AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

011750

CAR. NO.

01	[illegible]
02	[illegible] F4B
03	F4 STR
04	THE F4
05	FIL[illegible] PR[illegible]
06	SFULLY EJ[illegible] [illegible] MINOR [illegible]NJ.
07	PLT OF F4 REMAINED IN ACFT & WAS CARBONIZED FOLLOW
08	ING CRASH. MOR IND THAT ACDT WAS PROB CAUSED BY
09	LACK OF PROPER LOOKOUT DOCTRINE BY BOTH PLTS, AND
10	THAT A POSSIBLE CONTRIB CAUSE WAS FAULTY INFO
11	TRANS BY F8 PLTS WINGMAN. FLT SURG NOTES A DELAY O
12	F 72 HRS IN NOTIFICATION THAT HE WAS THE ONLY FLT
13	SURG ON THE BOARD.
14	
15	THE F-4 RIO EJT AT 3M FT 160 KTS; THE F-8 PLT
16	AT 5M FT 300 KTS. ALL EQUIP WORKED AS ADVERTISED.
17	DUE TO G-FORCES THE RIO WAS UNABLE TO REACH THE FA
18	CE CURTAIN SO USED THE SEAT FIRING HANDLE. RESCUE
19	EFFECTED BY USCG HELO. A LACK OF SAR CAPABILITY IN
20	THE YUMA/EL CENTRO AREA WAS NOTED.

NAVAL SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

111A1/1g
3750/2
Ser 1239
13 Apr 1970

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR

Subj: VF-124/VMFAT-101 AAR ser's 3-70A concerning F-8J/F-4B BuNo's 149212/150473 accident occurring 22 November 1969, pilots (b)(6) SAUER

1. The subject report and all endorsements have been reviewed. Concur with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. The cause factors contributing to this accident have been recorded as follows:

*a. PILOT--F-8J (improper lookout doctrine).

*b. PILOT--F-4B (improper lookout doctrine).

*Primary

H. Glenzer Jr.
H. GLENZER, JR.
By direction

Copy to:
CMC (AAP)
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E) (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
CGFMFPAC
CGTHIRDMAW
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
CO MCAS YUMA
COMRCVW-12
CO MAG-33
CO VMFAT-101
NAVPRO DALLAS
NAVPRO ST LOUIS
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN
CO NAVAERORECOVFAC
DIR AFIP

OK

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

R&DP-8 (11-67)

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE-OUT" LETTER
ON ORIGINAL REVIEW

NOTE: 1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DPEARTMENT: None

DA 1237
INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPARTMENT:

83 No comment J

84 AI comm should stress the need for the responsibility to be established to conform to existing medical directives

82 No comment HSD

INITIAL/CODE

EL CENTRO SAR

NAVSAFECEN 3750-9(11/67)

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to: Correction to:		Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1			/
DIR			/
Misc Items for Action or Correction			
To Code	From Code/Date		
ALL CONCERNED	512 / 8-17-70	This SAR has been forwarded through 2 different chains of command with each chain apparently being under the impression that they were endorsing the only ORIGINAL report, consequently some commands have endorsed this same report more than once. In an effort to include all of the available information and make the best use of it all endorsements have been arranged in chronological order and renumbered accordingly. VR GTB	/
511	512D / 7-9-70	Final review completed all document ready for the closed file. (b) (6) [redacted]	/
	09 JUL 1970	CLOSED	

Page 2 of 2

NAVSAFECEN 3750-9(11/67)

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to: Correction to:	Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1		/
DIR		/
Misc Items for Action or Correction		

To Code	From Code/Date		Completed Code/Date
all	512A / 2/10/70 -	Hard-coded 1-7-70 bp for new 01 acft will be F8 - per AAD - per Mr. Scott/ Hassell	/ / / / /
	511 / 3/2/70	ORIGINAL REC'D PS	/
512	511 / 3/2/70	~~The copy of AAR submitted as an ORIGINAL accepted as such by Mr. Sykes (see note bottom of page 3, OPNAV Form 3750-1.) MOR from Coded Adv. Copy married with ORIG. AND FIFTH END. FROM MCAS YUMA. ALSO MARRIED WITH ORIG document. List of discrepancies attached.~~ This note deleted as ORIG. AAR (completed as required by 3750-1) was received 3 Mar. 1970 S. E. VR [redacted]	/ / / / / / / / / / /

Page 1 of 21

NAVSAFECEN 3750-10 (Rev 3/69)

COUNT VC

UNIT VF 124 / VMFAT 101

MODEL F8U / F4B

BUNO 149212 / 150473

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING:
	M&M		3-26-70	O	
	LSD				

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS:

REMARKS:

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NAVSAFECEN 10 APR 1970

EXTENSIONS

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
AAD	27 Mar		10 Apr	L99	

NAVSAFECEN ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI.	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT
1	R&DP			
2	M&M			
3	ADMIN			

APP

ROUTING AFTER CLOSE-OUT

DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
LSD				

NOTES: 1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder.

2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch.

3. Any department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

3750
Ser 80/ 1497

27 FEB 1970

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

~~SIXTH~~ TENTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 AAR ser 3-70A concerning F-8J
BuNo 149212 accident occurring 22 Nov 69, pilot (b)(6) [redacted] and SAUER.

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center

Subj: VF-124 AAR ser 3-70A

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6F

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, and in the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements, particularly paragraph 4 of COMRCVW TWELVESS endorsement.

2. The third endorsement from the Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 33 indicates that the AAR has been readdressed via the VMFAT-101 operational chain-of-command. A telephone inquiry at Third Marine Aircraft Wing indicated that no additional endorsements would be made. Paragraph 39a(2)(3) on page 28 of reference (a) applies.

John E. Dobyns
By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM
CMC (CODE AAP)
CG FMFPAC
CG 3RD MAW
CO MAG THREE THREE
COMREDATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
CO FITRON ONE TWO FOUR
CO NAVAEROSPACERECFAC
CO MCAS YUMA
CO VMFAT ONE ZERO ONE
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
NAVPLANTREPO ST LOUIS
DIR AFIP

3750
Ser 80/ 1273

19 FEB 1970

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

~~EIGHTH~~ NINTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 AAR ser 3-70A, VMFAT-101 AAR ser 3-70A concerning F-8J BuNo 149212, F-4B BuNo 150473, of 22 Nov 69, pilots (b) (6) [redacted] and SAUER

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center

Subj: VF-124 AAR ser 3-70A

1. Forwarded, concurring with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board and subsequent endorsements, subject to the following comments:

a. Both aircraft had an equal responsibility for maintaining effective lookout doctrine, and when all circumstances are assessed, there appears to be equal fault in this aspect.

b. For a long period, COMNAVAIRPAC has attempted to improve the SAR facilities at NAF, El Centro. The helicopter and personnel assets have been approved, and in the very near future the SAR capability at NAF, El Centro should be substantially improved.

2. During the course of endorsing this report, the numerical assignments of endorsements of COMREDATKCARAIRWING TWELVE and COMFAIRMIRAMAR were changed from third and fourth endorsements to sixth and seventh endorsements, respectively. In the process of addressing this report, for some unknown reason the numerical sequence of the endorsements became confused. All holders of this report and the endorsements are requested to make the changes indicated in the first sentence of this paragraph.

R. A. Volpi

R. A. VOLPI
Force Safety Officer

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM
CMC (CODE AAP)
CG FMFPAC
CG 3RD MAW
CO MAG THREE THREE
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
COMREDATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
CO VFTRON ONE TWO FOUR
NAVPLANTREPO ST LOUIS
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
CO NAVAEROREGOVFAC EL CENTRO
DIR AFIMSC
CO MCAS YUMA
CO MARFITATKTRARON ONE ZERO ONE

RECEIVED

ORIGINAL

OP:RCH:cja
3750
Ser
10 FEB 1970

~~FIFTH~~ EIGHTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 serial 3-70A, VMFAT-101 concerning F-8J BuNo 149212, F-4B BuNo 150473, accident occurring 22 Nov 1969, pilots (b) (6) [redacted] and SAUER

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona 85364
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: Commander, Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report, forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

2. This command has concurred for many years with the well documented requirement for a SAR unit at NAF El Centro. One UH-34 aircraft was transferred from MCAS Yuma to NAF El Centro on 8 December 1969 for the purpose of establishing a SAR unit at that site, and should become operational when qualified pilots are assigned to fly the aircraft.

W. J. Sims

W. J. SIMS

Copy to:
NAVSAFCEN (2)
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)
COMNAVAIRPAC
CMC (Code AAP)
DIR AFIP
NAVAIRTESTCEN PAXRIV
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
NAVAEROSPACERECFAC
CG FMFPAC
CG 3RD MAW
MAG-33
VMFAT-101
VF-124
RCVW-12
COMFAIR MIRAMAR

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

30A/ced
3750
2 FEB 1970

SEVENTH ~~FIFTH~~ ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 AAR, serial 3-70A, VMFAT-101 AAR, serial 3-70A, concerning F-8J BuNo 149212, F-4B BuNo 150473, of 22 November 1969, pilots (b)(6) and SAUER

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific

Subj: VF-124 Aircraft Accident Report, Serial 3-70A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusion and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board and subsequent endorsers.

E. S. PAYNE
By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVSAFECEN (2 ADVANCE)
CMC (CODE AAP)
COMNAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR-09E)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFEADATTKARAIRWING-12
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
CG, 3RD MAW
DIR, AFIP
CO, MAG-33
CO, VMFAT-101
CO, VF-124
CO, MCAS YUMA
CO, NAVAEROSPACERECFAC
NAVPLANTREPO, DALLAS
NAVPLANTREPO, ST. LOUIS

ORIGINAL

31
3750
Ser 103

30 JAN 1970

SIXTH ~~FOURTH~~ ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 serial 3-70A, VMFAT-101 concerning F8J BuNo 149212, F4B BuNo 150473, accident occurring 22 November 1969, pilots (b) (6) [redacted] and SAUER

From: Commander Fleet Air Miramar
To: Commander Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding Officer MCAS Yuma
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VF-124, VMFAT-101 Aircraft Accident Report serial 3-70A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board and subsequent endorsements, subject to the following comments and exceptions:

a. This accident could have been avoided had the pilots of the aircraft directly involved in the mid-air collision maintained an effective lookout doctrine. There existed, of course, a responsibility for the F4 RIO and the F8 wingman to accurately and quickly analyze and report any potentially dangerous traffic situation. However, the final responsibility for this accident must rest with the pilots of the aircrafts involved in the collision.

b. Both the right-of-way rules (FAR part 91.67) and the "see and avoid" section of reference (b) would have been applicable had either participant in the accident maintained an adequate lookout and seen the other aircraft in time for these concepts to become operative.

c. The urgent need for a SAR unit at NAF El Centro has been recognized by higher authorities and is in the process of being established.

2. It is noted that Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE and Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group THREE THREE have each submitted a third endorsement to the AAR. Additionally, the latter endorser has apparently routed a copy of the accident report via U.S. Marine Channels to Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. It is requested that COMNAVAIRPAC rectify this administrative discrepancy when all endorsements have been received.

C. N. Conatser
C. N. CONATSER

Copy to:

COMNAVSAFCEN (2)	COMNAVAIRTESTCEN PAX RIV	CG THIRD MAW
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)	NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS	MAG-33
COMNAVAIRPAC	NAVAEROSPACEREGFAC	VMFAT-101
CMC (Code AAP)	NAVPLANTREPO ST LOUIS	VF-124
DIR AFIP	CG FMFPAC	RCVW-12

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

~~18~~ 20

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

25:JMV:dwn
3750

21 JAN 1970

Fifth ~~FOURTH~~ ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 AAR, serial 3-70A, VMFAT-101 AAR, serial 3-70A, concerning F-8J BuNo 149212, F-4B BuNo 150473, of 22 November 1969, pilots (b) (6) [redacted] and SAUER

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(2) Commander, Naval Air Forces, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VF-124 Aircraft Accident Report, Serial 3-70A

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7D

1. Forwarded.

2. Paragraph 3 of the Second Endorsement is substantiated by the board's flight path analysis (enclosure (6)) and is in accordance with paragraph 110 of reference (a). It is clear from enclosure (2) that F-8J BuNo 149212 was being maneuvered as an individual aircraft within the meaning of paragraph 616 of reference (a) pursuant to the change of tactical lead effected immediately before the collision. Accordingly the contention that it was incumbent on the pilot of F-8J 149212 to alter course so as to avoid F-4B 150473 is a correct conclusion.

R. G. Owens, Jr.
R. G. OWENS, Jr.

Copy to:
COMNAVSAFCEN (2)
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMREADATKARAIRWING-12
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
CMC (CODE AAP)
CG, FMFPAC
DIR, AFIP
CO, MAG-33
CO, VMFAT-101
CO, VF-124
CO, MCAS YUMA
CO, NAVAEROSPACERECFAC
NAVPLANTREPO, DALLAS
NAVPLANTREPO, ST. LOUIS

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

COMRCVW-12:lmc
3750
Ser 80/ 43
19 JAN 1970

~~THIRD~~ FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 serial 3-70A, VMFAT-101 serial 3-70A concerning F-8J BuNo 149212, F-4B, BuNo 150473 of 22 November 1969, Pilots (b) (6) and SAUER

From: Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE
To: Commander Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air, Miramar
(2) Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona
(3) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6 (series)
(b) OPNAVINST 3710.7 (series)

1. Forwarded, concurring with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board and subsequent endorsements, subject to the following comments and exceptions.

2. The AAR Board in part VII E states that NATOPS was violated. COMRCVW TWELVE agrees most emphatically with this in that proper lookout doctrine was not maintained. The AAR Board did not cite this as a factor in part I section B2 pages 1 and 4. It is therefore recommended, that this NATOPS violation be considered a causal factor.

3. COMRCVW TWELVE does not agree with paragraph 3 of the first endorsement. If proper lookout doctrine and correct radio/ICS transmissions had been made, this accident could have been avoided. Any action or set of circumstances that can prevent or modify an accident must be considered as a factor. Training of replacement pilots and RIOs must emphasize the importance of proper lookout doctrine.

4. COMRCVW TWELVE does not desire to comment on degree of responsibility as to which aircraft/pilot had the right-of-way. This type of comment does not readily adapt itself to corrective action and merely confuses the situation. Reference (b) paragraph 5510 clearly points out that under any circumstances "See and Avoid" is the basic premise involved.

5. The MOR states that a properly documented MOR could not be completed on Captain SAUER. In this case, proper coordination was lacking. This omission is not felt to derrogate the findings of the AAR Board.

6. COMRCVW TWELVE strongly concurs that action by higher command must be taken to remedy the lack of SAR facilities in the El Centro area. Repeated recommendations have been made to establish an adequate SAR facility to cover this area. It is incongruous to endanger the survivor of an accident

ORIGINAL

COMRCVW-12:lmc
3750

because proper SAR facilities are not available in an area so highly utilized.

7. In accordance with reference (a) and by copy of this endorsement, the Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR is requested to forward a copy of this AAR and subsequent endorsements to Commander Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River.

8. The following administrative errors are noted:

a. Date submitted to Commanding Officer, block 5 Part III should read "15 December 1969".

b. The second endorsement page numbers should be 14 and 15.

c. The first and second endorsement distribution list should include:

COMNAVSAFECEN (2)	COMFAIRMIRAMAR	COMRCVW TWELVE
COMNAVAIRPAC	COMNAVAIRTESTCEN PAXRIV	CO MCAS YUMA

L. C. PAGE, JR.

Copy to:
COMNAVSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)
COMNAVAIRPAC
CMC (CODE AAP)
DIR AFIP
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN PAXRIV
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
CO NAVAEROSPACERECFAC
NAVPLANTREPO STL
CG FMFPAC
CG THIRD MAW
CO MAG-33
CO MCAS YUMA
CO VMFAT-101
CO VF-124

ORIGINAL

25:FTB:mcl
3750
12 JAN 1970

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 accident, serial 3-70A, VMFAT-101 accident, serial 3-70A, concerning F8J BuNo 149212, F4B BuNo 150473, of 22 November 1969, pilots (b) (6) and SAUER

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 33
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding General, Third Marine Aircraft Wing
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(3) Commander, Naval Air Forces, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board and subsequent endorsers subject to the following comments.

2. Captain SAUER was on a scheduled syllabus flight which required maneuvers to be performed within the W-291 area. This area, however, was covered with a low overcast and the pilot therefore elected to conduct the required stalls over land. Although the area chosen by Captain SAUER was not prohibited, he might have been more prudent in choosing an area clear of airways.

3. This Headquarters has always stressed and will continue to stress that all overhead and syllabus maneuvers be performed in the W-291 area. In addition, this Headquarters will continue to stress the requirement to adhere to the proper flight cruising altitudes when operating under Visual Flight Rules.

F. N. PIPPIN

Copy to:

COMNAVSAFECN (2)	CO, MAG-33
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)	CO, VMFAT-101
COMNAVAIRPAC	CO, VF-124
COMREADATKARAIRWING ONE TWO	CONAVAEROSPACERECFAC
COMFAIRMIRAMAR	DIR AFIP
CMC (CODE AAP)	CO, MCAS YUMA
CG, FMFPAC	NAVPLANTREPO, DALLAS
CG, THIRD MAW	NAVPLANTREPO, ST. LOUIS

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

3:RWK:rej
3570
22 December 1969

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 serial 3-70A, VMFAT-101 serial 3-70A, concerning F-8J BuNo 149212, F-4B, BuNo 150473 of 22 November 1969, Pilots (b) (6) and SAUER.

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter/Attack Training Squadron-101
Marine Aircraft Group-33, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac
MCAS, El Toro (Santa Ana), California 92709
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander, Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing-12
(2) Commander, Fleet Air Miramar
(3) Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma Arizona
(4) Commander, Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded concurring with the comments and recommendations contained in the basic correspondence and the first endorsement except as follows.

2. The investigation established that shortly before impact SB-03 was not more than 25° right of the nose of NJ-412 whereas NJ-412 was 90° or more to the left of the nose of SB-03. Therefore the pilot of NJ-412 must assume major responsibility in that he failed to maintain proper surveillance to avoid collision.

3. SB-03 was to the right of and flying at one-half the speed of NJ-412. As defined in FAR Part 91, SB-03 was the aircraft being converged upon and the aircraft being overtaken, therefore it was incumbent upon the pilot of NJ-412 to avoid SB-03.

4. It is acknowledged that the pilot of SB-03 was performing a maneuver which, although not prohibited, should more prudently have been executed off airways. However, had SB-03 been a civil or commercial aircraft transiting the area via V-458 an ever greater disaster would have occurred. It is therefore recommended that aircrews again be reminded to either avoid airways under VFR conditions or to cross them at right angles with wings level.

5. In this era of high speed flight, clearing turns are at best marginally effective. The FAA sponsored "Near Midair Collision Report of 1968" substantiates this fact. Therefore the recommendation concerning such turns is not considered valid in this accident.

6. In addition to normal civil/commercial traffic, ten major military airfields contribute to air traffic congestion in the Southern California area. This accident not only occured near an airway but was within 10 miles of the NAS Miramar "LAGUNA IAF" and within 18 miles of the March

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

14 ORIGINAL

AFB "HENSHAW IAF". It is recommended that future tactical maneuvering and acrobatic flight be conducted in an area such as W-291.

7. It is further recommended that a dynamic educational review of aircrew lookout requirements, citing this accident as example, be instituted at all commands operating in the Southern California airspace complex.

8. It is recommended that a Southern California, all service, major command aviation safety council be established to exchange pertinent information concerning operating areas, air traffic density/control and mutual or individual problem areas.

R. W. KRON
LtCol USMC

Copy to:
FITRON-124
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
CONAVAEROSPACERECFAC
DIR AFIP
CO, MAG-33
CG, THIRD MAW
CG, FMFPAC
COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS (CODE AAP)
NAVPLANTREPO ST LOUIS
COMNAVSAFCEN (2)
CNAP
COMFAIR MIRAMAR
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN PAXRIV
COMRCVW TWELVE
CO, MCAS YUMA

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

VF-124/20:rt
3570
Ser 2047
DEC 19 1969

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 serial 3-70A, VMFAT 101 serial 3-70A, concerning F8J BUNO 149212, F4B, BUNO 150473 of 22 NOV 1969, pilots (b) (6) and SAUER

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron 124 (VF-124)
Naval Air Station, Miramar, California 92145
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: Commanding Officer, Fighter + Attack Training Squadron 101 (VMFAT 101)
Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE
Commander Fleet Air Miramar
Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona
Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board with the following exceptions and comments.

2. The preoccupation of the pilots of NJ412 and SB03 with items inside the cockpit and failure to maintain adequate lookout directly resulted in the accident. Therefore the pilots of NJ412 and SB03 share equal responsibility in that they failed to maintain adequate lookout so as to avoid collision.

3. The pilot of NJ413 and the RIO of SB03 while required to maintain lookout so as to avoid collision acted in an advisory capacity only. The pilot of NJ413 visually detected a threatening aircraft and notified the pilot of NJ412 as it was his duty to do. The pilot of NJ412 and SB03 were in command of their aircraft and therefore charged with the responsibility for the safe operation of those aircraft. Therefore I do not agree that the action by the pilot of NJ413 and the RIO of SB03 were a contributing factor to this accident.

4. It is noted that the Board failed to comment on the geographic position of the collision point. When plotted on a low altitude airways chart (L-3) it falls directly in the center of V458 airway. Although stalls do not fall in the category of acrobatics they are maneuvers that degrade aircraft control and seriously limit forward visibility from the airplane performing the maneuver. It is therefore recommended that stalls be performed clear of airways.

5. In the RIO statement enclosure (1), no mention is made of clearing turns by the pilot of SB03 prior to performing the stall maneuvers. It is recommended that clearing turns be made prior to commencing any maneuver restricting forward visibility. I feel that this recommendation is especially valid in the crowded airspace of Southern California.

6. Adequate lookout doctrine and contact reporting is absolutely vital to the survival of the fighter pilot in the hostile air environment. It is constantly stressed and is considered an essential part of the training of a fighter pilot.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

7. This command has unfortunately had aircraft involved in accidents in the same general geographic area as this one over the last few years in which the services of a helo were required for rescue operations. On each of those occasions as on this one there was excessive delay in effecting rescue because the rescue helo had to proceed to the crash site from MCAS Yuma. It is therefore strongly recommended that a rescue helo unit be based at NAF El Centro.

8. The last Safety Survey was completed on 11 October 1969.

W. I. PARRISH

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
CONAVAEROSPACERECFAC
DIR AFIP
CO, MAG 33
CO THIRD MAW
CG FMFPAC
COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS (CODE AAP)
NAVPLANTREPO ST LOUIS
COMNAVSAFCEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIR MIRAMAR
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN PAXRIV
COMRCVW TWELVE
CO, MCAS, YUMA

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART 1 GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY *	CO, VF-124 VF124 3-70A VMFAT101 3-70A
3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP *	0825U22 NOV 69
4. MODEL AIRCRAFT *	F8J
5. BUREAU NUMBER *	149212
6. *	TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
9. LOCATION OF MISHAP *	280°R 148NM IMPERIAL TACAN
10. DAMAGE *	ALFA
7. VIA: CO, VMFAT 101 *	RCVW-12
8. *	RC
11. TIME OF DAY *	DAY
12. TIME IN FLIGHT *	0 + 50
13. FLIGHT CODE *	1A1
	COMFAIRMIRAMAR
	CO, MCAS YUMA
	COMNAVAIRPAC
14. CLEARED FROM: NAF EL CENTRO TO: NAF EL CENTRO	
15. TYPE CLEARANCE *	LOCAL
16. AIRSPEED	300KE
17. A/C WEIGHT	24,500
18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP *	MID AIR COLLISION
19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP	S.L. 11,000 TERRAIN 8500'E
20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C) *	F4B, 150473, VMFAT 101 ALFA

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

* ✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
X	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL		17. WEATHER
	2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM	X	11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify) Pilot of NJ413		19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4. PILOT OTHER (Specify)		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
	5. CREW		13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN, TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
	6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)		22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)		23. UNDETERMINED
	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)		16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)		24. OTHER (Specify)

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial) *	2. RANK/RATE	3. FILE/SERVICE NO.	4. DESIGNATION	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7. YEARS EXP. DNA	8. BILLET	9. POSITION	10. INJURY CODE
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap) [redacted]	LCDR	(b) (6)	1310	USN	34	12	PILOT	COCKPIT	F
CO-PILOT (identify & submit separate page 1)									

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS		3473	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	351/101
				IN MODEL	341/101
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		234	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	0/0
				IN MODEL	0/0
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		81	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	8/0
				IN MODEL	2/0
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	1920	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	7/
	OFT/CPT	/		IN MODEL	1/0
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	129	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (If jet mishap)		2372
	OFT/CPT	/			
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	48	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	21 NOV 69
	OFT/CPT	/		DURATION	1.4
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK	MAY 69 QUALIFIED		24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		SPECIAL

OTHER PERS.

* 25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. DNA	27. RANK/RATE	28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	29. FILE/SERVICE NO.	30. UNIT	31. INJURY	32. BILLET	33. POSITION

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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL, AND FACILITIES DATA

A. A/C HISTORY

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST/PAR OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK

B. ENGINE HISTORY

1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)									
(2)									
(3)									
(4)									

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OV-HAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. FUR/AMPEUR
(1)							
(2)							
(3)							
(4)							

D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS*

1. PARTS REPAIRED: PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE	3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED: PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURES

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT:	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE
8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT ☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED	10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL ☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL		14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS
INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS		16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS				

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/BMEP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE
INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS		26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS				

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. AMPFUR SERIAL NUMBER _____
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP _____ Refer NASC on DIR request. See para. 36 OPNAVINST 3750.6E
3. OTHER VF-124 PRELIMINARY REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT P222222Z NOV 69
4. VF-124 SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT P230234Z NOV 69
5. VMF-101 P232030Z NOV 69
6. CO THIRD MAW REPORT OF DEATH P230222Z NOV 69

OP-09F

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *(as appropriate with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition)*

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

G. SHIPS DATA

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR	2. PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH/END SPEED

6. MARK NUMBER	7. MODEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION OF SHIP	9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDLE ARRESTER

10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS *(for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)*
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDING LAST 30 DAYS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY / OUTSIDE AIR	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
0	40		180F	38°F	

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS *(winds aloft, icing level, sea state, density-altitude, as appropriate)*

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS	2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
III		2	COPY DISTRIBUTION ICC CO MAG 33 ICC CG THIRD MAW ICC CG FMFPAC ICC CO VMFAT 101 ICC COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS (CODE AAP) ICC NAVPLANTREPO ST LOUIS	ZCC NAVAVNSAFECN DIRECT (AAR) ~~ASSOVERSEESDIV~~ COMNAVAIRSYSCOM(AIR-096) COMNAVAIRPAC COMREADATKARAIRWING-1 COMFAIRMIRAMAR NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS CONAVAEROSPACERECFAC DIR AFIP MCAS YUMA

COST DAMAGE TO:	3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	4. PRIVATE PROPERTY	5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO
	NONE	NONE	15 DEC 1969

PART IV SIGNAT

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted] MAJ, USMC

VF-121 MAINTENANCE OFFICER — UNIT BILLET

VMFAT-101 EXECUTIVE OFFICER — UNIT BILLET

2. FLIGHT (b) (6) [redacted] USNR

3. MEMBER (b) (6) [redacted] LCDR, USN

VF-121 FLIGHT SURGEON

VF-121 SAFETY OFFICER — UNIT BILLET

* When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *In accordance with*
Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART 1 GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY * CO, VF-124	VF124 3-70A, VMFAT101 3-70A	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP * 220825U NOV 69	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT * F4B	5. BUREAU NUMBER * 150473
6. * TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center		9. LOCATION OF MISHAP * 280/48 IPL TACAN		10. DAMAGE * ALPHA
7. VIA: *	8. *	11. TIME OF DAY * DAY	12. TIME IN FLIGHT * 0 + 40	13. FLIGHT CODE * 1A1
		14. CLEARED FROM: NZJ	TO: NZJ	
		15. TYPE CLEARANCE * LOCAL	16. AIRSPEED "140"E"	17. A/C WEIGHT 37,000 LBS.
18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP * MID AIR COLLISION			19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP 29% MAC S/L 11,000' TERRAIN 8500'	

20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C) *

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

* ✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
X	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL		17. WEATHER
	2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4. PILOT OTHER (Specify)		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
X	5. CREW RIO		13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
	6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)		22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)		23. UNDETERMINED
	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)		16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)		24. OTHER (Specify)

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial) *	2. RANK/RATE	3. REG SERVICE NO.	4. DESIG RATOR	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7. YEARS FOR PNA	8. BILLET	9. POSITION	10. INJURY CODE
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap) SAUER, WILLIAM C.	CAPT	(b) (6) [redacted]	7521	USMCR	26	3	PILOT	FWD C/P	"A"
CO-PILOT (identify & submit separate page 1)		(b) (6) [redacted]							

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS		932	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	11/0
				IN MODEL	0/0
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		296	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	0/0
				IN MODEL	0/0
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		21	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	5/3
				IN MODEL	5/3
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	637	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	4
	OFT/CPT	39		IN MODEL	4
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	296	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap) HELOS (if helo mishap)		907
	OFT/CPT	2			
[illegible] SERIES THIS MODEL [illegible] 3 MONTHS	A/C	21	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	11/20/69
	OFT/CPT	2		DURATION	1.5
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK			24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		

OTHER PERS:

* 25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. DNA	27. RANK/RATE	28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	29. REG SERVICE NO.	30. UNIT	31. INJURY	32. BILLET	33. POSITION
(b) (6) [redacted]		1/LT	USMCR	(b) (6) [redacted]	VMFAT101	"F"	RIO	AFT C/P

OP.06F

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition*

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL, AND FACILITIES DATA

A. A/C HISTORY

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST/PAR OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK

B. ENGINE HISTORY

1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)									
(2)									
(3)									
(4)									

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OVERHAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. FUR/AMPFUR
(1)							
(2)							
(3)							
(4)							

D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS*

1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED	
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURES

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE

8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT ☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED	10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL ☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL	14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS

INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/BMEP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE

INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. AMPFUR SERIAL NUMBER _____
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP _____ *Info NASC on DIR request. See para. 38 OPNAVINST 3750.6E*
3. OTHER
4.

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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition*

G. SHIPS DATA

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR
2. PRESSURE SETTING
3. WIND OVER DECK
4. RELATIVE WIND
5. APPROACH/END SPEED
6. MARK NUMBER
7. MODEL NUMBER
8. LOCATION OF SHIP
9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDLE ARRESTER
10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED
11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS *(for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)*
ENGAGED							
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD
3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT
4. DAY HOURS/LANDING LAST 30 DAYS
5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED
6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT
7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING
2. VISIBILITY
3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY
4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY OUTSIDE AIR
5. DEW POINT
6. ALTIMETER SETTING
7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS *(winds aloft, icing level, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate)*

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

REMARKS

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1.

2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
2CO NAVAVNSAFECH DIRECT (AAR)
[redacted]
COMAG 33
CO 3M MAW
CO, FMFPAC
CO, VMFAT-101

5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO

COST DAMAGE TO 3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY 4. PRIVATE PROPERTY

PART IV SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

1. SENIOR MEMBER — UNIT BILLET
2. MEMBER — UNIT BILLET
3. FLIGHT SURGEON MEMBER
3. MEMBER — UNIT BILLET

* When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

OP-06F

PART V. THE ACCIDENT

The accident involved a flight of two (2) Navy F8J's and a single Marine F4B. The Marine F4B (SB-03) aircrew briefed at 0600 and launched at 0748 on 22 November 1969 in VFR conditions from MCAS El Toro. The F8J's (NJ-412, 413) briefed at 0630 and took off at 0735 in VFR conditions from NAF El Centro on 22 November 1969. SB-03 was scheduled for a syllabus RIO training mission which included local area familiarization and flight characteristics demonstrations of the F4B. SB-03 had flown to the Yuma area and was returning to El Toro via El Centro remaining south of R2510 thence direct on an approximate heading of 290°M. The pilot of SB-03 had demonstrated a clean stall and was in the process of demonstrating a dirty stall with gear and flaps down at approximately 150 KIAS, when the RIO called a bogey at 10 o'clock low (NJ413). The pilot acknowledged the stranger by "TALLY HO" and commenced to recover the aircraft by adding power. Almost simultaneously NJ412, in a left bank and nose slightly high, appeared directly in front of SB-03. Enclosure (1).

The section of Navy F8J's, NJ412 and 413, were scheduled for a Formation I mission which involves parade formation practice, combat spread, tactical positioning and individual acrobatic maneuvering. The formation work was completed and the section was proceeding in combat spread on a heading of approximately 030° at 300 KIAS toward Borrego Desert Valley. NJ412 passed the lead to NJ413 and commenced a left turn to position himself in trail from a position approximately one (1) mile slightly forward of, and 1000' higher than the new leader.

NJ413 called "Knight I, aircraft between us". Enclosure (2). NJ412 increased his bank to look for the F4B and not seeing the unknown aircraft to the left, started to roll out of the bank and scanned to the right. He immediately saw the F4B at two o'clock level and closing, and pulled back on the stick, but was too late to avoid a mid-air collision.

The F4B contacted the F8J on the underside of the fuselage just aft of the trailing edge of the wing. Enclosure (3). The F4B RIO stated that he saw only the bottom side of the F8J and never saw the cockpit. The nose cone and front cockpit of the F4B were severely damaged on the initial impact of the two aircraft, incapacitating the pilot. The RIO lurched forward then back and pulled the alternate ejection handle on his backward movement. He stated there was smoke, fire, and debris coming back from the front cockpit as he ejected. Enclosure (1).

NJ412 had momentary nose control of the F8J and then the aircraft nosed over uncontrollably. He ejected very shortly there after.

The F8J engine, vertical stabilizer, horizontal stabilizer, ventral fins, and afterburner came apart from the violent impact and landed in a semicircular pattern on the desert floor. The forward fuselage and wing impacted nose first in a small valley. Enclosure (4).

The F4B descended in a flat spin and exploded on impact in a small arroyo. Parts distribution of the F4B was very compact; confined to within 100 yards of the shallow crater created by impact with the ground. The pilot's remains and all significant components of the Martin Baker Escape Unit were found in

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

the wreckage. There was no apparent attempt by the pilot to eject and there was positive evidence that an automatic sequence ejection was not utilized.

The F8J pilot landed in very rugged mountainous terrain and sustained minor contusions. The F4B RIO landed in rather flat terrain, but suffered multiple abrasions from cactus cuts as he was dragged by the chute.

PART VI DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT.

Marine F4B BUNO 150473 sustained major structural damage upon colliding with F8J BUNO 149212. It entered uncontrolled flight, struck the ground in a flat spin, burned and sustained STRIKE damage.

Navy F8J BUNO 149212 sustained STRIKE damage as the tail aft of FS595 was torn from the fuselage upon collision with the F4B. The fuselage with wing impacted the ground about two miles from the point of the collision and burned. Enclosure (4).

PART VII THE INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

The investigation orginally centered around statements and interviews of surviving aircrewmen, civilian witnesses on the ground, and a thorough search of the area bounded by wreckage of both aircraft. Interviews with civilian witnesses determined that while several saw the two aircraft falling to the ground, none actually saw the collision. Distribution of aircraft parts corroborated the statements of LCDR (b) (6) (NJ412) and 1/LT (b) (6) (SB-03) concerning the collision of both aircraft and their diverging flight paths to impact with the desert floor. The F4B crash site was immediately investigated to ascertain the reason for no apparent attempt by Captain SAUER (SB-03) to eject.

Significant components of the Martin Baker Escape Unit were salvaged to positively establish that there was no attempt by the pilot to eject nor was automatic seat sequencing involved. The pilot of the F4B was incapacitated by collision with the F8 and the RIO states that he did not set the ejection seat sequence valve for automatic ejection of the front seat.

A. PERSONNEL FACTORS

Due to the number of aircrewmen involved, it will be necessary to analyze each individual seperately. All had had ample rest and nourishment during the 48 hour period preceeding the accident.

1. Pilot/RIO Factors

A summary of Captain SAUER's flight experience is shown in Enclosure (5). Captain SAUER and 1/LT (b) (6) briefed for a standard RIO FAM 2, scheduled at 0600 on 22 November 1969. The hop was uneventful up to the time of the collision with NJ412. Captain SAUER was in the process of demonstrating a dirty stall when he was alerted to an F8 in close proximity,

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

low, at 10 o'clock. He acknowledged the warning with "TALLY HO" and commenced recovery. His nose high attitude, no doubt restricting his visibility, coupled with a possible preoccupation with getting his aircraft under better control and keeping the aforementioned F8 in sight, prevented his seeing the second F8 until moments before impact. However, prior to collision, F8J, NJ412 was never in a position where Captain SAUER's view of it would have been obstructed. Enclosure (6). In the dirty configuration the F4B's maneuverability is severely limited. This preoccupation with so many factors is considered the reason for failure to see the impending collision with NJ412.

2. First Lieutenant (b) (6) [redacted] was on his third flight in the F4B and was also preoccupied with many tasks such as: changing TACAN channels, noting airspeed, attitude and several other cockpit presentations. His sighting of the F8 (NJ413) and his concern as to the dangerous proximity thereto, shows that some lookout doctrine was being used and his head was out of the cockpit sometime prior to impact. LT (b) (6) [redacted] flight experience is 130 hours total of which 2 hours are in F4 aircraft. On this area FAM he was more concerned with looking at the ground as opposed to concentrating on airborne targets. The radar was inoperative prior to take off and he was instructed not to use it. LT (b) (6) [redacted] readily admits to his apprehension in flying in the back seat of the F4B where he has no means to control the aircraft. He stated that prior to the accident he was enjoying a hop for the first time. This accident is his second "close call" and his apprehension seems to be mounting. His lack of experience is considered a factor in his weak lookout doctrine in that when he saw one F8 he did not scan the sky for a wingman.

3. LCDR (b) (7)(A) [redacted] is well versed in proper lookout doctrine. He has considerable experience in tactical formation flying, with about 2000 hours of F8 Flight time and is his second tour as a RCVW instructor. Enclosure (7).

Marine F4B, SB03, was never farther than 25° from the nose of Navy F8J, NJ412. This can be verified geometrically by comparing the two to one speed advantage for NJ412 with the difference in heading of 100° for the two aircraft. Enclosure (6).

There are two reasons why LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] lookout was derogated to the point where he did not see the F4B. Neither reason can justify the failure to maintain an adequate lookout doctrine. First, within a minute prior to the collision, LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] was trouble shooting a minor lateral trim discrepancy in NJ412. Enclosure (2). This diverted the pilot momentarily to a head-in-the-cockpit situation. When this troubleshooting was completed, LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] looked to his left to reacquire visual contact with his wingman, F8J, NJ413. He passed the lead to that wingman and started a left turn maneuver to reposition his aircraft astern of the new flight leader. These two situations, troubleshooting a minor trim discrepancy and passing the lead to the other F8J, diverted LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] scan from the right side of his extended flight path so that he did not see the F4 until just prior to collision.

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4. LTJG (b)(6) the pilot of F8J NJ413 saw the F4B prior to the collision and transmitted to NJ412 that there was a bogey between the two F8's. Enclosure (2). This would have put the F4B on the port side of NJ412. Actually the F4B, SB03, was to the right side of NJ412. As a result of this call, the pilot of NJ412 looked to his left and not seeing a bogey increased his left bank angle in order to look farther astern. When he could see no bogey, he started to level his wings and switched his scan to the right. As soon as he did this, he saw the F4B, SB03, but it was too late to avoid the collision.

LTJG (b)(6) position relative to NJ412 was about one mile distant, 10°-15° aft of the beam position and 1000' low. The sun was level and slightly ahead of NJ412, creating a visibility problem for LTJG (b)(6) Since the F4B is larger than an F8, and since LTJG (b)(6) was not experienced in comparing the two aircraft together, he interpreted the F4B as being between and below the F8's, rather than level and at a greater range than NJ412.

B. SUPERVISORY FACTORS

Both flight schedules allowed ample time for flight briefings. Enclosures (8) and (9). It is apparent, however, that the full time allowed was not utilized effectively. Lookout doctrine was stressed and conduct of the flight was formulated, but some shortcuts must have manifested themselves due to take-off times. The board strongly urges all flight activities to utilize complete flight briefings covering all aspects of flight safety and procedures.

C. MATERIAL

Not a factor.

D. FACILITIES

Rescue of the survivers was accomplished by a USCG Station, San Diego helicopter. Retrieval of the remains of Captain SAUER was accomplished by MCAS Yuma Helicopter 1 hour and 40 minutes after the accident. This area is under the SAR responsibility of MCAS Yuma, which is 95NM from the site of the accident. NAF El Centro is 48NM from the site.

Inadequate response time of SAR facilities in this high density training area is considered absolutely unsatisfactory. Had one of the surviving crewmen been severly injured he might have succumbed prior to the arrival of the SAR helocopter. The board strongly concures with the statement of LT COL. (b)(6) operations officer at MCAS Yuma in paragraph 12 of enclosure (10).

E. NATOPS

All NATOPS require proper lookout doctrine be maintained. This basic

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

tenet was violated. Proper radio procedures were also violated by the wingman (NJ413). Enclosure (2). Although no changes to NATOPS are recommended, consideration should be given to standard procedures regarding automatic seat sequence ejection in F-4 aircraft.

PART VIII CONCLUSIONS

A. The primary cause factor of this accident is pilot error. The pilots of F8J NJ412 and F4B SB03 failed to maintain an adequate lookout doctrine.

B. The pilot of F8J NJ413 is considered a contributing factor in this accident in that he made an improper radio transmission as to the whereabouts of F4B, SB03.

C. The RIO of F4B, SB03 is considered a contributing factor in this accident in that he became preoccupied when he saw F8J, NJ413 and failed to maintain a proper lookout.

PART IX RECOMMENDATIONS

A. That lookout doctrine, proper voice terminology and inflight safety procedures be reemphasised in all preflight briefings.

B. That SAR facilities be established at NAF El Centro to decrease the SAR response time in this area.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

INDEX OF ENCLOSURES

1. Statement of RIO, 1/LT (b) (6) [redacted]
2. Statement of F8J, NJ412, pilot, LCDR (b) (6) [redacted]
3. Artist sketch of aircraft at moment of impact
4. Photograph showing crash sites and wreckage distribution
5. Resume of Captain SAUER's flight experience
6. Diagram showing estimated relative positions of the aircra[illegible] prior to collision
7. Resume of LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] flight experience
8. VF-124 DET El Centro flight schedule
9. VMFAT 101 Flight Schedule
10. NCAS Yuma Rescue report
11. WSCC Air Station, San Diego rescue report
12. MOR, Captain SAUER
13. MOR, LCDR (b) (6) [redacted]
14. MOR, 1/LT (b) (6) [redacted]
15. Statement of CWO4 (b) (6) [redacted]
16. Statement of Captain (b) (6) [redacted]
17. Statement of LTJG (b) (6) [redacted]

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)



VF-124 AAR 3-70A, VMFAT 101 AAR 3-70A occurring on 22 NOV 69 F8J BUNO 149212, F4B BUNO 150473 pilots (b) (6) and SAUER.
Artist's rendition showing relative position of F4B, SBO3, and F8J, NJ412, at instant of impact. The view is from directly above the two aircraft.

Enclosure (7)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES


F4B Crash Site
G
F
E
D
C
A
B
F8J BUNO 142212
PARTS DISTRIBUTION
A. Forward Fuselage and Wings
B. Engine plus surrounding Fuselage
C. Vertical Stabilizer
D. AFT Fuselage minus Tailcone
E. Canopy
F. Port WUT
G. Afterburner
(b) (6)
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Resume of Captain SAUER's, pilot of Marine F4B BUNO 150473, flying experience for the preceding five fiscal years; concerning VF-124 AAR 3-70A, VMFAT 101 AAR 3-70A of 22 NOV 69, F8J BUNO 149212, F4B BUNO 150473, pilots (b) (6) [redacted] and SAUER.

Command Attached	Period assigned	Model Aircraft	Flight Hours	CV Landings Day/Night	Operational Proficiency
NA TRACOM	MAR 66-MAR 67	various	285	7/0	Operational
VFT-1	MAY 67	TF9J	7	0/0	Operational
VMFA-513	JUN 67-JUN 68	F4B	241	0/0	Operational
VMFA-542	JUL 68-AUG 69	F4B	379	0/0	Operational
VMFAT-101	SEP 69-NOV 69	F4B	21	0/0	Operational

Pilot's synthetic trainer time for the preceding 12 months

Date	Type Trainer	Mission	Time logged
9/18/69	WST	Emerg Procedures	1.0
9/19/69	WST	Emerg Procedures	1.0

Enclosure (5)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Diagram showing estimated relative positions of the two aircraft during the 5 seconds preceding the collision, concerning VF-124 AAR 3-70A, VMFAT 101 AAR 3-70A of 22 NOV 69 F8J BUNO 149212, F4B BUNO 150473 pilots (b) (6) [redacted] and SAUER.



Seconds To Collision	F4B Look Angle to F8J	F8J Look Angle to F4B
5	88°L	1°R
4	93°L	6°R
3	100°L	10°R
2	106°L	13°R
1	112°L	18°R

Enclosure (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Resume of flying experience for the preceding five fiscal years.
LCDR (b)(6) [redacted] USN, (b)(6) [redacted], pilot of F8J, BUNO 149212, concerning VF-124 AAR 3-70A, VMFAT 101 AAR 3-70A of 22 NOV 69, F8J BUNO 149212, F4B BUNO 150473, pilots (b)(6) [redacted] and SAUER.

Command Attached	Period assigned	Model Aircraft	Flight Hours	CV Landings Day/Night	Operational Proficiency
USNPGS Monterey	NOV 64-DEC 65	T-2A	96	0/0	Proficiency
VF-124	JAN 66-APR 66	F8	105	16/10	Operational
VF-162	MAY 66-FEB 68	F8	497	171/40	Operational
VF-124	MAR 68-NOV 69	F8/T-28	374	0/0	Operational

Pilots synthetic trainer time for the preceeding 12 months:

NONE

Enclosure (7)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SDO: LTjg [redacted] (b)
LTjg [redacted] (b) (6)

FIGHTING ONE TWENTY FOUR
NAVAL AIR FACILITY
EL CENTRO DETACHMENT

DATE: 22 NOV 1969
DAY: SATURDAY

EV	BRIEF	PILOT	COMP	MODEX	TIME	T.O.	LAND	ETE	MISSION	CH	REMARKS
1	0630	[redacted] (b) (6)	00	457	12	0745	0915	1*30	T-8	17	OVERWATER
			00	456	12						
			00	462	12						
2	0630	[redacted] (b) (6)	00	412	07	0800	0930	1*30	FF-1	18	
			00	413	23						
3	0630	[redacted] (b) (6)	00	419	15	0800	0945	1*45	FF-2	19	
			00	415	15						
			00	450	15				FF-2		
4	0700	[redacted] (b) (6)	00	408	14	0800	1000	2*00	FI-1	17	LAUNCH NKX LAND nJK
			00	417	14						
5	1000	[redacted] (b) (6)	00	435	14	1100	1230	1*30	T-9	18	OVERWATER
			00	459	14						
			00	419	14				T-10		
			00	417	14						
6	1000	[redacted] (b) (6)	00	413	20	1100	1300	2*00	FI-1	19	
			00	415	20						
7	1000	[redacted] (b) (6)	00	435	19	1100	1300	2*00	FI-1	17	
			00	416	19						
8	1315	[redacted] (b) (6)	00	435	16	1415	1530	1*15	T-11	18	RNDV WITH TA4 AT1430
			00	416	16						
9	1315	[redacted] (b) (6)	00	419	17	1430	1545	1*15	T-11	19	
			00	459	17						
10	1330	[redacted] (b) (6)	00	408	17	1445	1615	1*30	FF-1	17	
			00	410	17						
11	1330	[redacted] (b) (6)	00	415	18	1445	1645	2*00	FI-1	18	
			00	417	18						
12		[redacted] (b) (6)	00	457	10	1700	1830		MLP	17	"C" 1700-1730 1800-1830
			00	462	10						
			00	408	10						
			00	416	12						
			00	410	13						
			00	413	16						
13		[redacted] (b) (6)	00	435	11	1730	1900		MLP	18	"C" 1730-1800 1830-1900
			00	414	12						
			00	417	11						
14		[redacted] (b) (6)	00	457	10	1900	2030		MLP	19	"C" 1900-1930 2000-2030
			00	413	10						
			00	468	13						

****

SUBMITTED BY
[redacted] (b) (6)
[redacted] (b) (6)

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

APPROVED BY
[redacted] (b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

TOTAL SERIES 38

TOTAL FIS HOURS 54.7

DET TOTAL 293.6

ENCLOSURE (8)

MARINE FIGHTER/ATTACK TRAINING SQUADRON-101
Marine Aircraft Group-33
3d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac
MCAS, El Toro (Santa Ana), California 92709

21 November 1969

FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR SATURDAY, 22 NOVEMBER 1969

SDO.....1STLT (b) (6) [redacted]
OPS CLERK..LCPL (b) (6) [redacted]

ODO:
0730-1030: 1STLT (b) (6) [redacted]
1030-1330: 1STLT (b) (6) [redacted]
1330-1630: 1STLT (b) (6) [redacted]
1630-SEC: 1STLT (b) (6) [redacted]

SUNRISE..0620
SUNSET...1645

EVENT NR	CALL SIGN	APC CODE	FLIGHT LEVEL	BRIEF	T/O	LAND	CREW	REMARKS	A/C TM	MSN ACCM
2600	SB-04	VFR		0530	0700	0845	(b) (6) [redacted]	INST II		
2601-1	SB-06	VFR		0600	0730	0845	LTCOL (b) [redacted]	FORM I		
-2	SB-22	VFR					(b) [redacted]	IUT FORM		
2602	SB-08	I-3	330	0600	0730	0915	(b) (6) [redacted]	RIO FAM II		
2603-1	SB-05	VFR		0845	1015	1200	MAJ (b) (6) [redacted]	FORM III		
-2	SB-23							IUT FORM		
2604	SB-04	I-2	330	0915	1045	1230	(b) (6) [redacted]	INST VI/ NATOPS EVAL		
2605	SB-10	VFR		0915	1045	1230	(b) (6) [redacted]	NAV REF		
2606-1	SB-33	VFR		1200	1330	1515	(b) [redacted]			
-2	SB-26	VFR						FORM I		
2607	SB-38	DD-175		1515	1645	ETR 231500U	(b) (6) [redacted]	X-C ETR 231500U		
2608	SB-21	DD-175		1515	1645	ETR 231500U	(b) (6) [redacted]	X-C ETR 231500 U		
2609	SB-28	DD-175		1530	1700	ETR 231500U	(b) (6) [redacted]	X-C ETR 231500U		
2610	SB-39	DD-175		1530	1700	ETR 231500U	(b) [redacted] TBA	X-C ETR 231500U		

FLIGHT HOURS LAST MONTH 398.4
FLIGHT HOURS THIS MONTH 151.7
FLIGHT HOURS THIS FISCAL YEAR 1467.9

NATOPS: MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE GROSS WEIGHTS (FOR THE F-4B

FIELD TAKEOFF - 54,800 LBS.
FIELD LANDING (FLARED)
BEFORE AFC 230 - 38,000 LBS.
AFTER AFC 230 - 42,000 LBS.
ARRESTED LANDING, TOUCH AND GO AND MLP
BEFORE AFL 230 - 34,000 LBS.
AFTER AFL 230 - 38,000 LBS.
(REF NATOPS 1-130)

Enclosure (9)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

EMERGENCY OF THE DAY: EXHAUST NOZZLE FAILURES (REF NATOPS 5-26, 27)

REC: 0800-1130: 1STLT (b) (6)
1130-1500: 1STLT (b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]

OPS OFF

RESCUE REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-13 (9-63)

SPEC[redacted]ANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST [redacted]50.6E
INSTRUCTIONS: SEE REVERSE

OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL 3750-14

1. FROM: Search and Rescue, MCAS, Yuma, Arizona 85364

2. DATE OF MISHAP: 22 Nov 1969

3A. DATE OF RESCUE: 22 Nov 1969

3. LOCATION AND DUTIES OF RESCUE VEHICLE: MCAS, Yuma, Arizona, SAR

4. RESCUE VEHICLE (Type/model): UH-34D

5. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: 5

5A. IN RESCUE VEHICLE OR ON RESCUE TEAM: 5

5B. TO BE RESCUED: 3

5C. RESCUED: 1 DOA

6. RESCUE BACK UP MEANS: UH-34D

7. TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Local Date Time Group)

7A. Alert Received	Method: Crash Phone
0935	
7B. Vehicle Departed	Distance to Scene
0942	88 NM
7C. Arrived on Scene	Search Required
1055	Yes
7D. Located Survivor	Method of Locating
1115	Cap Aircraft Directed Helo to Site
7E. Began Retrieval	What Was Sighted First
1115	Smoke from burning aircraft
7F. Ended Retrieval	Subsequently
1215	Departed for El Centro
7G. Survivor(s) Disembarked	Location (If different from Item 3)
1250	NAF El Centro

8. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RESCUE SITE

8A. WATER TEMPERATURE	AIR TEMPERATURE	WIND VELOCITY
N/A °F	72 °F	0

8B. SEA STATE/WAVE HEIGHT/FREQUENCY; TERRAIN DESCRIPTION

Rolling Desert, 1700' elevation.

9. EQUIPMENTS ACTUALLY USED DURING RESCUE

UH-34D (1)
Shovels (2)
Body Bag (1)
Gloves (1)

10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final outcome of rescue attempt, i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATING, RETRIEVING, POST-RETRIEVAL)

Two survivors picked up by Coast Guard helo based at San Diego. Pilot's body of F-4 was recovered by Yuma helo and returned to El Centro.

11. PERSONNEL REQUIRING RESCUE

NAME-LAST FIRST INITIAL	GIVE REASON FOR RESCUE	FACTORS COMPLICATING RESCUE ATTEMPT (Physical condition, importance of equipment, sea state, etc.)
SAUER, W. C., Capt. 092329	Midair Collision	None

12. REMARKS: (Training of rescue team or crew, communication equipments/techniques, retrieval equipments/techniques, rescue vehicle)

Accident occurred 39 NM from NAS Miramar, 48 NM from NAF El Centro, and 95 NM from Yuma. The SAR unit from NAF, Miramar could have more effectively covered this accident. This accident reaffirms the need for a SAR Unit at NAF El Centro.

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: Narratives of search, location and retrieving—Survivor's statements

14. NAME AND TITLE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL: (b) (6) [redacted] CWO-3, SAR Pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

15. NAME AND TITLE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL: (b) (6) [redacted] LtCol, Operations Officer (b) (6) [redacted]

[redacted]sure (10)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

RESCUE REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-13 (3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E
INSTRUCTIONS: SEE REVERSE

OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL 3750-14

1. FROM: USCG AIR STATION SAN DIEGO, CALIF

2. DATE OF MISHAP: 22 NOV 69

2A. DATE OF RESCUE: 22 NOV 69

3. LOCATION AND DUTIES OF RESCUE VEHICLE: USCG AIR STATION SAN DIEGO -- SAR

4. RESCUE VEHICLE (Type/model): HH3F

5. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: 5A. IN RESCUE VEHICLE OR ON RESCUE TEAM: 4 | 5B. TO BE RESCUED: 3 | 5C. RESCUED: 2

6. RESCUE BACK UP MEANS: 1 HH3F at CGAS SDIEGO

7. TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Local Date Time Group)

7A. Alert Received: 220837U — Method: NOTIFIED BY MIRAMAR RATTC (PHONE)

7B. Vehicle Departed: 220839U — Distance to Scene: 48 MILES

7C. Arrived on Scene: 220902U — Search Required: YES

7D. Located Survivor: 220905U — Method of Locating: RADAR VECTORS TO SCENE

7E. Began Retrieval: 220910U — What Was Sighted First: FIRST SURVIVOR WAS LOCATED VISUALLY

7F. Ended Retrieval: 220945U — Subsequently: SECOND SURVIVOR WAS LOCATED BY SMOKE FLARE

7G. Survivor(s) Disembarked: 2 — Location (If different from Item 3): NAS MIRAMAR, CALIF.

8. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RESCUE SITE

8A. WATER TEMPERATURE: NA °F | AIR TEMPERATURE: 55 °F | WIND VELOCITY: CALM

8B. SEA STATE/WAVE HEIGHT/FREQUENCY; TERRAIN DESCRIPTION: ROCKY MOUNTAIN

9. EQUIPMENTS ACTUALLY USED DURING RESCUE: HOIST (BASKET)

10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final outcome of rescue attempt, i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATING, RETRIEVING, POST-RETRIEVAL)

NONE

11. PERSONNEL REQUIRING RESCUE

NAME-LAST FIRST INITIAL	GIVE REASON FOR RESCUE	FACTORS COMPLICATING RESCUE ATTEMPT (Physical condition, ignorance of equipment, sea state, etc.)
(b) (6) [redacted]	MIDAIR COLLISION/BAILOUT	NONE
(b) (6) [redacted]	" " "	"

12. REMARKS (Training of rescue team or crew, communication equipments/technique, retrieval equipments/techniques, rescue vehicle)

HH3F CGNR 1435 LOCATED AND HOISTED TWO SURVIVORS, THEN CONTINUED SEARCH FOR THIRD PERSON. 1030U MIRAMAR OPERATIONS ADVISED GROUND PARTY HAD LOCATED BODY OF THIRD PERSON AT CRASH SITE, NO FURTHER CG ASSISTANCE REQUIRED. HH3F 1435 DEPARTED SCENE FOR NAS MIRAMAR.

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: [illegible] retrieving—Survivor's statements

14. NAME AND TITLE OF SUBMITTING: (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] CDR, USCG, OPERATIONS OFFICER

SIGNATURE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL

15. NAME AND TITLE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL

SIGNATURE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL

Enclosure (11)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of CWO4 (b) (6) [redacted] VF-124 Aircrew Survival Equipment Officer; concerning VF-124 AAR 3-70A, VMFAT 101 AAR 3-70A occurring on 22 NOV 69, F8J BUNO 149212, F4B BUNO 150473, pilots (b) (6) [redacted] and SAUER.

The pilot of F8J BUNO 149212 ejected using the MK7 Rocket Ejection Seat Ser #708, by pulling the face curtain. Ejection was normal with no difficulties. Configuration of the seat was up to date.

(b) (6) [redacted]

CWO4 USN

CWO4 (b) (6) [redacted] has worked in Aviation Maintenance for 29 years. The board consider him a credible witness.

Enclosure (15)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of VMFAT-101 Aircrew Survival Equipment Officer concerning VR-124 AAR 3-70A, VMFAT-101 AAR 3-70A of 22 November 1969, F-8J BuNo 149212, F-4B, BuNo 150473, Pilots (b) (6) and SAUER

F-4B BuNo 150473 had AFC #307 incorporated. Drogue chutes of both the forward and aft seats were inspected on 16 October 1969. On the day of the accident a daily pre-flight inspection of both seats was conducted by a qualified seat man prior to launch. A review of work center registers covering a period of 95 days prior to the accident revealed no discrepancies related to the seats or other survival equipment.

Information received from the Squadron AAR Board indicates no attempt to initiate an ejection was made by the front seat occupant.

The rear seat occupant initiated his ejection from the aircraft utilizing the lower ejection handle. No irregularities or malfunctions were noted by this crewmember throughout the escape episode

At the time of the accident both crewmembers were wearing or carrying all prescibe items of survival equipment and clothing.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Capt USMCR

The board considers CAPT (b) (6) a credible witness.

Enclosure (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

(b) (5), (b) (6)

NNNN

TSWZ48&1
/CSLA064
PTTUZYUW RUWJGFB1791 3272038-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 232038Z NOV 69
FM MARFITATKTRARON ONE ZERO ONE
TO RUWJAPA/FITRON ONE TWO FOUR
INFO RUCILSA/NAVSAFECEN
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUWJAPA/COMFAIRMIRAMAR
RUWJAPA/COMREDATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
RUNHFMA/CG FMFPAC
ZEN/CG THIRD MAW
ZEN/MAG THREE THREE
BT
UNCLAS
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION; YOUR AAR 3-70A/MY AAR 3-70A
A. OPNAVINST 3750-6F
B. FITRON ONE TWO FOOR MSG. 222222Z NOV 69
1. IAW REF (A) MAJOR (b)(6) [redacted] AND 1/LT (b)(6) [redacted] WILL
REPORT 24 NOV TAD YOUR ORG PD ABT TWO WKS IN CONN WITH ACFT
ACCIDENT INVEST REF (B)
2. MAJ (b)(6) [redacted] PROVIDES NECESSARY ASSISTANCE AS MY REPRESENTATIVE.
LT (b)(6) [redacted] PARTICIPATES AS CREWMEMBER IAW REF (A).
BT
#1791

00	01	011	012	013	014	015	02	02A	02B	03	051
/	/		/	/			/			/	

TOR: _____ CHANNEL NUMBER B-360

INIT: RT DATE _____

055	10	11	12	13	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
	A	/	/	/				/	/	/	/

F-8J 149212 F-4B 1150474 VMFA-124 3-70A 11/22/69 NOV 232038Z

NNNNOSWYGLAUNUSYN931
PTTUZYUW RUWJAPA0487 3270234-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P 230234Z NOV 69
FM FITRON ONE TWO FOUR
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVSAFECEN
RUWJGFA/VMFAT ONE ZERO ONE
INFO RULSSDE/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUWDSAA/COMELEVEN
ZEN/COMREDATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
ZEN/COMFAIRMIRAMAR
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUEBHOA/CMC
RUWTATB/NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
RUCIHHA/NAVPLANTREPO ST LOUIS
RUHHFMA/CGFMFPAC
RUEBNVA/CGFMFLANT
RUCLSKA/COMREDATKCARAIRWING FOUR
RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUEBUFA/CHNAVPERS
RUEBPDA/DIRAFIP
RUWJABA/DAS NORTON AFB

SUPP AAR

00	01	011	012	013	014	015	02	02A	02B	05	051
/	/		/	/			/			/	

TOR: _____ CHANNEL NUMBER A-446
INIT: RT DATE _____

055	10	11	12	13	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
	A	/	/	/				/	/	/	/

PAGE TWO RUWJAPA0487 UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BT
UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY //N03750//
NAVY SUPPLEMENTRY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT.
(A) OPNAVINST 3750.6F
1. 22 NOV 69 08250 DAY
2. 280 R 48 NM IMPERIAL TACAN
3. F8J, 149212
4. VF-124 AAR 3-70A
6. PILOT EJECTED WHILE ACFT WAS IN UNCONTROLLED FLIGHT.
7. (b) (6) [redacted] ILT, USMR, ACTIVE, (b) (6) [redacted],F, RIO OF BUNO 150474 MARTNBAKER MK7 ALTITUDE/ATTITUDE/AIRSPEED UNKNOWN
15. PILOT OF MARINE F4B BUNO 150474 SAUER, WILLIAM C. CAPT, (b) (6) [redacted], USMC, ACTIVE, ALFA 150473 per Adv AAR
17. AUTOVON 959-3384 CORRECTION
BT
#0487

NOV. 230234Z

COUNT ACFT → F8J/149212 VF-124 3-70A
F4B/150473 VMFAT-101 3-70A

11/22/69

QHCZCSLA890
PTTUZYUW RUWJAPA0483 3262222-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P 222222Z NOV 69
FM FITRON ONE TWO FOUR
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVSAFECEN
RUWJGFA/VMFAT ONE ZERO ONE
INFO RULSSDE/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUWDSAA/COMELEVEN
ZEN/COMREDATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
ZEN/COMFAIRMIRAMAR
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUEBHOA/CMC
RUWTATB/NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
RUCIHRA/NAVPLANTREPO ST LOUIS
RUHHFMA/CGFMFPAC
RUEBNVA/CGFMFLANT
RUCLSKA/COMREDATKCARAIRWING FOUR
RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUEBJFA/CHNAVPERS
RUEBPDA/DIRAFIP
RUWJABA/DAS NORTON AFB
BT

//CORCY//SVC 230355Z NOV//PARA 11//

AAR STRIKE

00	01	011	012	013	014	015	02	02A	023	05	051
/	/		/	/			/	/		/	

TOR: _____ CHANNEL NUMBER B313

INIT: C DATE _____

055	10	11	12	13	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
/	A	/	/	/				/	/	/	/

PAGE TWO RUWJAPA0483 UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY //N03750//
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT.
(A) OPNAVINST 3750.6F
1. 22 NOV 69 0825U DAY
2. 280R 48NM IMPERIAL TACAN
3. F8J, 149212
4. VF-124 AAR 3-70A
5. ALFA, MIDAIR COLLISION, PILOT EJECTED, ACFT COLLIDED WITH GROUND.
6. (b) (6) [redacted] LCDR, (b) (6) [redacted] USN, 1310, FOXTROT, 3473/1920/42 MARTIN BAKER MK7, 11,500MSL, STRAIGHT, NOSE LOW, 300KIAS
7. NA
8. NONE
9. FORMATION, LOCAL, VFR, EL CENTRO
10. FORMATION TACTICS
11. WHILE ON TWO PLANE FORMATION TRAINING FLIGHT F8J BUNO 149212 COLLIDED WITH MARINE F4B BUNO 150474. F4B BUNO 150474 ROLLED DOWN AND TO LEFT AND PIO EJECTED. PILOT DID NOT EJECT. F8J BUNO 149212 CONTINUED STRAIGHT AHEAD AND PILOT EJECTED SAFELY. F4B AND F8 MISSION UNRELATED INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE THAT PILOTS OF EITHER

PAGE THREE RUWJAPA0483 UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
AIRCRAFT DID NOT SEE EACH OTHER UNTIL A FRACTION OF A SECOND PRIOR TO IMPACT.
12. 270/5KTS, SKY CONDITION CLEAR, 48 F, 38 F, 40 MILES.
13. NONE
14. NONE
15. ONE UNIDENTIFIED CREW MEMBER MARINE F4B ~~150474~~ 150473 ALFA INJURY. MARINE F4B 150473 ALFA DAMAGE, REPORTING CUSTODIAN VMFAT 101.
16. VF-124 WILL CONVENE ACCIDENT BOARD.
17. (b) (6) [redacted] LCDR, ASO, (b) (6) [redacted] HOME PHONE (b) (6) [redacted]
BT

NOV 222222Z