Aer-MA-6101/1031

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on Addendum to VA-92 AAR ser 2-57
concerning F2H-3 BUNO 126368 accident occurring 1 Oct 57

28 JUN 1958

From: Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

O. L. MAUPIN
By direction

Closed

09

FF4-1/A25
Serial: 80/ 1797

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PART VII OPNAVINST 3750.6B

14 FEB 1958

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on Addendum to VA-92 AAR ser 2-57 concerning F2H-3
BUNO 126368 accident occurring 1 October 1957, pilot FISCHER

From: Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (MA-61)
(2) Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Addendum to VA-92 AAR ser 2-57

(b) (5)
[redacted]

Beecher Snipes
BEECHER SNIPES
By direction

Copy to:
NAVAVSAFCEN (2) (Airmail)
CINCPACFLT
COMFAIRALAMEDA
CO, VA-92
BAR, ST. LOUIS

10

FF7-2/A25
Ser: 322/ 626
6 FEB 1958

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PART VII OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6B

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on Supplementary Report on VF-92 AAR ser 2-57 concerning F2H-3, BuNo 126368 accident occurring 1 October 1957, pilot FISCHER

From: Commander Fleet Air Alameda
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(2) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (AER512)
(3) Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VF-92 Supplementary AAR ser 2-57; forwarding of

(b) (5)
[redacted]

R. HICKEY

Copy to:
BUAER (AER-512)
NAVAVSAFCEN (2)
CINCPACFLT
CO, VF-92

11

FF12/VF-92
AD:ASY:ws
A9-4
SER: 156
JAN 21 1958

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT on VF-92 AAR 2-57; concerning F2H-3 BUNO 126368 accident occurring 1 October 1957; pilot LTJG Stanley C. FISCHER, (b) (6) [redacted] /1325, USNR.

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron NINETY TWO
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commander, Fleet Air Alameda
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(3) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (AER-512)
(4) Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VF-92 Supplementary Aircraft Accident Report 2-57; forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

(b) (5)

[redacted]

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
12 PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6

FF12/VF-92

(b) (5)

[redacted]

A. S. Yesensky

A. S. YESENSKY

Copy to :
ONO (OP-57)
BUAER (512)
CINCPACFLT
CINCNAVAIRPAC
FAVAVSAFCEN (2)
BAR, St. Louis
BAR, Kansas City

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

(2)

FF12/VF-92
OPS:NS:clo
A9-4
Ser: 155
15 Jan 58

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT on VF-92 AAR 2-57, Concerning F2H-3 BUNO 126368
Accident occurring 1 October 1957: pilot LTJG
Stanley C. FISCHER, (b) (6) 1325, USNR

From: Aircraft Accident Board, Fighter Squadron NINETY TWO
To: Chief of Naval Operations (ATTN: OP-57)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron NINETY TWO
(2) Commander, Fleet Air Alameda
(3) Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(4) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (AER-512)
(5) Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft accident report 2-57, Supplementary report on

Ref: (a) VF-92 AAR 2-57

Encl: (1) DIR on starboard engine
(2) Materials laboratory test report on turbine blades
(3) Examination and evaluation report on starboard engine
(4) DIR on port engine
(5) Materials laboratory test report on seat ejection tube
(6) Parachute and flight gear shop report on parachute serial No. 17207
(7) VF-92 maintenance officer's statement
(8) Messages (6)
(9) Photograph (1)
(10) Photographs (15)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

1. The following information is herewith submitted as a supplement to reference (a):

VII. THE INVESTIGATION

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST 3750.6B

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ENCLOSURE 1 PRINT 2

ENCLOSURE 1 PRINT 3



ENCLOSURE 1 PRINT 4

ENCLOSURE 1 POINT 5

MATERIALS LABORATORY TEST REPORT

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
ALAMEDA, CALIFORNIA

70-341-RLZ/yt

REPORT No. 57-176

To: VP-92 Attn: Maintenance Officer

Ref: Encl: (1) Microstructure of ANS 5382 blade taken from J34-WE34 No. 201383. (250X Magn)
(2) Microstructure of ANS 5375 blade taken from J34-WE34 No. 201346. (250X Magn)

ACTIVITY REQUEST

DATE: 27 November 1957

MATERIAL TESTED

Turbine rotor blades from starboard engine J34-WE34 Serial No. 201383 and port engine serial No. 201346.

PART NUMBER	SPECIFICATION	GRADE	CLASS
	ANS 5375 and ANS 5382		

MODEL NUMBER	AIRCRAFT MODEL	BUREAU NUMBER
	P2V-3	126368

TEST PERFORMED

1. Visual examination.
2. Metallographic examination.
3. Hardness test.
4. Spectrographic analysis.

27

TEST RESULTS

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE 2

70-341-HLZ/yt

MATERIALS LABORATORY TEST REPORT NO. 57-176

(b) (5)

[redacted]

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

ENCLOSURE 2

Photographs from Materials Laboratory report No. 51-176 showing comparative microstructures of the second stage turbine blades from the Port and Starboard Engines of VP-92 AAR 2-57

ENCLOSURE (1) TO LAB REPORT NO. 57-176

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

ENCLOSURE (2) TO LAB REPORT NO. 57-176

NAS Alameda: Overhaul & Repair Department, Examination & Evaluation Section Report concerning Starboard Engine, Serial No. WE [illegible] of VF-92 AAR 4-57:

From: Examination & Evaluation Section (Engine Classification Unit), Overhaul & Repair Department, NAS Alameda
To: Safety Officer VF-92

Subj: Crash Investigation of F2H-3, 126368; Information concerning

(b) (5)

[redacted]

R. A. GRABENDIKE

R A Grabendike

30

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

ENCLOSURE (3)

NAS Alameda Overhaul Activity Disassembly and Inspection Report concerning Port engine, Serial No. WE 201346, of VF-92 AAR 2-57:

STATION: J119-57	OPERATING ACTIVITY:	ENGINE SERIAL NO:
NAS ALAMEDA, CALIFORNIA	VF-92	WE201346

ENGINE MODEL:
J34-WE34

OVERHAUL ACTIVITY DISASSEMBLY & INSPECTION REPORT: NAVAER-2491 Rev: 10-51
AER-REP-MA-1

NUMBER OF OVERHAULS:	HOURS SINCE LAST O/H:	TOTAL HOURS:
UNKNOWN	83.6	UNKNOWN

UR SUBMITTED(NUMBER AND DATE)
None Received.

YELLOW CROSS:
NO

REASON FOR OVERHAUL:
BANSHEE crashed at Richardson Bay, Marin County, California (Fatal)

DISCREPANCIES FOUND AND CONCLUSIONS AS TO CAUSE OF FAILURE

Discrepancies:
Ref: (a) COMFAIRALAMEDA msg 111857Z 1957

(b) (5)

[redacted]

SIGNATURE (reporting officer)	DATE OF REPORT:	TYPE A/C REMOVED FROM:
J. W. SALTER, LCDR USN	4 Dec 1957	F2H-3 126368

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

ENCLOSURE (4)

MATERIALS LABORATORY TEST REPORT
(END 4175 (REV. 6-55))

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
ALAMEDA, CALIFORNIA

70-342-VMI/yt
REPORT No. 57-207

TO: Fighter Squadron NINETY TWO (VF-92)

VIA:

ACTIVITY REQUEST: No. 3-57

DATE: 5 November 1957

MATERIAL TESTED: Inner tube of catapult assembly, Personnel NAMC TYPE I

PART NUMBER	SPECIFICATION	GRADE	CLASS

STOCK NUMBER	AIRCRAFT MODEL	BUREAU NUMBER
NAF 602200-1	F2H-3	126368

TEST PERFORMED: Examination of tube for residues of explosive charge after recovery from salt water crash.

TEST RESULTS:

The catapult tube was disassembled and cut longitudinally for visual inspection and for obtaining residues from the inside surface.

The inner surface showed no visible residues from the detonation of the explosive charge. An incrustation of corrosion products were present, some of which were scraped from the surface and tested for the presence of nitrates with negative results.

(b) (5) [redacted]

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
32 PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

REVIEW:

APPROVED: V. M. YOUNG V. M. Young

ENCLOSURE 5

(b) (5)

[redacted]

Roland J. Kumzak

Roland J. KUMZAK
Shop 313

33

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

STATEMENT OF THE MAINTENANCE OFFICER, Fighter Squadron NINETY TWO
CONCERNING F2H-3 BUNO 126368

(b) (5)

[redacted]

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

R. S. HUTCHES
LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (7)

INDEX OF MESSAGES

SUPPLEMENT TO VF-92 AAR 2-57, F2H-3, BUNO 126368

ENCLOSURE 8 MESSAGE: 1 - 102350Z OCT. 1957 from FITRON NINE TWO To COMFAIRALAMEDA requesting DIR on Jet engines WE - 201346 and WE - 201383.

2 - 1118572 OCT 1957 from COMFAIRALAMEDA to NAS ALAMEDA requesting DIR on Jet Engines WE - 201346 and WE - 201383.

3 - 051843Z DEC 1957 from NAS ALAMEDA to COMFAIRALAMEDA summarized DIR on Engines WE-201346 and WE - 201383.

4.- 161832Z OCT 1957 from FITRON NINE TWO to COMFAIRALAMEDA requesting Technical assistance on canopy jettison system and structural components.

6 - 080019Z NOV 1957 from NAS ALAMEDA to COMFAIRALAMEDA, Info FITRON NINE TWO, report on canopy jettison system and structural components.

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

MM RDWDQ RDWDA
DE RBWPT 58
M 102350Z
FM FITRON NINE TWO
TO COMFAIRALAMEDA
INFO COMNAVAIRPAC
NAS NORIS
BT
REQ DIR OH J34-WE-34 ENGS SER WE-201546 CMM WE-201383 REMOVED
FM F2H-3 BUNO 126368 CRASHED 2 OCT X SUSPECT ENG MALFUNCTION
CONTRIBUTED TO CAUSE OF ACRT
BT
CFM J34-WE-34 WE-201546 WE-201383 F2H-3 126368 1 ..
11/02307 OCT RBWPT

VF-92/DR[illegible]...../J12

[illegible]

ENCLOSURE 8 MESSAGE 1

MM RBWDQ RBWDA RBEWAG
DE RBWPT 231
K 111857Z
FM COMFAIRALAMEDA
TO FITRON NINE TWO
NAS ALAMEDA
INFO COMNAVAIRPAC
NAS NORIS
BAMR WESTDIST
NAVAVSAFCEN NORVA
BT
FITRON NINE TWO 102350Z NOTAL X FITRON NINE TWO REQ TURN IN J34-WE-34
ENGS SER WE201346 CNM WE-201363 FROM CRASHED F2H-3 BUNO 126368 TO
NAS ALAMEDA X NAS ALAMEDA X UPON REC REQ DIR TO DETM IF ENG FAILURE
CONTRIBUTED TO ACCIDENT X ACCON FINDINGS BY MAG
BT
CFN 102350Z J34-WE-34 WE201346 WE-201363 F2H-3 126368
11/1857Z OCT RBWPT

CFAA-FLCSES.....FLCLT.....COS.....ACNT.....COTL...../RD
(42)
FITRON 92...../RD
NAS--CNR/A/...../RD

NNNN

REF/102350Z/REQ DIR ON J34-WE-34 ENGS SER WE-201346
CNM WE-201363 REMOVED.....ETC....

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

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ENCLOSURE 8 MESSAGE 2

MM RBEPD RBUDQ RBWDA RBEKAC
DE RBWPT 299 111857Z:::VF-92 102350Z NOTAL ...REQ TURN IN J34-WE-34
ENGS SER WE201346 SUM .....ETC....
M 051843Z
FM NAS ALAMEDA
TO COMFAIRALAMEDA
TO INFO BUAER
COMNAVAIRPAC
BAMR WESTDIST
NAVAVSAFCEN NORVA
FITRON NINE TWO
BT
YOUR 111857Z OCT X INVESTIGATION FOL J34-WE-34 ENGS CLN ALFA X PORT
ENG SER WE201346 REVEALED ENG ROTATING AT TIME OF CRASH X POWER SETTING
UNDETERMINED BUT BELIEVE LOW RPM X NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND TO INDICATE
ENG FAILURE X
BRAVO X STARBOARD ENG SER WE201383 REVEALED ENG NOT ROTATING AT TIME
OF CRASH X ALL MAIN BRGS SAT X TURBINE SEC EXPOSED TO HIGH TEMPERATURE
WITH RESULTANT DAMAGE TO TURBINE BLADES AND ENG FAILURE X CAUSE OF HIGH
TEMPERATURE UNDETERMINED X BUAER AER-512
BT
CFN 111857Z J34-WE-34 WE201346 WE201383 AER-512
05/1843Z DEC RBWPT
NAS--O&R/ORIG/300/312/.....XO.....ADMINO. ...../JB
CF... FLOSEC....FLGLT....COS....ACST/A/.....
.....
VF-92...../JB

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

NNNN

ENCLOSURE 8 MESSAGE 3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

ENCLOSURE 8 MESSAGE 4

REF:161832Z. REQ TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
IAU OPNAV INST 3750PT6 ON FOL
ITEMS.....ETC.....

M 182037Z
FM COMFAIRALAMEDA
TO NAS ALAMEDA
INFO FITRON NINE TWO
BT
FITRON NINE TWO 161832Z X REQ PROV ENGR ASST AS NEC
BT
CFN 161832Z
18/1957Z OCT RBWPT

CFAA/43/FLGSEC....FLGLT....COS.....ACMT.....COMM.....
NAS-O&R/A/.....XO.....ADMINO.....
FITRON 92...../110

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

40

ENCLOSURE 8 MESSAGE 5

REF/182037Z/FITRON NINE TWO 161832Z X REQ PROV ENGR ASST
AS NEC

M 080019Z
FM NAS ALAMEDA
TO COMFAIRALAMEDA
INFO FITRON NINE TWO
BT
YOUR 182037Z OCT AND FITRON NINE TWO 161832Z OCT X COND OF CANOPY
JETTISON SYS PARTS DOES NOT CLEARLY INDICATE IF CANOPY JETTISON PRIOR TO
IMPACT X DEFLECTIONS OF PARTS AT IMPACT COULD HAVE POSITIONED PARTS AS
FOUND X SOOT ON TORN EDGES FUS SKIN PIECES FOUND SEPARATED FROM OTHER
LARGE PORTIONS OF ACFT TENDS TO INDICATE FIRE AND EXPLOSION IN FLT
PRIOR IMPACT
BT
CFN 182037Z 161832Z
08/0340Z NOV RBWPT

REF/161832Z/REQ TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IAW OPNAV INST
3750PT6 ON FOL ITEMS SALVAGED FROM F2H-3
BUNO 126963.....ETC.....

NAS--OAR/ORIG/300/311.....XO.....ADMINO...../RD
CFAA-FLCSEC.....FLCLT.....COS.....SDO.....ACMT.....COMM...../RD
FITRON 92...../RD
/A/

[illegible]

41 SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

ENCLOSURE 8 MESSAGE 2

FISHERMEN BEWARE—Lt. (JG) J. L. Billeter displays an ejection seat and canopy similar to pieces unrecovered from San Pablo Bay after a Navy Banshee jet fighter crashed months ago. The ejection seat may still contain two live and dangerous explosive charges.

Navy Asks Help in Locating Crashed Plane Seat, Canopy

Duck hunters and fishermen in the San Pablo Bay area today were warned to be on the lookout for an ejection seat and plexiglass canopy from a Navy Banshee jet fighter, unrecovered since the plane crashed Oct. 1.

The ejection seat may be armed with two live explosive charges, which could go off if the apparatus is moved.

The two units have not been found during extensive salvage operations conducted by the Navy, which said recovery is essential to completing its investigation of the cause of the fighter crash.

The pilot, Lt. (jg) Stanley C. Fischer of 2054 Santa Clara Ave., Alameda, was drowned in his parachute harness after the plane plummeted into the bay three miles southeast of Hamilton Air Force Base, north of Point San Pedro.

Anyone seeing either item should notify nearest civil or military authorities. Neither the seat nor canopy should be handled or moved.

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ENCLOSURE 9

DESCRIPTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS

SUPPLEMENT TO VF-92 AAR 2-57, F2H-3, BUNO 126368

ENCLOSURE 10 PRINTS: 1. - Overall view showing extent of damage and degree of salvage.

2 - View of port wing and tip tank.

3 - View of starboard wing and tip tank.

4 - View of nose radome.

5 - View of rear fuel cell, pressure fueling unit and interconnector.

6 - View of center fuel cell.

7 - View of forward fuel cell.

8 - View illustrating discontinuity of burned point areas on tail section.

9 - View showing canopy actuating mechanism assembly and position of canopy stop jettisoning cam.

10 - View of canopy actuating system components.

11 - View showing condition of starboard canopy forward roller track.

12 - View of MK2 life jacket showing broken cylinder arm and torn straps.

13 - View of parachute seat pack showing damage to seatpan and parakit.

14 - View of parachute pack showing damaged rip cord housing.

15 - View of link assembly and ejection seal firing pin actuator

ENCLOSURE (10)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

Enclosure ( ) Print

Enclosure No. 1 Print

QUIRED
PART VII
Enclosure ( ) Print


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Enclosure ( ) Print

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SPECIAL HANDLING
OPNAVINST
Enclosure (10) Print 5

49
Enclosure ( ) Print

Enclosure (1) Print
50

Enclosure ( ) Print



ENCLOSURE ( ) PRIOT

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ENCLOSURE 10 PRINT 11

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PART VII OPNAVINST

ENCLOSURE 10 PRINT 13



ENCLOSURE 10 PRINT 14

ENCLOSUE 10 PRINT 15

10-1
BW

10-39
1 Bm

Aer-MA-610/375

29 MAY 1958

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-92 AAR ser 2-57
concerning F2H-3 BuNo 126368 accident occurring 1 Oct 57

From: Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

Ref: (a) Telcon between CNO (OP-57) and Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (MA-61) of 14 April 1958

(b) (5) [redacted]

F. W. Snyder

F. W. SNYDER
By direction

FF4-1/A25
Serial:
80/ 15473

19 NOV 1957

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PART VII OPNAVINST 3750.6B

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VF-92 AAR ser 2-57 concerning F2H-3 BuNo 126308
accident occurring 1 October 1957, pilot FISCHER

From: Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (MA-61)
(2) Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VF-92 AAR ser 2-57

(b) (5)

[redacted]

Beecher Snipes
BEECHER SNIPES
By direction

Copy to:
NAVAVSAFCEN (2)(Airmail)
CINCPACFLT
COMFAIRALAMEDA
CO, VF-92

FF7-2/A25
Ser: 322/ 5699

7 NOV 1957

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PART VII OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6B

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, VF-92 AAR ser 2-57 concerning F2H-3,
BuNo 126368 accident occurring 1 October 1957, pilot FISCHER

From: Commander Fleet Air Alameda
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(2) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (AER-512)
(3) Director, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VF-92 AAR ser 2-57; forwarding of

(b) (5)

[redacted]

R. F. HICKEY

Copy to:
BUAER (AER-512)
NAVAVSAFCEN (2)
CINCPACFLT
CO, VF-92

FF12/VF-92
ADM:RFO:cek
A25
Ser: 664
16 October 1957

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VF-92 AAR 2-57, concerning F2H-3 BUNO 126368 accident occurring 1 October 1957; pilot LTJG Stanley C. FISCHER, (b) (6) /1325, USNR

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron NINETY TWO
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air Alameda
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(3) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (AER-512)
(4) Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VF-92 Aircraft Accident Report 2-57; forwarding of

(b) (5)

[redacted]

Copy to:
CNO (OP-57)
BUAER (512)
CINCPACFLT
COMNAVAIRPAC
NAVAVBAFCEN (2)
BAR, ST. LOUIS
BAR, KANSAS CITY

L. C. ALBER

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (REV. 11-55)
PAGE 1

See Instructions for completion prior to filling out

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART 1 – GENERAL

SECTION A – IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD CONVENED BY: Fighter Squadron NINETY-TWO
2. DATE OF ACCIDENT: 10-1-57 TIME: 2020U
3. AAG SERIAL NO.: 2-57
4. TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Op-57)
5. ENCLOSURES: (1) Preflight inspection; statement of
2. Plane Captain; statement of
3. Radio Contact; statement concerning
4. Flight Leader's statement
5. Hamilton AFB Tower
(See Remarks)
6. VIA: (1) Commander, Fleet Air Alameda
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Flt.
(3) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (Aero 512)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(LAST) DIRECTOR, U. S. NAV. AV. SAFETY CENTER
7. REPORTING CUSTODIAN (if different than item number 1)
8. ACTIVITY OPERATING AIRCRAFT (if different than item 7)
9. KIND OF FLT.: 3A6
10. TIME OF DAY: ☐ DAWN ☐ DAY ☐ DUSK ☒ NIGHT
11. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT: 1120 Mag., 13,144' fm Hamilton AFB GCA to tail
12. ELEV. ABOVE SEA LEVEL: Sea Level
13. PLACE OF LAST TAKE-OFF: NAS Alameda
14. CLEARED: Section of aircraft FROM NAS Alameda TO NAS Alameda
15. TYPE CLEARANCE: ☐ IFR ☒ VFR ☐ LOCAL ☐ OPERATIONAL ☐ AIRWAYS ☐ DIRECT ☐ OTHER, Specify
16. TIME IN FLT.: 0-08
17. TYPE ACCIDENT: B-5
18. PHASE OF FLIGHT: (4) Climb Out

AIRCRAFT

19. MODEL: F2H-3
20. SERIAL NO.: 126368
21. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT: ☒ A. ☐ B. ☐ C. ☐ D.
22. DOL. COST: $526,000
23. AIRSPEED (kts): Est. 160
24. A/C WT.: Est. 22,200
25. LIST MODEL, SER. NRS, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (complete separate OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C): NONE

SECTION B – PERSONNEL INFORMATION

PILOT AND CO-PILOT

1. PERSONNEL	2. NAME (last, first and middle initial)	3. RANK, RATE	4. FILE SERV. NO.	5. DESIGNATOR	6. DATE DESIGNATED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	AGE
PILOT (PERSON AT CONTROLS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT)	FISCHER, Stanley C.	LTJG	(b) (6)	1325	10-7-55	(b) (6)	23
CO-PILOT							

8. PERSONNEL	9. OPERATIONAL FLT. TRAINER AVAILABLE?	USED?	10. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	11. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD
PILOT	☒ YES ☐ NO	☒ YES ☐ NO	Fighter Squadron NINETY-TWO	☒ STANDARD ☐ SPECIAL
CO-PILOT	☐ YES ☐ NO	☐ YES ☐ NO		☐ STANDARD ☐ SPECIAL

PILOT, CO-PILOT, STUDENT EXP.

TOTAL PILOT HOURS

ITEM	PILOT	CO-PILOT	STUDENT	ITEM	PILOT	CO-PILOT	STUDENT
ALL MODELS	1059			CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	18/0		
ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MOS.	366			FCLP LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	205/38		
ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MOS.	90			INSTRUMENT HOURS, LAST 3 MONTHS	17.6		
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	279			NIGHT HOURS, LAST 3 MOS.	56		
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL, LAST 12 MONTHS	279			(jet accidents only) TOTAL JET PILOT HOURS	798		
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL, LAST 3 MONTHS	80			DATE LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	30 Sep 57		
				DURATION LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	2.0		

PERSONNEL INVOLVED

NAME (last, first and middle initial)	RANK, RATE	FILE SERVICE NO.	ORG. & STATION ATTACHED	INJURY CODE	BILLET	POSITION
1. FISCHER, Stanley C.	LTJG	(b) (6)	VF-92	A	Pilot	Cockpit
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						

(if additional space needed, use reverse side or attach additional sheets)

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PAGE 2

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV REPORT 3750

SECTION C. WEATHER

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE	OUTSIDE AIR	RUNWAY	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTINGS
Unlimited	15 plus						

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, icing levels, state of sea, etc., if pertinent to accident)

SECTION D. PRIMARY FACTOR / SECTION E. CAUSE FACTOR / SECTION F. SECONDARY FACTOR / SECTION G. DEPLOYMENT

ITEM	P	S	ITEM	P	S	ITEM	P	S
[redacted] (b) (5)								

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD DEPLOYED CARRIERS (Complete following Section on Pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED	2. DAY-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	3. DAY-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS
4. INSTRUMENT HRS. LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT	5. NIGHT-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	6. NIGHT-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS

PART II – MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

SECTION A – AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE DATA

1. AIRCRAFT HISTORY

DATE OF MANUFACTURE	SERVICE TOUR	MONTHS IN THIS TOUR	TOTAL NO. OF OVERHAULS	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	TYPE CHECK LAST PERFORMED	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST CHECK	NO. OF DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
18 Dec 52	2	15	1	459.9	961.7	5th Major	14.1	12

2. ENGINE HISTORY

	ENGINE MODEL	SERIAL NO. OF ENGINE						
NO. 1 18 Feb 52	J34-WE-34	WE 201346	1	87.3	471.6	B	14.1	12
NO. 2 8 Mar 52	J34-WE-34	WE 201383	1	86.9	566.6	B	14.1	12
NO. 3								
NO. 4								

3. GENERAL

a. DID FIRE OCCUR: ☐ BEFORE ACCIDENT ☒ AFTER ACCIDENT ☐ DID NOT OCCUR

b. DID EXPLOSION OCCUR IN FLIGHT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

C. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ AMP FOR SERIAL

D. HAS DIR BEEN REQUESTED? ☒ YES ☐ NO

E. FAILED COMPONENTS INVOLVED

4. A/C MAINT. AND ENG. FACTORS

CHECK BELOW ITEMS PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT

a. ☐ AIRCRAFT DESIGN

b. ☐ AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT

c. ☐ MAINTENANCE

d. ☒ UNDETERMINED

e. ☐ TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION

f. ☐ OTHER, Specify

g. ☐ SURFACE FACILITIES

h. ☐ HUMAN ENGINEERING (e.g. cockpit configurations)

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5. MISCELLANEOUS DATA

A. ALTITUDE AT MALFUNCTION	B. AIR SPEED (kts)	C. OPERATING TEMPERATURE	D. WEIGHT OF AIRCRAFT	E. C.G. (% M.A.C.)	F. KIND OF FUEL	G. FUEL PRESSURE
					115/145	

H. EVIDENCE OF FUEL CONTAMINATION

I. CAUSE OF ENGINE FAILURE OR REAPPOINT

J. FUEL CONTROL REGULATOR/CARBURETOR (List Stock and Ser. nos., give time since new or overhauled)

K. EXTERNAL STORES ABOARD A/C

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(if additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV REPORT 3750-

PART II – MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA (Cont'd)

SECTION B – FACILITIES DATA

1. GEN. (CK. BASIC FACILITIES INVOLVED, DESCRIBE EFFECT ON ACCIDENT IN THE ANALYSIS SECTION)

a. ☐ CLEARANCE AUTHORITY
b. ☐ FLIGHT PLANNING INFORMATION SOURCE
c. ☐ LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, etc.)
d. ☐ TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER (Field or Ship)
e. ☐ APPROACH AND ENROUTE AIDS TO NAVIGATION
f. ☐ RUNWAY WATCH
g. ☐ LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER
w. ☐ OTHER, Specify _____
h. ☐ RUNWAY
i. ☐ WATER LANDING AREA
j. ☐ APPROACH ZONE
k. ☐ END ZONE
l. ☐ SHOULDERS
m. ☐ TAXIWAY
n. ☐ PARKING AREA
o. ☐ EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR (Runway)
p. ☐ AIRCRAFT SERVICING, HANDLING & DIRECTING (Field or Sh)
q. ☒ CRASH AND RESCUE
r. ☒ SEARCH AND RESCUE
s. ☐ CATAPULT
t. ☐ ARRESTING GEAR (Carrier)
u. ☐ BARRIER OR BARRICADE (Field or Ship)
v. ☐ FLIGHT DECK

2. SHIPS DATA

a. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR | B. PRESSURE SETTINGS | C. WIND OVER DECK | D. RELATIVE HEADWIND | E. APPROACH SPEED (SPN-READING)

F. MARK NUMBER | G. MODEL NO. | H. LOCATION ON SHIP | I. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND CONFIGURATION USE

J. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

K. THIS PORTION SHALL BE COMPLETED WHENEVER (1) A MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES ARRESTING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT, OR (2) AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES MALFUNCTIONING OF ARRESTING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT. MINOR ACCIDENTS OR ROUTINE DAMAGE TO CABLES, WELDINGS AND OTHER EXPENDABLE COMPONENTS NEED NOT BE REPORTED.

ENGAGED	DECK RUNOUT (FT.)	RAM TRAVEL (IN.)	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	COMMENTS (for cable failure specify number of landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER							
BARRIER							
BARRICADE							

PART | SECTION | ITEM

PART III – REMARKS (continue on separate sheet if necessary)

Enclosures Cont.
6. Hamilton Control Tower Operator's statement
7. Witnesses' statements
8. Rescue Helicopter Pilot's statement
9. Recovery of pilot's body, statement of
10. Westinghouse Representative's statement [illegible]
11. VF-92 Squadron Duty Officer statement
12. LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] statement of
13. Photographs, prints 1-11
14. Medical Officer's report (original only)

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PART IV – SIGNATURES [illegible]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

THE ACCOUNT

PART V--THE ACCIDENT

The briefing, for a two-plane ground-controlled radar intercept hop, was commenced at 1900 on Tuesday, 1 October 1957. The briefing, in accordance with squadron doctrine, included: radio check on the line (tactical frequency), taxi, take-off with ENS [redacted] leading the flight and taking off first, to be followed by LTJG FISCHER who would remain astern and perform a weapons check during climb to altitude; mission and weather, safety precautions and emergency procedures, with emphasis on the tip-tank fuel transfer system and the emergency release of the tip tanks. (Both pilots had requested full tip tanks).

Prior to the briefing, ENS [redacted] arranged with [redacted] AT3, in the squadron radio shop to conduct a radio check on tactical frequency five minutes after take-off, as ENS [redacted] assigned A/C (NG 205 BUNO 127542) had been having radio discrepancies on previous flights (Enclosure 3).

Upon completion of the briefing, the two pilots manned their aircraft, ENS [redacted] in A/C NG 205 (BUNO 127542) and LTJG FISCHER in A/C NG 203 (BUNO 126368). After turning up, ENS DANIELS called VF-92 radio on tactical frequency for a radio check on the line, and received no reply (Enclosure 4). However, [redacted] AT3, in the radio shop, heard NG 205 call in and answered but it was not acknowledged (Enclosure 3). NG 203 then called 205 on tactical frequency, stating that he read 205 loud and clear and that he was ready to go. ENS [redacted] then proceeded to switch to ground control frequency for taxi instructions and while taxiing, switched to tower frequency for take-off clearance. Approximately thirty seconds after ENS [redacted] started rolling, he heard LTJG FISCHER, in NG 203, state: "203 rolling". The tower checked 203 rolling at 2012U.

After ENS [redacted] became airborne and passed over the Oakland Bay Bridge, on 320° Mag. heading, he continued to climb and attempted to contact VF-92 radio on tactical frequency. ENS [redacted] tried repeatedly to establish contact with either VF-92 radio or NG 203. [redacted] AT3, in VF-92 radio shop heard clicking sounds in his headset, approximately 10 minutes after NG 205 had called in on the line. Thinking NG 205 might be trying to call, [redacted] called NG 205. NG 203 rather than NG 205 acknowledged VF-92's radio call; NG 203 (126368) was airborne at this time. [redacted] AT3, waited about five minutes to see if 205 would call in, and then secured his radio (Enclosure 3). ENS [redacted] passed about one mile west of Hamilton AFB at 6000' and started a turn to port, trying to establish radio or visual contact with NG 203. ENS [redacted] continued his turn to port and as he passed through a radial of 210° from Hamilton AFB at 13,000 feet, he observed a bright explosion at [illegible] followed by a brilliant fire at a position approximately two miles off the south end of runway 30 at Hamilton AFB. ENS [redacted] started to head back for Alameda when he heard Hamilton tower, on guard frequency, state that an aircraft had crashed. He then contacted Alameda tower, on guard, and asked them if they had any information on NG 203. Alameda tower replied

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[illegible] ACCORDANCE
PART VII OPNAVINST 3750.6B

negative, so he informed then Hamilton AFB had reported a crash two to four miles south of Hamilton AFB. NG 205 then proceeded to the Hamilton area and contacted Hamilton tower and advised them that his wingman, NG 203, was missing. He gave Hamilton tower further information as to type aircraft and take-off time and Hamilton tower attempted to contact NG 203 on guard but to no avail. ENS [redacted] (b) (6) then proceeded back to Alameda and requested Alameda tower to inform the VF-92 Squadron Duty Officer that NG 203 was missing and presumed to have crashed. ENS [redacted] (b) (6) remained airborne for another hour and a half to burn down to safe landing weight. NG 205 could only receive on guard.

NG 203 was first observed by Hamilton tower personnel (Enclosure 5) two miles north of Hamilton tower, on a southeasterly heading, at an altitude of approximately three thousand feet. NG 203 was monitored continuously by DARNSLAEDE,A/3C,(Enclosure 6), north of Hamilton tower until he reached a position east of Hamilton tower where the aircraft appeared to nose over, at an altitude variously described as 1000 to 3000 feet (Enclosure 7, Page 2, Capt. Smith's Statement and Enclosure 6), and crashed into San Pablo Bay approximately two miles southeast of Hamilton AFB (Enclosure 13, Prints 5,6, and 7). NG 205 never did receive any voice transmission from NG 203 at any time after take-off. Hamilton tower crash conference phone rang at 2023½U. Hamilton boathouse was called at 2021U and a swamp buggy was dispatched at 2023U. At 2133U, the pilot of the 41st Helicopter squadron reported he was hovering over the pilot's body and chute and awaiting the arrivial of a boat (Enclosure 8). At 2146U, the body was picked up by a civilian boat owned by Mr. [redacted] (b) (6) of [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] (Enclosure 9).

PART VI - DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

The aircraft struck the surface of the water at an estimated angle of 30 degrees, nose level or very slightly elevated with respect to the horizon, right wing down about 10 degrees. The right wing outer panel tore off, the aircraft rolled to the left, nose yawing to the right. The port tail horizontal surfaces were torn off up, aft, and against the vertical stabilizer. The tail section, commencing at the dorsal fairing, was either broken off or blown off by the explosion of the fuel in the main cells. The aircraft was demolished by the impact and explosion, pieces being propelled to the positions indicated in Enclosure 13, Print 6. Both engines were thrown clear of their respective wing root sections. The portion of the fuselage containing the cockpit area was split open along the top. The starboard main landing gear strut assembly, main instrument panel, canopy, ejection seat, and ejection seat launching rails have not yet been located. Both forward lower wing hinge pin fittings (P/N 23-11088-L/R) appear to be intact. Damage to the engines is shown in Enclosure 13 Prints 8,9,10, and 11. to the port wing in Print 4, and to the cockpit section of the fuselage in Print 3. Additional photographs of damaged sections, after all recoverable parts become available and identified, will be submitted as part of a supplementary report. A Disassembly and Inspection of the engines has been requested from Commander Fleet Air Alameda. The remainder of the aircraft will be transferred to the Overhaul and Repair Department, Naval Air Station, Alameda, for salvage upon the completion of the investigation.

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PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6E

PART VII - THE INVESTIGATION

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

[redacted]

PART VIII - THE ANALYSIS

(b) (5)

[redacted]

PART IX - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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(b) (5)

[redacted]

STATEMENT CONCERNING PREFLIGHT INSPECTION OF F2H-3 BUNO 126368:

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

ADAN USN

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ENCLOSURE (1)

STATEMENT OF PLANE CAPTAIN CONCERNING F2H-3 BUNO 126368.

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

ADAN USN

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ENCLOSURE (2)

STATEMENT OF (b) (6) [redacted] AT3, CONCERNING RADIO CONTACT WITH A F2H-3 BUNO 126368 (NG 203)

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

AT3 USN

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ENCLOSURE (3)

STATEMENT OF LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] /1325, USNR, FLIGHT LEADER,
CONCERNING CRASH OF F2H-3 BUNO 126368

(b) (5)

[redacted]

RE-
NCE
50.6B

73 ENCLOSURE (4)

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

LTJG USNR

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ENCLOSURE (4)

Hamilton tower accident report concerning crash of F2H-3 BUNO 126368:

1902nd AACS (AIRWAYS AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE SQUADRON)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
HAMILTON AF BASE, CALIFORNIA

DATE 2 OCTOBER 1957

SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
SUPPLEMENT TO ORIGINAL, DATED 1 OCT. 57.
*SUPPLEMENTS IN PARENTHESIS.

At 2020 PST, tower observed an aircraft, of unknown type, start a steep, vertical dive, commencing at approximately three thousand feet. The aircraft made no visible attempt to pull out of the dive, and exploded upon contact with the water. Aircraft had previously been seen on a southeasterly heading and was monitored continuously. *(Due to the angle described by the aircraft in its final dive, it appeared it had made a right turn from its original heading. This cannot be definately stated, due to the heading the aircraft was on outbound from the field, and also, the view it presented to the tower).

*(Tower had no communications contact with the aircraft, nor did the aircraft, at any time, signal difficulty. The aircraft did not appear to be on fire, from our vantage point, at any time before it struck the water. The aircraft did not appear to be in a spin, for no change in the right wing navigation light was seen. The final dive intercepted the water at an approximate 45 degree angle, and as forestated, no visible attempt was made to pull out of the dive. Due to darkness, no chute was seen). The crash occured at a point approximately two miles off the departure end of runway 12.

Crash conference phone rang at 2020½. Boathouse called at 2021. Equipment on the way to the site at 2023. A running log follows:

2024 Blanket call made on all frequencies by tower to ascertain what aircraft are in local area; also to have all aircraft inbound to Hamilton or based at Hamilton, call in. Two other calls, made at one-minute intervals, followed.

2035 NOVEMBER GOLF 205, Navy F2H, called in and reported his wing man, NOVEMBER GOLF 203, missing. Blanket calls made for NOVEMBER GOLF 203, with no response (both aircraft had departed from Alameda). *(NG 205 called tower on channel # 1. frequency 236.6 mcs).

2036 41st ARS was advised of crash at 2022 and are now sending an SA-16 to the scene.

2050 Coast Guard helicopter 1301 arrived on the scene and started search.

2109 17199, 41st ARS SA-16, off on rescue scramble at this time.

2116 Coast Guard 1301 spotted pieces of wreckage but no sign of life apparent.

2133 7539, 41st helicopter, reported he was hovering over the pilot and his chute and is now awaiting the arrival of a boat. Pilot's condition unknown at this time.

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ENCLOSURE (5) J.B.G.

2146 Pilot reportedly picked up by a boat and taken to the boathouse. Upon calling the boathouse, we were advised that they had no information to that effect and the report could possibly have been in error.

The time is now 2215 and no further information is available. All agencies kept up to date on all developments and all aircraft are returning to their home bases. Aircraft participating in the search were: 7539 and 7513, 41st ARS helicopters; 7199, 41st SA-16; Coast Guard 1301 and Alameda helicopter 15. Base C-45, 0594 also flew over the scene until the rescue aircraft arrived.

James Burns
James BURNS A/2C
Shift Supervisor
Control Tower

76.

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REPORT OF CONTROLLER CONCERNING THE ACCIDENT INVOLVING F2H-3 BUNO 126368

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

ASSISTANT SHIFT SUPERVISOR
CONTROL TOWER

The Aircraft Accident Board considers (b) (6) [redacted] A/3C as a creditable witness.

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ENCLOSURE (6)

THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES' STATEMENTS WERE OBTAINED BY THE SAFETY OFFICER THROUGH INTERVIEWS WITH AIR FORCE PERSONNEL BASED AT HAMILTON AFB, ADJACENT TO THE ACCIDENT AREA.

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

COL., USAF
Dir Comm-Elect
Hq WADF
HAFB

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ENCLOSURE (7)

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

Capt. USAF

(b) (6) [redacted]

HAFB

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

4th WEARCO

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2

ENCLOSURE (7)

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

Lt Colonel, USAF
9482A
HAFB

The Aircraft Accident Board considered Colonel (b) (6) [redacted] Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] Captain (b) (6) [redacted] and (b) (6) [redacted] A/3C as credit-able witnesses.

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ENCLOSURE (7)

STATEMENT OF SEARCH AIR RESCUE HELICOPTER PILOT CONCERNING THE CRASH SCENE OF F2H-3 BUNO 126368:

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

Capt USAF

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ENCLOSURE (8)

STATEMENT OF [redacted] (b) (6) CONCERNING THE CRASH OF F2H-3
BUNO 126368:

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

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ENCLOSURE (9)

NOTE: The following statement, pages two and three of this enclosure, was prepared by Mr. (b) (6) [redacted], who is the Supervisor, Western Area, Aviation Gas Turbine Service Department, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Kansas City, Missouri. Further, Mr. (b) (6) is a graduate of the Crash Investigation Course, University of California at Los Angeles. He is considered by the accident board to be eminently qualified in the field covered by his statement.

Accident Board
Fighter Squadron NINETY TWO

AUTHENTICATED:

(b) (6) [redacted]

LT USNR

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ENCLOSURE (10)

October 10, 1957

To Whom It May Concern:

1.0 The undersigned arrived at NAS, Alameda on 10/9/57 to examine two J34-WE-34 engines involved in the crash of F2H-3 A/C, BuNo. 126368. Engine WE201346 was installed in the port position and Engine WE201383 was in the starboard position. The parts of the engines were examined in Hanger 23.

2.0 Engine WE201346 This engine was recovered in fairly good condition, considering the severity of damage to the airframe. The front bearing support and the accessory gearbox were broken from the engine and the exhaust collector was torn off. The front bearing support was recovered.

2.1 The compressor was found to be intact except for some blades missing from the first two or three stages. These missing blades appeared to have been driven from the rotor by crash impact loads. The blades remaining in the rotor were in good condition, with only a few being bent in a direction opposite to rotation, indicating that the engine was turning at a low RPM at time of impact. This fact was verified by the light compressor rubs in the compressor housing and the light individual blade marks found in the compressor housing.

2.2 The combustion chamber portion of the engine appeared to have suffered only impact damage. The combustion chamber housing was flattened on the bottom but otherwise this portion of the engine was not badly damaged.

2.3 The turbine section of the engine had a normal operating color and did not show signs of having been overtemperatured. The first stage turbine nozzle vanes were seen in the combustion chamber, displaced from their normal position in a manner usually associated with this type of impact loading. Several of the first stage turbine blades were broken near the tip and quite a number of the blades had been displaced about one half chord length axially in a forward direction in the turbine disc. The blades showed only impact damage with no evidence of burning. The second stage nozzles showed no signs of burning but there were a number of vanes with damaged trailing edges. This damage was apparently caused by contact with the second stage turbine blades. This last stage of the turbine also indicated that the engine was turning at a relatively low RPM at time of impact as there was little damage to the blades and the bending of the blades opposite to the direction of rotation was very slight.

2.4 It is the opinion of the writer that this engine was operating in the idle range or windmilling at the time of impact. From the evidence examined, there is no indication of any trouble that would have required the securing of this engine.

3.0 Engine WE201383 The main portion of the engine was recovered intact. Missing were the front bearing support, the accessory gearbox, the turbine housing and the exhaust collector. There were no turbine blades left in the first stage turbine disc and approximately ten blades or pieces of blades were

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PART OF ORDNANCE
NAVAIR 01-1A-34 13790.6B

ENCLOSURE 10

found in the second stage turbine disc. As of this writing, the front bearing support, the accessory gearbox, the turbine housing and the exhaust collector have not been found.

3.1 The compressor rotor of this engine was found intact with all blades in place and relatively light damage on the blades. From the individual blade marks in the compressor housing and from the almost complete absence of damage to the compressor blades, it is believed that the engine was at rest or turning at an extremely low RPM at the time of impact.

3.2 The combustion chamber section of the engine had suffered considerable impact damage and the aft vertical flange had been torn from the engine with the turbine housing. The combustion chamber housing showed signs of elevated operating temperatures for approximately four inches forward of the break. No reason was found for the high temperature of the housing at this point. The combustion chamber liner had suffered impact damage and was very black in the portions that could been seen without further disassembly of the engine. It would appear that this portion of the engine had been operating at higher than normal temperatures although the heat did not appear to have "soaked" into the No. 3 bearing.

3.3 The turbine housing, along with the first and second stage nozzles, was missing from the engine. Some very small pieces of the roots of first stage turbine blades were found in the first stage disc. Otherwise, all of the first stage blades were missing. The forward side of the disc did not appear to have been overtemperatured but the aft side did show some possible heat discoloration. The second stage turbine disc was discolored on both the fore and aft side. Approximately ten blades or portions of blades remained in this disc. The blades showed heat discoloration and some contact damage but there was no evidence of any of the metal being burned away. However, the surfaces of some cracks present were discolored by heat, indicating that the damage existed during or prior to the elevated temperature operation.

3.4 The undersigned believes that this engine was not operating at the time of the crash. It appears that the engine was at rest or rotating very slowly at the A/C impact. The evidence examined indicates that the engine had been operated at higher than normal temperatures and that some form of turbine blade or vane failure occurred during or prior to the overtemperature. This event probably led the pilot to secure the engine, prior to the crash.

4.0 The above opinions are based on a rather limited examination of the engines, the examination being restricted by the fact that the engines could not be further disassembled prior to a DIR by a Navy O&R Dept.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

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ENCLOSURE 10

STATEMENT OF VF-92 DUTY OFFICER ON DUTY 1 OCTOBER 1957 CONCERNING THE CRASH OF F2H-3 BUNO 126368:

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

LTJG USNR

86

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

STATEMENT OF A VF-92 PILOT CONCERNING THE CRASH OF F2H-3 BUNO 126368:

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

LTJG USNR

87

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

ENCLOSURE (12)

DESCRIPTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS

VF-92 AAR 2-57, F2H-3, BUNO 126368

ENCLOSURE 13 PRINT: 1 - View of Port engine, night flash.

2 - View of forward Electronics equipment, night flash.

3.- View of starboard side fuselage, cockpit, night flash.

4 - View of underside port wing and extended port gear, night flash.

5 - Charts showing flight path and point of impact in relation to Hamilton AFB.

6.- View of distribution of wreckage.

7 - Aerial view showing crash area and flight path in relation to runway 30, Hamilton AFB.

8 - View of starboard engine, turbine section.

9 - View of starboard engine, compressor section.

10.- View of port engine, turbine section.

11.- View of port engine, compressor section.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE PART VII OPNAVINST3750.6B

ENCLOSURE
(3) PRINT
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PORT ENGINE

RADAR WAVE
GUIDE
FORWARD ELECTRONICS
COMPARTMENT
RE (B) PRINT 2

ENCLOSURE (1) PRINT 3

ENCLOSURE (1) PRINT 4
PORT WING


APPROXIMATELY WHERE THE LIGHTS OF F2H-3 BUNO 126368 WERE FIRST SIGHTED BY HAMILTON AFB TOWER
HAMILTON AIR FORCE BASE
STANDPIPE
GCA
122°30'06"W
38°03'07"N
FLIGHT PATH
SAN PABLO BAY
CALCULATED POINT OF IMPACT
Gallinas Creek
TOWER
TOWER
OVERHEAD POWER CABLE AUTHORIZED CL 125 FT
Stakes
marsh
Venetia Harbor
China Camp
ENCLOSURE (13) PRINT (5)
CRASH AREA



ENCLOSURE (13) PRINT (6)

DISTRIBUTION OF WREC[illegible]AGE



ENCLOSURE ( ) PRINT (7)



ENCLOSURE ( ) PRINT (7)

STARBOARD ENGINE

ENCLOSURE 13 PRINT 8

ENCLOSURE /3 PRINT 9
STARBOARD ENGINE
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

ENCLOSURE / 3 PRINT / 10

PORT ENGINE


66
PORT ENGINE
ENCLOSURE /3 PRINT //

7 10 01 1 6 4

OPNAV FORM-3750-8 (REV. 2-54) PAGE 3

BAILOUT AND EJECTION REPORT

(Use separate form for each person)

UNIT	VF-92
DATE ACCIDENT	10-1-57
MODEL	F2H3
BU. NO.	126368

NAME | FILE NO. | RANK

1. AT TIME OF EJECTION

		YES	NO
INDICATED AIR SPEED *(Knots)*	FEET IN STIRRUPS		
ALTITUDE ABOVE SEA LEVEL	SEAT BELT FASTENED		
ALTITUDE ABOVE TERRAIN	SHOULDER HARNESS LOCKED		
ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT	SHOULDER HARNESS TIGHT		
	DISCONNECT USED *(Give type)*		

2. WERE "G" FORCES PRESENT ☐ YES ☐ NO — IF YES, STATE NATURE OF FORCE AND DIRECTION OF FORCE

3. LIST DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED IN EJECTION *(jettisoning canopy, positioning, ejecting, etc.)*

4. AFTER EJECTION

HOW LONG WAS FACE CURTAIN HELD AFTER EJECTION

DID SEAT TUMBLE AFTER LEAVING A/C ☐ YES ☐ NO *(If yes, describe)*

AUTOMATIC LAP BELT RELEASE USED ☐ YES ☐ NO TYPE

AUTOMATIC RIP CORD DEVICE USED ☐ YES ☐ NO TYPE

TIME IN SEAT AFTER EJECTION *(Seconds)*

WERE ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN LEAVING SEAT ☐ YES ☐ NO *(If yes, describe)*

5. BAILOUT ONLY

INDICATED AIRSPEED *(Knots)*	
ALTITUDE ABOVE SEA LEVEL	
ALTITUDE ABOVE TERRAIN	
ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT	
BAILOUT OVER RIGHTSIDE	☐ YES ☐ NO
BAILOUT OVER LEFTSIDE	☐ YES ☐ NO
BAILOUT INVERTED	☐ YES ☐ NO

6. BAILOUT AND EJECTIONS

WAS FREE FALL DELIBERATE	☐ YES ☐ NO
WAS BAILOUT OXY GEN AVAILABLE	USED ☐ YES ☐ NO — USEFUL ☐ YES ☐ NO
ALTITUDE RIP CORD PULLED	
ALTITUDE CHUTE OPENED	
BODY POSITION WHEN CHUTE OPENED	
TYPE PARACHUTE	SIZE (CANOPY) FEET
CHUTE HARNESS CINCHED TIGHT	☐ YES ☐ NO
CHUTE DAMAGE	

7. LIST ANY DIFFICULTIES IN PULLING RIP CORD OR CHUTE OPENING

8. DESCRIBE NATURE OF TERRAIN LANDED ON *(rocky, trees, water, etc.)*

9. POSITION OF BODY ON LANDING

10. DIFFICULTIES IN REMOVING HARNESS AND SPILLING CHUTE *(windforce, knots, direction)*

11. METHOD OF RESCUE *(list difficulties)*

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12. LIST TRAINING INDIVIDUAL HAD FOR BAILOUT OR EJECTION

13. SAFETY EQUIPMENT	TYPE	USED	DAMAGED	LOST	DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE OR WHEN LOST
HELMET	HA	X		X	
GOGGLES					
OXYGEN MASK	A13A	X		X	
CLOTHING	SPS	X			
GLOVES	AF				
SHOES	FDG				Right boot lost

14. OTHER SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT *(List all worn, effectiveness and damage)*

Mae West looked around O_2 cartridge retainer. Rip cord housing stretched out.

15. INCLUDE SURVIVING NARRATIVE OF BAILOUT PROCEDURE *(Include remarks on wind blast, force of ejection, emotion, etc.)*

OPNAV FORM-3750-8 (REV. 2-54)

UNIT VF-92
DATE ACCIDENT 10-1-57
MODEL FSH3
BU. NO. 126368

DITCHING AND WATER CRASH REPORT

☐ 1. CONTROLLED DITCHING Unknown at present ☐ 2. WATER CRASH

3. WEATHER — SEA: ☒ SLIGHT ☐ MODERATE ☐ ROUGH — WIND VELOCITY (Knots) (air temp. °F) (Water temp. °F): 3-5 65 EST 55 EST

4. PROCEDURES

CANOPY			DITCHED
☐ JETTISONED	POWER	☐ ON ☐ OFF	☐ INTO WIND
☒ OPEN	WHEELS	☐ UP ☒ DOWN	☐ DOWN WIND
☐ CLOSED	FLAPS	☒ UP ☐ PARTIAL ☐ FULL	☐ CROSS WIND

5. IMPACT (Estimated)

ATTITUDE	ANGLE	SPEED (Knots indicated)	STOPPING DISTANCE (ft.)	NO. OF IMPACTS	TIME A/C FLOATED (Sec.)
Normal	Mush in from several hundred feet. A/C lit on belly.	?	300	1-2	- - - -

6. EXIT

	NAME	BILLET	UNDERWATER	PLACE OF EXIT	DIFFICULTIES
A.		PILOT			Denote below
B.					under A, B,
C.					C and D
D.					

A

B

C

D

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7. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

	SHOES		GLOVES		LIFE VEST		EXPOSURE SUIT		RAFT		USED TO ATTRACT ATTENTION					
	TYPE	DAMAGED	TYPE	DAMAGED	TYPE	DAMAGED	TYPE	DAMAGED	TYPE	DAMAGED	DYE	FLARES	FLASHLIGHT	MIRROR	GUN	RADIO
A	Flight Boot	Right Boot			MK2	Con. 14 Section 5										
B																
C																
D																

8. LIST CAUSE OF DAMAGE, IF ANY, TO SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT (include photo of damage) (use additional sheet, if necessary)

Break in angle actuator arm for CO_2 left side. On crash ??. Both cartridges punctured.

9. LIST ANY DIFFICULTIES OR FAILURES IN USE OF SURVIVAL GEAR (use additional sheet, if necessary)

10. TIME IN RAFT | TIME IN WATER | METHOD OF RESCUE

11. LIST EQUIPMENT DROPPED TO SURVIVORS; STATE IF USED EFFECTIVELY (use additional sheet, if necessary)

12. LIST ALL ITEMS IN SURVIVAL KIT WHICH WERE USED - EFFECTIVENESS (List those needed items which failed or were lost - Recommendations) (Use additional sheet, if necessary)

13. INCLUDE SURVIVORS NARRATIVES