Duplicative

R&DP-20-1(1/68)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

1 MAY 1969 R9156

mok Coded 9-15-69

PCZ

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: BJ REVIEWED: ab LOGGED: Nb PUNCHED: P VERIFIED: P

CARD 1

Field	Columns	Entry
Record Identification – Date – Cal. Yr.	01–02	69
Record Identification – Date – Mo.	03–04	01
Record Identification – Date – Day	05–06	07
Type Report	07	1
Log Line Number	08–09	02
Aircraft Number	10–11	01
Source	12	2
Don't Count	13	
Enemy Action	14	
Aircraft Model – Mission Modif.	15–16	
Aircraft Model – Basic Mission	17	A
Aircraft Model – Design Number	18–20	0A7
Aircraft Model – Series Symbol	21	B
Model Code	22–23	06
Aircraft Bureau Number	24–29	154510
Reporting Custodian	30–32	206
Type Duty	33–35	321
Major Command	36	1
Condition	37	4
Time of Mishap – Local Time	38–41	1835

Field	Columns	Entry
Acdt. Dmg.	42	A
Acft. Dmg.	43	A
Acdt. Inj.	44	L
Acft. Inj.	45	L
Hull Number	46–48	A14
Kind of Flight	49–51	1A7
Clearance	52	2
Location – Name Code	53–59	F5CVA14
Location – Bearing From	60–61	
Location – Dist. From	62	Z
Fac. Rway Descrip. – Distance	63	
Fac. Rway Descrip. – Area	64	
Fac. Rway Descrip. – Runway Heading	65–66	
Fac. Rway Descrip. – Length	67	
Was Duty Rwy Used?	68	
Fac. Ship Descrip. – Ship Type	69	
Fac. Ship Descrip. – Ship Course	70–71	
Fac. Ship Descrip. – Ship Speed	72–73	
Loc'n – Initial Contact	74	
Loc'n – Final Rest	75	
	76	
Trans. Code	77	A
Card Number	78–80	010

CARD 2

Field	Columns	Entry
Relative Wind – Direction	12–13	W4
Relative Wind – Velocity	14–15	30
Density Altitude	16–18	
Alt. of Emergency – Above Terrain	19–21	
Alt. of Emergency – Pressure Altitude	22–24	
Acft. Gross Weight	25–28	0022
	29–30	
Fiscal Year	31–32	69
Fleets and Maws.	33–34	
	35–49	

Field	Columns	Entry
	50–52	
Property Damage Cost – Gov't.	53–55	000
Property Damage Cost – Non Gov't.	56–58	000
Total Occupants This Acft.	59–60	01
Aircraft Injury Summary – Total Injuries "A" "U" "L" – Navy	61–62	01
Total Injuries – Non Navy	63–64	
"A" Injuries – Navy	65–66	
"A" Injuries – Non Navy	67–68	
"U" Injuries – Navy	69–70	
"U" Injuries – Non Navy	71–72	
"L" Injuries – Navy	73–74	N1
"L" Injuries – Non Navy	75–76	
Trans. Code	77	A
Card Number	78–80	020

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 1

CLOSED

R&DP-20-2(1/68)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 3

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Aircraft Injury Summary (cont'd)																								
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		"B" Injuries				"C" Injuries				"D" Injuries				"E" Injuries				"F" Injuries				"G" Injuries				Total Injuries				No. Occupants All Acft. Involved		
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day							Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy				
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
6	9	0	1	0	7	1	0	2	0	1																									0	1			0	0	1

ESCAPE SYS. DATA																																											
Sys.	Component	Spec. Data																Component Separated From Aircraft		Pri Acdt. Type		Pri Phase of Operation		1st Acdt. Type		1st Phase of Operation		2nd Acdt. Type		2nd Phase of Operation		Trans. Code	Card No.		
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																			B	7	4	A		B	7	4	A							A	0	3	0

CARD 4

		3rd Acdt. Type		3rd Phase of Operation			Type Operations		Contributing Causes							Pilot Error Causal Fac.						Pilot Factor After Fact.		Other Personnel Causal Factor						Other Pers. Factor After Fact		Inv. Mat. Comp. 1st Causal Factor					
																First		Second		Third				First		Second		Third				Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
							2	8	Z																												

Involved Mat. Comp. (cont'd.)												Material Fact. After Fact				Acft. Design Comp. Causal Factor						DESIGN C.F.					
2nd Causal Factor						3rd Causal Factor																					
Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Special Equipment	Pilot Equipment	Trans. Code	Card No.		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																											A	0	4	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET ____ OF ____

R&DP-20-3(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 6

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Weather Causal Factor									Environ. Factor									Cause + Factor Primary							Cause + Factor 1st Possible							
Date																			Facility Causal Factor Facility Fact. After Fact										Misc							Misc.							
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day			Type Report		Log Line Number		Aircraft Number																				Wx						Fact	Wx						Fact
																													Pers					Factor		Pers						Factor
																													Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
6	9	0	1	0	7	1	0	2	0	1									G									Z							1						X	J

S Ø

Cause + Factor 2nd Possible							Cause + Factor 3rd Possible						Cause + Factor 4th Possible							Special Attention	Special Data and Conditions																			
Misc							Misc						Misc																												
Wx					Fact		Wx					Fact	Wx					Fact																							
Pers					Factor		Pers					Factor	Pers					Factor																							
Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.																	Trans. Code		Card Number		
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
2					~~B7~~ A9		2					A	8	2					A	7		H	L	R										A	0	6	0

CARD 8

								Material Special Data																																	
								First				Second				Third				Fourth				Fifth				Maneu. Prior To Occur.	OPERATOR INCAPACITATED C.P.										
								Code				Code				Code				Code				Code																	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49				
																												R													

																						Multi. Occurrences			Multi. Maintenance Problems		Trans. Code	Card Number													
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80											
																											A	0	8	0											

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET ____ OF ____

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 9

Record Identification: Date – Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		1st Flight After Maint.	D. I. R.	Tour	Hours Since Acceptance				Aircraft Data – Since Last Insp.: Type	Hours			Days		Since Last Per/O'Haul: Activity	Hours				Months		Power Plant Model Number							
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
6	9	0	1	0	7	1	0	2	0	1			1		1	1	5	C																				

Power Plant Serial Number										Primary Involved Material Component – Manufacturers Part Number																Total Hours				Since Last Per/O'Haul: Activity	Number	Hours					Trans. Code	Card Number		
40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																																					/	Ø	9	Ø

CARD 10

Pri. Inv. Mat. Comp. (cont'd) – Since Last Check Perf.: Type	Hours		Days		Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component – Manufacturers Part Number																Total Hours				Since Last Per/O'Haul: Activity	Number	Hours				Since Last Check Perf.: Type	Hours			Days	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

																											Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												1	Ø	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET ______ OF ______

R&DP-20-6(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 11

RECORD IDENTIFICATION										
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	9	0	1	0	5	1	0	2	0	1

Controlling LSO's Carrier Pass Description																											
Start							Middle							In-Close							Ramp						
Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39

CLCPD (cont'd)								Trans. Code	Card Number		
TOUCH-DOWN											
Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position					
40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47–76	77	78	79	80
									1	1	Ø

CARD 12

12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30

31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61

File or Serial Number (Pilot)							Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Trans. Code	Card Number		
62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
6	7	1	2	8	5	A	5	2	7	1	A	1	L	1	A	1	2	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET ____ OF ____

R&DP-20-7(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 13

RECORD IDENTIFICATION: Date – Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	9	0	1	0	7	1	0	2	0	1

Pilot Factor Inv.	Service Tour	Instrument Card	Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 6 Months		Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 12 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 6 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 12 Months	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
2		2			1	6			Ø	1

Time All Models Total		Time All Models Last 3 Months		Time This Model Total		Time This Model Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Number of → Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model	
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
0	5	1	4	1	9	1	0		6	2	9	H	7	3	2	0	2	0

Carrier Landings: Total Nite This Model		This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days											
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57
0	9														

File or Serial Number (Co-Pilot)							Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Service Tour	Instr. Card		Trans. Code	Card Number		
58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																			A	1	3	Ø

CARD 14

Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 6 Months		Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 12 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 6 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 12 Months		Time All Models Total		Time All Models Last 3 Months		Time This Model Total		Time This Model Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

Total Jet or Helo Time		Number of Carrier Landings: Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model		Total Nite This Model		This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days						
32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

				File or Serial Number (Instr. Plt. in Other A/C)								Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65

Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Service Tour	Instr. Card					Trans. Code	Card Number		
66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
												1	4	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET ____ OF ____

R&DP-20-8(1/68)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Emerg. Syst. Train.				Instrument Trainer				Time All Models				Time This Model										Number of Carrier →						
Date																																							
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model		Total Nite This Model	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	9	0	1	0	7	1	0	2	0	1																													

Landings																																							
This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days				This Individual in Acft.			Name (Instr. Plt. in Other Acft.)																				Number of Personnel Records							Trans. Code	Card Number		
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																													0	1						A	1	5	Ø

CARD 16

P								File or Serial Number (All Persons)							Name										Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Card Code 65				
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
P								(b) (6) [redacted]							C	O	I	N	M	A	N		W	M	5	2	7	1	A	1	L	1	6	5			

Equip 1						Equip 2						Equip 3						Equip 4												
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number			
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																									0	1	A	1	6	Ø

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET ____ OF ____

R&DP-20-16(1/68)

LD. Number: 69 01 07 102 | 1 | N N N | 1 | 14 | A

Common Fields in All Cards

CLASS CODE: 1 - Non-Class; 2 - Conf

TYPE BRIEFS — CODES: 1 - GEN. MISHAP; 2 - BIO-MED; 3 - SAF-SURV; 4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. CODED 3/3/69 REVIEWED CC KEY PUNCHED VERIFIED

COLL WATER AFTER NIGHT BOLTER. PLT BOLTERED ON 7TH CC
A APPR AFTER 6 TECHNIQUE W/O. PLT CLR OUT WINGS LEVEL
, STRAIGHT AHEAD & 8 SECONDS LATER REQ DOWNWIND TURN.
SUPV PERS HAD PREVIOUSLY DECIDED TO DIVERT PLT IF NO
ARREST ON 7TH APPR. FOLLOWING PLT'S DOWNWIND REQ, CC
A GAVE DIVERT INFO WHICH WAS ROGERED FOR BY PLT. 20 S
ECONDS LATER ACFT IMPACTED WITH WATER. NO APPARENT EJ
T. PLT & ACFT LOST @ SEA. ACFT OBSR TO ENTER OVERCAST
MOMENTARILY & THEN BEGIN INCREASING RATE OF DESCENT
TO IMPACT. EST CEILING 7C FT, NO HORIZ, VIS 5 MILES,
SEA SWELL CALM. 1 OTHER PLT REPT VERTIGO DURING LAN O
~~PS. PRI- UNDET. PROB PLT- PREOCCUPATION AT A CRITICAL~~
~~MOMENT. PROB OTHER PERS- CONT PERS- CCA GAVE VERBOSE~~
~~DIVERT INSTRUCTIONS WHILE PLT BELOW 5C FT.~~
~~PS. PRI- UNDET. PROB PLT- SPATIAL DISORIENTATION. PRO~~
~~B OTHER PERS- CONT PERS- CCA GAVE VERBOSE DIVERT INST~~
~~RUCTIONS WHILE PLT BELOW 5C FT CAUSING DIVERSION AST~~
~~NFO COPIED.~~

CARD NO.

— SEE CORRECTED CARD —

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/22 (REV. 5/69)

GENERAL DATA SECTION NARRATIVE BRIEF

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 Typ Brief	13 14 15 Narr File I.D.	69 CL	70 71 72 73 Orig. Use	75 76 Tot-Cds	77 78 Trans. Code
	69	01	07	10	2	1	N N N	1			A

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf.

CARD NO. CODED _____ REVIEWED _____ KEY PUNCHED _____ VERIFIED _____

Card No.	Text
12	PS. SHIP COMMAND LEVEL, FLT CONTROLLING + SQD COMMAND
13	LEVEL ALL PROB CAUSAL FACTORS DUE ALLOWING PLT TO PE
14	RFORM EXCESS NUMBER OF APPROACHES WHEN HIS PERFORMANC
15	E INDIC DIFFICULTY IN ACFT CONT. PRI- UNDET. PROB PLT
16	- DISORIENTATION/DISTRACTION. PROB OTHER PERS- SUPV-
17	SHIP COMMAND LEVEL, PROB O/P- SUPV- FLT CONT. PROB O/
18	P- SUPV- SQD COMMAND LEVEL.
08	
09	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	

CARD NO.

R&DP-30(6/68)

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: RECORDS DEPT

DATE 19 MAY 1969

TO: (1) CODING SECT
(2) REC CONT BRANCH
(3) ADPE DIV DP 28 MAY 1969
(4) REC CONT BRANCH

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen Data Sect of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.									AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYP-RPT	LOG NUMBER			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	9	Ø	1	Ø	7	1	4	2	Ø	1

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL OF FLD START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS	PERSON SEQ NUMBER	FIELD LENGTH	DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)	TAPE REC DIV NO.	TRANS CODE
1	SOURCE	Ø1	12	12 13 14 15 Ø Ø 1 2	16 17 Ø Ø	18 19 Ø 1	20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 1		
2	1ST PROB CAUS FACTOR	Ø6	41	30 31 32 33 Ø 2 9 6	34 35 Ø Ø	36 37 Ø 2	38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 S Ø		
3				48 49 50 51	52 53	54 55	56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65	66 67 Ø 1	77 M

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

R&DP-22 (1/68)

NARRATIVE BRIEF CHANGE SHEET

Date 19 MAY '69

IDENT. NO.										TRANS. CODE
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYPE REPT	LOG	LINE NO.	TYPE BRIEF	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77
6	9	Ø	1	Ø	7	1	Ø	2	1	M

TYPE BRIEF CODE
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

NOTE: 1) TO DELETE THE ENTIRE BRIEF USE CARD COLUMNS 1-10 AND PLACE TRANS. CODE D IN CARD COLUMN 77.
2) TO MODIFY BRIEF, COMPLETE CARD COLUMNS 1-10 WITH CODE M IN CARD COLUMN 77. IDENTIFY CARD NO. TO BE MODIFIED IN BRIEF CARD NO. FIELD (CC 11-12) AND REWRITE THAT ENTIRE CARD AND ALL SUBSEQUENT CARDS THAT WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THIS CORRECTION. CORRECTED DATA WILL OVERLAY THE TAPE DATA WHICH IS DESIRED TO BE CORRECTED IN CARD IMAGE.
3) IF 50% OR MORE OF THE CARDS IN A BRIEF ARE AFFECTED BY THE CHANGE, USE THE DELETE OPTION AND REWRITE THE ENTIRE BRIEF (WHEN MIN. OF 10 CARDS/BRIEF).

CHANGED NARRATIVE BRIEF

BRIEF CARD # REQ. CHG.	
11	12
12	
13	
14	
15	

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

PS. PRI- UNDET. PROB PLT- SPATIAL DISORIENTATION. PRO
B OTHER PERS- CONT PERS- CCA GAVE VERBOSE DIVERT INST
RUCTIONS WHILE PLT BELOW 5C FT CAUSING DIVERSION AS I
NFO COPIED.

PREPARED BY (b) (6) [redacted]
ORGANIZATION/DEPT

REVIEWED

PUNCHED D

26 MAY 1969

VERIFIED P

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION DIRECTOR CARD

NAVSAFECEN 3750 – 1/20 (NEW 3/69)

COINMAN

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: 6-15 REVIEWED: LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: 9 VERIFIED: K 18 SEP 1969

RECORD IDENTIFICATION																														
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number			Trans Code	No. of Aircraft in Mishap									Corrected Mishap Identification Number									
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																											
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
6	9	0	1	0	7	1	0	2	0	0		A	0	1															

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 9

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 1(ACFT)

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/21 (Rev 3/69)

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: RK REVIEWED: ___ LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: ___ VERIFIED: ___

Card 1

RECORD IDENTIFICATION																																									
Date																																									
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report		Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Format No.	Trans Code	Card Number			Reporting Custodian			Acft. Damage	Total Pers. This Acft		Mission Modif.		Basic Mission	Design No.			Series Symbol	Aircraft Bureau Number					
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35
6	9	0	1	0	7	1	0	2	0	1	1	A	B	1		2	0	6	A	0	1			A	0	0	7	B	1	5	4	5	1	0

Altitude of Emergency															Time At Alt.																										
Terrain Clearance					Cabin Altitude					Ambient Altitude					At Cabin Altitude			At Ambient Altitude			Place in Formation	Cloud Condition	Time of Mishap: Horizon	Time of Mishap: Condition	DURATION OF FLIGHT														
36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63														
															0	0	5	0	0	5	A	1	2	4	0	1	8													

Card 2

Format No.	Trans Code	Card Number		Kind of Flight				Narrative Identification: Safety and Survival						Narrative Identification: Bio-Med						Combat Environment	Primary Cause	Enemy Action
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
1	A	B	2		1	A	7	Y						0	C						Z	

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 2 OF 9

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO 2(LONG)

1

I.D. Number	69	01	07	02	01	2	A	01	19
	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 8 Tvp	9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/10 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 3 OF 9

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

CODED: BY REVIEWED ____ LOGGED ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN. TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
01		13		FILE/SERVICE NO.	002207		(b) (6) [redacted]
		13		NAME	002907		COINMAN
		09		NAME (CONT)	003603		D M
		07		RANK/RATE	003901		5
02		07		BRANCH OF SERVICE	004001		1
		07		STATUS	004101		A
		07		INJURY	004201		L
		07		DISPOSITION	004301		U
		08		DAYS HOSPITALIZED	004402		
		08		DAYS QUARTERS	004602		
		08		DAYS GROUNDED	004802		
		09		UNCONSCIOUS	005003		
		08		AMNESIA	005302		I
		08		EXPOSURE/SHOCK	005502		I
03		13		INJURY NO. 1 BODY PART	005707		10100C
		13		INJURY NO. 1 DIAGNOSIS	006407		2241444
		13		INJURY NO. 1 CAUSE	007107		8005/6A
		13		INJURY NO. 2 BODY PART	007807		
		13		INJURY NO. 2 DIAGNOSIS	008507		
		13		INJURY NO. 2 CAUSE	009207		
		13		INJURY NO. 3 BODY PART	009907		
		13		INJURY NO. 3 DIAGNOSIS	010607		
		13		INJURY NO. 3 CAUSE	011307		
		13		INJURY NO. 4 BODY PART	012007		
		13		INJURY NO. 4 DIAGNOSIS	012707		
		13		INJURY NO. 4 CAUSE	013407		
		13		INJURY NO. 5 BODY PART	014107		
		13		INJURY NO. 5 DIAGNOSIS	014807		
		13		INJURY NO. 5 CAUSE	015507		
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 1	016206		
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 2	016806		
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 3	017406		
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 4	018006		
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 5	018606		
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 6	019206		
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 7	019806		
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 8	020406		
		08		X-RAY	021002		
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 1	021203		
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 2	021503		

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

2

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/11 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 4 OF 9

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

CODED: 08 REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	69	01	07	1	02	01	2	A	01	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 3	0218	03	
		08		AUTOPSY	0221	02	
		10		MATERIAL TO AFIP	0223	04	
		07		AFIP REPORT	0227	01	
		11		ADDITONAL INJURY NO. 1	0228	05	
		11		ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 2	0233	05	
		11		ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 3	0238	05	
		11		ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 4	0243	05	
5		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 1	0248	05	302AD
04		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 2	0253	05	710AD
		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 3	0258	05	303AD
		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 4	0263	05	608AS
		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 5	0268	05	615AS
05		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 6	0273	05	623AS
		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 7	0278	05	811AS
		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 8	0283	05	
		08		ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL	0288	02	A1
		12		LEAVE INFO - DATE LAST LEAVE	0290	06	281268
06		09		LEAVE INFO - NO. OF DAYS/TYPE	0296	03	05A
		12		DATE LAST PREV. FLIGHT	0299	06	070169

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		09		HOURS FLOWN LAST 24	0305	03	039
		09		HOURS FLOWN LAST 48	0308	03	029
07		10		MISSIONS FLOWN LAST 24 (2)/48 (2)	0311	04	0202
		12		HOURS WORKED LAST 24 (3)/48 (3)	0315	06	130210
		12		HOURS SLEPT LAST 24 (3)/48 (3)	0321	06	080160
		09		HOURS DUTY PRIOR TO MISHAP	0327	03	110
		09		HOURS AWAKE PRIOR TO MISHAP	0330	03	
08		09		HOURS DURATION LAST SLEEP	0333	03	080
		08		TIME IN COCKPIT PRIOR TO MISHAP	0336	02	30
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 1	0338	06	102680
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 2	0344	06	602680
09		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 3	0350	06	002680
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 4	0356	06	
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 5	0362	06	
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 6	0368	06	
		08		AGE	0374	02	26
		08		HEIGHT	0376	02	70
		09		WEIGHT	0378	03	145
10		09		SITTING HEIGHT	0381	03	360
		09		TRUNK HEIGHT	0384	03	242

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

3

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	69	Ø1	Ø7	1	Ø2	Ø1	2	A	Ø1	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/12 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 5 OF 9

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

CODED: Ø1 REVIEWED: ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		09		FUNCTIONAL REACH	0387	03	
		09		BUTTOCK-KNEE LENGTH	0390	03	26Ø
		09		LEG LENGTH	0393	03	44Ø
11		09		SHOULDER WIDTH	0396	03	17Ø
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 1	0399	07	9999ØØA
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 1 CONTINUED	0406	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 1 CONTINUED	0412	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 2	0416	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 2 CONTINUED	0423	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 2 CONTINUED	0429	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 3	0433	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 3 CONTINUED	0440	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 3 CONTINUED	0446	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 4	0450	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 4 CONTINUED	0457	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 4 CONTINUED	0463	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 5	0467	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 5 CONTINUED	0474	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 5 CONTINUED	0480	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 6	0484	07	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 6 CONTINUED	0491	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 6 CONTINUED	0497	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 7	0501	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 7 CONTINUED	0508	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 7 CONTINUED	0514	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 8	0518	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 8 CONTINUED	0525	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 8 CONTINUED	0531	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 9	0535	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 9 CONTINUED	0542	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 9 CONTINUED	0548	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 10	0552	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 10 CONTINUED	0559	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 10 CONTINUED	0565	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 11	0569	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 11 CONTINUED	0576	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 11 CONTINUED	0582	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 12	0586	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 12 CONTINUED	0593	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 12 CONTINUED	0599	04	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

4

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	69	Ø1	Ø7	1	Ø2	Ø1	2	A	Ø1	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/10 (REV 2-69)

CODE SHEET 6 OF 9

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

CODED: OK REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 13	0603	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 13 CONTINUED	0610	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 13 CONTINUED	0616	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 14	0620	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 14 CONTINUED	0627	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 14 CONTINUED	0633	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 15	0637	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 15 CONTINUED	0644	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 15 CONTINUED	0650	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 16	0654	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 16 CONTINUED	0661	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 16 CONTINUED	0667	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 17	0671	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 17 CONTINUED	0678	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 17 CONTINUED	0684	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 18	0688	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 18 CONTINUED	0695	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 18 CONTINUED	0701	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 19	0705	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 19 CONTINUED	0712	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 19 CONTINUED	0718	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 20	0722	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 20 CONTINUED	0729	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 20 CONTINUED	0735	04	
S		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 21	0739	04	Ø1Ø1
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 22	0743	04	Ø6Ø3
12		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 23	0747	04	Ø8Ø1
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 24	0751	04	Ø9Ø1
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 25	0755	04	Ø7Ø7
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 26	0759	04	1Ø01
13		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 27	0763	04	1303
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 28	0767	04	1602
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 29	0771	04	1703
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 30	0775	04	1807
14		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 31	0779	04	1901
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 32	0783	04	1904
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 33	0787	04	1917
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 34	0791	04	2009
15		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 35	0795	04	2108
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 36	0799	04	2202

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

5

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 16 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	69	01	07	1	02	01	2	A	01	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/14 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 7 OF 9

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

CODED: 04 REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
5		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 37	0803	04	2201
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 38	0807	04	2501
16		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 39	0811	04	2801
		0		EQUIPMENT NO. 40	0815	04	2914
		11		LOCATION IN AIRCRAFT	0819	05	
		09		METHOD OF ESCAPE	0824	03	7 7
		07		INTENT FOR ESCAPE	0827	01	
		07		EXIT USED	0828	01	
		07		COCKPIT CONDITION	0829	01	
		08		ORDER OF ESCAPE	0830	02	
		09		REASON(S) FOR ESCAPE	0832	03	
		08		COMMUNICATION PRIOR TO ESCAPE	0835	02	
		10		NUMBER OF PREVIOUS ESCAPES	0837	04	
		09		TERRAIN OF LANDING OR CRASH SITE	0841	03	
		13		AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE	0844	07	
		08		AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE CONTINUED	0851	02	
	5	14		EJT. TRAINING/LECTURES	0853	07	0 0 0 0 9
17		14		EJT. TRAINING/FILMS	0860	07	0 0 0 0 9
		14		EJT. TRAINING/ UNARMED SEAT	0867	07	0 0 0 0 9
		14		EJT. TRAINING/ ARMED SEAT	0874	07	0 0 0 0 9

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		09		JUMP/PARASAIL/OTHER SCHOOL ROLE	0881	03	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. BEFORE PROB. 1 & 2	0884	06	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. BEFORE PROB. 3 & 4	0890	06	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. DURING PROB. 1 & 2	0896	06	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. DURING PROB. 3 & 4	0902	06	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. AFTER PROB. 1 & 2	0908	06	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. AFTER PROB. 3 & 4	0914	06	
		11		TIME FROM EMER UNTIL ESCAPE ATTEM.	0920	05	
		09		REASON FOR DELAY	0925	03	
		11		TERRAIN CLEAR AT ESCAPE	0928	05	
		11		TERRAIN CLEAR AT PRCHT. OPENING	0933	05	
		09		AIR SPEED	0938	03	
		09		GROUND SPEED	0941	03	
		07		PRCHT. DID NOT OPEN	0944	01	
		12		PROTECTIVE HELMET CHINSTRAP/VISOR	0945	06	
		08		CHIN STRAP NAPE STRAP	0951	02	
		08		ZERO LANYARD	0953	02	
		07		AUTO LAP BELT RELEASE	0955	01	
		10		ACFT. CANOPY REMOVAL	0956	04	
		09		EJECTION	0960	03	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

6

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	6 9	0 1	0 7		0 2	0 1	2	A	0 1	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/15 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 8 OF 9

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

CODED 21 REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 0		BODY POSITION	0 9 6 3	0 4	
		0 9		SEAT POSITION/SEPAR TYPE SEPARATION	0 9 6 7	0 3	
		1 2		Parachute Data Deploy/Open Shock/Oscillat	0 9 7 0	0 6	
		1 0		PARACHUTE DAMAGE	0 9 7 6	0 4	
		1 0		PARACHUTE DAMAGE CAUSE	0 9 8 0	0 4	
		0 7		DIRECTION FACED AT CHUTE LANDING	0 9 8 4	0 1	
		1 1		LANDING CONDITIONS (WEIGHT WINDS)	0 9 8 5	0 5	
		0 9		DRAGGED BY CHUTE DISTANCE DRAGGED	0 9 9 0	0 3	
		1 0		LANDING POSITION	0 9 9 3	0 4	
		0 9		DEPLOYED BEFORE LANDING	0 9 9 7	0 3	
		0 7		CANOPY DEFLATION POCKETS	1 0 0 0	0 1	
S		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAINING SWIM	1 0 0 1	0 5	0 6 6 8 0
18		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAINING GILBERT DUNK	1 0 0 6	0 5	1 0 6 6 0
		1 1		PARACHUTE DRAG	1 0 1 1	0 5	0 6 6 8 0
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN IMMERSED COCKPIT	1 0 1 6	0 5	
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN IMMERSED SEAT	1 0 2 1	0 5	
S		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN JUNGLE	1 0 2 6	0 5	0 3 6 8 0
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN ARCTIC	1 0 3 1	0 5	0 3 6 8 0
19		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN DESERT	1 0 3 6	0 5	0 3 6 8 0
		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAIN MOUNTAIN	1 0 4 1	0 5	0 3 6 8 0

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
S		1 1		SURVIVAL TRAINING GENERAL	1 0 4 6	0 5	0 6 6 8 0
		1 3		CONDITIONS AT SURVIVAL/ RESCUE SITE (TEMP WINDS)	1 0 5 1	0 7	
		1 0		CONDITION AT SITE CONT. (WAVES)	1 0 5 8	0 4	
		1 0		CONDITION AT SITE CONT. (TERRAIN WEATHER)	1 0 6 2	0 4	
		1 1		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO ALERT (RESCUE VEH)	1 0 6 6	0 5	
		1 0		TIME LAPSE OTHER ASSIST NO. 1	1 0 7 1	0 4	
		1 0		TIME LAPSE OTHER ASSIST NO. 2	1 0 7 5	0 4	
		1 1		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (RESC VEH)	1 0 7 9	0 5	
		1 0		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (ASSIST NO. 1)	1 0 8 4	0 4	
		1 0		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (ASSIST NO. 2)	1 0 8 8	0 4	
		1 1		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (RESCUE VEH)	1 0 9 2	0 5	
		1 0		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (ASSIST NO. 1)	1 0 9 7	0 4	
		1 0		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (ASSIST NO. 2)	1 1 0 1	0 4	
		1 1		TIME LOCATE TO REACH (RESCUE VEHICLE)	1 1 0 5	0 5	
		1 0		LOCATE TO REACH (ASSIST NO. 1)	1 1 1 0	0 4	
		1 0		LOCATE TO REACH (ASSIST NO. 2)	1 1 1 4	0 4	
		1 1		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO RESCUE/ABANDON	1 1 1 8	0 5	
		1 0		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO RESCUE COMPLETE	1 1 2 3	0 4	
		1 0		TIME IN WATER	1 1 2 7	0 4	
		1 0		TIME IN RAFT	1 1 3 1	0 4	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP NARRATIVE CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 3

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/19 (REV 2/69)

CARD 1 OF 9

CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED

PUNCHED: VERIFIED:

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 8 9 Log	12 Format No.	13 Trans Code	18 19 Tot. No. Cards
	69	01	07	102	3	A	03

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CARD NO. 14 15 16

01	THE PILOT ATTEMPTING TO LAND ABOARD CVA, TOOK SIX
02	SUCCESSIVE W/O. HIS 7TH PASS WAS A BOLTER AT WHICH
03	TIME HE WAS BINGOED TO BEACH. THE ACFT WAS OBSVRD
04	TO ENTER EDGE OF OVERCAST + THEN DESCENT AT APPROX
05	45 DEGREES + IMPACT WATER. THE PLT WAS LOST WITH T
06	HE ACFT. THE MOR INDICATES THAT FATIGUE, INDUCED
07	BY THE NUMBER OF ATTEMPTS TO COME ABOARD PLUS DISO
08	RIENTATION, DISTRACTION CAUSED BY XMISSIONS TO PLT
09	MAY HAVE CONTRIB TO MISHAP
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

1

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	6	9	0	1	0	7	0	2	0	1	2	C	0	1	0	1

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/10 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET ____ OF ____

AIRCRAFT ____ OF ____ PERSONNEL ____ OF ____

CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN. TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 3		FILE/SERVICE NO.	0 0 2 2	0 7	
		1 3		NAME	0 0 2 9	0 7	
		0 9		NAME (CONT)	0 0 3 6	0 3	
		0 7		RANK/RATE	0 0 3 9	0 1	
		0 7		BRANCH OF SERVICE	0 0 4 0	0 1	
		0 7		STATUS	0 0 4 1	0 1	
		0 7		INJURY	0 0 4 2	0 1	
		0 7		DISPOSITION	0 0 4 3	0 1	
		0 8		DAYS HOSPITALIZED	0 0 4 4	0 2	
		0 8		DAYS QUARTERS	0 0 4 6	0 2	
		0 8		DAYS GROUNDED	0 0 4 8	0 2	
		0 9		UNCONSCIOUS	0 0 5 0	0 3	
		0 8		AMNESIA	0 0 5 3	0 2	
		0 8		EXPOSURE/SHOCK	0 0 5 5	0 2	
0 1		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 BODY PART	0 0 5 7	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 DIAGNOSIS	0 0 6 4	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 1 CAUSE	0 0 7 1	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 BODY PART	0 0 7 8	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 DIAGNOSIS	0 0 8 5	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 2 CAUSE	0 0 9 2	0 7	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 BODY PART	0 0 9 9	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 0 6	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 3 CAUSE	0 1 1 3	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 BODY PART	0 1 2 0	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 2 7	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 4 CAUSE	0 1 3 4	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 BODY PART	0 1 4 1	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 4 8	0 7	
		1 3		INJURY NO. 5 CAUSE	0 1 5 5	0 7	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 1	0 1 6 2	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 2	0 1 6 8	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 3	0 1 7 4	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 4	0 1 8 0	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 5	0 1 8 6	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 6	0 1 9 2	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 7	0 1 9 8	0 6	
		1 2		LABORATORY TEST NO. 8	0 2 0 4	0 6	
		0 8		X-RAY	0 2 1 0	0 2	
		0 9		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 1	0 2 1 2	0 3	
		0 9		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 2	0 2 1 5	0 3	

TO: (1) CODING SECT. Chg Dir
(2) REC. CONT. BRANCH 93-7-10
(3) ADPE DIV 29 JUL 1970
(4) REC. CONT. BRANCH

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq. No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen. Data Sect. of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq. No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq. No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.										
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYPE REPT	LOG NUMBER		AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	9	Ø	1	Ø	7	1	Ø	2	Ø	1

Corrected

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL. OF FLD. START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS	PERSON SEQ. NUMBER	FIELD LENGTH	DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)	TAPE REC DIV. NO.	TRANS. CODE
				12 13 14 15	16 17	18 19	20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29		
✓ 1	2ND PROB CAUSE FACT	46	10	Ø3 Ø3	ØØ	05	09		
				30 31 32 33	34 35	36 37	38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47		
✓ 2	3RD PROB CAUS FACTOR	46	50	Ø3 Ø5	ØØ	Ø7	2 A 8		
				48 49 50 51	52 53	54 55	56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67		77
✓ 3	4TH PROB CAUS FACTOR	46	57	Ø3 12	ØØ	Ø7	2 A 7	Ø1	M

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV. may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

ORIGINATORS SIGNATURE

R&DP-30(6/68)

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: MdM / Records DEPT

DATE 6-3-69 6/23/69

TO: (1) CODING SECT chg in flue [illegible] 6/23/69
(2) REC CONT BRANCH
(3) ADPE DIV 0 JUL [illegible] 0
(4) REC CONT BRANCH

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen Data Sect of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.										
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYP-RPT	LOG NUMBER		AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	9	Ø	1	Ø	7	1	Ø	2	Ø	1

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL OF FLD START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS				PERSON SEQ NUMBER		FIELD LENGTH		DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)										TAPE REC DIV NO.		TRANS CODE
				12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29			
1	SPEC DATA	6	67	Ø	3	2	2	Ø	Ø	Ø	1													
				30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47			
2																								
				48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	77
3																						Ø	1	M

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

NAVAL SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

111B3/gr
3750/2
Ser 1296
20 June 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron TWENTY-FIVE

Subj: VA-25 AAR ser 2-69A concerning A-7B BuNo 154510 accident occurring 7 January 1969, pilot COINMAN

1. The subject report and all endorsements have been reviewed. Concur with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. The cause factors contributing to this accident have been recorded as follows:

*a. PILOT and MAINTENANCE/MATERIAL--UNDETERMINED (most probable--pilot disorientation/distraction).

b. OTHER PERSONNEL--SUPERVISORY (command, flight control and ship level--allowed excessive number of approaches when pilot's performance indicated difficulty in aircraft control).

3. WEATHER (low ceilings and lack of horizon) has been recorded as an environmental factor in this mishap.

*Primary

(b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E) (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
CO USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14)
COMCVW-16
NAVPRO DALLAS
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

R&DP-8 (11-67)

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE-OUT" LETTER
ON ORIGINAL REVIEW

NOTE: 1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DPEARTMENT: None

(b) (6) [redacted] 126

INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPARTMENT: To Dr Alhot.

No specific aeromed comments / 82

No comment 83 J

Concur c̄ MOR - Pilots should Confess to fatigue.

This case may well represent the effects of stress, fatigue causing changes in the cardiovascular reaction and changes in oculomotor equilibrium & vestibular leading to misjudging of distance, altitude, spatial relationships as well as misreading of flight instrumentation. 84 (cont).

INITIAL/CODE

No Comment HWP

R&DP-7 (11-67)

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to: Correction to:		Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1			/
DIR			/
Misc Items for Action or Correction			
To Code	From Code/Date		
	511 / 2-24-69	Rough draft gig for (2) Adv AAR w/MOR S. Tuning	/
		Hard coded 2/26/69 released 4/29/69 ab BW	/
	511 / 4-17-69	Rough draft gig for 3rd Endorsement. pH	/
	511 / 5-16-69	ORIGINAL REC'D	/
511	512D / 7-17-70	Final review completed and document ready for the closed file.	/
	20 JUL 1970	CLOSED	/

R&DP-27(4/68)

UNIT VA-25
MODEL A7B
BUNO 154510

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING:
	M&M		6.3.69	[illegible]	
	AERO-MED	23 MAY	5-20-69 JUN 1969	HWP	DO NOT ROUTE

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS:
REMARKS:

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NAVAVNSAFECEN 18 JUN 1969
EXTENSIONS

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
11/B3 AOA	4 June		~~6-11-69~~	~~[illegible]~~	

19 June 69 L99

NAVAVNSAFECEN ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT
1	R&DP			
2	M&M			
3	ADMIN			

AVA 6/23/69

ROUTING AFTER CLOSE-OUT

DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
AERO-MED				

NOTES: 1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder.

2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch.

3. Any department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

3750
80/ 5416

20 JUN 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FIRST ENDORSEMENT ON CO, VA-25 LTR ser 253 of 23 May 1969

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center

Subj: VA-25 AAR 2-69A

1. Forwarded, contents noted.

(b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:
CO, ATKRON TWO FIVE
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMATKCARWING ONE SIX
CO USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14)
NAVAIRTESTCENPAX

ORIGINAL

80/81

ATTACK SQUADRON TWENTY FIVE
FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO 96601

VA25:03
3750
Ser 253
23 May 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

From: Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron 25, FPO San Francisco 96601
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center, Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia 23511
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: ATKRON 25 Accident Report Serial 2-69A; comments concerning

Ref: (a) COMFAIRALAMEDA FOURTH ENDORSEMENT Ser 80/1531 of 25 Apr 69 on VA-25 Accident, Serial 2-69A

1. Reference (a) indicates a statement by the Maintenance Officer, covering findings of a maintenance records review, should have been included in the subject report.

2. The AAR Board examined the maintenance records in making its initial determination that aircraft malfunction be eliminated as a possible cause of the accident. The examination of the records revealed two discrepancies and associated corrective action:

a. Loss of power to attitude director indicator, standby gyro, and horizontal situation indicator. The corrective action was incorporation of Interim Air Frames Change 70. (ASN-50) Power Interlock Bypass Switch)

b. Stick would not center on UHT viscous dampener check. The corrective action was reinstallation of a bolt in the linkage that was previously incorrectly installed. These discrepancies were the only two recorded in the hydraulic/flight control, engine or electrical/instrument categories. The corrective action was satisfactory and the aircraft had no discrepancies during four flights and 7.0 hours before the accident.

3. The AAR did not include a statement concerning the maintenance records investigation. However, the records were reviewed, as noted above, and given proper attention in the investigation.

S. L. SMITH

Copy to:
COMNAVSAFECEN (2)
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
NAVAIRTESTCEN
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMATKCARAIRWING 16
CO, USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14)

ORIGINAL

3750
80/ 3924

12 MAY 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FIFTH INDORSEMENT on VA-25 AAR ser 2-69A concerning A-7B BuNo 154510 accident occurring 7 Jan 69, pilot COINMAN

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center

Subj: VA-25 AAR ser 2-69A

1. Forwarded, concurring in part with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements, subject to the following comments:

a. The cause of this accident is unknown but considering the weather conditions at the time, pilot error - spatial disorientation, is considered to be the probable cause.

b. Conclusion 2d is not considered to be a factor in this accident. If adequate radar coverage had been available, there is no assurance that this type of accident would have been prevented.

c. Recommendation one is not concurred in. To establish a hard number does not appear to be the solution. The LSO, air officer, squadron representative in Pri-fly, and the carrier commanding officer are capable of assessing the situation. Also, any pilot should not be reluctant to advise the ship, if he feels that existing conditions exceed his ability.

d. Recommendations 2, 5, 6, and 7 are supported. Paragraph 1, under recommendation 2, in the third endorsement, discusses the ship's action with respect to this recommendation.

e. With respect to recommendation 4, it is questionable whether the positioning of ships to provide lighting reference would reduce vertigo inducement. However, as indicated in the third endorsement, the commanding officer of the carrier is attempting to improve the situation.

R. A. VOLPI
Force Aviation Safety Officer

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMATKCARAIRWING SIXTEEN
COMFAIRALAMEDA
CO ATKRON TWO FIVE
CO USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14)
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN

FF7-2/3750
Ser 80/1531

24 APR 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VA-25, Accident, Serial 2-69A, concerning A-7B, BUNO 154510, of 7 Jan 69, Pilot COINMAN

From: Commander Fleet Air Alameda
To: Commander Naval Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: ATKRON 25 Aircraft Accident Report Serial 2-69A

1. Forwarded, concurring in the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board and subsequent endorsements subject to the following comments.

2. Do not concur with assignment of "Pilot Error", Section B of Form 3570-1A. While the cause of the accident is undetermined, the preponderance of evidence indicates that it would be more appropriate to indicate "Item 4. Pilot Other: vertigo/spatial disorientation" as a probable factor - loss of control, a result.

3. Further, there is no indication in the record of the investigation that the log books and maintenance records of the aircraft were reviewed to determine if there had been prior discrepancies in the control systems or other material malfunctions which may have had a bearing on the accident. Under these circumstances, a statement by the Maintenance Office in this regard is considered pertinent to obviate the appearance of arbitrarily ruling out material malfunction.

4. Special exception is taken to para. 3 of the first endorsement. Anything that distracts the pilot's attention from the instruments derogates rather than enhances his chances for survival. Illumination of the water ahead of the ship or utilization of single light sources (a prime cause of spatial disorientation through auto kinesis) ahead of the ship will detract from a successful instrument transition. The problem is one of divided scan between visual and instrument references and diverting attention away from the instruments in a night catapult shot/bolter situation violates time proven precepts of sound airmanship.

S. R. BROWN, Jr.

Copy to:
COMNAVSAFCEN (2)
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR-09E)
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
NAVAIRTESTCEN PAX
COMATTCARAIRWING 16
CO, USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14)
CO, ATKRON 25

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

CVA14:04:bz
3750
Ser 540

2 APR 1969

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VA-25 Accident Serial 2-69A occurring 7 January 1969, A7B BUNO 154510, Pilot: COINMAN

From: Commanding Officer, USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14)
To: Commander Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air Alameda
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VA-25 Accident Serial 2-69A occurring 7 January 1969, A7B BUNO 154510, Pilot: COINMAN

1. Forwarded with following comments on the recommendations of the board.

Recommendation 1. CNAPINST 3740.2M and the CVA/CVS NATOPS Manual state that the decision to divert aircraft will be made by the Carrier Commanding Officer, or his designated representative. The Air Operations Officer, the Air Officer and the LSO should make divert recommendations based on unsatisfactory pilot performance or unsatisfactory Carqual conditions around the ship. In addition a senior well qualified representative of each squadron must be present in Air Operations during IFR/night recoveries. It is the responsibility of all of these experts to recommend whether to divert or give one more pass. A set number of attempts, a "reasonable number," should not and cannot be programmed in advance but must be based on the experience and observed performance of the pilot. Nevertheless the number of approaches in this case was excessive under the circumstances and was probably the major factor contributing to the accident.

Recommendation 2. CVA/CVS NATOPS states that the pilot shall be given the name of the field, the magnetic heading, and the distance to the diversionary field. It further states that a read back is mandatory. The pilot shall then be instructed to shift to a control frequency for positive control while enroute to a diversionary airfield. TICONDEROGA has modified its BINGO instructions since this accident. Divert information is given to all pilots prior to commencing approach. If an aircraft is diverted, following a bolter or wave off, the radar controller gives the following information: "Your signal BINGO, steer (in degrees) call passing 2500 feet." After passing 2500 feet the aircraft is shifted to departure frequency and additional information is then given over this frequency.

Recommendation 3. Destroyer night plane guards are now positioned with one directly aft of the carrier and the second placed 330 degrees relative and 3000 yards. The second is instructed to show a normal stern light when lighting measure green is set. Though this arrangement complicates maneuvering of the formation it does provide additional reference to pilots. The position recommended by the board is not feasible during

variable wind conditions requiring frequent reorientation.

Recommendation 4. The conflicting demands of landing a large number of aircraft at night and of keeping the carrier into the wind for the minimum amount of time require a short interval between approaches. Because there are many more aircraft than frequencies and controllers available, more than two aircraft must be assigned the same frequency and controller in this ship.

R. E. FOWLER, Jr.

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOM HQ (AIR-09E)
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
NAVAIRTESTCEN
COMCVW-16
FITRON-25

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

FF12/CVW16:st
3750
Ser: 30-69
FEB 16 1969

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VA-25 Mishap Serial 2-69A occuring 7 January 1969, A-7B BUNO 154510, Pilot COINMAN

From: Commander Attack Carrier Air Wing SIXTEEN
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14)
(2) Commander Fleet Air Alameda
(3) Commander Naval Air Force Pacific

Subj: VA-25 Mishap Serial 2-69A occuring 7 January 1969, A7B BUNO 154510, Pilot COINMAN

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board.

2. A night carrier landing is one of the most demanding manuvers a pilot performs. It must be emphasized that flying the airplane is first priority and communicating is secondary. Radar controllers should not give long detailed instructions immediately following a bolter, thus not allowing for possible pilot distraction.

J. H. FINNEY
Acting

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

VA-25:03
3750
Ser 72
11 February 1969

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VA-25 Mishap Serial 2-69A occuring 7 January 1969, A-7B BUNO 154510, Pilot COINMAN

From: Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron 25, FPO San Francisco 96601
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander, Attack Carrier Air Wing ONE SIX
(2) Commanding Officer, USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14)
(3) Commander, Fleet Air Alameda
(4) Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific

Subj: VA-25 Mishap Serial 2-69A occuring 7 January 1969, A-7B BUNO 154510, Pilot COINMAN

1. Forwarded, concuring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board.

2. It is refreshing to see concrete recommendations for this type of mishap, rather than the standard reiteration of instrument fundamentals. It is axiomatic that a pilot puts forth his maximum effort on every night carrier approach. The amount of effort being a function of proficiency, experience, and fatigue. In this case, the pilot had limited experience, his proficiency was reduced after the Christmas holidays, and a certain amount of fatigue had probably been induced.

3. The most difficult maneuver a pilot performs is the transition from visual to instrument flight. Performing this transition at 60 feet after a bolter makes it even more hazardous. Anything that can be done to permit the pilot to establish his climb under visual conditions is likely to improve survivability in an already dangerous occupation. Illuminating the water forward of the ship or positioning the Destroyers ahead of the carrier would probably improve the pilots response to this instrument transition.

S. L. Smith
S. L. SMITH

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOM HQ (AIR-09E)
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
NAVAIRTESTCEN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with
Para. 6d, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, current edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART 1 GENERAL

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY: Commanding Officer, VA-25	2. SERIAL NO.: 2-69A	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP: 071835U JAN	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT: A-7E	5. BUREAU NUMBER: 154510
6. TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center		8. LOCATION OF MISHAP: 33-07N 118-15W		10. DAMAGE: ALFA
7. VIA: Commander, Attack Carrier Air Wing Seventeen; Co, USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14); Commander, Fleet Air Alameda; Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet	8.	11. TIME OF DAY: NIGHT	12. TIME IN FLIGHT: 1.8	13. FLIGHT CODE: 147
		14. CLEARED FROM: CVA-14	TO: CVA-14	
		15. TYPE CLEARANCE: LOCAL VFR/IFR	16. AIRSPEED: 150-250K	17. A/C WEIGHT: 21,900
18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP: COLLISION WATER AHEAD OF SHIP FOL BOLTER/DIVERT			19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP: S.L. 0	TERRAIN 0

20. LIST MODEL, BUREAU, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C): NONE

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

X	FACTOR		FACTOR	X	FACTOR
X	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL	X	17. WEATHER
	2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4. PILOT OTHER (Specify)		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
	5. CREW		13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK BOW/GIN GEAR
	6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (ICA, OCA, ILS, GCA)		22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or Field)	X	23. UNKNOWN
X	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify): SHIP & CHAIN OF CMD.		16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)		24. OTHER (Specify)

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2. RANK	3. [redacted]	4. AGE	5. [redacted]	6. [redacted]	7. [redacted]	8. [redacted]	9. [redacted]	10. [redacted]
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap): COLMAN, Mr. MICHAEL	LT,JG	[redacted] (b) (6)	1315	USN	26	ONE	PILOT CONTROLS A		AT
CO-PILOT (Identify & submit separate page 1): NONE									

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS		514	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	28 / 9
				IN MODEL	20 / 9
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		257	18. FOLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	82 / 107
				IN MODEL	82 / 107
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		108	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	4.9 / 5.1
				IN MODEL	4.9 / 5.1
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	194	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	29 /
	OFT/OPT	16 / 1		IN MODEL	29 /
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	194	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap) HELOS (if helo mishap)		476
	OFT/OPT	16 / 1			
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	108	22. LAST FIRST FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	7 JAN 69
	OFT/OPT	4 / 0		DURATION	2.1
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK: 28 OCT 68/QUAL			24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD: STANDARD		

OTHER PERS.

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. [redacted]	27. [redacted]	28. [redacted]	29. [redacted]	30. [redacted]	31. [redacted]	32. [redacted]	33. [redacted]
NONE								

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

A. A/C HISTORY

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL, AND FACILITIES DATA

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST/PAR OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
4 OCT 68	115	0	NA	NA	NA	CAL	UKN	UKN

B. ENGINE HISTORY

	1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR REQUESTED?	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)										
(2)										
(3)										
(4)										

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

	1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OVERHAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. FOR AMPLIFIER
(1)								
(2)								
(3)								
(4)								

D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS

1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED	
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURES

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. MB	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE
8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT ☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED	10. ALTITUDE	11. MB	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL ☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL	14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS	
INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS		16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS				

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. MB	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/SHEP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE
INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS		26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS				

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. AMPLIFIER SERIAL NUMBER NONE
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP NONE
3. OTHER PRELIMINARY/SUPP MSG USS TICONDEROGA 080904Z JAN 69
4.

OPNAV

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 46, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, [illegible] edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

G. SHIPS DATA

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR
2. PRESSURE SETTING
3. WIND OVER DECK
4. RELATIVE WIND
5. APPROACH/END SPEED
6. MARK NUMBER
7. MODEL NUMBER
8. LOCATION OF SHIP
9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDLE ATTACHMENT
10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED
11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify — landings and meshes in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS: 6 JAN 69
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD: 2
3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT: 2.1/1
4. DAY HOURS/LANDING LAST 30 DAYS: NA
5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED: .34/0 STM
6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT: 0/0
7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS: NA

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING: E 700
2. VISIBILITY: 5
3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY: 340/30
4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY: 54 OUTSIDE AIR: 54
5. DEW POINT: 50
6. ALTIMETER SETTING: 29.96
7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (clouds aloft, icing level, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate): TOPS OF OVCST 1200-1400 FT, SEAS 280 DEG 35SEC AFT/SWELL CALM

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS	2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
				1CC NAVAVIRAFFCN DIRECT (AAR) 1CC NAVAIRSYSCOM HQ (AIR-09E) 1CC NAVPLANTRE DO DALLAS 1CC NAVAIRTESTCEN PAX RIV.

COST DAMAGE TO: 3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY: NONE (ACFT) 4. PRIVATE PROPERTY: NONE 5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO: 5 FEB 1969

PART IV SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

1. SENIOR MEMBER: [redacted] (b) (6) OPERATION OFFICER
2. MEMBER: [redacted] (b) (6) PERSONNEL OFFICER
3. FLIGHT SURGEON MEMBER: [redacted] (b) (6) MC, USN
4. MEMBER: [redacted] (b) (6) USN, ASO

UNIT BILLET

* When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

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OP-05F

PART V

THE ACCIDENT

The accident occured at 1835 U on 7 January 1969 in the vicinity of the USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14) which was conducting an Operational Readiness Exercise off of the Southern California coast. LTJG W. M. COINMAN, attached to Attack Squadron 25 received fatal injuries when his A-7B aircraft (BUNO 154510) impacted with the water ahead of the ship while enroute to NAF El Centro, California following seven CCA approaches which resulted in six technique waveoffs and one bolter. The pilot and aircraft were not recovered.

On the morning of 7 January LTJG COINMAN flew 2.1 hours on a Close Air Support training flight to the Chocolate Mountain target Northwest of Yuma, Arizona. No abnormalities or factors which may have contributed to this accident were present during this flight which terminated at 1200 U aboard USS Ticonderoga. LTJG COINMAN briefed for the next flight which was to be another CAS mission to the 29 Palms target. He flew with LT [redacted] (b) (6) of VA-25. The flight launched at approximately 1614 U, rendezvoused, and proceeded to the target. BUNO 154510 was configured with four LAU-68 rocket pods each containing seven 2.75 inch rockets. These were loaded symmetrically on TER's on wing stations 1 and 8. The four ammunition cans were loaded with 600 rounds of 20mm. The flight utilized the target complex from 1630 to 1645 and then departed for the ship. LTJG COINMAN only fired five of the seven rockets in each pod before vacating the target in order to allow two A-4 aircraft the remaining 15 minutes of target time. The flight proceeded to CCA marshall and was assigned individual holding altitudes. Sky conditions were clear above a low overcast and there was no moon. The pilot commenced a standard CCA approach at 1749 with a fuel state of 4,600 lbs. LT [redacted] (b) (6) preceded LTJG COINMAN and later reported that the top of the overcast was between 1200 and 1400 feet while the bottom was approximately 400 feet above the surface. Enclosure (1). LT [redacted] (b) (6) received a waveoff for being high and very shortly thereafter LTJG COINMAN also received a waveoff for the same reason. The two pilots were receiving glide slope information at the same time from the same controller indicating their interval was somewhat closer than normal. LTJG COINMAN's second approach resulted in a waveoff for being too high. On the pilot's third approach the centerline was intercepted at 1½ mile well above glide path. At one mile he was given a 20 degree right turn and then the CCA controller instructed him to waveoff and proceed over the ship at 1,200 feet, and call one mile upwind. The pilot was then instructed to proceed downwind when he was at 4½ miles ahead. Following a turn to final bearing the pilot was told that he was still way high. The pilot then called "clara" indicating that he did not have the meatball. Shortly thereafter he called the ball, was told to come right for line-up, and was waved off by the LSO. This was his fourth approach. He was cleared downwind and reported abeam with a fuel state of 2,800 lbs. On his fifth approach the pilot appeared somewhat erratic in heading control and was waved off by the LSO. The pilot's sixth approach was similar to the others in that he was high all the way and once again called "clara". On the seventh and final approach the pilot had 2,200 lbs of fuel and received a 3½ mile straight-away. (VFR bingo fuel was 1,400 lbs.) His heading and rate-of-descent control were good and he touched down just beyond the number four wire which resulted in a bolter. This was the first time he had touched

the flight deck in seven approaches. The pilot climbed out wings level, straight ahead and eight seconds later he requested permission to turn downwind. It had been previously decided by supervisory personnel in air operations that LTJG COINMAN would be diverted if he failed to make an arrested landing on this approach. Following the request to turn downwind the CCA controller instructed the pilot as follows: "516 signal bingo channel 106, clean up, hook up, pigeons 079/119, passing 2,500 go button 7, over". Following a brief pause of from 2 to 4 seconds the pilot said, "Roger". Twenty seconds after this transmission the aircraft impacted with the water. The aircraft was observed to enter the overcast momentarily and then begin an ever-increassing rate of descent until impact with the water at approximately 45 degrees nose down. Determination of wing attitude was not possible because the aircraft was between two and four miles ahead of the ship. The aircraft was very slightly right of the ships course indicating that a right wing down/right turn had commenced while the aircraft was climbing after the bolter or as it entered the overcast. Enclosure (2). There was no indication of difficulty prior to the impact and an ejection was apparently not attempted. Witnesses observed an explosion on the surface and the ship turned to starboard while informing the helicopter and plane guard destroyer that there was an aircraft in the water. Enclosure (3) contains information on the weather and sea state at the time of the accident.

Air operations were terminated following the accident and SAR efforts were conducted until approximately 1200 the following day. These efforts produced positive confirmation that the pilot received fatal injuries when his helmet was located floating near the scene of the accident the next morning. A portion of the APH-6A helmet was torn away and missing on the right side where the oxygen mask is normally attached. The oxygen mask, retaining cup, and the hose/miniature regulator combination were still attached to the left side of the helmet by the Sierra Butterfly fitting. The helmet was dented and grazed in many areas and was severely weakened by a fracture running fore to aft through the center. The rear of the helmet at the center was extensively damaged. Both earphones were missing. Both the chin strap and nape strap were still attached to the helmet.

PART VI

DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

A-7B BUNO 154510 was lost at sea in the vicinity of 33 degrees, 7 minutes, 8 seconds North latitude and 118 degrees, 15 minutes, 9 seconds West longitude. The aircraft impacted at a 45 degree angle between 150 and 250 KIAS causing massive damage to the airframe which apparently sank immediately. The only portion of the aircraft to be recovered was the fin cap UHF/IFF fiberglass antenna which is mounted atop the vertical stabilizer.

PART VII

INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

A. PERSONNEL FACTORS

1. Pilot Factors

LTJG COINMAN was designated a Naval Aviator on 23 January 1968 following completion of advanced flight training. He had accumulated 514 total hours including 194 hours in A-7A and B aircraft at the time of the accident. He was considered to be an above average aviator throughout the training command and since. His overall training command flight grades averaged 57 which includes advanced stage grades between 3.01 and 3.14. The only comment concerning his flying abilities from the Advanced Training Command was that he was an excellent student pilot.

LTJG COINMAN reported to VA-122, the A-7 replacement training squadron at NAS Lemoore, in February 1968. He completed the instrument training syllabus in the TA-4F at VA-127 prior to commencing A-7 flight training and received an average flight grade of 2.92, (2.91 being the average). No abnormal tendancies were noted while undergoing instrument training. LTJG COINMAN began flying the A-7 on 19 June 1968 and completed RAG training on 17 October 1968, having accumulated 101 hours. His flight grade average was 3.03 at VA-122 which once again indicated above average flight performance. See Enclosure (4).

LTJG COINMAN had flown with VA-25 since 17 October and had accumulated 93 hours in the A-7B, including 50 hours during a weapons deployment in November. He had also participated in the weapons training exercise aboard USS TICONDEROGA in December where he accumulated twelve carrier landings in nine flights including three night arrested landings during three flights. At no time during this carrier deployment or during RAG CARQUALS did LTJG COINMAN exhibit any degree of difficulty during routine flying. A random survey of VA-25 pilots, including three ex-instructor pilots from VA-122 who had observed LTJG COINMAN while in the RAG concluded that he was one of the most conscientious junior aviators they had known. He was very serious and professional in his approach to work and flying and his motivation was high.

LTJG COINMAN was apparently physically and mentally prepared for his two flights on 7 January. See Enclosure (5) for the medical officers report, (Original only). There was no indication of aircraft difficulties prior to the accident. As stated in Part V, the pilot had difficulty in maintaining glide slope on five of the seven approaches and had heading control problems on three. On the first pass he was less than a mile behind the aircraft ahead (his section leader) and was receiving final approach information at the same time as LT (b) (6). Both aircraft were waved off in rapid succession for being high. (Several F-8's had landed prior to this). Pilots reported that the tops of the overcast were at 1,200 to 1,400 feet with bases at 400 to 600 feet. The visibility was at least

five miles, but there was no horizon. On his second pass LTJG COINMAN was again high all the way and was waved off by the LSO. The tape recording indicated that he was very possibly turned onto final too early on his third approach as the first glide slope indication came at 1½ miles vice the normal descent at 2 3/4 miles when the controller told him he was well above glide path. At one mile he was given a 20 degree right turn and then told to climb to 1,200 feet overhead the ship and continue upwind for one mile. On his fourth pass he started out above glide path and to the left of centerline and was given a ten degree right turn at one mile. The LSO attempted to talk him down to the proper glide slope and upon calling "clara" LTJG COINMAN sounded somewhat busy and shakey. Once again he was waved off for being high. On his fifth approach he was given a turn to final bearing, 285 degrees. He overshot and was given the following headings within the last three miles: 210, 275, 285, 290, 295, 300, and finally 302 degrees before he was waved off for going high in close. The pilots attention to heading changes may have resulted in poor descent control. Upon replying for a turn instruction during his sixth approach his voice was once again slightly choppy in that he had to say his side number twice. These slight voice characteristics were noted in repeated replays of the approach recordings and apparently went unnoticed at the time of the approaches as the majority of his transmissions (all but two) gave no indications of anxiety or difficulty. On his seventh and final approach his fuel state was 2,800 lbs. This was his best approach. He was on glide slope and centerline almost all the way. His transmission was somewhat choppy upon calling the meatball. The LSO thought that he had a wire but he went just slightly high over the ramp and bolted. See Enclosure (6). He was observed to climb straight ahead into the edges of the overcast and then descend into the water.

The board considers the three most likely pilot factors causing this accident to be vertigo, distraction or an aircraft malfunction. Although there was no positive indication that the pilot had vertigo to the extent that would cause him to fly into the water, his concentration on flying instruments from marshall to the ship and through seven approaches may have helped him to overcome any disorientation or vertigo. At least one other pilot reported vertigo during this time, (LT (b) (6) and apparently conditions were of the type that usually cause some degree of vertigo in the majority of pilots, i.e. no external reference to the horizon, fatigue from numerous approaches, and many changes in aircraft attitude with occasional references to a point source of light, (the ship). If LTJG COINMAN did have vertigo following his last approach he apparently did not consider that it would degrade another attempted approach because he asked for permission to turn downwind eight seconds after the bolter. It was at this time that the second possible cause factor appeared. Very shortly after his downwind request the controller transmitted the lengthy divert information previously mentioned on page five of this report. If LTJG COINMAN had attempted to copy this lengthy information he may very well have inadvertently commenced a right descending turn from which he either could not recover or failed to recognize. Any disorientation or vertigo would have only compounded this situation. Use of attitude and/or altitude hold would have precluded this descending turn but it is not known whether or not any of those modes were utilized. The pilot had diverted to NAS Miramar (for other than pilot technique reasons) during a night recovery in December and had one previous day divert. Anyone of the factors already discussed could have resulted in the pilot feeling a sense of urgency to copy the divert information

while he was climbing into the overcast. It is possible that lack of experience was responsible for his unawareness of the everincreasing fatigue and danger following so many approaches under such conditions. Either this lack of experience, or pride in his previously displayed abilities prevented LTJG COINMAN from realizing or admitting that it would be wise to discontinue approach attempts and divert to a shore station at an earlier time.

A third possible cause would be an aircraft malfunction in the form of a hydraulic/flight control failure, flameout or electrical/instrument failure. A radio or electrical failure would have prevented a transmission indicating a malfunction. Since the radio was known to be operable 20 seconds prior to the impact and the aircraft was apparently operating normally at that time, the board concludes that an aircraft malfunction was highly unlikely.

2. Maintenance personnel were not a factor in this accident.

3. Supervisory Factors

Several areas of a supervisory nature were analyzed by the board. The first of these involved squadron and ship officers who were in a position to take action to possibly prevent the accident. While LTJG COINMAN was making his fourth approach LT (b) (6) had returned to the ready room and was discussing his problems of vertigo. At that time he made the recommendation to divert LTJG COINMAN and a call was made to the VA-25 observer in air operations in order to make him aware of this pilot report and recommendation. The observer had noted LTJG COINMAN's problems and had attributed some of his difficulties to a lack of straight-away on final approach. The observer requested that LTJG COINMAN be given a longer final approach and this was complied with on the remaining approaches. Following the sixth approach the squadron representative in Air Operations recommended a wave-off. It was decided by air operations that the pilot would be diverted if he did not land successfully on his seventh approach. Had this decision been made earlier LTJG COINMAN may have been better able to execute the divert instructions successfully. It is very likely that he became more fatigued and anxious with each succeeding approach. The fact that the nearest divert field reporting VFR weather was El Centro, which was 119 miles East, may have contributed to the reluctance on the part of all supervisory personnel to divert him earlier. There was no divert maintenance crew at El Centro for the A-7. These and other factors contributed to this accident in that the pilot was allowed to continue making approaches to a point where he may have had an accident during any phase of flight requiring close tolerance, precision flying.

The board considered that the amount of straight-away may have had an effect on LTJG COINMAN's glide path control during several approaches. This would have made these approaches more difficult, but they had little direct effect on that which caused the accident. It is possible that the controller was over-taxed by having to control four A-7's at one time as well as keep track of other aircraft in the pattern. Apparently it is standard procedure for one controller to control four aircraft on a single frequency simultaneously. See enclosure (7). The board considers that the divert information was initially verbose and will make recommendations to that effect.

B. MATERIAL FAILURES OR MALFUNCTIONS

As stated earlier the board considers that an aircraft malfunction was highly unlikely.

C. FACILITIES

Except for the possibility of contributing causes on the part of supervisory personnel, the board found no fault with the facilities of the USS Ticonderoga.

D. NATOPS

Although the board could find no specific recommendation for changes to the A-7 NATOPS Manual, it did consider the possibility for changing standard operating procedures governing general carrier operations. Many pilots and aircraft have been lost under similar circumstances to this accident, ie. flying into the water ahead of the ship following a catapult launch or attempted landing. Many of these accidents have involved poor weather, low ceilings, lack of horizon, and in some cases more than one landing attempt. While much has been accomplished to aid the pilot during his landing approach, and in fact make it automatic (ACL) little has been done to assist the pilot faced with controlling the aircraft in the black void ahead of the ship where aircraft control, response, and pilot anxiety are just as critical as they are astern, and in some cases, even more critical. It appears that in this accident, as in similar accidents, the pilot was not aware that he had stopped climbing and was in fact descending ahead of the ship. It is likely that the pilot never knew he was about to fly into the water. Just as there are landing aids, the board feels there is a need for some sort of control of aircraft ahead of the ship to preclude this sort of accident from happening. The board considers that there are three possibilities immediately available which may assist in precluding future repetitions of this type of accident. The first of these would be to install precision radar which would afford altitude information to a controller assigned to monitor all aircraft leaving the bow of a carrier. Any aircraft which failed to meet certain minimums as it climbed ahead of the ship would be reason to transmit advisory information to the pilot concerning his altitude. While this aid would require time and money to install throughout the fleet it would nevertheless pay for itself if it saved at least one aircraft and pilot. The second means of assistance to the pilot would be to provide a visible horizon forward of the ship in the form of lights which could be on at least one ship between two and five miles ahead. While it is understood that the pilot is supposed to take his reference to the horizon from the instruments, every pilot knows that almost any reference to an external horizon reference will almost always reduce symptoms of vertigo and disorientation. This may involve repositioning the plane guard destroyer but this in turn may make its assignment even more useful in that it would still be able to provide S/R both fore and aft of the ship at the same time it was providing a horizon and even an azimuth reference for aircraft approaching and departing the ship. It is realized that speed keeping ability may be a factor for the plane guard ship, but it is felt that this could be resolved under most circumstances The third possibility would be to position a knowledgeable person as a forward observer who's job it would be to observe all aircraft leaving the bow in order to warn the pilot of any variation from prescribed minimum standards. While this is sometimes provided by pri-fly and bridge observers it is realized that they cannot always clearly see aircraft ahead of the ship and often have other time consuming distractions.

Another procedure which may preclude this type of accident is to establish criteria for limiting the number of approaches a pilot may make under varying degrees of environmental conditions. An example would be to limit the number of approaches to six under all environmental conditions, after which the pilot would either be given an extended downwind leg or another approach following a specific time at a higher altitude. Under conditions of reduced visibility and/or lack of a visible horizon the maximum number of approaches would be limited to four befor the afore-mentioned action would be taken. It is felt that the majority of pilot would agree with the need for a "cooling off" period after several attempted landings under trying conditions. During this time they could engage the auto-pilot, consider the conditions and possible mistakes they had made, and possibly more clearly analyze whether or not they were prepared to attempt further approaches under the present conditions. It is realized that while this time delay and possible divert may be precluded by operational necessity, in the long run it would preclude the loss of assets vital to the commitment generating this operational necessity.

PART VIII

CONCLUSIONS

1. The board was unable to determine a positive cause factor for this accident. The most probable cause factor is failure of the pilot to properly control the aircraft while climbing to divert after reported unsuccessful landing attempts. This lack of control no doubt resulted from vertigo and/or distraction.

2. Contributing cause factors are as follows:

a. Weather: low ceilings and lack of a visible horizon which would have contributed to vertigo and/or disorientation.

b. Supervisory: failure of personnel to divert the pilot after a reasonable number of approaches when it was known that he was unable to control the aircraft on glide slope and glide path to the degree necessary to effect a landing.

c. Supervisory: unnecessarily verbose divert instructions were given by CCA to the pilot while he was below 500 feet which possibly caused a diversion as the pilot may have copied this information.

d. Supervisory: failure to provide a means of monitoring aircraft altitude ahead of a carrier to warn a pilot of an inadvertent descent.

e. Supervisory: the CCA controller was required to control four aircraft at the same time thereby making close supervision of any one aircraft/pilot extremely limited.

PART IX

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the interest of reducing the number of accidents of this type the board recommends the following action be taken:

1. Establish standard criteria commensurate with environmental conditions and operational necessity for limiting the number of landing attempts a pilot can make before he is required to either delta or divert. The board suggests six attempts during day operations and four during night operations.

2. Reduce the length and amount of divert information initially transmitted to a pilot to include no more than the heading to the field and which frequency to shift to (if necessary) above 2,500 feet. Complete divert information would then be transmitted upon the pilot's request. All heading and distance information will be given to the nearest five degrees and five miles in the interest of simplification and understanding.

3. Conduct a study on the feasibility of installing forward looking altitude detecting equipment aboard aircraft carriers to monitor the altitude of aircraft ahead of the ship.

4. Study the feasibility of positioning a ship or ships between four and six miles ahead of the carrier on an extended centerline of the axial deck (or Base Recovery Course) during all-night launches and recoveries to provide a horizon and BRC reference.

5. When available, pilots should utilize the automatic flight control system (AFCS), particularly attitude hold to assist in maintaining the desired attitude following a waveoff or bolter, and as soon as possible following a catapult launch. During poor environmental conditions when vertigo and/or disorientation is often prevalent, the pilot should rely on all modes of the AFCS and the automatic power compensator (APC) at the first sign of control difficulties or possible distractions.

6. Every effort should be made to reduce the number of aircraft under control of any one CCA final controller to a maximum of two.

7. Encourage all pilots to advise the controlling agency or wingman of any problems which may degrade their control of the aircraft in order that a timely decision may be made at the first indication of difficulties. All pilots should be cautioned as to the dangers of letting pride interfere with wise decision making, or trying "just one more time" before deciding on an alternate plan.

LIST OF ENCLOSURES

1. Statement of LT [redacted] (b) (6), Pilot

2. Statement of CDR T. A. LOGNIS, Executive Officer, USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14)

3. Statement of LCDR [redacted] (b) (6), USN, Meteorological Officer, USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14), and weather report

4. Flight Experience Resume

5. Medical Officers Report (Original only)

6. Statement of LT [redacted] (b) (6), USN, LSO

7. Statement of [redacted] (b) (6), AC2, USN, CCA controller

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of LT [redacted] (b) (6), USN, pilot/section leader, concerning VA-25 AAR 2-69A occuring 7 Jan 1969, A-7B BUNO 154510, Pilot COINMAN.

On 7 January 1969 I was scheduled with LTJG W. M. COINMAN for a daylight launch and close air support mission with a night recovery aboard USS Ticonderoga.

Brief, launch, rendezvous and mission were all normal. The target was the Twenty-Nine Palms impact area. LTJG COINMAN's ordnance consisted of full ammo and 4 LAU 68's on TER's on stations 1 and 8. He was briefed to fire the LAU-68 rockets on single. After four runs our target time was terminated in order to facilitate some A-4 aircraft with the same overhead time as ours.

On calling "feet wet" we were given individual marshall information. LTJG COINMAN acknowledged his clearance and called departing from my wing.

The sun had set when I commenced my approach, LTJG COINMAN commenced one minute later. There was a definate horizon and visibility was in excess of 30 miles with a low cloud layer. I entered this cloud layer at 1400 feet MSL. Entry into the cloud cover was immediately followed by a severe experience of spatial disorientation. I engaged heading and altitude hold on my APCS at 1200 feet in order to combat the vertigo. At about five miles, still experiencing vertigo I commenced my final descent as directed by the controller. Bottoms' were called at six hundred feet with visibility 6 to 8 miles. I had preset my APN-141 radar altimeter index to 600 feet. When the light illuminated at 600 feet I was still IFR. At approximately 350 feet I made contact with the ship visually. I was still experiencing vertigo and was given a wave-off. I climbed above the overcast to 1500 feet, turned down wind and recovered uneventfully on the next pass. The time was 1800. Walking aft after my recovery I saw LTJG COINMAN on a low wave-off with 20 to 25 degrees of left bank from the ramp until cloud entry.

Arriving in the ready room I approached my Executive Officer and recommended that LTJG COINMAN be diverted immediately. The Executive Officer called CCA and spoke with the command's Operations Officer who at that time was the air operations observer. Approximately 20 minutes later LTJG COINMAN impacted with the water.

I was designated a Naval Aviator in November of 1962 and have accumulated 2,500 total hours including 490 hours in A-7 aircraft.

[redacted] (b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Enclosure (1)

Statement of CDR THOMAS A. LOOMIS, USN, (b) (6) /1310, Executive Officer USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14), concerning VA-25 MAR 2-69 occuring 7 JAN 69, A-7B BUNO 154510, Pilot COINMAN.

I was standing the Command Duty Officer watch on the bridge, when about 1835, I observed Canasta 516 take a bolter and heard the CATC controller giving him cleanup and bingo instructions on the bridge radio. The bolter appeared to be routine in all respects with the aircraft climbing out on a heading of approximately 305°. The base of the clouds appeared to be about 400-500 feet in altitude and I watched Canasta 516 climb into the base of the clouds. His lights and tailpipe exhaust disappeared into the cloud but I could still see the suffused glow. Suddenly the lights reappeared below the clouds and I observed them descending at an angle of 30° - 40° toward the water and accelerating. I would judge that the heading of the aircraft was at least 45° to the right of his previous heading when he went into the clouds. I observed the lights impact at the horizon and a brilliant yellow-orange explosion momentarily lit the sky. I told the OOD that an aircraft had crashed dead ahead (Foxtrot Corpen 315°) and to inform CIC to mark the DRT at an estimated distance of 3 to 6 thousand yards. I ordered a slight turn to starboard to avoid the area of the crash and informed the plane guard destroyer of the crash. The night was dark but a distinct horizon was observed below the overcast. Visibility was at least 8-10 miles.

I am the Executive Officer of USS TICONDEROGA and have been aboard for 22 months as Navigator and Executive Officer. I am a naval aviator of 19½ years experience with 3100 hours of multi-engine land, sea, and carrier based aircraft.

Thomas A. Loomis
THOMAS A. LOOMIS

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Enclosure (2)

Statement of LCDR [redacted] (b) (6), USN, USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14) Meteorological Officer concerning VA-25 AAR 2-69A occuring 7 JAN 69, A-7B BUNO 154510, Pilot COINMAN

1. Synoptic situation at 090240Z January 1969: The operating area was under the influence of a weak trough of low pressure aligned northeast southwest with a high pressure system approaching from the northwest.

2. Detailed information on the weather elements were as indicated below:

SKY CONDITION	ESTIMATED 700 OVERCAST
VISIBILITY	5 MILES
WEATHER	HAZE
ALTIMETER	29.96 INCHES
SEA LEVEL PRESSURE	1011.5 MILLIBARS
DRY BULB TEMPERATURE	54.0 DEGREES F.
WET BULB TEMPERATURE	52.0 DEGREES F.
DEW POINT TEMPERATURE	50.4 DEGREES F.
SEA WATER TEMPERATURE	59.0 DEGREES F.
APPARENT WIND DIRECTION	340 DEGREES
APPARENT WIND SPEED	30 KNOTS
TRUE WIND DIRECTION	280 DEGREES
TRUE WIND SPEED	16 KNOTS
SHIPS COURSE	220 DEGREES
SHIPS SPEED	16 KNOTS
SEA STATE	
SEAS	280 DEG 03 SEC 4 FT.
SWELL	CALM
TYPE AIRCRAFT	A7
BUREAU NUMBER	154510
SIDE NUMBER	516
PILOT	LTJG W. M. COINMAN

[redacted] (b) (6)

LCDR USN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Enclosure (3)

FLIGHT EXPERIENCE RESUME

COMMAND ATTACHED	PERIOD ASSIGNED	MODEL AIRCRAFT	FLIGHT HOURS	CV LNDG DAY/NIGHT	OPERATIONAL/ PROFICIENCY
CNATRA	NOV 66 AUG 67	T-34 T-2A/B	27 127	0/0 4/0	OPERATIONAL
CNAVANTRA	OCT 67 JAN 68	A/TF-9J	138	4/0	OPERATIONAL
VA-122	FEB 68 OCT 68	TA-4F A-7A/B T-28B	22 101 6	0/0 10/6 0/0	OPERATIONAL
VA-25	OCT 68 JAN 69	A-7B	93	10/3	OPERATIONAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
IDENTIFICATION, FLIGHT AND NARRATIVE DATA
OPNAV FORM 3750/8A (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-8101

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

I. IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity)	2. MOR NUMBER	3. DAMAGE CODE
Attack Squadron Twenty-Five, FPO, San Francisco 96601	2-69	ALPHA

4. TYPE OF MISHAP	5. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	6. DATE	7. MODEL A/C	8. BUNO
[X] ACCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT [ ] INCIDENT	ONE	7 JAN 69	A-7B	154510

9. MODEL OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	10. BUNO	11. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	12. DAMAGE CODE

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED (Use Additional Sheets if Required) NAME (Last, First and Middle Initial)	14. RANK/RATE	15. BRANCH OF SERVICE	16. DUTY BILLET	17. INJURY CODE	18. DISPOSITION
PILOT AT CONTROLS AT TIME OF MISHAP					
A. COINMAN, William M.	LTJG	USNR	Pilot	L	U
CO-PILOT					
B.					
C.					
D.					

II. FLIGHT DATA (At Time of Emergency)

1. TERRAIN CLEARANCE	2. CABIN ALTITUDE	3. TIME AT CABIN ALTITUDE	4. AMBIENT ALTITUDE	5. TIME AT AMBIENT ALTITUDE
Sea Level FEET	Sea Level FEET	___ HOURS 30 MIN.	Sea Level FEET	___ HOURS 30 MIN.

6. PLACE IN FORMATION
- [X] A - SINGLE AIRCRAFT
- [ ] L - LEAD
- [ ] W - WING
- Y - OTHER (SPECIFY) ___

8. HORIZON
- [ ] 1 - DISTINCT
- [X] 2 - OBSCURED
- 3 - OTHER (SPECIFY) Overcast

7. CLOUD CONDITIONS
- [ ] 0 - CLEAR
- [X] 1 - OVERCAST
- [ ] 2 - UNDERCAST
- [ ] 3 - IN CLOUDS
- [ ] 4 - IN AND OUT OF CLOUDS
- 5 - OTHER (SPECIFY) ___

9. DURATION OF FLIGHT: HOURS 1 MIN. 48

III. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP (Continue on Reverse Side if necessary)

LTJG COINMAN was returning from a CAS mission to Twenty-Nine Palms. His A/C commenced CCA at 1749U. A standard SPN-35 Precision Final Approach was executed to a wave for being high, in close. Four additional Precision approaches resulted in Technique Wave Offs by the LSO for being high. The sixth approach was very near glide slope and centerline, until in close, when the rate of descent decreased and a bolter occurred at 1831U, with a fuel state of approximately 2,200 lbs. The deck was steady in a calm sea. The aircraft was observed to climb normally off the angle deck. Eight seconds after bolter, pilot requested downwind turn. CCA immediately told pilot to bingo to El Centro and gave directions. This information was acknowledged by pilot immediately, his last transmission being, "Roger".

Flight deck and Bridge personnel observed aircraft lights to climb straight ahead into edge of low overcast and then commence an ever increasing rate of descent at approximately 45° to an impact at an estimated 2 to 4 miles forward of the ship. A surface explosion occurred. No attempt at ejection was noted.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
MEDICAL INFORMATION
OPNAV FORM 3750/98 (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-8201

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

1. DEGREE OF INJURY

- [ ] 1 - NONE
- [ ] 2 - MINOR
- [ ] 3 - MAJOR
- [ ] 4 - FATAL
- [ ] 5 - MISSING, LAND
- [x] 6 - MISSING, WATER
- [ ] 7 - MISSING, UNKNOWN

2. DAYS HOSPITALIZED
3. DAYS IN QUARTERS
4. DAYS GROUNDED
5. UNCONSCIOUS ____ HOURS ____ MIN.

5a. DISPOSITION: U

5b. EXPOSURE: [ ] 1 - MILD [ ] 2 - MODERATE [ ] 3 - SEVERE

5c. SHOCK: [ ] 1 - MILD [ ] 2 - MODERATE [ ] 3 - SEVERE

6. INJURIES INCURRED DURING MISHAP
(Use Standard DOD Terminology for Body Part, Diagnosis and Cause of Injury.) (See DDHC, NAVMED P5082.)

LEAVE THESE COLUMNS BLANK

A. BODY PART:
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

B. BODY PART:
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

C. BODY PART:
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

D. BODY PART:
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

E. BODY PART:
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

7.

LABORATORY TESTS	A. TISSUE TESTED	B. METHOD USED	C. LABORATORY POINT TESTS	D. RESULT
CARBON MONOXIDE				
ALCOHOL				
LACTIC ACID				
OTHER (SPECIFY)				

8. X-RAY RESULTS: [ ] CHECK IF PERFORMED. SUBMIT RESULTS ON SEPARATE SHEET.

9.

DISEASES/DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF MISHAP	METHOD OF DISCOVERY				WAIVERS (AS APPLICABLE)	
DIAGNOSIS	ANNUAL PHYSICAL	SICK CALL	AUTOPSY	OTHER	AUTHORITY	DATE

10. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY:

- [ ] M - MILITARY PATHOLOGIST
- [ ] C - CIVILIAN PATHOLOGIST
- [ ] PROTOCOL ATTACHED
- [ ] F - FLIGHT SURGEON
- [ ] T - OTHER
- [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

11. MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO AFIP:

- [ ] 1 - AUTOPSY REPORT
- [ ] 2 - FROZEN TISSUE
- [ ] 3 - PICTURES
- [ ] 4 - FIXED TISSUE

12. LIST ADDITIONAL INJURIES RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF THE MISHAP, AND ADD ANY PERTINENT REMARKS:

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
COINMAN, William M.	(b) (6)	A-7B	154510

C-01410

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
OPNAV FORM 3750/BC (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-0301

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete on all occupants of aircraft, all injured persons, and all persons possibly contributing to the cause of the mishap. Supervisory factors attributed to persons not in the aircraft and such factors as design or weather should be reported only for the person in primary control of the aircraft. Factors contributing to injury during mid-air collisions, crash landings, ditchings, etc., are to be considered part of survival phase. Use codes at right to show only those factors present or contributing in each phase.

PHASES OF MISHAP
A – Accident
E – Escape
S – Survival (includes parachute landings)
R – Rescue

FACTOR IMPORTANCE
D – Definitely contributed
S – Suspected factor
P – Condition present but did not contribute to accident or injury

FACTORS		A	E	S	R
1. SUPERVISORY FACTORS					
A. INADEQUATE BRIEFING	101				
B. ORDERED/LED ON FLIGHT BEYOND CAPABILITY	102	S			
C. POOR CREW COORDINATION	103				
D. OTHER (SPECIFY)	199				
2. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS					
A. FAULTY FLIGHT PLAN	201				
B. FAULTY PRE-FLIGHT OF AIRCRAFT	202				
C. FAULTY PREPARATION OF PERSONAL EQUIPMENT	203				
D. HURRIED DEPARTURE	204				
E. DELAYED DEPARTURE	205				
F. INADEQUATE WEATHER ANALYSIS	206				
G. OTHER (SPECIFY)	299				
3. EXPERIENCE/TRAINING FACTORS					
A. INADEQUATE TRANSITION	301				
B. LIMITED TOTAL EXPERIENCE	302	D			
C. LIMITED RECENT EXPERIENCE	303	S			
D. FAILURE TO USE ACCEPTED PROCEDURES	304				
E. OTHER (SPECIFY)	399				
4. DESIGN FACTORS					
A. DESIGN OF INSTRUMENTS, CONTROLS	401				
B. LOCATION OF INSTRUMENTS, CONTROLS	402				
C. FAILURE OF INSTRUMENTS, CONTROLS	403				
D. COCKPIT LIGHTING	404				
E. RUNWAY LIGHTING	405				
F. LIGHTING OF OTHER AIRCRAFT	406				
G. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE	407				
H. WORKSPACE INCOMPATIBLE WITH MAN	408				
I. OTHER (SPECIFY)	499				
5. COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS					
A. MISINTERPRETED COMMUNICATIONS	501				
B. DISRUPTED COMMUNICATIONS	502				
C. LANGUAGE BARRIER	503				
D. NOISE INTERFERENCE	504				
E. OTHER (SPECIFY) verbose clearance at low altitude	599	S			
6. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS					
A. FOOD POISONING	601				
B. MOTION SICKNESS	602				
C. OTHER ACUTE ILLNESS	603				
D. OTHER PRE-EXISTING DISEASE/DEFECT	604				
E. GET-HOMEITIS	605	S			
F. HANGOVER	606				

FACTORS		A	E	S	R
G. SLEEP DEPRIVATION	607				
H. FATIGUE, OTHER	608	D			
I. MISSED MEALS	609				
J. DRUGS PRESCRIBED BY MEDICAL OFFICER	610				
K. DRUGS, OTHER	611				
L. ALCOHOL	612				
M. VISUAL ILLUSIONS	613				
N. UNCONSCIOUSNESS	614				
O. DISORIENTATION/VERTIGO	615	D			
P. HYPOXIA	616				
Q. HYPERVENTILATION	617				
R. DYSBARISM	618				
S. CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING	619				
T. BOREDOM	620				
U. INATTENTION	621				
V. CHANNELIZED ATTENTION	622				
W. DISTRACTION	623				
X. PREOCCUPATION WITH PERSONAL PROBLEMS	624				
Y. EXCESSIVE MOTIVATION TO SUCCEED	625	P			
Z - OVERCONFIDENCE	626				
AA. LACK OF SELF-CONFIDENCE	627				
BB. LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN EQUIPMENT	628				
CC. APPREHENSION	629				
DD. PANIC	630				
EE. OTHER (SPECIFY)	699				
7. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS					
A. ACCELERATION FORCES, IN-FLIGHT	701				
B. ACCELERATION FORCES, IMPACT	702				
C. DECOMPRESSION	703				
D. VIBRATION	704				
E. GLARE	705				
F. SMOKE, FUMES, ETC.	706				
G. HEAT	707				
H. COLD	708				
I. WINDBLAST	709				
J. VISIBILITY RESTRICTION–WEATHER, HAZE, DARKNESS	710	D			
K. VISIBILITY RESTRICTION–ICING, WINDOWS FOGGED, ETC.	711				
L. VISIBILITY RESTRICTION–DUST, SMOKE, ETC. IN ACFT	712				
M. WEATHER, OTHER THAN VISIBILITY RESTRICTION	713				
N. OTHER (SPECIFY) No horizon	799	D			
8. OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED					
A. HABIT INTERFERENCE, USED WRONG CONTROL	801				
B. CONFUSION OF CONTROLS, OTHER	802				
C. MISREAD INSTRUMENT(S)	803	S			
D. MISINTERPRETED INSTRUMENT READING	804				

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
COINMAN, William M.	(b) (6) redacted	A-7B	154510

FACTORS		A	E	S	R	FACTORS		A	E	S	R
6. OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED (Cont.)											
E. MISLEAD BY FAULTY INSTRUMENTS	805					K. DELAY IN TAKING NECESSARY ACTION	811				
F. VISUAL RESTRICTION BY EQUIPMENT STRUCTURES	806					L. VIOLATION OF FLIGHT DISCIPLINE	812				
G. TASK OVERSATURATION	807					M. NAVIGATIONAL ERROR	813				
H. INADEQUATE COORDINATION OR TIMING	808					N. INADVERTENT OPERATION, SELF-INDUCED	814				
I. MISJUDGED SPEED OR DISTANCE	809					O. INADVERTENT OPERATION, MECHANICALLY INDUCED	815				
J. SELECTED WRONG COURSE OF ACTION	810					P. OTHER (SPECIFY)	899				

REMARKS: *(Indicate item and describe circumstances in detail as necessary.)*

(b) (6)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
PERSONAL DATA
OPNAV FORM 3750/5D (REV. 6-68) S/N 0107-731-8401

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

I. CONTRIBUTING EFFECT

I. ROLE OF THIS INDIVIDUAL IN THE CAUSE OF THE MISHAP:

A. PRIMARY: [X] 1. DEFINITE [ ] 2. PROBABLE [ ] 3. POSSIBLE

B. CONTRIBUTING: [ ] 4. DEFINITE [ ] 5. PROBABLE [ ] 6. POSSIBLE [ ] 8. NONE [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

II. BACKGROUND (Complete for all pilots and others who possibly contributed to mishap)

A. DATE LAST LEAVE ENDED: 28 DEC 68

B. DAYS DURATION LAST LEAVE: 5 Days

C. TYPE OF LEAVE LAST TAKEN: [X] 1. ORDINARY [ ] 2. EMERGENCY [ ] 3. REENLISTMENT [ ] 4. GRADUATION [ ] 5. SICK OR CONVALESCENT [ ] 6. DELAY ENROUTE [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

D. DATE OF LAST PREVIOUS FLIGHT: Morning of 7 JAN 69

HOURS AND MINUTES FLOWN
E. IN LAST 24 HOURS: 3 MIN. 54 F. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 3 MIN. 54

MISSIONS FLOWN
G. IN LAST 24 HOURS: 2 H. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 2

HOURS AND MINUTES WORKED
I. IN LAST 24 HOURS: 13 MIN. J. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 21 MIN.

HOURS SLEPT
K. IN LAST 24 HOURS: 8 L. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 16

M. CONTINUOUS DUTY PRIOR TO MISHAP: HOURS 11 MIN.

N. HOURS CONTINUOUSLY AWAKE PRIOR TO MISHAP:

O. DURATION OF LAST SLEEP PERIOD: HOURS 8 MIN.

P. TIME IN COCKPIT PRIOR TO FLIGHT: HOURS 30 MIN.

III. PHYSIOLOGICAL, LOW PRESSURE CHAMBER AND VERTIGO TRAINING (For all personnel)

TYPE TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED	PLACE TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETED Month	COMPLETED Year	ROLE* IN MISHAP
Low pressure chamber	NAS Lemoore	Feb	68	
Vertigo disorientation	NAS Lemoore	Feb	68	
Physiology	NAS Lemoore	Feb	68	

*For role in mishap, use following code:
0 – NO IMPORTANCE
1 – TRAINING DEFINITELY HELPED
2 – TRAINING POSSIBLY HELPED
3 – LACK OF TRAINING DEFINITELY A FACTOR
4 – LACK OF TRAINING POSSIBLY A FACTOR
9 – UNKNOWN

IV. ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA

a. DATE OF BIRTH: DAY [redacted] (b) (6) b. HEIGHT [redacted] (b) (6) INCHES c. WEIGHT [redacted] (b) POUNDS

d. SITTING HEIGHT [redacted] (b) (6) INCHES e. TRUNK HEIGHT [redacted] (b) (6) INCHES f. FUNCTIONAL REACH [redacted] (b) (6) INCHES

g. BUTTOCK-KNEE LENGTH [redacted] (b) (6) INCHES h. LEG LENGTH [redacted] (b) (6) INCHES i. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID) [redacted] (b) (6) INCHES

V. GENERAL

1. NUMBER AND TYPE OF PRIOR MISHAPS (Complete for all pilots, crewmen, and/or other persons as cause of aircraft)

a. No. NONE b. DESCRIBE TYPE(S):

2. TOTAL YEARS OF FORMAL EDUCATION: 16

3. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES OF PREVIOUS 72 HOURS (For all pilots, crewmen, and/or persons possibly contributing to mishap)

LEUG COINMAN on the 4th of January 1969 was the squadron duty officer of VA-25 stationed at NAS Lemoore, California. He remained as the S.D.O. until Sunday the 5th of January. Upon being relieved of his duties he returned home around noon to return late that afternoon to board a flight to North Island which left Lemoore at approximately 1500. On arrival at North Island he shortly boarded the USS Ticonderoga (CVA14) around 1800.

That evening he ate dinner at the Officer's Club and was seen by his roommate later that evening at a local entertainment spot. He returned on ship between 2200 and 2300 and went to bed shortly thereafter.

He awoke at 0730 to 0800 on the morning of January 6th and through the day was observed at meals and around the ready room by his three roommates and other fellow pilots. All emphasized that at no time did they observe any unusual patterns in his behavior. He was observed several times to be studying procedures of the A7. He ate three meals on the Ticonderoga that day. He retired at 2230 and

(over)

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
COINMAN, William M.	[redacted] (b) (6)	A-7B	154510

and awoke at 0700.

After breakfast he attended several briefing in his ready room and flew a 2 hour and 6 minute bombing mission to Yuma, Arizona. This flight was not marked by any unusual circumstances.

Shortly before 1700 he departed for his final flight to 29 Palms, California which ended at 1835 in a fatal crash. Throughout this time period beginning in Lemoore through his boarding the ship and its two days at sea his eating and sleeping habits were regular and consistent with duties of flying. No member of his squadron noticed any unusual behavior.

(b) (6)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
PERSONAL, SURVIVAL AND ESCAPE EQUIPMENT
OPNAV FORM 3750/8E (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-8501

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6
PAGE 1 OF 2

NOMENCLATURE AND MODEL DESIGNATION	REQUIRED	AVAILABLE	USED	NEEDED	PROBLEMS Indicate by code from list on reverse side.
1. CLOTHING (SUITS, HEADGEAR, SHOES, GLOVES, VISOR, UNDERWEAR, ETC.)					
NOMEX FLIGHT SUIT, APH-6A HELMET SUMMER FLIGHT GLOVES, VISOR, NEUTRAL GRAY, FLIGHT BOOTS.					
2. OXYGEN MASK A-13A					
3. OXYGEN REGULATOR ROBERT SHAW FULTON MINI					
4. LIFE VEST MK 3 C					
5. LIFE RAFT LR-1					
6. SURVIVAL RADIO(S) AN/PRC-63					
7. SIGNALLING DEVICES MK-79 MOD o FLARE KIT					
MK-13 MOD O FLARES 2. STROBE LIGHT SURVIVAL WHISTLE.					
8. SURVIVAL KIT (CONTAINER) RSSK-8A(SCOTT)					
9. OTHER SURVIVAL GEAR MAGNETIC COMPASS, SHROUD CUTTER, SURVIVAL KNIFE.					
10. RESTRAINTS (LAP BELTS, SHOULDER HARNESS, LEG RESTRAINTS)					
INTERGRATED TORSO HARNESS, LAP RESTRAINTS, AND SHOULDER HARNESS, WITH KOCH FITTINGS.					
11. PARACHUTE TYPE NB-10					
12. PARACHUTE CANOPY RELEASE MASTER SPECIALITIES					
13. PARACHUTE OPENING/DEPLOYMENT DEVICES 1000 F					
14. SEAT TYPE ESCAPAC 1c-2					
15. OTHER (SPECIFY)					

16. EXPLAIN PROBLEMS (USE REVERSE SIDE IF NECESSARY)

PILOT HAD ALL REQUIRED PERSONAL, SURVIVAL AND ESCAPE EQUIPMENT. THE AIRCRAFT ENTERED THE WATER AND EXPLODED ON IMPACT, WITH NO APPEARENT ATTEMPT MADE TO ESCAPE.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
COINMAN, WILLIAM M.	(b) (6) [redacted]	A7-B	154510

01 - NOT AVAILABLE--SUPPLY PROBLEM
02 - NOT AVAILABLE--LEFT BEHIND
03 - DISCARDED
04 - LOST
05 - DAMAGED--MINOR
06 - DAMAGED--MAJOR
07 - BURNED--MINOR
08 - BURNED--MAJOR
09 - DESTROYED BY EXTREME FORCE/FIRE
10 - FAILED TO OPERATE (RADIO, ACTUATOR, ETC.)
11 - OPERATED PARTIALLY
12 - DIFFICULTY LOCATING
13 - BEYOND REACH
14 - CONNECTION/CLOSURE DIFFICULTY
15 - CONNECTION/CLOSURE FAILURE
16 - RELEASE/DISCONNECT DIFFICULTY
17 - RELEASE/DISCONNECT FAILURE
18 - INADVERTENT RELEASE/DISCONNECT
19 - INADVERTENT ACTUATION
20 - ACTUATION DIFFICULTY
21 - ACTUATION FAILURE
22 - ACTUATED BY OTHER PERSON
23 - RESTRAINT/ATTACHMENT INADEQUACY
24 - RESTRAINTS/ATTACHMENTS NOT USED PROPERLY FOR MAXIMUM PROTECTION
25 - IMPROPER USE (OTHER)
26 - UNFAMILIAR WITH USE
27 - COLD HAMPERED USE
28 - INJURY HAMPERED USE
29 - WATER HAMPERED USE
30 - OTHER EQUIPMENT INTERFERED
31 - DONNING/REMOVAL PROBLEM
32 - DISCOMFORT/BULKINESS
33 - POOR FIT
34 - LEAKED
35 - MATERIEL DEFICIENCY
36 - DESIGN DEFICIENCY
37 - HANGUP/ENTANGLEMENT (WITH A/C OR OTHER EQUIPMENT)
38 - ENTANGLEMENT (PARACHUTE SUSPENSION LINES ONLY)--MAJOR
39 - ENTANGLEMENT (PARACHUTE SUSPENSION LINES ONLY)--MINOR
40 - DRAGGING (PARACHUTE ONLY)
41 - NON-STANDARD CONFIGURATION
42 - AIDED IN LOCATION/RESCUE
43 - NOT EFFECTIVE IN LOCATION/RESCUE (USED IN AREA OF SAR VEHICLES)
44 - PREVENTED/MINIMIZED INJURY
45 - EQUIPMENT PROBLEM (LOSS, FAILURE, ETC.) A FACTOR IN PRODUCING INJURY
46 - EQUIPMENT PRODUCED INJURY (HIT BY EJECTION SEAT, ETC.)
47 - FAILURE/DELAY IN USING COMPROMISED SURVIVAL/RESCUE
48 - ALL CREW EQUIPMENT (CODE ONLY ONCE)
49 - MAINTENANCE/INSTALLATION ERROR
50 - PROBLEM EXPERIENCED BY OTHERS IN ACTUATION/RELEASE OF EQUIPMENT
51 - EQUIPMENT DAMAGE--SELF INDUCED
52 - EQUIPMENT FAILURE--SELF INDUCED
60 - OTHER (SPECIFY)

(b) (6)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
ESCAPE - EGRESS COMPLETED FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS
OPNAV FORM 3750/07 (Rev. 6-68) S/N-0107-751-0801

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section II of OPNAVINST 3750.6

1. LOCATION IN AIRCRAFT

A.
- [X] 1. COCKPIT OR PILOT'S COMPARTMENT
- [ ] 2. NAVIGATOR'S/ENGINEER'S COMPARTMENT
- [ ] 3. PASSENGER COMPARTMENT (MIDDLE DECK)
- [ ] 4. PASSENGER COMPARTMENT (UPPER DECK)
- [ ] 5. PASSENGER COMPARTMENT (LOWER DECK)
- [ ] 6. OTHER COMPARTMENT
- [ ] 9. COMPARTMENT UNKNOWN

B. LONGITUDINAL LOCATION
- [X] 1. FORWARD SECTION
- [ ] 2. CENTER SECTION
- [ ] 3. AFT SECTION
- [ ] 4. SECTION UNKNOWN

C. LATERAL LOCATION
- [X] 2. CENTER
- [ ] 4. LEFT SIDE
- [ ] 5. RIGHT SIDE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

D. DIRECTION FACING
- [X] 1. FORWARD
- [ ] 2. AFT
- [ ] 3. INBOARD
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

E. USE OF SEAT
- [ ] 0 NOT IN SEAT
- [X] 1. IN SEAT
- [ ] 2. DUNK/LITTER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

2. METHOD OF ESCAPE *(More than one may apply)*

A. EJECTION
- [ ] 1. ACCOMPLISHED (FREE OF AIRCRAFT)
- [ ] 2. ATTEMPTED (NOT ACCOMPLISHED)
- [ ] 3. SEAT EJECTED ON IMPACT (TERRAIN)
- [ ] 4. INADVERTENT EJECTION
- [X] 7. UNKNOWN IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE
- [ ] 8. INSPECTED EJECTION
- [ ] 0. DEFINITELY NOT ATTEMPTED

B. BAILOUT
- [ ] 1. ACCOMPLISHED (FREE OF AIRCRAFT)
- [ ] 2. ATTEMPTED (NOT ACCOMPLISHED)
- [ ] 3. BAILED OUT AFTER EJECTION ATTEMPT FAILED
- [X] 7. UNKNOWN IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE
- [ ] 8. INSPECTED BAILOUT
- [ ] 0. DEFINITELY NOT ATTEMPTED

C. OTHER
- [ ] A. STANDARD EMERGENCY GROUND EGRESS
- [ ] B. UNDERWATER EGRESS (NOT EJECTION)
- [ ] C. DID NOT ESCAPE
- [ ] D. EXIT UNASSISTED (OTHER THAN STANDARD NORMAL GROUND EGRESS)
- [ ] E. CARRIED/ASSISTED OUT
- [ ] F. BLOWN/THROWN OUT
- [ ] G. JUMPED FROM A/C (AUTOGIRO)
- [ ] 8. UNKNOWN IF ESCAPE ACCOMPLISHED
- [ ] 9. ESCAPED, METHOD UNKNOWN

3. INTENT FOR ESCAPE
- [ ] 1. INTENTIONAL
- [ ] 2. UNINTENTIONAL, SELF INDUCED
- [ ] 3. UNINTENTIONAL, MECHANICAL
- [X] 4. INTENT UNKNOWN

4. EXIT USED
- [ ] 1. NORMAL EXIT
- [ ] 2. EJECTED THROUGH CANOPY
- [ ] 3. EMERGENCY EXIT
- [ ] 5. OTHER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

5. COCKPIT/CABIN CONDITION AFTER IMPACT
- [ ] 0. NO DAMAGE (OTHER THAN CANOPY LOSS, ETC.)
- [ ] 1. MINOR DAMAGE (DEFINITELY HABITABLE)
- [ ] 2. REASONABLY INTACT (PROBABLY HABITABLE)
- [ ] 3. MAJOR DAMAGE (PROBABLY NOT HABITABLE)
- [ ] 4. DESTROYED (DEFINITELY NOT HABITABLE)
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

6. ORDER OF ESCAPE *(1st, 2nd, etc.)* _____

7. REASON(S) FOR ESCAPE *(More than one may apply)*
- [ ] A. FIRE/EXPLOSION/SMOKE
- [ ] B. LOSS OF CONTROL
- [ ] C. ENGINE FAILURE
- [ ] D. FUEL EXHAUSTION
- [ ] E. STRUCTURAL FAILURE
- [ ] F. MID-AIR COLLISION
- [ ] G. WATER IMPACT
- [ ] H. GROUND/STRUCTURE IMPACT
- [ ] J. LAUNCH FAILURE
- [ ] K. ARRESTMENT FAILURE
- [ ] Y. OTHER
- [ ] Z. UNKNOWN

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	[redacted]	A/C	DATE
COINMAN, William M.	(b) (6)	A-7B	154 510

8. COMMUNICATIONS PRIOR TO ESCAPE

- [ ] 1. DISTRESS SIGNAL TRANSMITTED
- [ ] 2. POSITION FIX TRANSMITTED
- [ ] 3. EMERGENCY IFF (MANUAL)
- [ ] 4. EMERGENCY IFF (AUTOMATIC)
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
- [ ] 0. NONE

9. NUMBER OF PREVIOUS:

EJECTIONS 0 EMERGENCY BAILOUTS 0

OTHER PARACHUTE JUMPS (TRAINING, SKYDIVING, ETC.) _____

10. TERRAIN OF PARACHUTE LANDING OR CRASH SITE

(More than one may be applicable)

- [ ] A - OPEN SEA
- [ ] B - LARGE LAKE
- [ ] C - RIVER
- [ ] D - DEEP WATER, OTHER
- [ ] E - SHALLOW WATER
- [ ] F - DEEP SNOW
- [ ] G - THICK ICE
- [ ] H - MARSH/SWAMP/MUD
- [ ] U - HARD GROUND
- [ ] J - SOFT GROUND
- [ ] K - BUILDING
- [ ] L - FLIGHT DECK
- [ ] M - DENSE WOODS
- [ ] N - IN TREES
- [ ] T - THROUGH TREES
- [ ] P - RAVINE/STEEP SLOPE
- [ ] Q - ROCKS
- [ ] R - IN/NEAR FIREBALL
- [ ] S - DESERT
- [ ] Y - UNKNOWN
- [ ] Z - OTHER _____

11. AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE AT TIME OF ESCAPE

(Either in flight or after crash, ditching, etc.)

- [ ] NOSE UP
- [X] NOSE DOWN 45° DEGREES
- [ ] RIGHT BANK
- [ ] LEFT BANK _____ DEGREES
- [ ] A. NOSE DOWN SPIN
- [ ] F. DISINTEGRATION
- [ ] B. FLAT SPIN
- [ ] G. INVERTED
- [ ] C. OSCILLATING SPIN
- [ ] H. BURNING
- [ ] D. ROLLING
- [ ] Z. UNKNOWN
- [ ] E. TUMBLING
- [ ] Y. OTHER (DESCRIBE) _____

12. EJECTION SEAT/PARACHUTE TRAINING

(Not required for passengers who had no opportunity to escape)

TYPE OF TRAINING	TOTAL HOURS IN TRAINING	DATE OF LAST TRAINING	ROLE*
LECTURES/DEMONSTRATIONS		Feb 68	9
TRAINING FILMS		Feb 68	9
UNARMED EJECTION SEAT		Feb 68	9
ARMED SEAT ON TOWER		Feb 68	9
JUMP SCHOOL			9
PARASAIL TRAINING			9
OTHER (SPECIFY)			9

Use codes below to indicate role training played in this mishap.

0 - NO IMPORTANCE
1 - TRAINING DEFINITE HELP
2 - TRAINING POSSIBLE HELP
3 - LACK OF TRAINING FACTOR
4 - LACK OF TRAINING POSSIBLE FACTOR
9 - TRAINING ROLE UNKNOWN

13. EGRESS DIFFICULTIES *(Place X in appropriate column)*

B - Before; D - During; A - After

		GROUND B	GROUND D	GROUND A		WATER B	WATER D	WATER A		AIR B	AIR D	AIR A
1. BUFFETING	01				01				01			
2. G FORCES	02				02				02			
3. WINDBLAST	03				03				03			
4. SEAT PINS NOT REMOVED	04				04				04			
5. DIFFICULTY LOCATING CANOPY JETTISON MECHANISM	05				05				05			
6. HAMPERED BY CLOTHING	06				06				06			
7. HAMPERED BY EQUIPMENT (INCLUDE BODY ARMOR)	07				07				07			
8. HAMPERED BY INJURIES	08				08				08			
9. DIFFICULTY RELEASING CANOPY/HATCH	09				09				09			
10. FAILURE TO RELEASE CANOPY/HATCH	10				10				10			
11. DIFFICULTY LOCATING/REACHING NORMAL EJECTION MECHANISM	11				11				11			
12. DIFFICULTY LOCATING/REACHING ALTERNATE EJECTION MECHANISM	12				12				12			
13. FACE CURTAIN FAILED TO ACTIVATE SEAT	13				13				13			
14. FACE CURTAIN PROBLEM (LOCATING, REACHING, ETC.)	14				14				14			
15. SEAT PAN FIRING HANDLE FAILED TO ACTIVATE SEAT	15				15				15			
16. SEAT PAN FIRING HANDLE PROBLEM (LOCATING, ETC.)	16				16				16			
17. CANOPY JETTISON PROBLEM	17				17				17			
18. CANOPY JETTISON FAILURE (AUTOMATIC MEANS)	18				18				18			

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

(b) (6)

13. EGRESS DIFFICULTIES *(Place X in appropriate column) (Continued)*

B - Before; D - During; A - After

		GROUND B	GROUND D	GROUND A	WATER B	WATER D	WATER A	AIR B	AIR D	AIR A
19. COULD NOT OPEN CANOPY/HATCH	19									
20. DIFFICULTY RELEASING RESTRAINTS	20									
21. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-OBSTRUCTIONS	21									
22. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-INJURIES	22									
23. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-A/C ATTITUDE	23									
24. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-EQUIPMENT HANGUP	24									
25. PINNED DOWN IN A/C (OTHER THAN EQUIPMENT HANGUP)	25									
26. CONFUSION/PANIC/DISORIENTATION	26									
27. DARKNESS-NO VISUAL REFERENCE	27									
28. FIRE/SMOKE/FUEL	28									
29. ANTHROPOMETRIC PROBLEM	29									
30. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT FACTOR (OTHER THAN HANGUP)	30									
31. UPPER EXTREMITIES HIT COCKPIT STRUCTURES	31									
32. LOWER EXTREMITIES HIT COCKPIT STRUCTURES	32									
33. MAN STRUCK CANOPY/CANOPY BOW	33									
34. STRUCK EXTERNAL SURFACE OF AIRCRAFT	34									
35. FLAILING - UPPER EXTREMITIES	35									
36. FLAILING - LOWER EXTREMITIES	36									
37. DROGUE SLUG SWINGING AT MAN	37									
38. DROGUE SLUG STRUCK MAN	38									
39. MAN STRUCK BY OTHER EQUIPMENT	39									
40. MAN STRUCK BY SEAT	40									
41. SEAT SEPARATION DIFFICULTY	41									
42. SEAT/PARACHUTE ENTANGLEMENT	42									
43. MAN TANGLED IN CHUTE RISERS-MAJOR	43									
44. MAN TANGLED IN CHUTE RISERS-MINOR	44									
45. PARACHUTE LINE OVER	45									
46. MAN HELD ON TO SEAT	46									
47. TUMBLING/SPINNING	47									
48. PARACHUTE DID NOT OPEN	48									
49. PARACHUTE STREAMED	49									
50. INADVERTENT OPENING OF LAP BELT	50									
51. FAILURE OF LAP BELT TO OPEN	51									
52. INRUSHING WATER	52									
53. COLD	53									
54. UNCONSCIOUS/DAZED	54									
55. OTHER	99									

REMARKS OR CONTINUATION *(Index each remark with code from above)*

A/C was observed to dive at 45^0 angle directly into the sea, a surface explosion was noted. The pilot and A/C were not recovered.

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
COINMAN, William M.	(b) (6)	A-7B	154510

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
SURVIVAL AND RESCUE
OPNAV FORM 3750/5H (REV. 8-68) S/N 0107-701-[illegible]

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section II of OPNAVINST 3750.6
PAGE 1 OF 3

1. SURVIVAL TRAINING
*Use Code at right to indicate the role this person's training played in survival.

0 - NOT A FACTOR
1 - DEFINITELY HELPED
2 - POSSIBLY HELPED
3 - LACK OF TRAINING DEFINITE FACTOR
4 - LACK OF TRAINING POSSIBLE FACTOR
9 - ROLE UNKNOWN

	TYPE TRAINING	COURSE AND SPONSOR	PLACE ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETED Month	COMPLETED Year	*ROLE
A.	WATER SURVIVAL:					
	1. MAINTENANCE DUNK	VA-122	NAS Lemoore	JUN	68	0
	2. OXLEY DUNKER	Pre-Flight	NAS Pensacola	OCT	66	0
	3. PARACHUTE DRAG	DWEST/FASTUPAC	San Diego	JUN	68	0
	4. IMMERSED COCKPIT	NONE				0
	5. IMMERSED SEAT	NONE				0
B.	JUNGLE SURVIVAL	Survival School	FASTUPAC, San Diego	MAR	68	0
C.	ARCTIC SURVIVAL	Survival School	FASTUPAC, San Diego	MAR	68	0
D.	DESERT SURVIVAL	Survival School	FASTUPAC, San Diego	MAR	68	0
E.	MOUNTAIN SURVIVAL	Survival School	FASTUPAC, San Diego	MAR	68	0
F.	SURVIVAL (GENERAL)	Survival School	FASTUPAC, San Diego	MAR	68	0

2. CONDITIONS PREVAILING AT SURVIVAL/RESCUE SITE *(If widely variable, give range)*

A. WATER TEMPERATURE 52 °F
B. AIR TEMPERATURE 59 °F
C. SURFACE WINDS 16 KNOTS
D. WAVE HEIGHT 4 FEET
E. WAVE FREQUENCY 20 PER MIN.

F. TERRAIN
- [ ] 1. OPEN GROUND
- [ ] 2. WOODS/JUNGLE
- [ ] 3. MOUNTAINS
- [ ] 4. DESERT
- [x] 5. WATER
- [ ] 6. ICE/SNOW
- [ ] 7. SWAMP
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

G. WEATHER
- [ ] 1. CLEAR
- [ ] 2. OVERCAST
- [ ] 3. FOG
- [ ] 4. RAIN
- [ ] 5. SNOW
- [ ] 6. SLEET
- [ ] 7. HAIL
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

3. TIME LAPSE SEQUENCE FOR RESCUE EVENTS *(Give time lapse in hours and minutes from time of mishap)*

For actual rescue vehicle and personnel and others who took an active part in the rescue sequence but did not actually recover this individual. See Instructions for details.

	ACTUAL	OTHER ASSIST	OTHER ASSIST	LIGHT CONDITIONS Day	Night	Dawn	Dusk
A. RESCUE PERSONNEL NOTIFIED THAT MISHAP HAD OCCURRED							
B. RESCUE VEHICLE DEPARTED							
C. THIS INDIVIDUAL LOCATED BY RESCUE PERSONNEL							
D. THIS INDIVIDUAL PHYSICALLY REACHED BY RESCUE VEHICLE PERSONNEL							
E. THIS INDIVIDUAL ACTUALLY ABOARD RESCUE VEHICLE OR RESCUE ATTEMPT ABANDONED							
F. RESCUE COMPLETED (PERSON RETURNED TO STATION, HOSPITAL, ETC.)							

4. A. TIME THIS INDIVIDUAL SPENT IN WATER ____ HRS. ____ MIN. B. TIME THIS INDIVIDUAL SPENT IN LIFE RAFT ____ HRS. ____ MIN.

5. AT TIME OF RESCUE ALERT, DISTANCE IN MILES FROM MISHAP SITE TO:
A. ACTUAL RESCUE VEHICLE ____ B. NEAREST ASSIST RESCUE VEHICLE ____

6. PERSONNEL/VEHICLES PARTICIPATING IN RESCUE

A. VEHICLE PERFORMING ACTUAL SNCRUP OF THIS PERSON
1. TYPE/MODEL: ____ 2. LOCATION WHEN ALERTED ____ 3. DUTY WHEN ALERTED ____

B. DID RESCUE PERSONNEL LEAVE VEHICLE TO ASSIST IN RESCUE? [ ] 1. YES [ ] 2. NO [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
IF SO, HOW?
- [ ] A. PARACHUTED
- [ ] B. JUMPED WITHOUT PARACHUTE
- [ ] C. DESCENDED LINE/LADDER/NET
- [ ] D. LOWERED BY HOIST
- [ ] E. NORMAL GROUND/WATER
- [ ] Y. OTHER

C. LIST OTHER VEHICLES PARTICIPATING IN RESCUE EFFORT: (OTHER ASSISTS IN ITEM 5) ____
OTHERS WHO STOOD BY READY TO RENDER ASSISTANCE IF REQUIRED: ____

D. NUMBER SEARCH AND RESCUE HOURS ____

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	DATE
COTTMAN, William M.	(b) (6) redacted	A-7B	154510

6-67

7. RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED *(Use numbers to show sequence)*

- ☐ A - SLING
- ☐ B - SEAT
- ☐ C - CARGO NET
- ☐ D - ROPE
- ☐ E - LIFE RING
- ☐ F - BASKET
- ☐ G - BOOM NET
- ☐ H - DAVIT
- ☐ J - RAFT
- ☐ K - WEBBING CUTTERS
- ☐ L - CHICAGO GRIP
- ☐ M - GRAPHEL
- ☐ N - BOARDING LADDER
- ☐ P - KNIFE/AXE/SAW
- ☐ Q - MAKESHIFT CARRIER/SUPPORT
- ☐ R - FIRST AID EQUIPMENT
- ☐ S - TREE PENETRATOR SEAT
- ☐ T - HELICOPTER PLATFORM
- ☐ U - STRETCHER
- ☐ V - CABLE CUTTERS
- ☐ W - HELICOPTER RESCUE BOOM
- ☐ X - BILLY PUGH NET _____
- ☐ Y - OTHER (DESCRIBE) _____

8. RESCUE ALERTING MEANS *(Use numbers to show sequence)*

- ☐ A - WITNESSED
- ☐ B - RADAR SURVEILLANCE
- ☐ C - OVERDUE REPORT TO SAR
- ☐ D - AIRBORNE RAPID RELAY
- ☐ E - CRASH PHONE
- ☐ F - OTHER TELEPHONE
- ☐ G - RADIO MAY-DAY CALL
- ☐ H - RADIO SURVIVAL TYPE
- ☐ J - OTHER RADIO REPORT
- ☐ K - VISUAL SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- ☐ L - AUDIO SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- ☐ M - SURVIVOR REPORT
- ☐ N - LOSS OF RADIO CONTACT
- ☐ P - SMOKE/FIRE-CRASH SCENE
- ☐ Y - OTHER (DESCRIBE) _____

9. ALERTING/COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS

- ☐ A - POOR RADIO RECEPTION
- ☐ B - TELEPHONE LINE BUSY
- ☐ C - POOR RADIO DISCIPLINE
- ☐ D - AIRCRAFT RADIO/IFF EQUIPMENT INOPERATIVE
- ☐ E - POOR RADIO PROCEDURES
- ☐ Y - OTHER _____

10. DELAYS IN DEPARTURE OF RESCUE VEHICLES

- ☐ A - VEHICLE OPERATOR NOT AVAILABLE
- ☐ B - VEHICLE NOT READY
- ☐ C - VEHICLE CREW NOT AVAILABLE
- ☐ D - COMMUNICATIONS BREAKDOWN
- ☐ E - COMPLETING PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED DUTIES
- ☐ F - LACK OF INFORMATION ON CRASH SITE
- ☐ G - NATURE OF TERRAIN
- ☐ H - WEATHER
- ☐ Y - OTHER _____

11. RESCUE VEHICLE PROBLEMS ENROUTE

- ☐ A - HEADWIND
- ☐ B - POOR VISIBILITY
- ☐ C - HIGH SEA STATE
- ☐ D - MECHANICAL PROBLEMS
- ☐ E - NATURE OF TERRAIN
- ☐ F - OTHER OBSTRUCTIONS (FENCES, ETC.)
- ☐ G - RESCUERS LOST
- ☐ H - WEATHER
- ☐ Y - OTHER _____

12. PROBLEMS IN LOCATING INDIVIDUAL (OR KEEPING IN SIGHT)

- ☐ A - HEAVY SEAS
- ☐ B - TREES
- ☐ C - FOG/CLOUDS
- ☐ D - PRECIPITATION
- ☐ E - DARKNESS
- ☐ F - RADIO INTERFERENCE
- ☐ G - CONFUSION DUE TO OTHER LIGHTS
- ☐ H - MALFUNCTION OF DIRECTIONAL EQUIPMENT
- ☐ J - LACK OF CORRECT INFORMATION ON LOCATION OF SURVIVOR
- ☐ K - INABILITY TO VISUALLY DISTINGUISH SURVIVOR FROM TERRAIN
- ☐ L - LOSS OF RADIO/RADAR CONTACT
- ☐ M - SURVIVOR'S FAILURE TO USE SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- ☐ Y - OTHER _____

13. LOCATOR MEANS

Consult Instructions for listing of specific locator means and enter under appropriate categories. Use numbers to indicate sequence of observance.

GENERAL	PYROTECHNICS	ELECTRONIC SIGNAL DEVICES	BALLISTICS	AUDITORY	VISUAL

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

(b) (6) [redacted]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
FLIGHT SURGEON'S COMMENTS, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OPNAV FORM 3750/1E (REV. 6-68) S/N 0107-731-8900

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

Flight Surgeon's Comment, Analysis, and Recommendations

In analyzing the fatal accident of LTJG COINMAN previously described, several factors are worthy of note. There was no indication from the pilot or ship observers that any mal-function of the aircraft existed. Since parts (other than the antennae) were not found, it can't be conclusively stated that a mechanical failure did not occur. However, there are multiple factors helping explain the human factor error.

From a medical aspect, LTJG COINMAN was fit for flying. He had had no recent illness or complaints. As mentioned earlier there were no discrepancies or irregularities in the 72 hours preceding the accidents. Although this medical officer did not personally know the subject, all those who did described him as a hard working individual striving for perfection and quality in his flying abilities. He approached flying with real intent. Due to this factor it was difficult for him to accept defeat in not being able to land on the carrier at night and rather than going to the beach, he continued to attempt to "come aboard" making seven passes. By the seventh attempt fatigue and frustration were undoubtedly present.

In describing the night, (see enclosure 1) there was overcast to 600ft. and no horizon, and due to this vertigo had been experienced by more senior pilots. These factors when combined with the distraction of a lengthy voice report from Central Control regarding bingo information set the stage for the fatal accident.

Recommendations in such a case must first be aimed at the completness of training for young aviators prior to attempts at landing under such undesirable circumstances. In retrospect it is now evident that LTJG COINMAN should not have been allowed to make as many passes as he did. Had limitations on the number of passes been set, fatigue and frustration would not have existed. Finally it would be suggested that information to get the pilot to the beach be delayed so that he is not distracted at this critical time.

FLIGHT SURGEON PARTICIPATED FULLY IN INVESTIGATION	NO. OF HOURS SPENT	DATE OF REPORT
[X] YES [ ] NO	6	11 February 1969
FLIGHT SURGEON PARTICIPATED FULLY IN BOARD PROCEEDINGS	NO. OF HOURS SPENT	NO. REPORTS PREPARED
[ ] YES [ ] NO		
FLIGHT SURGEON'S NAME AND GRADE	DUTY STATION	SIGNATURE
(b) (6) [redacted] LT(MC), USNR	CVW 16	(b) (6) [redacted]

Statement of LT [redacted] (b) (6), USN, LSO, concerning VA-25 AAR 2-69A occuring 7 JAN 69, A-7B BUNO 154510, Pilot COINMAN.

I was the controlling LSO of AH 516 on the night of 7 January 1969. There was no visible horizon at all; an extremely dark night. The conditions that existed during the recovery were as follows: Wind 360 degrees relative at 28 kts with the deck steady. The preceding passes were consistently high which resulted in five wave-offs. On the last pass, AH 516 boltered and I called bolter. I turned and observed the aircraft had a good climb and the engine sounded as if at full power.

I am a designated Naval Aviator with 2800 hours and an A-7 day and night LSO qualified.

[redacted] (b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Enclosure (6)

Statement of [redacted] (b) (6), AC2, USN, concerning VA-25 MAR 2-69A occuring 7 JAN 1969, A-7B BUNO 154510, Pilot COINMAN.

On the night of 7 January 1969 I was marshall controller and approach controller for CANASTA 511, CANASTA 516, WAR PARTY 313, and WAR PARTY 305. With exceptions of a few speed changes all aircraft flew a good TACAN approach coming out of marshall to TICONDEROGA. CANASTA 516 was the 2nd aircraft out of marshall and after about 2 minutes it was noted that 516 was closing on the lead aircraft CANASTA 511. CANASTA 516 was given speed 225 for correct interval. On 516's first approach he showed up on final well left of center line. A 10 degree right correction at 5 miles brought him back to center line but numerous corrections were needed to keep him there. CANASTA 516 made a total of six approaches all of which were erratic in regards to center line except for the last one. 516 flew good glide path up until reaching 1 mile. At that time he continued to go high every pass until the last one. The last approach he was given headings in degrees and responded well to all turns. He flew good glide slope all the way to the deck on the last pass but got a bolter.

It is my feeling that he was afraid to come down the first few passes because he seemed to level off from about 1 mile on in. On the sixth approach however I could tell that he had made up his mind to get aboard and flew a good approach both in Azimuth and glide slope.

This controller has 14 years experience in air traffic control work.

[redacted] (b) (6)

AC2, USN CATTIC 14
USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Enclosure (B)

NNNNMSCNASCB35 IRTTUZ YUW RUWJMUA0451 0271812-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 271812Z JAN 69
FM COMNAVAIRPAC
TO RUWMHMA/ATKRON TWO FIVE
INFO ZEN1/USS TICONDEROGA
RUWMHVA/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUCILSA/NAVSAFECEN
BT
UNCLAS
VA-25 AAR 2-69A
A. YOUR 242342Z JAN 69
1. SEVEN DAY EXTENSION FOR SUBJECT AAR REQUESTED IN REF (A) APPROVED.
BT
#0451

351A

AIR AI

TOR/1929z 27 JAN 1969

A-7B/154510

VA-25
2-69A

1-7-69

JAN 271812Z

A161
69

NNNZCZCNASCB161B621
PTTUZYUW RUWMHMA0151 0242343-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 242342Z JAN 69
FM ATKRON TWO FIVE
TO RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO ZEN/COMATKCARAIRWING ONE SIX
RUWJMUA/USS TICONDEROGA
RUWMHVA/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUCILSA/NAVSAFECEN
BT
UNCLAS
EXTENSION OF VA-25 AAR 2-69A
REF (A) OPNAVINST 3750.6F
(B) USS TICONDEROGA MSG DTG 080900Z JAN 69
1. IAW REF (A) REQ 7 WORKING DAY EXTENSION OF AAR RPTD REF (B) DUE
OF COMMIT/PREP FOR WESTPAC DEPLOY.
BT
#0151

TOR/0251Z/25 JAN 1969

RECORDS

A7B/154510 VA-25 2-69A

JAN 242342Z
1-7-69

EXZCNASCA777QZCZCSLA101
PTTUZYUW RUKSBMU0693 0090724-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU ZYO RUWNSAA
P 090724Z JAN /9
FM USS TICONDEROGA
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVSAFECEN
RUKRSYA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO RUWDSAA/COMELEVEN
RUEBBHB/CHNAVMAT
RUKSSZB/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUWTATA/NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUEBEEA/NAVAIRTESTCEN PAXRIV
RULKSZQ/COMNAVAIRPLANT
RUWNSAA/COMREDATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
RUCLSKA/COMREDATKCARAIRWING FOUR
RUWMHMA/NAS LEMOORE
RUKSSZE/COMTWELVE
RULCSYB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUEBPDA/DIR AFIP
RUYHSYB/CINCPACFLT
RULCSYF/BUPERS

777B

ACTION

SUPP
AAR

PAGE TWO RUKSBMU0693 UNCLAS
RUKRSYJ/COMFAIRMIRAMAR
RUWJABA/DAS NORTON AFB CALIF
RUWMHMA/ATKRON ONE TWO TWO
RUCLSKA/ATKRON ONE SEVEN FOUR
ZEN/ATKRON EIGHT SEVEN
RUCLSKA/ATKRON EIGHT SIX
RUYHZFF/ATKRON ONE ZERO FIVE
RUYHZFF/ATKRON THREE SEVEN
RUCLSKA/ATKRON EIGHT TWO
RUWMHMA/ATKRON ONE ONE THREE
RUKRSYC/NAVMISCEN PT MUGU
BT
UNCLAS
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUPPLEMENTARY NUMBER 2 MSG RPT OF ACFT ACCIDENT
A. MY 080904Z JAN 69
1. ITEM 6; DEGREE OF INJURY, LIMA.
2. ITEM 11: SAR TERMINATED AT 091915Z DEBRIS FOUND FLOATING NEAR OIL SLICK INCLUDED PILOTS HELMET AND OXYGEN MASK. HELMET DAMAGED CONSIDERABLY, INDICATING SEVERE IMPACT.
BT
#0693

Toc: 1511Z 09 JAN 1969

JAN 090724Z

make

NMQNASCB896ZCSLB719
PTTUZYUW RUKSBMU0535 0080904-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU ZYO RUWNSAA
P R 080904Z JAN 69
FM USS TICONDEROGA
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVSAFECEN
RUKRSYA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO RUWDSAA/COMELEVEN
RUEBBHB/CHNAVMAT
RUKSSZB/COMFAIRALAMEDAU
RUWTATA/NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUEBEEA/NAVAIRTESTCEN PAXRIV
RULKSZQ/COMNAVAIRPLANT
RUWNSAA/COMREDATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
RUCLSKA/COMREDATKCARAIRWING FOUR
RUWMHMA/NAS LEMOORE
RUKSSZE/COMTWELVE
RULCSYB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUEBPDA/DIR AFIP
RUYHSYB/CINCPACFLT
RULCSYF/BUPERS

A896

ACTION

AAR

PAGE TWO RUKSBMU0535 UNCLAS
RUKRSYJ/COMFAIRMIRAMAR
RUWJABA/DAS NORTON AFB CALIF
RUWMHM
IXATKRON ONE TWO TWO
RUCLSKA/ATKRON ONE SEVEN FOUR
ZEN/ATKRON EIGHT SEVEN
RUWNSAA/ATKRON EIGHT SIX
RUYHZFF/ATKRON ONE ZERO FIVE
RUYHZFF/ATKRON THREE SEVEN
RUWNSAA/ATKRON EIGHT TWO
RUWMHMA/ATKRON ONE ONE THREE
RUKRSYC/NA
HMISCEN PT MUGU
BT
UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PRELIM/SUPP MSG RPT OF ACFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6F
1. 7 JAN 69 1835 U NIGHT
2. CVA-14 AT SEA 33-07-08 N, 118-15-09 W
3. A7B, 154510
4. VA-25, SER 2-69A
5. ALFA ACFT LOST AT SEA.

TOR: 17128
08 JAN 1969

90107102

1-7-69

A7B/154510

VA-25
2-69A

080904Z/JAN

PAGE THREE RUKSBMU0535 UNCLAS
6. WILLIAM MICHYEL COINMAN, LTJG [redacted] (b) (6) USNR, 1315, ACTIVE,
MISSIKZ AT SEA/POSSIBLE LIMA, 514.6 TOTAL HRS, 194.1 HRS THIS MODEL
102.6 TOTAL HRS LAST 90 DAYS. DEGRESS NOT OBSERVED.
7. NONE
8. NONE
9. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, 2.4 HRS, IFR/VFR ON TOP. CVA-14.
10. ENROUTE TO NAF EL CENTRO FOL BOLTER/DIVERT
11. SECT OF A7B LAUNCHED AT 1614U ON CAS MISSION TO 29 PALMS. BUNO
154510 CONFIG WITH 4 LAU-68 WITH 7 EA 2.75 IN FFAR AND 600 ROUNDS 20
MM. ONLY 5 FFAR EA LAU-68 WERE EXPENDED. NO ASSYM LOADING EXISTED.
ACFT COMMENCED CCA AT 1749 U, FUEL STATE 4,600 LB. A STANDARD SPN-35
PRECISION FINAL APPROACH WAS EXECUTED TO A WAVE OFF FOR BEING HIGH IN
CLOSE. FOUR ADDITIONAL PRECISION APPROACHES RESULTED IN TECHNIQUE
WAVE OFFS BY THE[redacted]SO FOR BEING HIGH. THE SIXTH APPROACH WAS VERY
NEAR GLIDE SLOPE AND CENTERLINE UNTIL IN CLOSE WHEN THE RATE OF DESCENT
DECREASED AND A BOLTER OCCURRED AT 1835U WITH A FUEL STATE OF APPROX
2,200. THE DECK WAS STEADY IN A CALM SEA, PILOTS REPORTED NO HORIZON
REF. THE AIRCRAFT WAS OBSERVED TO CLIMB
NORMALLY OFF THE ANGLE. EIGHT SEC AFTER BOLT PILOT REQ DOWNWIND TURN.
CCA IMMED TOLD PILOT TO "BINGO CH126 CLEAN UP HOOK UP PIGIONS 079/119
PASSING 2500 SWITCH BUTTON 7" THIS INFO WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY PILOT
IMMED, HIS LAST TX BEING ROGER. EL CENTROL(106)

PAGE FOUR RUKSBMU0535 UNCLAS
WAS VFR AND BINGO FUEL WAS 1435 LB. IMPACT WITH WATER OCCURRED APPROX
22 SEC AFTER LAST
TX. FLT DECK/ BRIDGE PERS OBS ACFT LIGHTS TO CLIMB STRAIGHT AHEAD INTO
EDGE OF LOW OVCST AND THEN COMMENCE AN EVER INCREASING RATE OF DESCENT
TO AN IMPACT OF APPROX 45 DEGREES AT AN EST DIST OF 2 TO 4 MILES.
A SURF EXPL RESULTED. NO ATTEMPT AT EJECTION WAS OBS. SAR IS CONTINUING.
12. EST 700 OVCST, 5 MI HAZE, TEMP 54, DP WKGN WIND 280 DEG 16 KTS
(350 DEG 29 KTS REL).
ALT 29.96 . SEA STATE 280 DEG, 03 SEC, 4 FT, SWELL CALM. WATER TEMP
59 DEG F. PILOTS REPORT TOPS AT 1200 TO 1400, BASES 400 TO 600
FT.
13. NONE
14. NEGATIVE
15. NONE
16. PILOT LAST FLEW 2.1 HR CAS FLT SAME DAY LANDING AT 1200U.
OTHER PILOTS RPT LACK OF HORIZON AND VERTIGO ON 1800 U RECOV.
17. [redacted] (b) (6), LT, VA-25 ASO, USS TICONDEROGA
BT
#0535

NNNN

08090421JW