OFFICE	AUDIT	RECOMMENDATION	STATUS (AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2018)
			than November 14, 2018, 6 months from the effective date of the rule. Ports also will be reminded that liquidated damages claims and other enforcement actions against carriers for Vessel Stow Plan and Container Status Message violations are authorized.
OFO	GAO-17-419SU (rec 3)	Identify and collect additional performance information on the impact of the 10+2 data, such as the identification of shipments containing contraband, to better evaluate the effectiveness of the 10+2 program	The OFO Directorates of CCS and (b) (7)(E) are collaborating on a plan to assess additional performance metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of the ISF program. CCS will work with the (b) (7)(E) to analyze the data from a targeting standpoint to evaluate the program for the following performance areas. They are: 1) identify the number of unmanifested containers and determine how/if they were mitigated before arrival; 2) determine the number of times that CTPAT companies were identified as ISF entity and given targeting benefits, but did not receive the same treatment because of manifest information; and 3) identify the number of times potential terrorism matches were made against ISF entities versus the number of times not matched using the same manifest data.
USBP	GAO-17-66 (rec 2)	The Chief of Border Patrol should collect information on reasons agents do not apply the CDS [Consequence Delivery System] guides' Most Effective and Efficient consequences to assess the extent that agents' application of these consequences can be increased and modify development of CDS guides, as appropriate.	CBP continues to address the recommendation and, to date, has completed the following milestones: Members of the CDS Program Management Office recently completed the annual CDS reevaluations. SMEs and sector command staff were asked to provide reasons for CDS guide deviation. Reasons provided included processing guidelines, reliance on strategic partnerships, and processing timelines. All interviewed agreed that

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			mandatory guide usage was not a realistic or achievable option.
OC-OPR	GAO-17-605SU and GAO-18-72	(FOUO/LES) Update the Security Policy and Procedures Handbook to include the Interagency Security Committee's (ISC) Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities Standard to assess all undesirable events (including three cyber-related threats), consider all three factors of risk, and document deviations from the standard.	The Physical Security Policy and Procedures Handbook (PSPPH) was disseminated for agencywide review and comment on September 30, 2018. Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) expects to publish the final, signed version by June 30, 2019.
OC-OPR	GAO-17-605SU and GAO-18-72	Update the Security Policy and Procedures Handbook: Include data to include data collection and analysis requirements for monitoring the performance of its physical security program.	The PSPPH was disseminated for agencywide review and comment on September 30, 2018. OPR expects to publish the final, signed version by June 30, 2019.
OC-OPR	GAO-17-605SU and GAO-18-72	Revise the plan's [plan to eliminate the backlog of facility risk assessments] assumptions to balance assessments with competing priorities, such as updating the policy manual and reviewing new construction design, to develop a feasible timeframe for completing the assessment backlog.	CBP/OPR/ Security Management Division successfully has completed risk assessments of all CBP-owned facilities (minus the two under construction). As such, they are now on a cycle to be completed per the ISC standards. CBP has submitted documentation for closure of this recommendation.
OFO	GAO-17-606	CBP to, in conjunction with USPS [U.S. Postal Service], (1) establish measureable performance goals for pilot programs and (2) assess the performance of the pilots in achieving these goals.	In relation to USPS developing a solution to present to CBP-targeted international mail, USPS has agreed that the presentment rate of all CBP-targeted mail going forward will be at (b) (7)(E) [redacted]

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			(b) (7)(E) In April 2018, CBP and USPS exchanged data covering the month of February 2018 for the purpose of comparing presentment rates. On May 3, 2018, CBP and USPS completed their respective reviews of the data and met to discuss findings. These finding revealed a difference of approximately 9 percent between CBP and USPS relative to the presentment rates. Discussions revealed differences in counting methodology, which could contribute to this delta. CBP and USPS agreed to look into the following identified factors that may have contributed to these differences: 1) USPS will check for updated scans in their Product Tracking and Reporting system (scanning and tracking events) and review their list with Inspection Service daily logs; and 2) CBP will have its port to review the list of mail items placed on hold and to make appropriate updates in its Automated Targeting System/Cargo Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (CERTS) to reflect item had been examined and released. This will ensure more timely coordination between the input to the USPS Global Business System and the CBP Automated Targeting System. In relation to the development of an electronic tool to assist international mail facility (IMF) staff in managing international mail, CBP continues to work with OIT on the development of an International Mail Dashboard to assist in the tracking of CBP targeting

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			activity at each IMF. This will allow CBP to compare and confirm presentment rates provided by the USPS in order to assess the performance of the mail pilots.
OFO	GAO-17-606	CBP to, in conjunction with USPS, evaluate the relative costs and benefits of collecting electronic advance data for targeting mail for inspection	CBP OFO CCS continues to work with the Economic Analysis Branch, Regulations and Rulings (EIAB) for additional guidance to address this recommendation. At a meeting between CCS and EIAB on February 2, 2018, it was determined that, because of previously scheduled assignments, EIAB would not be able to provide assistance to CCS prior to April 1. On April 17, 2018, CCS met with EIAB to provide an overview of the processing by CBP of inbound mail at the IMFs. EIAB subsequently provided a list of 21 questions/requests for additional information to assist in developing its analysis. On April 30, 2018, CCS provided a response to EAIB to address several of questions. Some of the information requested is required from the field and USPS. CCS has requested this information and is awaiting responses. CCS and USPS have provided respective responses to each of the 21 EAIB questions/ requests. EAIB is in the process of reviewing these responses and subsequently has reached back to USPS for clarification on some of the information provided.
OS-LSSD	GAO-17-774SU, GAO-18-214	(U/FOUO-LES) Develop a monitoring system to help ensure that CBP officials comply with license verification policies and procedures.	CBP's Weapons of Mass Destruction Division (WMDD) has been realigned (operationally) from the Office of Intelligence (OI) to Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) within Operations Support (OS). Accordingly, LSS now has responsibility for Recommendations 1 and 3.

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			LSS, in coordination with OFO and OT, will conduct an analytical study to develop a risk matrix and statistically valid sample size to verify companies' compliance with the NRC regulation. CBP will use the results of the analytical study to frame the monitoring system. Directive 5290-015B will be updated to include the addition of a monitoring process to ensure compliance with mandated license verification policies and procedures. CBP, using the results of the analytical study and a risked-based layered approach, will identify (b) (7)(E)
OS-LSSD	GAO-17-774SU, GAO-18-214	Develop a robust system that identifies shipments of radiological material that pose the greatest risk and revise CBP's policies and procedures as necessary to verify licenses for these shipments.	CBP's Weapons of Mass Destruction Division (WMDD) has been realigned (operationally) from the Office of Intelligence (OI) to Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) within Operations Support (OS). Accordingly, LSS now has responsibility for Recommendations 1 and 3. LSS, in coordination with OFO and OT, will conduct an analytical study to develop a risk matrix and statistically valid sample size to verify companies' compliance with the NRC regulation. CBP will use the results of the analytical study to frame the monitoring system. Directive 5290-015B will be updated to include the addition of a monitoring process to ensure compliance with mandated

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			license verification policies and procedures. CBP, using the results of the analytical study and a risked-based layered approach, will identify shipments that are high risk or may pose a high risk (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)
ES-OFAM	GAO-18-11	The Commissioner of CBP should develop and implement a policy and related guidance for documenting arrangements with landowners, as needed, on Border Patrol's maintenance of roads it uses to conduct its operations, and share these documented arrangements with its sectors.	Facilities Management and Engineering Office (FM&E) and USBP collaborated on the development of new processes, adapting existing guidance to current organizational needs, and utilized lessons learned to make the guidance successful for the organization. The updated policy defines coordination with landowners, where landowner agreements will be stored, POCs for questions, and procedures associated with the coordination with landowners for road maintenance. Additionally, recurring calls with the real estate and environmental team, USBP headquarter representative, Sector representatives, and program management have been developed to ensure transparent and clear communication of requirements, clearance status, and upcoming contract activities. The Real Property Requirements Management Policy was finalized on July 31, 2018.
USBP	GAO-18-11	The Commissioner of CBP should clearly document the process and criteria for making decisions on funding non-owned operational requirements and communicate this process to Border Patrol sectors.	The USBP and FM&E team is finalizing the process for maintenance and repair of roads and have draft guidance for the field that has not been finalized. USBP and FM&E will work to complete the process by the end of October 2018. USBP and FM&E developed the first iteration of

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			a prioritization process that was deployed as a pilot for prioritization of FY 2018 new roads. Through collaborative meetings and in coordination with the field, they identified key best practices and developed a prioritization process that considers three pillars: qualitative, quantitative, and feasibility. Through the pilot, sectors prioritized their new road requirements and tied those requirements back to their capability gap analysis submissions by referencing a core-card for each requirement. The criteria were developed and leveraged from best practices used at the sectors and after the Border Wall Decision Support Tool. Through this pilot, USBP was able to compile each sector's top new road requirements for national prioritization at USBP Headquarters. As of August 11, 2018, USBP and Office of Facilities and Asset Management are continuing work on refining the prioritization methodology and will be expanding it to prioritizing maintenance and repair requirements. A prioritization tool and guidance are in draft.
USBP	GAO-18-11	The Commissioner of CBP should assess the feasibility of options for addressing the maintenance of nonfederal public roads. This should include a review of data needed to determine the extent of its reliance on non-owned roads for border security operations.	The USBP and FM&E team is finalizing the process for maintenance and repair of roads and have draft guidance for the field that has not been finalized. USBP and FM&E will work to complete this process by the end of October 2018.
OS-LSSD	GAO-18-205	The Commissioner of CBP should, in consultation with the Executive Director of CBP's LSSD and the Laboratory Directors, assess volume and risk at each port of entry to determine those with the greatest need for resources, use this information as a basis for staff allocations, and document its risk-based, staff allocation process to	CBP continues to address the recommendation. LSS has been engaged fully with OFO at the (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) providing daily onsite scientific and forensic support through (b) (7)(E) LSS, in

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		ensure that CBP and LSSD priorities can be accomplished as effectively and efficiently as possible.	coordination with OFO, is now assessing (b) (7)(E) to evaluate the impact of (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) and to determine the best utility and allocation of LSS resources at (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) A draft report of findings and recommendations will be completed by November 9, 2018. On October 1, 2018, LSS activated the 24/7 Narcotics Reachback Center for presumptive analysis and technical advice. Additionally, the (b) (7)(E) at the LSS (b) (7)(E) activated on October 1, 2018. LSS is working closely on a risk model to inform resource allocations and anticipates the completion of a draft model by November 9, 2018. Final assessments and evaluations from site visits, discussions, and (b) (7)(E) are progressing and will be concluded by November 9, 2018, with a draft report of findings and recommendations for resource allocations.
Trade	GAO-18-271	The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the Commissioner of CBP, in collaboration with partner agencies, finalizes an interagency approach to the post-core management of ACE [Automated Commercial Environment] that includes (1) processes for prioritizing enhancements to ACE and for sharing ACE operations and maintenance and development costs, including the costs of suggested enhancements among partner agencies that may benefit, and (2) time frames for implementing such processes.	CBP, in collaboration with partner agencies, finalized an interagency approach to the post-core management of ACE. The Border Interagency Executive Council (BIEC) finalized the ACE PAYGO Model; a cost-sharing model and prioritization process for all ACE Single Window enhancements, identified as the "Single Window Sustainment (SWS) Planned Pay-As-You-Go Model." The approved SWS Planned PAYGO Model and associated prioritization process has been implemented fully. The BIEC has conducted two

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			successful prioritization sessions, prioritizing a total of 26 Requests for Development (RFD). Prioritization sessions will continue for the remaining RFDs quarterly. CBP considers the GAO recommendation mitigated and completed because the process has been approved by the BIEC and has been implemented fully. CBP has submitted a request for closure to GAO.
ES-OA	GAO-18-489SU, GAO-18-614	Analyze the costs associated with future barrier segments and include cost as a factor in the Impedance and Denial Prioritization Strategy	On September 26, 2018, CBP provided the signed approved documentation from the Border Wall System Program Annex B Excursion 1 for the secondary barrier for the San Diego Sector to GAO, and noted that it is Annex B, not Appendix B, as noted in the July update. CBP considers this action to be completed, and requested that GAO consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.
ES-HRM	GAO-18-487	Commissioner of CBP should ensure that its operational components systematically collect and analyze data on departing law enforcement officers and use this information to inform retention efforts.	CBP agrees that high-quality exit survey data are essential to support and inform retention efforts. In May 2018, CBP's Office of Human Resources Management formed a workgroup tasked with the development of custom questions for a CBP-wide exit survey. The workgroup comprised representatives from across the agency, which included the Office of the Commissioner, OFO, USBP, AMO, OT, OS, Enterprise Services, Congressional Affairs, OPR, and the Office of Public Affairs. The workgroup initially reviewed the USBP-specific exit survey as the foundation for the CBP-wide exit survey. They also considered employee exit survey research and

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			CBP office-specific information needs. The survey was launched on August 17, 2018. POCs were established across CBP in each office to assist in communicating the launch of the new survey. The POCs are available to answer any questions from supervisors or exiting employees about the survey. On September 10, 2018, an announcement and link to the survey was included in the weekly CBP Central message broadcast across the agency. Immediately following that message, exit survey POCs were encouraged to send an email announcement regarding the launch of the survey to their staff. POC's were provided with sample email language and a guide for supervisors, which detailed all the steps of the off-boarding process so that they could encourage exiting employees to complete the survey. The first announcement of the exit survey response rates were sent to the POCs on October 2, 2018. The response rates were broken out by office. POCs were encouraged to continue messaging about the exit survey in order to increase the response rate. Survey response rates will be sent to the POCs biweekly until further notice. The exit survey working group currently is working on embedding a link to the exit survey on the Separations and Clearance Form, CBP Form 241, in order to facilitate further the easy completion of the exit survey during the off-boarding process. Additional avenues for automation of the off-boarding process currently are being researched, and, if appropriate, more

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			automation of exit survey notifications to exiting employees will be included.
OC-OPR	GAO-18-405	Revise policy or guidance to ensure documentation of required control activities in its case management system, such as legal review of adverse actions, and data verification.	The CBP OPR Investigative Operations Division is in the process of creating and implementing procedures for the use of a Data Verification Checklist for OPR Investigations that will assist OPR in verifying the data contained in the Joint Integrity Case Management System (JICMS) are complete and accurate. As for the legal review of adverse actions, this responsibly falls with the Labor and Employee Relations (LER), within the Office of Human Resources Management (HRM). OCC conducts a legal review of all adverse actions, and LER documents this review in its Human Resources Business Engine (HRBE).
OC-OPR	GAO-18-405	Require staff to document investigative findings (e.g., whether an allegation is substantiated) in the case management system, and document and disseminate associated referral procedures for adjudication.	Currently, OPR investigative findings are documented in OPR's reports of investigation that are uploaded in both JICMS and HRBE. However, under CBP's uniform discipline procedure, the final determination as to whether an allegation is substantiated is a management determination, made after OPR has referred the case to LER for review and action. In HRBE, LER documents the misconduct that the proposing official has determined is actionable, along with the misconduct the deciding official substantiated. OPR will document and disseminate associated referral procedures for adjudication by developing internal protocols establishing when and how cases should be referred to LER for adjudication.
OC-OPR	GAO-18-405	Ensure the appropriate program offices include evaluating and testing internal	OPR and HRM will continue to work with the CBP's Management

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		controls related to the employee misconduct process in CBP's annual self-inspection program.	Inspections Division to develop Self-Inspection Program (SIP) worksheets for inclusion in the FY 2019 SIP cycle to evaluate and test internal controls related to specific roles in the employee misconduct process.
OC-OPR	GAO-18-405	Monitor the duration of all cases beginning-to-end by stage and by case type.	Data that would allow for the monitoring of the duration of all cases beginning-to-end by stage and by case type is maintained in two case management systems, OPR's JICMS and HRM's HRBE. HRBE provides a complete audit trail for each case from date of receipt by HRM to the date of closure and also identifies the stages at each point in the HRBE audit trail. OPR currently is working on the modernization of JICMS that includes a detailed case audit trail for better monitoring of cases beginning-to-end by stage and by case type. Once implemented, OPR will work to relaunch the OPR Executive Dashboard. Because the data needed to monitor all cases beginning-to-end are maintained in two separate systems, OPR and HRM will work together to develop a comprehensive dashboard to monitor the duration of all cases from beginning to end.
OC-OPR	GAO-18-405	Monitor the timeliness of misconduct cases according to established targets for management inquiries, administrative inquiries, and criminal and non-criminal investigations using case management system data.	Monitoring the timeliness of misconduct cases according to established targets for various case types using case management system data is linked to the comprehensive Executive Dashboard discussed in Recommendation #4. Captured data will be used to generate reports allowing OPR Headquarters and local OPR management to review and monitor timeliness. OPR and HRM will work together to ensure that the Dashboard monitors timeliness of misconduct cases.

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OC-OPR	GAO-18-405	Define and document the case management system data fields to be used for monitoring all established performance targets and provide related guidance to staff.	OPR will define clearly the data fields used to measure performance within the Executive Dashboard. Once developed, OPR will provide the appropriate guidance to staff.
OS-PARE	GAO-18-550	The Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection through the Executive Assistant Commissioner for Operations Support finalizes and promulgates the Customs and Border Protection's draft policy for requirements development.	CBP OS Capabilities and Requirements Division's (CRD) Operational Capabilities and Requirements Development Directive is complete and was signed by the Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner (D/EAC), OS on October 11, 2018. The OS D/EAC is an authorized representative of the Component Requirements Executive as outlined in the Component Requirements Executive Delegation Order dated January 3, 2018.
OS-PARE	GAO-18-550	The Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection through the Executive Assistant Commissioner for Operations Support updates the 2013 workforce assessment to account for the independent requirements organization's current workforce needs.	The Commissioner of CBP, through the Executive Assistant Commissioner for OS, updates the 2010 workforce assessment to account for the independent requirements organization's current workforce needs. The workforce assessment was reviewed and approved on October 11, 2018 by the Executive Director, Planning Analysis Requirements & Evaluation Directorate, OS (OS/PARE). The Executive Director OS/PARE is an authorized representative of the Component Requirements Executive as outlined in the Component Requirements Executive Delegation Order dated January 3, 2018.
OS-PARE	GAO-18-550	The Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection through the Executive Assistant Commissioner for Operations Support establishes component specific training for requirements development.	CBP's CRD completed the first working-level training course on March 12-16, 2018, the second on April 30-May 4, 2018, and the third on June 18-22, 2018. A fourth course was delivered as specific modules on Capability Analysis Reports and Operational Requirements Documents (vice the entire week-long

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			curriculum) based on the needs of the Agency at the time. CRD also currently is condensing the curriculum for delivery at the Executive Level. We request that GAO consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented. August 201 8 Update: The course development concluded, and CRD has executed multiple iterations. CRD also has started a rolling curriculum addressing specific segments of the training in 1.5-2 hour blocks. This delivery method initially targeted internal CRD resources, but was made available to a broader CBP audience beginning in September 2018. CBP considers this recommendation completed and has requested closure.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTS

OFFICE	AUDIT	RECOMMENDATION	STATUS
USBP	OIG-12-132	The OIG recommends that the Chief, U.S. Border Patrol complete the planned Concept of Operations document describing how the identified capabilities need to function from a cross-component perspective to support the Analysis of Alternatives for the Tunnel Detection and Technology Program.	CBP continues to address the recommendation and, to date, has completed the following milestones: USBP is working toward the creation of a draft operational requirements document to detect capability gaps for the Cross-Border Tunnel Threat (CBTT) program. This draft document will be used to support the analysis of alternatives, which has been paused temporarily. The CBTT integrated master schedule provides that the concept of operations is complete and is in the review/signature cycle. Once the necessary signatures are obtained, it will be submitted to the Joint Requirements Council (JRC), which has 20 days to review and comment. If changes are recommended, CBTT has 10 days to respond and return them to the JRC. Barring any unforeseen circumstances, the process will be completed by November 30, 2018.
OS-LESC	OIG-13-114	Develop a formal process to evaluate use of force training field audit results and follow up on field audit recommendations.	CBP has addressed the recommendation. CBP completed FY 2018 visits to the field; finalized the development of an automated process that allows CBP management to evaluate use of force training audit results and follow up on field audit recommendations; and developed a requirements document specifying the capabilities and functionality of the SharePoint site and forms.
USBP	OIG-17-114	Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol, in collaboration with the Assistant Commissioner for OIT: Complete modernization plans for the e3 system to ensure adequate availably and functionality to support border security mission needs	USBP included the modernization plan in the Border Patrol Enforcement System (BPES) narrative for the FY19 Business Case. Additionally, USBP estimated initial Fiscal Year 2018 funding requirements for preliminary modernization planning. USBP is on track to identify and develop key artifacts to support Joint Requirements Council (JRC) requirements. USBP

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			will work with the CBP, Office of Acquisition to schedule an Acquisition Decision Event (ADE) – 1 for the BPES Modernization by December 31, 2018. The USBP Enforcement Systems Division (ESD) completed the Capability Analysis Study Plan (CASP) in November 2017, and finished the Capability Analysis Report (CAR) in April 2018. The document is currently working through CBP channels to the DHS JRC. The ESD has completed the p-MNS for internal CBP review. The ESD will complete the p-CONOPS by October 31, 2018.
ES-OFAM	OIG-17-115-MA	CBP promptly upgrade the infrastructure at Tucson Sector stations and ensure Border Patrol agent safety by providing the resources necessary to correct the urgent physical security issues.	CBP continues to address the recommendation: (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)
ES-OFAM	OIG-17-115-MA	CBP review the security policy and procedures at Border Patrol stations and CBP facilities in the Tucson Sector to (b) (7)(E)	CBP continues to address the recommendation: (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) are projected for completion by March 31, 2019. CBP is in the process of pursuing two like-for-like direct leases by December 31, 2018. The leases will address additional or changed security improvements.
ES-OIT	OIG-18-19	Ensure that the TECS test environment is sufficiently similar to the TECS production environment so that testing scenarios will be able to identify errors caused by processing a large volume of queries.	CBP continues to address the recommendation. To date, CBP has completed the TECS system assessment of the current architecture and finalized the cloud infrastructure for a representative TECS system to include a test environment.

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ES-OIT	OIG-18-19	Provide the DHS Chief Information Officer [CIO] with a weekly status of CBP's planned and actual modernization migration schedule and milestones detailing when (a) the Legacy mainframe environment is no longer needed, and (b) the recovery site is fully functional.	CBP continues to address the recommendation as it continues to report status information to the DHS CIO via the INVEST report. Reporting will continue although legacy mainframe environment no longer is needed.
OC-OPR	OIG-18-18	CBP should update the Special Agent Internal Operating Procedures immediately to reflect the guidance on the use of Section 1509 Summonses provided in the May 25, 2017 email referenced in this report from the Executive Director of CBP OPR's Investigative Operations Division.	The Internal Operating Procedures Chapter to reflect the guidance on the use of Section 1509 Summonses was drafted and submitted to OCC for review and clearance. It is pending return from OCC.
OC-OPR	OIG-18-18	The relevant CBP personnel should receive training on the proper use of Section 1509 Summonses as soon as practicable.	The training materials on the use of Section 1509 Summonses were drafted and submitted to OCC for review and clearance. The materials are pending return from OCC.
OC-OPR	OIG-18-18	CBP should look at use of Section 1509 Summonses across the agency to determine how such summonses are being used, and whether such uses comport with the law and CBP's updated policy.	The responses received from components on the use of the Section 1509 Summonses were sent to the OCC for review. OCC completed its review, and documentation was submitted to request closure of this recommendation.
OC-OPR	OIG-18-68	Develop and implement a formal policy for the complaint review and response process.	CBP OPR conducted a comprehensive internal review of the processes and procedures utilized to review and respond to polygraph complaints. The review confirmed the need for a comprehensive policy, which formalized the manner in which the agency addresses complaints about polygraph exams. Following the review, CBP OPR developed a policy, which addresses all facets of the complaint review and response process. It provides the required level of oversight while ensuring reviews and responses are conducted in an

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			efficient, objective, and thorough manner. On August 13, 2018, OPR implemented the "Standard Operating Procedures: Responding to Polygraph Exam Complaints," formalizing CBP's polygraph complaint review and response process. Additionally, to provide increased public visibility and transparency of the complaint process, OPR added the following questions and answers to the frequently asked questions' polygraph portion of CBP's public facing website (https://www.cbp.gov/careers/car/poly) . On the basis of the above information and the SOPs, OPR has requested closure of recommendation two as well as closure of the OIG's audit, via the 90-Day Update to the Office of Accountability dated September 19, 2018.
OS-LESC	OIG-18-76	Provide recurring familiarization training on official assault reporting systems.	CBP's Law Enforcement Officer Safety and Compliance Directorate (LESC) continues to address the milestones to achieve complete implementation of the recommendation. On schedule to complete the implementation plan by December 31, 2018.
OS-LESC	OIG-18-76	Clarify guidance on the types of assaults that must be officially reported, as well as the steps in the reporting process.	CBP LESC continues to work on the milestones to achieve complete implementation of the recommendation. On schedule to achieve a complete implementation by December 31, 2018.
OS-LESC	OIG-18-76	Mandate that law enforcement officers complete refresher training quarterly, including training on individual threat assessments (to include pre-assault recognition), assault mitigation	CBP LESC continues to address the milestones to achieve complete implementation of the recommendation. On schedule to complete the implementation by March 31, 2019.

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		techniques, defensive tactics training, and scenario-based training exercises	
ES-OIT	OIG-18-79	Develop a process for ensuring all information systems are included in the CBP Office of Information Technology inventory, along with notification to the CBP Privacy and Diversity Office when a system is added.	OIT will develop a process for ensuring all information systems are included in the official CBP OIT's Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) system inventory. CSD Security Operations Center/Vulnerability Assessment Team will begin tracking rouge assets on the CBP network and will create a dashboard showing detected unauthorized systems. The report will highlight decentralized servers and systems without the Tanium agent. CBP OIT will reach out to CBP's Privacy and Diversity Office to discuss its role and inclusion in the updated FISMA Inventory SOP. CBP OIT will update the FISMA Inventory SOP and will draft memoranda to the CBP community regarding security compliance communication failures in the implementation of "rogue" systems on the CBP network.
AMO	OIG-18-79	Provide a plan, including timelines, for fulfilling supporting requirements and obtaining authorization to operate ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] Systems.	AMO is developing a number of documents needed to obtain an authorization to operate through the formal CBP Immigration Automated Clearance System process. AMO has a plan of action and milestones (POA&M) that includes the completed privacy threshold analysis for ISR Systems and its System Privacy Plan. The POA&M includes timeframes for obtaining authorization for operating ISR Systems.

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AMO	OIG-18-79	Create and implement a process according to DHS policy for timely installing software patches on the VADER [Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar] and Minotaur systems.	AMO has created a process for timely, 90-day installation of software patches on the VADER and Minotaur systems. To maintain Department of Defense and CBP integrity and current efficiencies, AMO has prepared a request to CBP OIT for approval to implement a timely software patch cycle of 90 days for Minotaur and VADER.
AMO	OIG-18-79	Create and implement a process to update all ISR System subsystems currently running on unsupported operating systems.	AMO has created and implemented a process to update all ISR Systems subsystems currently running on unsupported operating systems. The transition from unsupported legacy software to the supported Minotaur system is programmed to occur.
OFO	OIG-18-80	CBP Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, take steps to coordinate with airport and airline stakeholders to increase bandwidth to meet the operational demands of biometric processing at the Nation's top airports.	Because CBP is approaching biometric entry-exit implementation in partnership with airline/airport operators' network connectivity is a key topic with regard to implementing the program. Although CBP is not selecting specific hardware or bandwidth requirements, connectivity information is included in Section 2 of the Traveler Verification Service Technical Reference Guide. Given that airports and airlines are beginning to include the use of biometrics in their own business processes (e.g., aircraft boarding), it is in their own interests to ensure adequate connectivity so that they can meet the complex operational demands to ensure timely aircraft departures.
OFO	OIG-18-80	CBP Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, develop an internal plan to institute enforcement mechanisms or back-up procedures to prevent airlines from bypassing biometric processing prior to flight boarding.	As the biometric air exit capability nears full operational capability, CBP will develop a plan to institute photo capture enforcement mechanisms in partnership with airport and airlines stakeholders. The plan will include operating parameters, SOPs, and an enforcement ramp-up period to allow travelers, airlines, and airports

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			adequate time to adjust operations and ensure compliance with biometric air exit.
OFO	OIG-18-80	CBP Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, continue to refine the Traveler Verification Service algorithm to ensure the highest possible passenger match rate, with allowances for photo and age quality.	CBP has instituted rigorous process to review data and metrics associated with biometric facial recognition matching performance. Since the completion of the OIG's field work in January 2018, and as of the end of July 2018, CBP has conducted departure operations on more than 3,300 flights with a total of 621,000 passengers; of those travelers' images that were captured at the gate and a photo in the gallery, 97 percent were matched successfully. As a result of CBP's continuous monitoring and incremental improvements to the matching algorithm, CBP data currently do not demonstrate any significant difference in match rate between citizenship, age, or gender. CBP's biometric matching service utilizes a number of tools to minimize and mitigate algorithmic performance including: 1) Use of diverse training sets; 2) Matching against a limited set of faces based on the flight, cruise, or border crossing; 3) Continuous monitoring for performance; and 4) Execution of a variety of statistical tests to bolster performance thresholds and minimize any matching discrepancies. To ensure a high performance of the algorithm further, CBP has partnered with DHS Science and Technology and is currently in the process of partnering with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to perform an independent and comprehensive scientific analysis of CBP's operational

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			face matching performance, including impacts due to traveler demographics and image quality. CBP expects to begin this work no later than December 31, 2018. CBP will continue to monitor actively and refine the performance of the algorithm and associated operational processes in order to make incremental improvements and ensure the high accuracy of facial matching for all travelers, regardless of ethnicity, age, or gender.
OFO	OIG-18-80	CBP Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, develop internal contingency plans for funding and staffing the program, in the event that airlines do not agree to partner with CBP in implementing the biometric capability nationwide.	The OIG's draft report indicates that collaboration with the private sector is a significant point of failure for the biometrics program; however, CBP believes otherwise. Specifically, CBP's viewpoint is that not collaborating with the private sector is a far greater risk, as evidenced by the lack of biometric exit progress between 2004 and 2014, and further demonstrated by airlines'/ airports' comments and concerns expressed during the 2008 Notice of Proposed Rule Making process, which put the burden of biometric exit squarely onto air carriers. CBP's partnership approach allows CBP to build and maintain a robust traveler identity service ecosystem that enables airports and airlines to approach the biometric exit mandate within their own modernization plans and in a way that meets individual operational nuances. The alternative is a government wholly owned solution that could add layers to an already complex travel environment with limited regard to traveler experience and individual airline/airport facility and operational realities. Since the OIG completed its fieldwork in January 2018, CBP has

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			received eight letters from different airports and airlines committing to implement biometric exit in collaboration with CBP. CBP recognizes that a collaborative approach with the private sector is new, does not necessarily fit into current government acquisition and project management processes, and may present a certain uneasiness with oversight authorities with regard to project schedule and funding. Although CBP is confident that a partnership is the right approach for implementation of biometric exit, CBP will develop an internal contingency plan for funding and staffing the program in case airlines and airports do not partner with CBP.
OFO	OIG-18-83	The Executive Assistant Commissioners for Office of Field Operations and Operations Support conduct an analysis to determine what additional staff, canines, x-ray scanning machines, and hand-held chemical analysis devices are needed to adequately address the threat from opioids arriving daily in the large volume of international mail.	OFO will collaborate with OS to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. The cost-benefit analysis will evaluate and determine additional staffing levels, canine teams, and technology that is necessary to address efficiently and adequately the threat. (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) It is important to note that significant equipment upgrades already have been made at the (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) since the OIG's July 2017 audit team visit. For example, as of November 7, 2017, the (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) A permanent narcotics detection and analysis laboratory to replace the temporary

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			laboratory is in the planning stage for the facility.
OFO	OIG-18-83	The Executive Assistant Commissioners for Field Operations and Operations Support assign and dedicate canine teams as appropriate to detect opioids at the international mail facility on a daily basis.	The OFO (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) will work with the OFO Operations Directorate (OPS) to evaluate an increase in the total number of canine narcotic detector teams assigned at the (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) As an interim solution, the (b) (7)(E) and OPS will explore alternatives to commercial kenneling, as a means of enhancing the port's ability to deploy more rapidly available canine teams to address immediate threats of illicit opioids in international mail.
OFO	OIG-18-83	The Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Information and Technology (OIT) and Executive Assistant Commissioners for Field Operations and Operations Support jointly establish a process to inventory arriving international air mail received from USPS, scanned by CBP, and returned to USPS.	OFO, Manifest and Conveyance Security Division, in collaboration with the NII Division, already has identified the need for (b) (7)(E) NII equipment with the capacity to address the specific inventory issue as described in the recommendation, as well as (b) (7)(E) The procurement and acquisition process currently is being developed internally.
OFO	OIG-18-83	The Executive Assistant Commissioners for Field Operations and Operations Support update CBP's International Mail Operations and Enforcement Handbook to reflect all types of arriving international mail.	OFO will revise CBP's International Mail Operations and Enforcement Handbook to reflect more fully the current operational conditions in relation to (b) (7)(E) of international mail arriving, increasing volumes of international mail, and the applicability of advance electronic data to (b) (7)(E) inbound international mail.
OFO	OIG-18-83	The Executive Assistant Commissioners for Field Operations and Operations Support perform and document periodic 'Mail Flex' operations, including use of canine teams, to better determine the size and scope of the threat inherent in specific	The OFO (b) (7)(E) is collaborating with OFO's National Targeting Center-Cargo, OPS, HSI, U.S. Postal Inspection Services, and state and local law enforcement agencies, to develop and implement (b) (7)(E)

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		classes of mail and form specific countries.	(b) (7)(E) through the (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)
OFO	OIG-18-83	The Assistant Commissioner for the OIT and the Executive Assistant Commissioners for Field Operations Support jointly establish adequate internal control processes, including maintaining inventories and physically securing suspicious mail that may be seized following additional review.	OFO, (b) (7)(E) in collaboration with Enterprise Services - OIT will develop and deploy an automated technical solution for maintaining an accurate inventory on those segregated international mail items that are subject for further scrutiny, but not yet seized. CBP (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) to ensure (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) parcels prior to seizure. Parcels (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) but not yet seized, are secured immediately upon initial examination in (b) (7)(E) and is equipped with (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Only personnel assigned to work in the secure space are granted access card privileges.
OFO	OIG-18-83	The Executive Assistant Commissioners for Field Operations and Operations Support jointly update the Seized Asset Management and Enforcement Procedure Handbook and the International Mail Operations and Enforcement Handbook to outline all of the precautions necessary to safeguard suspicious mail prior to formal seizure.	In 19 U.S.C. 1499 § (c)(1), CBP is provided a 5-day period (excluding weekends and holidays) following the date on which merchandise is presented for customs examination, to make informed determinations regarding merchandise releases or detentions. This 5-day period is prior to formal seizure. The Seized Asset Management and Enforcement Procedure Handbook (SAMEPH) references 19 U.S.C. 1499 § (c)(1). OFO will revise the International Mail Operations and Enforcement Handbook to reflect more fully the appropriate operational processes in international mail to account for safeguarding of mail held by CBP prior to formal seizure. The SAMEPH also will be updated to reference the International Mail Operations and Enforcement Handbook for proper

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			procedures governing the handling of these mail items prior to seizure.
ES-OIT	OIG-18-83	The Assistant Commissioner for OIT update CBP's targeting servers with DHS-recommended system configuration management settings or request waivers, as appropriate.	OIT will update CBP's targeting servers with updated Configuration Management (CM) settings developed and defined through implementation of the CBP Enterprise Security Program. Upon completion, OIT will reference any waivers as needed to ensure either the CM settings fully comply with DHS-recommended system settings, or are documented via waivers or other methods. OIT completed documenting the difference between CBP and DHS Security Technical Implementation Plan for Windows 16 via compliance scans conducted by CBP/OIT Security Operations Division.
ES-OIT	OIG-18-83	The Assistant Commissioner for OIT develop a plan with milestones for replacing the noncompliant CCTV system with an inventoried and compliant system.	CBP will develop and implement a plan with milestones for replacing the noncompliant CCTV system with an inventoried and compliant system. OIT installed two new CISCO switches and configured the VLAN for Centralized Area Video Surveillance System (CAVSS) Project on September 21, 2018. The CAVSS installation is complete.

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