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 66, OPNAVINST 3[illegible].

1E



ENCL (1e) to VT-3 Serial 6-03A sho
position of BUNO 140604. SPECIAL
REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE W
3700.8E


ENCL (1f) to VT-3 Serial 6-63A show
position of BUNO 140634, SPECIAL
REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 3d,
3750.6E



ENCL (1g) to VT-3 Serial 6-63A showing final position and port wing root of [illegible] 140604.
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 66, OPNAVINST 3750.6S

ENCL (1k) to VT-3 Serial 6-63A starboard
wing damage. note engine position. BUNO 1400
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARA 66, OPNAVINST 3750.6E







ENCL (1a) to VT-3 Serial 6-63A showing initial
contact with ground of BUNO 140604
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
PARA 66, OPNAVINST 3750.6E


ENCL (In) to VT-3 Serial 6-
(A) Initial
(B) Contact
snack shack
th fuselage
with port wing. (C) Contact of tree with
wing
head-on collision with tree
(E) Contact with ground,
stop at pt. F. (F) Aircraft
60 feet. SPECIAL
PARA 66, OPNAVINST 3750.68
F
D
C
B
A
G
E

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (5)

[redacted]