R&DP-20-1(1/68)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

24 MAR 1969

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [signature] REVIEWED: [initials] LOGGED: ds PUNCHED: P VERIFIED: D

CARD 1

Section	Field	Columns	Entry
RECORD IDENTIFICATION – Date	Cal. Yr.	01–02	68
	Mo.	03–04	12
	Day	05–06	07
	Type Report	07	1
	Log Line Number	08–09	02
	Aircraft Number	10–11	01
	Source	12	1
	Don't Count	13	
	Enemy Action	14	
Aircraft Model	Mission Modif.	15–16	
	Basic Mission	17	A
	Design Number	18–20	007
	Series Symbol	21	B
	Model Code	22–23	06
	AIRCRAFT BUREAU NUMBER	24–29	154459
	Reporting Custodian	30–32	249
	Type Duty	33–35	321
	Major Command	36	1
Time of Mishap	CONDITION	37	4
	LOCAL TIME	38–41	2045
	Acdt. Dmg.	42	A
	Acft. Dmg.	43	A
	Acdt. Inj.	44	A
	Acft. Inj.	45	A
	Hull Number	46–48	A65
	Kind of Flight	49–51	3A7
	Clearance	52	4
Location	NAME CODE	53–59	F5CVA65
	Bearing From	60–61	16
	Dist. From	62	G
FAC. RWAY DESCRIP.	Distance	63	
	Area	64	
	Runway Heading	65–66	
	Length	67	
	WAS DUTY RWY USED?	68	
FAC. SHIP DESCRIP.	Ship Type	69	
	Ship Course	70–71	
	Ship Speed	72–73	
LOC'N	Initial Contact	74	
	Final Rest	75	
		76	
	Trans. Code	77	A
	Card Number	78–80	010

CARD 2

Section	Field	Columns	Entry
RELATIVE WIND	Direction	12–13	
	Velocity	14–15	
	Density Altitude	16–18	
Alt. of Emergency	Above Terrain	19–21	
	Pressure Altitude	22–24	080
	Acft. Gross Weight	25–28	0024
		29–30	
	Fiscal Year	31–32	69
	Fleets and Maws.	33–34	
		35–49	
		50–52	
PROPERTY DAMAGE COST	Gov't.	53–55	000
	Non Gov't.	56–58	000
	Total Occupants This Acft.	59–60	01
Aircraft Injury Summary – TOTAL INJURIES "A" "U" "L"	Navy	61–62	01
	Non Navy	63–64	
"A" Injuries	Navy	65–66	01
	Non Navy	67–68	
"U" Injuries	Navy	69–70	
	Non Navy	71–72	
"L" Injuries	Navy	73–74	
	Non Navy	75–76	
	Trans. Code	77	A
	Card Number	78–80	020

CLOSED
20 JUL 1970

1234

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 13

OPNAV R&DP-20-1(1/68)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

24 MAR 1969

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED: ak LOGGED: ds PUNCHED: P VERIFIED: D

CARD 1

Field	Columns	Entry
Record Identification – Date – Cal. Yr.	01–02	6 8
Record Identification – Date – Mo.	03–04	1 2
Record Identification – Date – Day	05–06	0 7
Type Report	07	1
Log Line Number	08–09	0 2
Aircraft Number	10–11	0 1
Source	12	1
Don't Count	13	
Enemy Action	14	
Aircraft Model – Mission Modif.	15–16	
Aircraft Model – Basic Mission	17	A
Aircraft Model – Design Number	18–20	0 0 7
Aircraft Model – Series Symbol	21	B
Model Code	22–23	0 6
Aircraft Bureau Number	24–29	1 5 4 4 5 9
Reporting Custodian	30–32	2 4 9
Type Duty	33–35	3 2 1
Major Command	36	1
Condition	37	4
Time of Mishap – Local Time	38–41	2 0 4 5
Acft. Dmg.	42	A
Acft. Dmg.	43	A
Acft. Inj.	44	A
Acft. Inj.	45	A
Hull Number	46–48	A 6 5
Kind of Flight	49–51	3 A 7
Clearance	52	4
Location – Name Code	53–59	F 5 C V A 6 5
Location – Bearing From	60–61	1 6
Location – Dist. From	62	G
Fac. Rway Descrip. – Distance	63	
Fac. Rway Descrip. – Area	64	
Fac. Rway Descrip. – Runway Heading	65–66	
Fac. Rway Descrip. – Length	67	
Fac. Rway Descrip. – Was Duty Rwy Used?	68	
Fac. Ship Descrip. – Ship Type	69	
Fac. Ship Descrip. – Ship Course	70–71	
Fac. Ship Descrip. – Ship Speed	72–73	
Fac. Ship Descrip. – Loc'n – Initial Contact	74	
Fac. Ship Descrip. – Loc'n – Final Rest	75	
	76	
Trans. Code	77	A
Card Number	78–80	0 1 0

CARD 2

Field	Columns	Entry
Relative Wind – Direction	12–13	
Relative Wind – Velocity	14–15	
Density Altitude	16–18	
Alt. of Emergency – Above Terrain	19–21	
Alt. of Emergency – Pressure Altitude	22–24	0 8 0
Acft. Gross Weight	25–28	0 0 2 4
	29–30	
Fiscal Year	31–32	6 9
Fleets and Maws.	33–34	
	35–49	
	50–52	
Property Damage Cost – Gov't.	53–55	0 0 0
Property Damage Cost – Non Gov't.	56–58	0 0 0
Total Occupants This Acft.	59–60	0 1
Aircraft Injury Summary – Total Injuries "A" "U" "L" – Navy	61–62	0 1
Aircraft Injury Summary – Total Injuries "A" "U" "L" – Non Navy	63–64	
Aircraft Injury Summary – "A" Injuries – Navy	65–66	0 1
Aircraft Injury Summary – "A" Injuries – Non Navy	67–68	
Aircraft Injury Summary – "U" Injuries – Navy	69–70	
Aircraft Injury Summary – "U" Injuries – Non Navy	71–72	
Aircraft Injury Summary – "L" Injuries – Navy	73–74	
Aircraft Injury Summary – "L" Injuries – Non Navy	75–76	
Trans. Code	77	A
Card Number	78–80	0 2 0

CLOSED
20 JUL 1970

1234

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 13

R&DP-20-2(1/68)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 3

RECORD IDENTIFICATION										
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number			Aircraft Number
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	8	1	2	0	7	1	0	2	0	1

Aircraft Injury Summary (cont'd)																																									
"B" Injuries				"C" Injuries				"D" Injuries				"E" Injuries				"F" Injuries				"G" Injuries				Total Injuries				No. Occupants All Acft. Involved		
Navy		Non Navy		Navy		P'on Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy				
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
																								0	1			0	0	1

ESCAPE SYS. DATA																																									
Sys.	Comp-onent	Spec. Data																Component Separated From Aircraft		Pri Acdt. Type		Pri Phase of Operation		1st Acdt. Type		1st Phase of Operation		2nd Acdt. Type		2nd Phase of Operation		Trans. Code	Card No.		
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
C	0	0	A																G	3	8	7	9	P	2	8	7	9	G	3	2	7	9	A	0	3	0

CARD 4

		3rd Acdt. Type		3rd Phase of Operation			Type Operations		Contributing Causes							Pilot Error Causal Fac.						Pilot Factor After Fact.		Other Personnel Causal Factor						Other Pers. Factor After Fact		Inv. Mat. Comp. 1st Causal Factor					
																First		Second		Third				First		Second		Third				Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
		B	3	A	2		6	3	3																							C	H	[illegible]	[illegible]	9	9

Involved Mat. Comp. (cont'd.)												Material Fact. After Fact						Acft. Design Comp. Causal Factor						DESIGN C.F.					
2nd Causal Factor						3rd Causal Factor																							
Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Special Equipment	Pilot Equipment		Trans. Code	Card No.	
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
	C	1	2	9	9																						A	0	4	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 2 OF 13

R&DP-20-3(1/68)

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: *bgu* REVIEWED: ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 6

RECORD IDENTIFICATION: Date – Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	8	1	2	0	7	1	0	2	0	1

Weather Causal Factor						Facility Causal Factor	Facility Fact. After Fact	Environ. Factor								
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28

Cause + Factor Primary (Misc / Wx Fact / Pers Factor): Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cause + Factor 1st Possible (Misc. / Wx Fact / Pers Factor): Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
3	C	H	[illegible]	[illegible]	9	9	~~3~~		~~C~~	~~1~~	~~2~~	~~0~~	~~8~~

Cause + Factor 2nd Possible (Misc / Wx Fact / Pers Factor): Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cause + Factor 3rd Possible (Misc / Wx Fact / Pers Factor): Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cause + Factor 4th Possible (Misc / Wx Fact / Pers Factor): Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Special Attention
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64

Special Data and Conditions												Trans. Code	Card Number		
65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
8	A	C	H									A	0	6	0

CARD 8

								Material Special Data: First – Code				Second – Code				Third – Code				Fourth – Code				Fifth – Code				Maneu. Prior To Occur.	OPERATOR INCAPACITATED C.F.								
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
									C	3	9		H	1	6		H	4	1									N									

																						Multi-Occurrences			Multi-Maintenance Problems		Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																											A	0	8	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 3 OF 13

R&DP-20-4(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ___ LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: ___ VERIFIED: ___

CARD 9

RECORD IDENTIFICATION													Aircraft Data																									
Date																		Since Last Insp.						Since Last Per/O'Haul														
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		1st Flight After Maint.	D. I. R.	Tour	Hours Since Acceptance				Type	Hours			Days		Activity	Hours				Months		Power Plant Model Number							
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
6	8	1	2	0	7	1	0	2	0	1			1			8	9	C		1	3	0	9										T	F	3	0	P	8

Power Plant Serial Number										Primary Involved Material Component																														
										Manufacturers Part Number																Total Hours				Since Last Per/O'Haul								Trans. Code	Card Number		
																														Activity	Number	Hours									
40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																																					A	0	9	0

CARD 10

Pri. Inv. Mat. Comp. (cont'd)						Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component																															
Since Last Check Perf.						Manufacturers Part Number																Total Hours				Since Last Per/O'Haul						Since Last Check Perf.					
Type	Hours			Days																						Activity	Number	Hours				Type	Hours			Days	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

																												Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												1	0	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 4 OF 13

R&DP-20-6(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: hga REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 11

RECORD IDENTIFICATION										
Date: Cal. Yr.		Date: Mo.		Date: Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	8	1	2	0	7	1	0	2	0	1

Controlling LSO's Carrier Pass Description

Phase	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position
Start	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Middle	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
In-Close	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
Ramp	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
CLCPD (cont'd) TOUCH-DOWN	40	41	42	43	44	45	46

Columns 47–76: (blank)

Trans. Code	Card Number		
77	78	79	80
	1	1	0

CARD 12

Columns 12–61: (blank)

File or Serial Number (Pilot)							Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.M.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Trans. Code	Card Number		
62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
0	6	0	6	3	5	7	3	1	G	A	A	1	A	2	A	1	2	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 5 OF 13

R&DP-20-7(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 13

Record Identification – Date – Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	8	1	2	0	7	1	0	2	0	1

Pilot Factor Inv.	Service Tour	Instrument Card	Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 6 Months		Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 12 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 6 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 12 Months	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
2		3			0	1				

Time All Models Total		Time All Models Last 3 Months		Time This Model Total		Time This Model Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Number of → Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model	
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
3	5	0	8	3	5	0	7	0	2	2	2	7	0	B	B	8	2	5

Carrier Landings – Total Nite This Model		This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days											
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57
0	8														

File or Serial Number (Co-Pilot)							Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Service Tour	Instr. Card		Trans. Code	Card Number		
58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																			A	1	3	0

CARD 14

Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 6 Months		Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 12 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 6 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 12 Months		Time All Models Total		Time All Models Last 3 Months		Time This Model Total		Time This Model Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33

Number of Carrier Landings – Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model		Total Nite This Model		This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days						
34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

					File or Serial Number (Instr. Plt. in Other A/C)							Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Service Tour	Instr. Card					Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												1	4	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 6 OF 13

R&DP-20-8(1/68)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Emerg. Syst. Train.				Instrument Trainer				Time All Models				Time This Model										Number of Carrier →						
Date																																							
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model		Total Nite This Model	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	8	1	2	0	7	1	0	2	0	1																													

Landings																																							
This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days				This Individual in Acft.			Name (Instr. Plt. in Other Acft.)																				Number of Personnel Records							Trans. Code	Card Number		
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																													0	1						A	1	5	0

CARD 16

P								File or Serial Number (All Persons)							Name										Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Card Code 65				
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
P								0	6	0	6	3	5	7	S	I	M	O	N	I	C		R	J	3	1	G	A	A	1	A	2	6	5			

Equip 1						Equip 2						Equip 3						Equip 4												
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number			
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
N	2	2	2	M	L	N	2	0	4	M	X	Q	4	2	2	M	L	Q	4	0	0	M	W		0	1	A	1	6	0

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 7 OF 13

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 17

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 5						Equip 6						Equip 7						Equip 8						Equip 9					
Date																																								
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report		Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	2	1	2	0	7	1	0	2	0	1	H	F	0	6	P		J	1	0	0	P	X	L	A	3	1	N		H	B	0	6	P		E	2				

Equip 10								Equip 11						Equip 12						Equip 13						Equip 14											
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data				Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data			Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
H	0							D	D					S	A					0	1					P	2						0	1	A	1	7	8

CARD 18

Equip 15						Equip 16						Equip 17						Equip 18						Equip 19						Equip 20							
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data			
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
P	5					A	A					S	6																								

Equip 21						Equip 22						Equip 23						Equip 24											
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data			Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																									0	1	A	1	8	8

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 8 OF 13

RADP-20-11(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 21

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 45						Equip 46						Equip 47						Equip 48										
Date																																							
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Card Code 66		ACFT DESCRIPT	MISHAP DESCRIPTOR	Topog.at Mishap
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	8	1	2	0	7	1	0	2	0	1																									6	6	A	A	J

Type of Egress	Eject. Info.								Egress Problems: Prior			During			Subsequent			Type/Mod. Eject. Seat		Firing Method Seq. Eject.	Seat Position	Attitude/Maneu. A/C at Exit	Altitude When Ejected	Airspeed			Weight			Alt. Chute Open	In Crash Area	Time in Water		Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
									Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob																						
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
A	F														X			S		C		C	A	2	5	0	1	8	2	2		3	2	0	1	A	2	1	0

CARD 22

Time in Raft		Vertebral Fractures				Eject. Fatal Causes		Injury	Combat Zone									Card Code 67		Wind Velocity in Knots		Wave Height	Wave Interval in Seconds	Visibility	Air Temperature		Water Temperature		Alerting Factors			Located Site	Survivor Left Site	Means of Locating			
						Pri.	Sec.																						1st Factor	2nd Factor	3rd Factor								
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
						7	A	A										6	7	0	3			3	5	7	5	9	H			L		M			

Survival Factors		Fatals Time Lapse From:			Time Lapse Last Training				Training Factors																Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
		Mishap to Site Locat.	Site Locate to Victim	Mishap to Death	Low Press. Chamber	Eject. Tower	Eject. Seat	Survival																						
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
R		B	B	B	T	I	I	P	B																0	1	A	2	2	0

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 9 OF 13

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [initials] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 23

Field	Columns	Entry
RECORD IDENTIFICATION – Date – Cal. Yr.	01–02	6 8
RECORD IDENTIFICATION – Date – Mo.	03–04	1 2
RECORD IDENTIFICATION – Date – Day	05–06	0 7
Type Report	07	1
Log Line Number	08–09	0 2
Aircraft Number	10–11	0 1
CARD CODE 68	12–13	6 8
Time of Day – Mishap	14	2
Time of Day – Rescue Report	15	2
Time of Day – Rescue Locate	16	2
Time of Day – ACC/ABAN	17	2
Rescue Vehicle – Location	18	C
Rescue Vehicle – Duty	19	A
Rescue Vehicles – Model/Type	20	J
Rescue Vehicles – Model/Type	21	V
Rescue Vehicles – Model/Type	22	D
Rescue Vehicles – Model/Type	23	U
No. Personnel To Rescue	24	1
No. Personnel Rescued	25	1
Rescue Vehicles Back-Up – Model/Type	26	H
Rescue Vehicles Back-Up – Model/Type	27	
Actual Water Temperature	28–29	5 9
Actual Air Temperature	30–31	5 7
Sea Cond. – Wave Height	32	D
Sea Cond. – Wave Interval	33	
Gen. Wx. Cond.	34	
Wind Velocity (Knots)	35–36	Ø 4
Rescue Equip. Used	37–40	0 T M
Rescue Team Trang	41–42	
Comm Equip't Tech	43–44	
Retriev Equip/Tech	45–46	
Rescue Team Work F.	47–48	A
Rescue Site Topography	49	D
Res. Vehic. Dist. to Scene	50	B
Time Lapse Mishap To Alert	51–52	Ø Ø
Alert Prob	53–54	
Methods of Alert	55–57	H
Time Lapse Alert to Depart.	58	Ø
Departure Delays	59–60	
	61–74	
Person Sequence Number	75–76	Ø 1
Trans. Code	77	A
Card Number	78–80	2 3 Ø

CARD 24

Field	Columns	Entry
CARD CODE 69	12–13	6 9
Time Lapse Alert to Locate	14–15	Y Y
Prob. Enroute – Prob	16	
Prob. Enroute – Prob	17	
Vehicle Failed To Reach Scene	18	
Failure Reason	19	
Time Lapse Locate to Reach	20–21	Y Y
Locator Means – Primary	22	H
Locator Means	23–25	J
Prob. Locating	26–27	
Survivors Signalling Problems	28–30	H
Rescue Problems – Vehicle	31	D
Rescue Problems – Individual	32	U
Rescue Problems – Problems	33–38	F M V H
Rescue Problems – Vehicle	39	J
Rescue Problems – Individual	40	V
Rescue Problems – Problems	41–46	P F
	47–49	
Rescue Problems – Vehicle	50	
Rescue Problems – Individual	51	
Rescue Problems – Problems	52–57	
Rescue Problems – Vehicle	58	
Rescue Problems – Individual	59	
Rescue Problems – Problems	60–65	
Rescue Close Out – Vehicle	66	J
Rescue Close Out – Individual	67	V
Rescue Close Out – Close Out Code	68	C
	69–74	
Person Sequence Number	75–76	Ø 1
Trans. Code	77	A
Card Number	78–80	2 4 Ø

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1Ø OF 13

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [handwritten initials] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 25

Record Identification: Date: Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Survivor's Problems				Survivor's Condit.: During	After	Time Lapse Reach to Rescue		Time Lapse Mishap to Rescue Completion		Rescue Recommend		CARD CODE 73		Weight			Height		Age		Sitting Height Nearest 1/4 Inch			Trunk Height Nearest 1/4 Inch			Functional Reach Nearest 1/4 Inch		
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	8	1	2	Ø	7	1	Ø	2	Ø	1	A	D	E		E	K	Y	Y	3	2			7	3	1	5	2	7	Ø	3	5	3	5	1	2	5	1	3	1	3

Buttock Knee Nearest 1/4 Inch			Leg Length Nearest 1/4 Inch					Sidefold Nearest 1/4 Inch			CARD CODE 74		Role of Indiv. in Cause	Supervisory Factors: Inadequate Briefing	ORD/LEFT ON FLT BEY CAP	Poor Crew Coordination	Other	Pre-Flight Factors: Faulty Flight Plan	Faulty A/C Pre-Flight	Faulty Prep. Pers. Equip.	Hurried Departure	Delayed Departure	Inadequate Wx. Analysis	Other	Experience Trng. Factors: Inadequate Transition	LIMITED TOTAL EXPERIENCE	LIMIT RECENT EXPERIENCE	FAIL TO USE ACCEPT PROC.	Other				Person Sequence Number		Trans. Codes	Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
2	4	1	4	3	1			1	8	2	7	4																					Ø	1	A	2	5	Ø

CARD 27

Design Factors: Design of Inst/Controls	Location of Inst/Controls	Failure of Inst/Controls	COCKPIT LIGHTING	Lighting	Lighting Other A/C	PERSONAL EQU INTERFERENCE	WORK SPACE IN COMPAT. W/MAN	Other	Communication Problems: MISINTERPRET COMM	DISRUPTED COMM	Language Barrier	Noise Interference	Other	Environmental Factors: ACCELERATION FOR IN FLIGHT	DECOMPRESSION	Vibration	Glare	Smoke Fumes	Heat	Cold	Wind Blast	Visibility Restrictions: WX Haze Dust	Icing Windshield Fog	DUST/WIND SNOW	WX OTHER THAN VISIBILITY	Other	CARD CODE 75		Psycho Physiological Factors: Food Poisoning	Motion Sickness	Other Acute Illness	OTH PRE EXIST DISEASE/DEFECT	Get "Homeitis"	Hangover	Sleep Deprivation	FATIGUE	OTHER Missed Meals
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
																											7	5									

Psycho Physiological Factors (cont'd): DRUGS PRESCR MEDICAL DR.	Drugs, Other	Alcohol	Visual Illusions	HALLUCINATIONS	UNCONSCIOUSNESS	DISORIENTATION VERTIGO	Hypoxia	Hyper-Ventilation	Dysbarism	CO Poisoning	Boredom	Inattention	Channelized Attention	Distraction	PREOCCUPATION PERS. PROB.	EXCESSIVE MOTIVATION TO SUC	Over Confidence	Lack of Self-Confidence	LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN EQUIP	Apprehension	Panic	Other			Person Sequence Number		Trans. Codes	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												2	7	Ø

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 11 OF 13

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED ____

CARD 29

RECORD IDENTIFICATION										
Date: Cal. Yr.		Date: Mo.		Date: Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	8	1	2	0	7	1	0	2	0	1

Other Factors To Be Considered														
Habit Pattern Wrong Cont.	Confus of Contl. Other	Misread Instruments	Misinterpret Instruments	Misled by Faul. Instrum.	Vis. Rest. by Equip. Struct.	Task Over-Saturation	Inadequate Coord/Timing	Misjudged Speed/Dist.	Wrong Course of Action	Delay Taking Nec Action	Violation of Flt. Discip.	Navigational Error	Inadvertent Operation	Other
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26

CARD CODE 77		Disposition	Body Position	Direction Facing
27	28	29	30	31
7	7	4	1	1

Physical Defects Post Crash Exam.									
Visual Acuity or None	Hearing	Cardio-Vascular	Neuromuscul Skeletal	Gastro-Intestinal	Respiratory	Urogenital	Other Abnormal	Reason for [illegible]
32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40

Estimated Duration of Grounding		Pri. Cause of Death Diagnosis Number				Autopsy: Preformed	Autopsy: Protocol	Autopsy: Conducted By
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
		8	7	0	6	1	2	3

Lab Toxicological Test On: Blood or None	Urine	GI Contents	CNS Contents	Muscle Tissue	Visceral Tissue	Other	Ultra-Viol or Oth Special Investig	CARD CODE 78	
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59
								7	8

Unconsciousness	Internal Injury: Head, Neck or None	Thorax	Abdomen	Other	Cerebral Concussion	Facial Injuries	Intra Oral Injuries	Eye Injuries
60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68
						1		

						Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
						0	1	A	2	9	0

CARD 30

Fractures Group A									
Cranial or None	Facial	Cervical	Thoracic	Lumbar	Sacral	Coccygeal	Shoulder Girdle	Rib
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
			4					

Fractures Group B								
Pelvis or None	Upper Arm	Lower Arm	Hand Incl. Fingers	Upper Leg	Lower Leg	Foot Incl. Toes	Other Fractures
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
1							

Dis-Locations Group A								
Jaw or None	Cervical Vertebral	Thoracic Vertebral	Lumbar Vertebral	Sacral Vertebral	Coccygeal Vertebral	Shoulder Girdle	Rib	Pelvis
29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37

Dis-Locations Group B									CARD CODE 79		
Shoulder or None	Elbow	Wrist	Hand Fingers	Hip	Knee	Ankle	Foot Toes	Other Dislocations			
38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
									7	9	

Amputations/Avulsions				
Head, Neck or None	Trunk	Upper Extrem.	Lower Extrem.	Other
50	51	52	53	54

Soft Tissue Injuries Group A								
Lacerations Head or None	C.S.S. Head	Abrasions Head	Lacerat Neck	C.S.S. Neck	Abrasions Neck	Lacerat Thorax	C.S.S. Thorax	Abrasions Thorax
55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63
					6		8	

Soft Tissue Injuries Group B									
Lacerations Abdom/None	C.S.S. Abdomen	Abrasions Abdomen	Lacerat Up Extr	C.S.S. Up Extrem	Abrasions Up Extr	Lacerat Low Extr	C.S.S. Low Extrem	Abrasions Low Extr	Other S.T. Injuries
64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73
			4				8		

Asphyxiation Suspected	Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
74	75	76	77	78	79	80
	0	1	A	3	0	0

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 12 OF 13

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 31

RECORD IDENTIFICATION						Affected Equipment	Shock Supported	Exposure	Burns/Frostbite	Control Characters	
Date											
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day	Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number						
01 02	03 04	05 06	07	08 09	10 11	12	13	14	15	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
6 8	1 2	0 7	1	0 2	0 1			4			

	Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74	75 76	77	78 79 80
	0 1	A	3 1 0

(THIS SPACE BLANK)

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 13 OF 13

R&DP-30(6/68)

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: RECORDS DEPT

DATE 9 MAY 1969

Chg in rec
5/9/69

TO: (1) CODING SECT
(2) REC CONT BRANCH rdb 5-13-69
(3) ADPE DIV BZB
(4) REC CONT BRANCH 14 MAY 1969

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen Data Sect of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.										
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYP-RPT	LOG NUMBER		AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	8	1	2	Ø	7	1	Ø	2	Ø	1

A7 Simonic

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL OF FLD START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS				PERSON SEQ NUMBER		FIELD LENGTH		DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)										TAPE REC DIV NO.		TRANS CODE
				12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29			
1	SOURCE	Ø1	12	Ø	Ø	1	2	Ø	Ø	Ø	1	1												
				30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47			
2																								
				48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	77
3																						Ø	1	M

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6) [redacted]

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD
OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: RECORDS DEPT. chg in blue DMK 6/23/69 ok

DATE 23 JUNE 1969

TO: (1) CODING SECT
(2) REC. CONT. BRANCH [illegible] 7-[illegible]-70
(3) ADPE DIV [illegible] 17 JUL 1970
(4) REC. CONT. BRANCH

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq. No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen. Data Sect. of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq. No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq. No. order.

Simonid

IDENTIFICATION NO.										
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYPE REPT	LOG NUMBER		AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	8	1	2	Ø	7	1	Ø	2	Ø	1

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL. OF FLD. START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS	PERSON SEQ. NUMBER	FIELD LENGTH	DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)	TAPE REC DIV. NO.	TRANS. CODE
✓ 1	2ND C.F. INV. MAT COMP	Ø4	51	12 13 14 15: Ø 2 4 8	16 17: Ø Ø	18 19: Ø 5	20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29: C 1 2 9 9		
✓ 2	1ST PROB CAUS FACTOR	Ø6	36	30 31 32 33: Ø 2 9 1	34 35: Ø Ø	36 37: Ø 7	38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47		
3	INVOLVED MAT. ASSY	4	46	48 49 50 51: Ø 2 4 3	52 53: Ø Ø	54 55: Ø 2	56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 77: Ø 1 M		

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV. may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

ORIGINATORS SIGNATURE

NAVSAFECEN 3750/7 (Rev. 4/69)

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: RADP DEPT

DATE 7-17-70

TO: (1) CODING SECT
(2) REC CONT BRANCH
(3) ADPE DIV 17 JUL 1970
(4) REC CONT BRANCH

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "00" in Person Seq No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen Data Sect of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.										
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYP-RPT	LOG NUMBER		AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	8	1	2	0	7	1	0	2	0	1

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL OF FLD START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS (12–19)	PERSON SEQ NUMBER (20–29)	FIELD LENGTH (30–37)	DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED) (38–47)	TAPE REC DIV NO. (66–67)	TRANS CODE (77)
1	CAUSE + FACT PRI	6	32	0287000201					
2	M+M SPEC	8	29	0342000344					
3								01	M

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6)

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

R&DF-20-16(1/68)

I.D. Number	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Typ	Log	Typ Brief	Narr. File I.D.	CL	Orig. Use	Tot-Cds	Trans. Code
68	12	07	10	2		1	N N N	1		13 2	A

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf

TYPE BRIEFS
CODES
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. CODED _____ REVIEWED _____ KEY PUNCHED _____ VERIFIED _____

CARD NO.	
01	PC-2 FAILURE ON NIGHT FLT/EJT. PLT REPT @ MARSHAL WIT
02	H PC-2 FAILURE & REQ IMMED LAN. CLEARED FOR CCA, PLT
03	REPT WOULD GO DIRTY @ 8M FT. 2 MINUTES SUBQ PLT REPT
04	PC-1 NORM BUT TROUBLE HOLDING NOSE UP FOLLOWED BY "I'
05	M GOING TO LOSE IT I BELIEVE." IMMED AFTER REPT OF DI
06	RTIED UP WITH NOSE UP PROBLEM. LAST XMSSN "PASSING 3S
07	, PUNCHING OUT" @ 5 MILES. PLT EJT, HELO SWIMMER UNAB
08	LE FREE PLT FROM SHROUD LINES BUT ABLE HOLD PLTS HEAD
09	ABOVE WATER. PICK UP 24 MINUTES LATER BY WHALEBOAT.
10	A INJ DUE DROWNING. ACFT LOST @ SEA. PRI- MAT FAILURE
~~11~~	~~/MAL- UNDET PC-2 SYS/COMPONENT. PROB MAT FAILURE/MAL-~~
~~12~~	~~UNT ACTUATOR.~~
11 ~~13~~	/MAL- INDET COMPONENT PC-2 HYD SYS CAUSED LOSS OF PC-
12 ~~14~~	2 PRESS. CONTRIB- MAT FAILURE/MAL- UNDET LONGITUDINAL
13 ~~15~~	CONT SYS.
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	

R&DP-20-16(1/68)

I.D. Number	68	12	07	02	2	N N N	1	15	A
	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 Typ Brief	12 Nam 14 File 15 I.D.	69 CL 70 71 72 73 Orig. Use	75 76 Tot Cds	77 78 Trans. Code

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf

TYPE BRIEFS

CODES
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. CODED _____ REVIEWED ar KEY PUNCHED _____ VERIFIED _____

CARD NO.	
01	ACFT RETURNING FROM NIGHT ROCKET FIRING FLT EXPERIENC
02	ED A CONTROL MAL DUE HYD SYSTEM FAIL. THE PLT REPORTE
03	D HE WAS UNABLE TO CONTROL ACFT & THAT HE WAS EJT AT
04	35C FT IN A NOSE DOWN ATTITUDE. EVIDENCE INDICATES TH
05	AT EJT WAS INITIATED AT INSUFFICIENT ALT FOR FULL PRC
06	HT DEPLOYMENT & THAT THE PLT WAS RENDERED UNCONSCIOUS
07	ON WATER CONTACT. THE HELO SWIMMER REACHED THE PLT A
08	PPROX 10 MINUTES AFTER EJT, PILOT SEVERELY ENTANGLED
09	IN PRCHT AND WAS NOT CONSCIOUS. RESUSCITATION & EXTER
10	NAL CARDIAC MASSAGE FAILED & THE PLT WAS PRONOUNCED D
11	EAD APPROX 2 HRS AFTER MISHAP. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH
12	WAS DROWNING. THE PLT HAD ALSO SUSTAINED COMPRESSION
13	FRACT OF T-9, A SEPARATION OF THE SYMPHYSIS PUBIS &
14	ABRASIONS & CONTUSIONS ALL OF WHICH WERE CONSIDERED TO
15	BE THE RESULT OF WATER IMPACT.
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	

CARD NO.

R&DP-20-16(1/68)

I.D. Number	1-2 Yr.	3-4 Mo.	5-6 Day	7 Typ	8-9 Log	10 Typ Brief	13-14-15 Narr File I.D.	69 CL	70-71-72-73 Orig. Use	75-76 Tot-Cds	77-78 Trans. Code
	68	12	07	1	02	3	N N N	1	98	18	A

Common Fields in All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf

TYPE BRIEFS
CODES
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. 11 12 CODED H.W.P. REVIEWED ar KEY PUNCHED VERIFIED

01 DUE TO CONT MAL PLT UNABLE TO CONT ACFT. HE TRANSMITT
02 ED "PASSING 35 PUNCHING OUT". HE WAS LOCATED 5 MIN LA
03 TER BY HIS STROBE LIGHT. HIS MK3C HAD BEEN INFLATED O
04 N ONE SIDE. A SMALL TEAR HAD RENDERED IT INADEQUATE F
05 OR PROPER FLOTATION. HIS HELMET & O2 MASK WERE ON, O2
06 MASK WAS LOOSE ON ONE SIDE. HE WAS GROSSLY ENTANGLED
07 IN HIS PRCHT & OTHER EQUIPMENT & WAS UNCONSCIOUS. TH
08 E FLT SURG INVESTIGATION INDICATED IMPACT FORCES WITH
09 WATER WAS GREATER THAN THAT OF A NORMAL PRCHT DESCEN
10 T. NAVAERORECOVFAC, EL CENTRO AGREES WITH FLT SURG. HO
11 WEVER THE IMPACT FORCE ITSELF WOULD NOT HAVE CAUSED A
12 FATAL INJ. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE PLT FOR AN UNKNO
13 WN REASON DELAYED EJT UNTIL THE VERY EDGE OF THE ENVE
14 LOPE, THE PRCHT PROBABLY OPENED IMMED PRIOR TO IMPACT
15 , HE WAS RENDERED UNCONSCIOUS & DROWNED. IT IS THEORI
16 ZED THAT THE STROBE LIGHT & MK3C INADVERTENTLY ACTUAT
17 ED UPON IMPACT. RECM EXPEDITING PROCUREMENT OF BALLIST
18 TIC DEPLOYED PRCHT CPYS & LPA-1 TYPE LIFE VESTS.
19
20

CARD NO. 11 12

NAVAL SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

111B3/ls
3750/2
Ser 1284
19 June 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron ONE FOUR SIX

Subj: VA-146 AAR ser 2-69A concerning A-7B BuNo 154459 accident occurring 7 December 1968, pilot SIMONIC

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6F

1. The subject report and all endorsements have been reviewed. Concur with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron ONE FOUR SIX and all endorsing commands are requested to comply with reference (a) in forwarding the basic AAR and/or endorsements to Commanding Officer, Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility, El Centro, California 92244.

3. The cause factor contributing to this accident has been recorded as follows:

a. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION:

(1) Undetermined component of the PC-2 hydraulic system caused loss of PC-2 pressure.

(2) Undetermined longitudinal control system.

(b) (6)
[redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMCARDIV-1
COMFAIRALAMEDA
CO USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65)
COMCVW-9
NAVPRO DALLAS
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN
CO NAVAERORECOVFAC
DIR AFIP

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

R&DP-8 (11-67)

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE-OUT" LETTER ON ORIGINAL REVIEW

NOTE:
1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DPEARTMENT:

Concur with closeout as written i.e.
Cause - Mat fail/Malfunction - undetermined
Longitudinal control system.
Control - PC-2 sys fail from undetermined unit.

(b) (6) [redacted]

INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPARTMENT:

No comment NC.

INITIAL/CODE

GDP-7 (11-67)

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to: Correction to:		Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1			/
DIR			/
Misc Items for Action or Correction			
To Code	From Code/Date		
	/	Hard-coded 2-4-69 bgr	/
	511 / 5/8/69	ORIGINAL REC'D RAO	/
511	512D / 7-20-70	Final review completed and document ready for the final closed file [illegible]	/
	/	CLOSED	/
	20 JUL 1970		/

R&DP-27(4/68)

UNIT VA-146
MODEL A7B
BUNO 154459

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING:
	M&M	28 May	6-3-69	O	
	AERO-MED	28 MAY			

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS:
REMARKS:

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NAVAVNSAFECEN 10 JUN 1969
EXTENSIONS

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
111B3 AOA	4 June		~~[illegible]~~ 17 June		

NAVAVNSAFECEN ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT
1	R&DP			
2	M&M			
3	ADMIN			

ROUTING AFTER CLOSE-OUT

DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
AERO-MED				

NOTES: 1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder.

2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch.

3. Any department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

AIR-09E21:RLC

30 APR 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SEVENTH ENDORSEMENT on VA-146 AAR ser 2-69A concerning A-7B BuNo 154459 accident occurring 7 December 1968, pilot SIMONIC

From: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Forwarded.

2. NAVAIR is continuously investigating and evaluating possible improvements to the A-7 flight control system. A number of specific proposals are currently being evaluated and appropriate action will be initiated on those which are determined to provide significant improvements. Airframe Change 50 was one attempt to provide a stable nose attitude for sufficient time to allow a controlled ejection subsequent to a dual hydraulic failure. An engineering change proposal to provide a steel cylinder as a replacement for the present aluminum UHT cylinder is now being processed for approval in NAVAIR. This change is expected to constitute a significant reliability improvement.

3. The contractor is preparing an engineering change proposal for incorporation of the NB-11 ballistically spread parachute in the A-7. The proposal is expected in NAVAIR in May 1969.

4. As noted in the sixth endorsement, delivery of the LPA life preserver has already commenced.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRPAC
CO ATKRON ONE FOUR SIX
NAVPRO DALLAS
DIR AFIP
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN
COMCARDIV ONE
COMCARAIRWING NINE
CO USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65)
COMFAIRALAMEDA

3750
80/ 2787

4 APR 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on VA-146 AAR ser 2-69A concerning A-7B
BuNo 154459 accident occurring 7 Dec 68, pilot SIMONIC

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command

Subj: VA-146 AAR ser 2-69A

1. Readdressed and forwarded for NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ comments concerning the recommendations contained in part IX, of the AAR, pertaining to control system, the NB-11 parachute and LPA life preserver.

2. COMNAVAIRPAC concurs with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements.

3. Delivery of the LPA-1 life preserver has started and COMNAVAIRPAC is controlling issue. Priority will be given to deployed squadrons.

4. The helicopter crew performed admirably in making the night no-doppler approach and extended hover. There was apparently some confusion as to the number of survivors in the water by Higbee's boat crew and the helicopter swimmer. The OTC must keep all rescue forces informed of this type of vital information so that time will not be lost in returning injured personnel to medical facilities.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVSAFECEN (advance)
CO ATKRON ONE FOUR SIX
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
DIR AFIP
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN
COMCARDIV ONE
COMCARAIRWING NINE
CO USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65)
COMFAIRALAMEDA

ORIGINAL

FF7-2/3750
Ser 80/ 1001
13 MAR 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on ATKRON 146, Accident, Serial 2-69A, concerning A-7B, BUNO 154459, of 7 Dec 1968, Pilot SIMONIC

From: Commander Fleet Air Alameda
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: ATKRON 146 Aircraft Accident Report Serial 2-69A

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Accident Board and subsequent endorsers except as noted below.

2. Conclusions:

a. Conclusion 1. Concur.

b. Conclusion 2. Do not concur. Insufficient evidence is available to substantiate an indication of pressure loss in the PC1 system. Enclosure (3) in fact reveals that one minute and 21 seconds prior to the pilot's last transmission, PC1 pressure was "OK" and that with full up trim the pilot could not hold the nose up. The Accident Board in Part VII (Investigation and Analysis), concludes that the pilot's statement, "I'm going to lose it I believe", refers to PC1 system pressure. In accordance with the above rationale and chronology of events listed in enclosure (3), the statement most likely refers to the impending loss of the aircraft. The reference to VA-122 AAR Ser 2-69A of 3 August 1968 is apt and further substantiates the probability of loss of flight controls while indicating adequate PC1 pressure.

c. Conclusions 3 and 4. Do not concur. It is known that the pilot stated "Passing 35 punching out." It is assumed that this transmission was intended to mean that the aircraft was passing three thousand five hundred feet and that the pilot was initiating ejection. A reasonably accurate average aircraft rate of descent from this transmission until aircraft impact can be computed from information contained in enclosure (4) and is approximately 6700 feet per minute. Enclosure (13) indicates a probable normal ejection sequence up to complete main parachute canopy deployment and further states that the "extra" piece of cord could have impeded the withdrawal of the suspension lines from their storage loops. The evidence revealed in the AAR and enclosures does not support conclusions 3 and 4 and they must be considered conjecture.

3. This endorser strongly concurs with recommendation 4. Inordinate delays have already been suffered in the receipt of this equipment.

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

FF7-2/3750
13 MAR 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

4. Additionally, the following administrative comments are offered:

a. Parts V through IX of the basic AAR and the first four endorsements are not marked in accordance with paragraph 66, OPNAV Instruction 3750.6 series. By copy of this endorsement all addressees are requested to mark their copies of the AAR and subsequent endorsements accordingly.

b. Page five exists twice in the basic AAR (Part VI and Part VII).

c. By copy of this endorsement, CO, VA-146 is directed to forward one copy of the AAR to CO, NARF, El Centro, in accordance with OPNAV Instruction 3750.6F, paragraph 39b(2)(f).

R. E. BREEN, Jr.
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
NAVSAFECEN (2)
CO ATKRON 146
NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)
NAVPLANTREPODALLAS
DIR AFIP
NTS PAX RIVER
COMCARAIRWING 9
COMCARDIV 1
CO USS ENTERPRISE

Advance copy:
COMNAVAIRPAC

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

FBL/CVA/CO2:mcw
3750
Ser: 55
17 February 1969

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on ATKRON 146, Accident, Serial 2-69A, Concerning A7-B, BUNO 154459, of 7 December 1968, Pilot SINGNIC.

From: Commander Carrier Division ONE
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air, Alameda
(2) Commander Naval Air Force U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: ATKRON 146 Aircraft Accident Report Serial 2-69A

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Accident Board and subsequent endorsers.

M. W. CAGLE

Copy to:
CO, ATKRON 146
NAVSAFECEN (2)
NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)
NAVPLANTREPODAL
DIR AFIP
USS PAX RIVER
CAG NINE
CO, USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65)

Advance copy to:
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

ORIGINAL

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65)

F.P.O. SAN FRANCISCO 96601

CVA(N)65/04A
3750
Ser 365

8 FEB 1969

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on ATKRON 146, Accident, Serial 2-69A, Concerning A7-B, BUNO 154459, of 7 December 1968, Pilot SIMONIC.

From: Commanding Officer, USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)65)
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander, Carrier Division ONE
(2) Commander Fleet Air, Alameda
(3) Commander Naval Air Force U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: ATKRON 146 Aircraft Accident Report Serial 2-69A

1. Forwarded concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board and the first endorser.

K L Lee

K. L. LEE

Copy to:
CO, ATKRON 146
NAVSAFECEN (2)
NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)
NAVPLANTREPODAL
DIR AFIP
NTS PAX RIVER

Advance copy to:
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMCARDIV ONE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

C-6

FF12/CVW9
3750
Ser 17
22 JAN 1969

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on ATKRON 146, Accident, Serial 2-69A, Concerning A7-B, BUNO 154459, of 7 DEC 1968, Pilot SIMONIC

From: Commander, Attack Carrier Air Wing NINE
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)65)
(2) Commander Carrier Division ONE
(3) Commander Fleet Air, Alameda
(4) Commander Naval Air Force U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: ATKRON 146 Aircraft Accident Report Serial 2-69A

1. Forwarded concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board.

A. R. BURT

Copy to:
CO, ATKRON 146
NAVSAFECEN (2)
NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)
NAVPLANTREPODAL
DIR AFIP
NTS PAX RIVER

Advance copy to:
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMCARDIV ONE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

FF12/VA146:00:rab
3750
Ser 6
11 January 1969

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VA-146, accident, serial 2-69A, concerning A7-B, BUNO 154459, of 7 December 1968, pilot SIMONIC

From: Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron ONE HUNDRED FORTY-SIX
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Attack Carrier Air Wing NINE
(2) Commanding Officer, USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N) 65)
(3) Commander Carrier Division ONE
(4) Commander Fleet Air Alameda
(5) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VA-146 AAR Ser 2-69A

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board.

2. It is further recommended that the hydraulic pressure monitor system be modified. The dual hydraulic system has essentially only one caution system. The operative system can only be monitored by frequent reference to the pressure indicator. If there were independent caution systems, the Master Caution Light would provide warning of subsequent malfunction of the "operative system". This in turn would allow the pilot to concentrate more on performing the proper emergency procedures.

3. A change to the A7 NATOPS Manual is being submitted that recommends transition to landing configuration be accomplished as soon as possible and at altitude after any hydraulic system malfunction. Secondly, that flight control movement be limited and that a "straight-in" approach be performed.

4. Intimate knowledge of the A7 hydraulic system and the indications associated with flight control malfunction is mandatory to preclude remaining with an unsalvagable situation beyond safe limits.

5. All squadron pilots have been thoroughly briefed on this mishap.

Ford J. E. Schultz
FORD J. E. SCHULTZ

Copy to:
NAVSAFECEN (2)
NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-03E)
NAVPLANTREPO DAL
DIR AFIP
NTS PAX RIVER

Advance copy to:
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMCARDIV ONE
CO USS ENTERPRISE
COMATKCARAIRWING NINE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition*

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART I GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY: CO ATKRON ONE FOUR SIX	2. SERIAL NO.: 2-69A	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP: 0720Z,5J DEC 68	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT: A7-B	5. BUREAU NUMBER: 154459
6. TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center		9. LOCATION OF MISHAP: 31-51 118-05 W		10. DAMAGE: ALFA
7. VIA: CO ATKRON ONE FOUR SIX COMATKCARAIRWING NINE CO USS ENTERPRISE COMCARDIV ONE COMFAIRALAMEDA COMNAVAIRPAC	8.	11. TIME OF DAY: NIGHT	12. TIME IN FLIGHT: 1+56	13. FLIGHT CODE: 3A7
		14. CLEARED VFR OPERATIONAL FROM: ENTERPRISE TO: ENTERPRISE		
		15. TYPE CLEARANCE: OPERATIONAL	16. AIRSPEED: 250 K	17. A/C WEIGHT: 24,000 LBS

18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP: PC-2 FAILURE FOLLOWED BY PROBABLE PC-1 FAIL/LOSS OF CONTROL OF A/C/UNSUCCESSFUL EJECT.

19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP: ESTIMATED TERRAIN S.L. 3000'

20. LIST MODEL, BUNO REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C): NONE

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

*	V	FACTOR	V	FACTOR	V	FACTOR
		1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL		17. WEATHER
		2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
		3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
		4. PILOT OTHER (Specify)		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
		5. CREW		13. FACILITIES RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
		6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, DGL, ILS, MOLS)	X	22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
		7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)	X	23. UNDETERMINED
		8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)		16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)		24. OTHER (Specify)

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

*	1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2. RANK/RATE	3. FILE/SERVICE NO.	4. DESIGN. OF SERVICE	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7. YEARS EXP. DNA	8. BULLET	9. POSITION	10. INJURY CODE
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap)	SINOTIC, ROBERT J.	LCDR	(b) (6) [redacted]		USN	35	11 YRS	PILOT	COCKPIT ALFA	
CO-PILOT (identify & submit separate item 1)	NONE									

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS		3533	16. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	236 / 83
				IN MODEL	25 / 8
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		236	17. FOLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	52 / 45
				IN MODEL	52 / 45
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		85	18. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	2 / 0
				IN MODEL	2 / 0
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	355	19. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	22 /
	OFT/CPT	5/2		IN MODEL	20 /
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	230	20. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (at jet mishap) HELOS (at helo mishap)		705
	OFT/CPT	1/0			
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	77	21. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	7 DEC 1968
	OFT/CPT	1/0		DURATION	2
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK	JAN 1968/QUAL		24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		SPEC

OTHER PERS.

*	25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. DNA	27. RANK/RATE	28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	29. FILE/SERVICE NO.	30. EXIST	31. INJURY	32. BULLET	33. POSITION
	NONE								

OF-250

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A Rev. 3-63 Page

SYSTEM NAMES, NOT LESS THAN 3 CHARACTERS, TO SUPERSEDE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

OPNAV REPORT 3750-4

A. AIRCRAFT HISTORY

1. DATE OF ACCEPTANCE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	DATE LAST CHECK
JULY 1968	89	0	[illegible]		[illegible]	C.D. INSP	13	9

B. ENGINE HISTORY

1. [illegible]	2. [illegible]	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. [illegible]	5. [illegible]	6. [illegible]	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DATE LAST CHECK

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OVERHAULS	5. [illegible]	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DID. DOCUMENTED	8. SER. NO. PERMANENT

D. DAMAGED & CAUSED ACCIDENTS

1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MAINTENANCE INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED	
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURE

AT TAKEOFF (Takeoff Power Taken Not Including Takeoff Roll Distance)

AT TIME OF TAKEOFF	1. ALTITUDE	2. [illegible]	3. [illegible]	4. [illegible]	5. [illegible] AT TIME OF TAKEOFF	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ALTITUDE
8. [illegible]	9. [illegible] ☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED		10. ALTITUDE	11. [illegible]	12. [illegible]	13. FUEL CONTROL ☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL	14. [illegible] ATTEMPTS
[illegible]	15. ENGINE DISPOSITION			16. CAUSE OF DISPOSITION			

MECHANICAL ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. [illegible]	19. ATTITUDE	20. [illegible]	21. [illegible]	22. TEMPERATURE	23. [illegible]	24. [illegible]
[illegible]	25. ENGINE DISPOSITION			26. CAUSE OF DISPOSITION			

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. ASUTTER SERIAL NUMBER
2. DIO MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP
3. OTHER

4. Preliminary msg ENTERPRISE 0809[illegible]Z DEC 68
5. Supplementary msg ATKRON 146 111958Z DEC 68
6. Extension request ATKRON 146 232340Z DEC 68

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with
Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR	2. PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACHING WIND

6. SHIP HEADING	7. SHIP'S SPEED	8. LOCATION OF SHIP	9. LANDING SINGLE AND DOUBLE ARRESTED

10. COMPLETE/CONCISE DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents of routine damage to cables, webbings and other consumable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. BAR TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE: DOME (PSI)	CONSTANT PRESSURE: RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (W.T. LBS.)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no. landings and remarks in caution)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED COMMENCED	2. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS
2 DEC 1968	7/4	17/11
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
SIX		
3. NOC. HOURS FLOWN SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED	**6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT**	**7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS**
0/0	2/0	1/2

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
12 BKN	7		RUNWAY / OUTSIDE AIR 57	54	30.09

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, icing level, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate)

Ceiling was thin broken/sea state calm/wind calm

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

FIRST	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS

2. COPY DISTRIBUTION

SCC NAVAVNSAFECH DIRECT (AAR)
SCC DUWEPS DIRECT (AAR)
1cc CONAVAIR-9
1cc CO ENTERPRISE
1cc COMFAIRWESTLANTEDM
1cc COMCARDIV ONE
1cc COMNAVAIRPAC
1cc NAVPLANTREPO DAL
1cc DIR AFIP
1cc NTC PAX RIVER

GOVT DAMAGE TO:	1. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	2. PRIVATE PROPERTY	3. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO
	0	0	6 JANUARY 1969

PART IV SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

(b) (6) [redacted] SDR, USN, VA-146 OPERATIONS — UNIT BILLET	(b) (6) [redacted] , VA-146 ASO — UNIT BILLET
(b) (6) [redacted] Lieut, MC, USNR	(b) (6) [redacted] USN, VA-146 INTENANCE — UNIT BILLET

* When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

GP-607

PART V

THE ACCIDENT

On the 7th of December, LCDR Robert J. SIMONIC was the scheduled flight leader of a two plane night rocket mission assigned a target on San Clemente Island. Briefing commenced at 1715U with LT (b) (6) and LCDR (b) (6) (spare) in attendance. The briefing was considered to be thorough in all respects. In accordance with the load plan, each aircraft carried three M24 flares (NER) and one LAU 68 rocket pod (TER) on wing station 1 and 8 respectively. LCDR SIMONIC launched from USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65) at 1856U in NG (Busy Bee) 305, BUNO 154459.

A rendezvous was effected with LT (b) (6) and the flight proceeded to the target area as briefed. Upon arrival at the target the flight was informed that the area was clear, and they could commence their runs at 1915U vice the 1930U scheduled target time. Alternate rocket runs and flare drops were made by the flight until all ordnance was expended. The flight then proceeded to a prearranged rendezvous point and LT (b) (6) assumed the lead.

While inbound to the ship, each aircraft was given individual marshal instructions. After acknowledgement, the flight separated and proceeded independently. At 2035U, Busy Bee 305 reported from marshal that he had experienced a PC-2 hydraulic failure. At this time he requested to, "come aboard as soon as possible or be diverted to Miramar or some other shore base." He was granted almost immediate clearance for an approach, and he reported that he could commence in about 90 seconds. Busy Bee 305 originally stated he would make a dirty penetration, but in fact penetrated clean at approximately 300 knots. Clearance was granted to descend VFR to angels 12 and at approximately 2038U Busy Bee 305 reported leaving FL 180 and switched to button 18 (final CCA frequency). Busy Bee 305 checked in on button 18 and reported a DME of 30 miles. Busy Bee 305 was then told to continue his descent to angels 8 and was given the final bearing of 335 degrees. At 2041U, in response to questioning by the ship, the pilot stated he was clean and would transition to the landing configuration when he leveled at 8,000 feet. Two minutes later he informed the ship that his PC-1 pressure was normal, but he was having trouble holding the nose up. This was followed by "I'm going to lose it I believe." Immediately thereafter, the pilot stated he was on the 155 degree radial at seven miles and once again reported he was having trouble holding his nose up. The ship asked if an increase in speed would help, and the pilot informed them he was dirty. He then requested that they dispatch the helo and made his last transmission, "passing 35, punching out". At this time he was approximately five miles aft of the ship.

The helo crew arrived overhead in about seven minutes, having sighted the pilot's strobe light. The helo crewman entered the water at 2053U and discovered the pilot to be badly entangled in his parachute and shroud lines. The crewman was unable to free the pilot and assistance from USS HIGBEE was requested. At 2117U a whaleboat from HIGBEE reached the scene. The helo crewman was still in the water with the pilot maintaining his head above water. The pilot was placed in the whaleboat and taken aboard HIGBEE. Revival efforts were unsuccessful and the pilot was pronounced dead at 2215U.

2117
2053
54

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

PART VI

DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

The aircraft, BUNO 154459 was lost at sea and is non-recoverable. Therefore, an assessment of damage is not applicable.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

The investigation was initiated immediately after the accident. All members of the board were present from the onset including the flight surgeon who actively participated in the pilot revival efforts.

(a) Personnel Factors

1. Pilot Factors

LCDR SIMONIC was designated a Naval Aviator in August 1957 and had accumulated 3533 total flight hours of which 358 were in the A7A/B aircraft. LCDR SIMONIC was considered to be a highly competent, professional aviator with a complete and thorough knowledge of the A7B aircraft and associated systems.

After experiencing the PC-2 hydraulic system failure, it is considered that LCDR SIMONIC'S request for an immediate approach or a divert to a shore facility to be one of sound judgement. It is not known whether the PC-2 pressure went to zero, but the pilot did deem it necessary to land the aircraft as soon as possible. Squadron procedures dictate that the flap handle be in ISO for all normal operations, and there is no reason to doubt that the pilot did not have it so positioned. Following NATOPS procedures then, the pilot's direct concern would be to monitor the PC-1 pressure and be prepared to deploy the EPP (emergency power package) only if needed.

LCDR SIMONIC originally decided to make a dirty penetration (gear and flaps down, speed brake in), but in fact did penetrate clean at approximately 300 knots. The reason for this decision change is not known, but was most likely made to expedite departure from marshal. As a matter of note, the board unanimously felt that in this instance the original decision to penetrate dirty was a better one (see para 3d this section) and should have been adhered to. The boards reasons for this conclusion were, (1) preclude the last minute configuration change requiring a large power lever reduction (no speed brakes available), (2) establish aircraft in proper attitude well before landing, thereby allowing for better monitoring of the PC-1 system, (3) reduce utilization of the hydraulic system at an altitude whereby if it fails, ejection is required immediately.

Similarities exist between this accident and VA-122's AAR serial 2-69A of 3 August, in that the loss of flight controls took place over such a long duration. From the initial PC-2 failure to the actual loss of flight controls encompassed a period of about 10 minutes. In fact, approximately 8 minutes elapsed before there was any reported loss of flight control effectiveness. At 2043:39 (initial PC-2 failure was at 2035) the pilot reported that his PC-1 was still OK, but he couldn't hold his nose up even with full up trim. The pilots's next statement at 2043:59 of, "I'm going to lose it I believe" is subject to conjecture as to what he meant. This board concluded that he was most probably referring to his PC-1 pressure. By 2044:15 it was definite that he could not hold the airplane up in the air. (Refer to section (b) Part VII for a dissertation of the effects of lost hydraulic pressure on the flight controls). At 2044:48 the pilot asked that the "angel" be sent over to his position. The ship then asked for Busy Bee 305's present altitude and at 2045 the final transmission from Busy Bee 305 was "Passing 35 punching out".

This next portion of the investigation is the one that the board devoted it's major time and efforts in analyzing. The primary question being, why did the pilot suffer fatal injuries from what appeared on the surface to be an ejection within the ESCAPAC envelope? The original direction of the analysis was made on the assumption that the pilot did in fact initiate the ejection sequence at 3500 feet. Various sets of parameters from aircraft attitudes of 30 degrees nose down to 180 degrees (fully inverted) and airspeeds from 150 to 250 knots were given to the ESCAPAC experts at Douglas Long Beach. Each time the question was asked, when would full parachute deployment occur? All answers came back with altitudes ranging from 2500 feet to a low of 950 feet (most adverse condition). At the same time the board was receiving these results, the Flight Surgeon had concluded his MOR and the preliminary autopsy report was received. From the latter reports, it became apparent that the pilot impacted the water with a greater than normal parachute rate of descent. Discarding the original assumption then, of when the ejection sequence commenced, other areas were investigated. The parachute, RSSK-8A and the torso harness were flown to the Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility, El Centro for DIR. (Enclosure (13)). These findings substantiated the MOR and the preliminary Pathologist report that ejection was apparently outside the envelope, and water impact was greater than normal. As to why it was, the most logical reason was that the ejection sequence was not initiated at 3500 feet. To possibly understand it was readily determined that the aircraft with full nose down pitch and accelerating in airspeed could easily experience rates of descent in excess of 10,000 feet per minute. For example, at 45 degrees nose down and 200 knots, (certainly within the realm of possibility), the rate of descent is approximately 14,000 feet per minute. In converting this example to a time frame, we see that if the pilot delayed his ejection 5 to 6 seconds he would be on the very edge of the safe envelope. Paragraph 3 of the aero medical conclusions (MOR) discusses some possibilities for such a delay. Additionally the board considered the following factors pertinent:

(1) Negative G of the aircraft could cause difficulty in reaching or activating either the primary or secondary ejection handle.

(2) A possible last ditch effort to get the nose up or deploy the EPP.

(3) Possible activation of pilots strobe light prior to ejection. As indicated by the rescue report (enclosure (10)) the pilots strobe light was operating in the water and instrumental in the quick location of the pilot. No evidence could be found of anyone ever actuating the strobe light prior to ejection, but the board concluded it a possibility because of the two tape transmissions of the pilots direct concern for the helo knowing his position. If in fact the pilot did actuate the strobe light prior to ejection, it could very well have been a fatal error. If he didn't, it could have been activated on water entry due to the position it was worn on the pilots torso harness.

2. Maintenance, servicing, and ground handling personnel factor

Although the presence of the extraneous piece of lanyard reported in enclosure (13) remains a mystery, it is not felt that it contributed to the accident. Exhaustive efforts were made to determine the origin of the lanyard but were all to no avail. It can be concluded however, that this specific type lanyard is not used by this command or NAS Lemoore AMD.

Similarly, the discussion surrounding the laceration of the MK3C given in paragraph 5 of the MOR conclusions does not constitute any maintenance error. This was concluded after a thorough investigation into NAS Lemoore AMD's procedures for testing and certifying the MK3C.

3. Supervisory factor

There were no known supervisory factors contributing to the accident.

(b) Material failure or malfunction

In the event both Power Control Systems experience loss of hydraulic pressure, the UHT will move to the full nose down position due to the aerodynamic load on the control surface.

A7 Interim Airframe Change 50 was incorporated to provide check valves at the inlet ports of the UHT cylinder actuators as a means of delaying the UHT surface movement. Typical values of UHT movement as provided by LTV engineering are as follows:

1. For a ruptured UHT cylinder casting and loss of both PC systems, a nose down rate equal to a pilot input of 8 degrees per second can be expected.

2. For loss of both Power Control Systems pressure up stream of the check valves, lab tests have shown a bleed off rate equal to 1/10 of a degree per second. These values were given as typical only, as the actual rates would depend on many variables difficult to measure. With a gradual loss of PC-1 pressure, following a PC-2 system failure, flight control discrepancy in the form of inability to hold the nose up would most likely occur in stages. As the loss of PC-1 fluid and pressure progressed, the pilot would reach the limit of nose up trim without further aircraft response. This would occur because the electrical trim actuator positions the same servo valve as the normal pilot input. When system pressure is no longer adequate for UHT actuation in response to stick or trim inputs, the aerodynamic load on the UHT would cause the aircraft to pitch nose down quite probably at an ever increasing rate until reaching the point where aircraft attitude and negative G loading would adversely effect the pilots ability to maintain control of the aircraft.

Due to the difficulties experienced with the UHT actuating cylinders by the A7 aircraft, it is strongly suspected that this item played a very vital role in this accident. The requirement for the modification of the A7 UHT actuating cylinder assembly as directed by A7 Interim Airframe Change 66; the incorporation of UHT actuator hydraulic pressure line check valves as required by A7 Interim Airframe Change 50; The ensuing difficulties with the sychronization of the UHT cylinder servo valve as indicated by A7 Interim Airframe Bulletin 54; all tend to support this suspicion. The catastrophic failure possibility mentioned in IAFB #54 apparently is occurring and all that is needed for confirmation is recoverable evidence.

Naval Air Rework Facility Alameda letter serial 3298 of 5 December 1968, enclosure (14) further lends credence to the theory of UHT cylinder failure. It reports the results of rechecking the synchronization of the A7 UHT cylinder servo valves and the fact that there still exists an out of sync situation which is detrimental to the service life of the UHT cylinder.

(c) Facilities

No causal factors are assigned any facility.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

(d)

NATOPS requirements or procedures are not considered a factor in this accident. Whether specific dual hydraulic system failure procedures were used in this mishap,(ie. EPP deployment and flaps up) is unknown. However, due to the pilots intimate familiarity with A7 NATOPS procedures it is suspected that proper procedures were being complied with.

A recommendation for a change to the NATOPS manual is being prepared in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.0 series to include that in the event of PC-1 or PC-2 hydraulic systems failure a straight in type approach be made and transition to the landing configuration be done prior to commencing the approach. It is considered extremely important to eliminate last minute, low altitude configuration/trim changes which may adversely effect emergency egress.

In this mishap the control difficulty was experienced about the time the pilot was configuring the aircraft for landing probably somewhere between 8,000 feet and 4,000 feet. Had this been done when the pilot commenced his approach the decision to eject might have been early enough to effect a successful egress from the aircraft.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

PART VIII

CONCLUSIONS

1. That a material failure/malfunction of an undetermined component of the PC-2 hydraulic system occurred causing loss of PC-2 hydraulic pressure.

2. That a probable failure/malfunction occurred shortly thereafter in the PC-1 hydraulic system causing loss of pressure and subsequent loss of pitch control of the aircraft.

3. That the ejection sequence was initiated outside or on the very edge of the safe envelope of the ESCAPAC 1C2 system.

4. That the ejection seat, seat separation and pilot chute all functioned properly, but that the main chute did not have time to fully deploy prior to water impact.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6

PART IX

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That investigation continue with top priority in the suspect areas of the Longitudinal Flight Control System to determine what has precipitated dual hydraulic failures, and also to resolve the current difficulties associated with the UHT cylinders.

2. That an investigation be made into the feasibility of designing a fix for the UHT that would allow it to go to a nose up position (2 or 3 degrees) vice full nose down after a dual hydraulic failure.

3. That the explosive parachute canopy opening device, such as incorporated in the NB-11 parachute, be incorporated in all A7 aircraft as soon as possible.

4. That delivery of the LPA-1 life preservers be expedited.

5. That in addition to a straight-in approach for all PC-1/2 system failures, transition to landing configuration be made prior to commencement of approach.

* 6. That all A7 pilots be briefed on the insidious nature of this type failure, and the rapidity in which it can deteriorate and require immediate ejection.

CROSS FEED

?

INDEX OF ENCLOSURES

(1) Flight Schedule

(2) Statement by LT (b) (6) [redacted]

(3) Verbatim transcript of CCA Tapes

(4) Statement by (b) (6) [redacted], AC2

(5) Statement by (b) (6) [redacted] AMSAN

(6) Statement by (b) (6) [redacted], BM2

(7) Statement by (b) (6) [redacted] HMSN

(8) Statement by (b) (6) [redacted], HM1

(9) Ships Weather Report

(10) Rescue Report

(11) Statement by LCDR (b) (6) [redacted]

(12) Statement by LCDR [redacted]

(13) Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility letter serial 1466 of 26 DEC 68

(14) Naval Air Rework Facility letter serial 3298 of 5 DEC 68

(15) NOR

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

ATTACK SQUADRON ONE HUNDRED FORTY-SIX
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SDO: LTJG (b) (6) [redacted]
IWO: LTJG (b) [redacted] 1600-2000
SUNRISE: 0641
SUNSET: 1645

TACTICAL CALL
BUSY BEE

SATURDAY 7 DECEMBER 1968
JULIAN: 8342
MOONRISE: 1900
MOONSET: 0826

EVT NO	BRIEF L/L	MISSION	MODEX	PILOT	TIME	FUEL	ORDNANCE STORES	REMARKS
1C	0815 1000 1140	1A7 ARMED RECCE		(b) (6) [redacted]		10.0	3x1 LAU 68 AMMO 300R	TGT 29 PALMS CHARLIE MINFIELD 1050-1115
1H	0815 1000 1310	1A0 SEA DRAGON SPOTTER				14.0	2x1 AGM 45 AMMO 300R	DO NOT FIRE SHRIKE
2E	0945 1130 1310	1A0 RESCAP		SIMONIC (b) (6) [redacted]		10.0	AMMO 300R	
2B	0945 1130 1310	1A7 STRIKE		(b) (6) [redacted]		10.0	3x6 MK 76 AMMO 300R	TGT SPAR 1225- 1245
3C	1115 1300 1440	1A7 ARMED RECCE				10.0	4x1 LAU 68 AMMO 300R 1x1 AGM 45 CAPTIVE	TGT CHOC MTN. TRUCK CONVOY 33-23N 115-30W TOT 1330-1415
3L	1115 1300 1440	1A0 OBSERVER		TBA		10.0	AMMO 300R	
4G	1245 1430 1610	1A0 RESCAP		(b) (6) [redacted]		10.0	AMMO 300R	
4C	1245 1430 1610	1A7 STRIKE				10.0	4x6 MK 76 AMMO 300R	TGT SPAR 1530- 1545
6B	1515 1730 1912	3A7 NIGHT HAWK		(b) (6) [redacted]		10.0	4x3 MK 24 4x1 LAU 68	SHOBA 1800-1845
7C	1715 1900 2042	3A7 NIGHT HAWK		SIMONIC (b) (6) [redacted]		10.0	4x3 MK 24 4x1 LAU 68	SHOBA 1930-2015
8C	1845 2030 2200	3A7 NIGHT HAWK				10.0	4x3 MK 24 4x1 LAU 68	SHOBA 2100-2145

NOTES:

1. AIR OPS NIGHT RECOVERY OBSERVERS: 1900 - LT (b) (6) [redacted]
2030 - LC
2200 - LC

CERTIFIED TO BE CORRECT:
(b) (6) [redacted]

SUBMITTED:
(b) (6) [redacted]
OPERATIONS OFFICER

APPROVED:
for CDR FORD J.E. SCHULTZ
COMMANDING OFFICER

ENCLOSURE (1)

Statement of LT (b) (6) [redacted] Attack Squadron ONE HUNDRED FORTY-SIX, concerning aircraft accident of A7B BUNO 154459 on 7 December 1968, Pilot SIMONIC.

LCDR SIMONIC and I briefed at 1730 for a Nite Hawk exercise in the SHOBA area on San Clemente Island. The take off, rendezvous and arrival on target went as briefed, the only deviation being the fact that with the target unoccupied, we were cleared on from 1915 to 1945 (vice the scheduled 1930 to 2015 target time). LCDR SIMONIC was unable to get a good flare on any of his three releases, so we used my three flares to make a total of three rocket runs. Having dispensed all our ordnance on target, we rendezvoused off target and I assumed the lead, checking our flight in with Pirez, Strike and Marshall in that order. LCDR SIMONIC and I received our individual marshalls and once south of the ship, I detached LCDR SIMONIC. Approximately 6 minutes prior to his final EMT, LCDR SIMONIC called Marshall to report a PC-2 failure, requesting either immediate clearance to land or a divert to Miramar. LCDR SIMONIC was cleared for an immediate approach, and explained that due to his PC-2 failure, he would be unable to use his speed brake, and that a dirty penetration would be required. LCDR SIMONIC was cleared as requested and given a frequency change. This was the last I heard about him prior to my landing aboard CVAN-65 at 2104.

(b) (6) [redacted]

LT USN

Enclosure (2)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3760.6F

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF CCA TAPES

TIME MARSHAL FREQUENCY, CH 17, TRANSMISSIONS

2035:04 * Marshal Busy Bee 305 over

BB 305 go ahead

* Ah roger I've just had a PC-2 hydraulic failure ah request to come aboard as soon as possible or be diverted to Miramar or some other shore base.

Roger 305 standby

305 Climax commence your approach, what's the earliest you can commence?

305 Climax

2036:04 * Ah roger in about ah 90 seconds

2036:34 * 305 advise when your out of marshal

305 how soon do your expect to commence.

* Ah this is 305 in about ah 30 seconds. I'm going to have to make a dirty approach also ah no speed brake available.

2037:39 * Ah marshal . ah 305 you copy?

305 affirmative and can you decend VFR to angels 12? Take angels 12 report level.

2037:54 * Ah roger and I'm leaving flight level 180 commencing this time.

Roger understand commencing and go 18 pogo

* Roger button 18

TIME APPROACH FREQUENCY, CH 18, TRANSMISSIONS

2038:04 * 305 up

Busy Bee 305 Climax, you calling?

* BB 305 up this frequency

Roger DME?

* Ah 30

BB 305 are you still up this frequency?

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

TIME	APPROACH FREQUENCY, CH 18, TRANSMISSIONS
2039:24	* 305 affirmative I'm descending VFR to 12 thousand.
	Roger continue descent to angels 8
	* Roger descend to 8 passing 14
2041:04	BB 305 the final bearing is 335
	* Ah roger understand 335
	And show you 18 miles now
	* Concur
	305 are you dirty?
	** affirmative (this transmission from 205 an F4 ahead of 305 in approach)
	Roger
2041:34	* Ah 305 negative, I'll dirty when I level at 8
2043:19	BB 305 speed normal through the gate for your configuration
2043:39	* 305 I'm having trouble holding this thing up in the air. My PC-1 is still OK but I've got full up trim and I can't hold the nose up.
2043:59	* I'm going to lose it I believe
2044:04	* Ah marshal you copy?
	305 say your problem again please sir.
2044:15	* Ah roger I'm on the 155 at 7 miles. I can't hold the airplane up in the air.
2044:24	305 if you increase speed can you keep it
	* I'm dirty
2044:48	* How about sending the angel over to my posit
	305 your altitude now
2045	* Passing 35 punching out

* Transmission by Busy Bee 305

Enclosure (3)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

Statement of (b) (6) [redacted] AC2, USN, (b) (6) [redacted] USS [illegible] CVA concerning aircraft accident of A7B BUNO 154459 on 7 December 1968, Pilot SHONI[illegible].

Busy Bee 305 was handed off to my approach position (button 18), at 30 miles. Positive radar contact was established utilizing IFF decode. The CCA supervisor advised me that the A/C was proceeding VFR to Angels 12, and to continue his decent to Angels 8. At this time I had 305 in radio contact, gave normal approach information, asking about one minute later if he was dirty. I recieved what I understood to be an afirmative reply from 305, this turned out to be from another A/C however. I was under the impression for the remainder of the approach that 305 was in fact dirty since departing Marshal.

BB 305 followed his interval (Shoutime 613), also under my control, straight in to the 10 mile gate, the interval between the A/C going from an original 5 miles, to 3 miles, and remaining there. 613 had been given a speed change to 300 kts. when I first observed the interval between the two A/C was closing. At gate 10, I advised BB 305 to go to normal speed for his configuration, still under the impression that he was dirty. Shortly after this, 305 stated his problem, although unable to understand all of his transmission, I begun passing to the CCA supervisor that 305 could not hold his altitude. I was asked to get more exact information from 305, I then asked 305 to state his difficulties again, getting no reply. After asking 305 if he could remain airborne if he speeded up, his reply was that he was dirty, and then, shortly thereafter, would we send a helo to his position.

The next transmission from305 was that he was punching out. I went to the SPN-6 radar on my position to obtain a fix on 305, and passed that information to the CCA supervisor. His target was directly aft of the angle at 4½ miles in a slight right turn. This target was visible for about 35 to 40 seconds after 305 reported ejecting.

(b) (6) [redacted]

AC2 USN

Enclosure (4)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3760.6F

Statement of (b) (6) [redacted], AMSAN, USN, (b) (6) [redacted] HC-1 Detachment 65, concerning aircraft accident of A7B BUNO 154459 on 7 December 1968, Pilot SIMONIC.

Angel 83 was flying plane-guard for USS ENTERPRISE on the night of December 7, 1968. At approximately 2047 we were notified of a pilot who had punched out 6 miles aft of the ship.

As the helo started for the area, the first crewman started the lookout for the pilot as I put on my mask and fins.

We made the sighting of the pilot by the flashing of his strobe light and made a pass to drop a marker flare. As we passed over the pilot ,he seemed to be moving his arms in a weak effort to help stay afloat. We also noticed he was still in the chute.

On the second pass I, as the second crewman, was lowered into the water by the hoist and proceeded to swim toward the pilot. As I neared the pilot I noticed he had stopped his efforts at using his arms and his head had fell slightly forward.

When I reached the pilot his face mask was still over his nose and mouth, but was very loose. After I removed his mask I saw his eyes move to one side. I never heard the pilot say anything so I checked him for any apparent injuries and found none.

The pilot had his life vest inflated but it wasn't keeping him afloat as well as it should have.

I then removed the shroud lines from his head, neck and shoulders and started to tow him away from his chute. The chute was not pulling the shroud lines from his legs and feet so I stopped and found that part of the chute was caught on his feet and lower legs. I freed the chute and towed him further. Still the shroud lines would not pull from his feet or legs.

I stopped a second time and dove under the pilot to try and pull the lines free by hand. When I was under him I saw him start to go under so I surfaced and pulled him up. I tried to pull and cut the shroud lines from the pilot but each time I went under to work the pilot started to sink.

Because of the shroud lines around his raft I was unable to inflate it for fear it would become caught and float the pilot with his head below water.

When I saw that I would not be able to free the chute from the pilot, I concentrated on holding his head above water and tried to get him in position for artificial resuscitation but failed. I held his head above water until a swimmer from the destroyers whaleboat towed us to the boat. A little trouble was had in getting the pilot into the boat because of the shroud lines and chute.

After we had the pilot aboard, a member of the boats crew started giving mouth-to-mouth while the rest of the crew started looking for a second man thought to be in the water.

When it was determined the pilot was in need of a resuscitator we returned to the destroyer.

After transferring the pilot and me to the destroyer, the boat put out in search of the second man again.

When the helo lowered the doctor to the destroyer, I was picked up and we returned to the ENTERPRISE for plane-guard duty.

From the time I entered the water until the time I was aboard the whale boat was about 20-25 minutes.

(b) (6) [redacted]

AMSAN USN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3760.6F

ENCLOSURE (5)

Statement of (b) (5) [redacted] BM2, USN, (b) (6) [redacted] USS HIGBEE, concerning aircraft accident of A7B BUNO 154459 on 7 December 1968, Pilot SIMONIC.

Assuming duties as Coxswain of HIGBEE Motor Whale Boat, myself along with an assigned crew including one signalman, one Gunnersmate, one Corpsman, one swimmer, one Boat Engineer and bow hook were cast off with orders to retrieve two men out of the water off the ship's port side. As the boat rounded the ship's bow three small lights were visible in the water. I headed the boat at maximum speed towards the nearest light, approximately 300 yards away. As we approached I saw it was a pilot and a swimmer in a wet suit. Swimmer joined the other swimmer in the water and with the help of the other crewmen the pilot was brought aboard in the forward part of the whale boat. The pilot's head gear was removed immediately and mouth-to-mouth resusitation was begun.

After bringing the two swimmers aboard I started search for the other two lights but was unable to find either one. A burned-out smoke bomb was sighted.

Upon advice from the Corpsman I brought the boat back to the ship to get Medical Aid for the pilot.

The boat was brought to the ship's rail and a stokes stretcher brought aboard and the pilot was removed from the whale boat. The boat was put back in the water for a search for other possible pilots. Upon receiving Flashing Light signal message from the ship that there was no one else in the water we returned to the ship and the boat was hoisted in.

The pilot's life vest appeared to be inflated. The pilot's head was tilted back and he appeared to be unconscious. His body was limp as he was brought aboard. There was no raft visible at the scene.

(b) (6) [redacted]
BM2 USN

CERTIFIED TO BE CORRECT:
(b) (6) [redacted]

Enclosure (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3760.6F

Statement of (b) (6) [redacted] HMSN, USN, (b) (6) [redacted] USS HIGBEE, concerning aircraft accident of A7B BUNO 154459 occuring on 7 December 1968, pilot SIMONIC.

When we pulled up to the pilot the swimmer was holding him by the top of his helmet. The pilot's eyes were open and his face was very pale, almost "greenish" in color. As we were pulling him into the boat I attempted to check his pulse but received no results. I started cutting away the shrouds to clear his head and neck. We then turned him over on his side to allow water and other particles out of his mouth and throat. I then began mouth-to-mouth resuscitation with no results. We again turned him over to the side and got more water out. Then (b) (6) [redacted] HM3, started mouth-to-mouth and I was pushing on his chest to help induce breathing. We continued this action till the boat pulled along side the ship.

(b) (6) [redacted]
HMSN USN

CERTIFIED TO BE CORRECT:
(b) (6) [redacted]

Enclosure (7)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAV INST 3760.6F

Statement of (b) (6) [redacted] HM1, USN, (b) (6) [redacted] USS MIGHEE, concerning aircraft accident of A7B BUNO 154459 occuring on 7 December 1968, Pilot SIMONIC.

At approximately 2115 the pilot was brought aboard and taken immediately to sickbay. I immediately started mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. The pulse beat was absent. His pupils were dilated and not responding to light. No blood pressure was obtainable. His finger tips and lips showed lack of oxygen. After about five minutes, 2130, we started external cardiac massage. Several times the patient's throat was cleared and he was turned on his side and back. Mouth-to-mouth resuscitation was continued until Medical Officer from USS ENTERPRISE arrived.

(b) (6) [redacted]
HM1 USN

CERTIFIED TO BE CORRECT:
(b) (6) [redacted]

Enclosure (8)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3760.6F

U. S. NAVAL WEATHER SERVICE
USS ENTERPRISE CVA(N)-65

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

DATE: 07 DECEMBER 1968 TIME: 2040U

LATT 31-51N LONG 118-05W

WIND:

ANEMOMETER USED PORT

SHIP'S HEADING 360 SHIPS SPEED 24 KNOTS

RELATIVE 350 KNOTS 27 KNOTS

TRUE 290 KNOTS 04 KNOTS

STATE OF SEA INDETERMINATE DUE TO DARKNESS

CLOUD COVERAGE EIGHT TENTHS

CEILING 1200 THIN BROKEN

TEMPERATURE 57 °F DEW POINT 54 °F

SEA TEMPERATURE 59 °F

VISIBILITY 07 MILES

OBSTRUCTION TO VISION NONE

ALTIMETER SETTING 30.09 INS

PRESSURE ALTITUDE FEET

REMARKS:

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) CDR, USN
METEOROLOGICAL OFFICER

ENCLOSURE (9)

RESCUE REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-13 (2-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST [illegible].OE

INSTRUCTIONS: SEE REVERSE

OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL 3750-14

1. FROM: OFFICER IN CHARGE, HELSUPPRON ONE DET 65		2. DATE OF MISHAP: 7 DECEMBER 1968	2A. DATE OF RESCUE: 7 DECEMBER 1968
3. LOCATION AND DUTIES OF RESCUE VEHICLE: PLANE GUARD, HELICOPTER ABOARD CVAN-65		4. RESCUE VEHICLE (Type/model): UH-2C	
5. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: 5A. IN RESCUE VEHICLE OR ON RESCUE TEAM: 4	5B. TO BE RESCUED: 1	5C. RESCUED: 0	6. RESCUE BACK UP MEANS: DD 806

7. TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Local Date Time Group)

7A. Alert Received: 2046	Method: RADIO MESSAGE FROM CVAN-65
7B. Vehicle Departed: 2045	Distance to Scene: 150/5 MILES
7C. Arrived on Scene: 2050	Search Required: NONE
7D. Located Survivor: 2050	Method of Locating: VISUAL
7E. Began Retrieval: 2055	What Was Sighted First: PILOTS STROBE LIGHT
7F. Ended Retrieval: 2126	Subsequently: PROCEEDED TO CVAN-65
7G. Survivor(s) Disembarked	Location (If different from Item 3):

8. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RESCUE SITE

8A. WATER TEMPERATURE	AIR TEMPERATURE	WIND VELOCITY
59 °F	57 °F	290T/4

8B. SEA STATE/WAVE HEIGHT/FREQUENCY; TERRAIN DESCRIPTION

SEA STATE - ONE
SWELLS - FOUR TO SIX FEET

9. EQUIPMENTS ACTUALLY USED DURING RESCUE

RESCUE SLING
SWIMMERS GEAR
DIVING MASK
FINS
WET SUIT
UDT VEST
SWIMMERS GEAR (CONT.)
SWIMMERS HARNESS
3-MK 25 SMOKE LIGHT SIG.

10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final outcome of rescue attempt, i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATING, RETRIEVING, POST-RETRIEVAL)

RETRIEVAL OF EJECTED PILOT BY SWIMMER WAS NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO PILOTS ENTANGLEMENT IN PARACHUTE SHROUD LINES. EACH TIME SWIMMER ATTEMPTED TO REMOVE LINES FROM LOWER PORTION OF PILOTS BODY THE PILOTS HEAD WOULD GO UNDER WATER. UPON REALIZING THIS, THE SWIMMER DISCONTINUED FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO UNTANGLE LINES AND DEVOTED HIS EFFORTS TO KEEPING PILOTS HEAD ABOVE WATER. PILOT AND SWIMMER WERE SUBSEQUENTLY REMOVED FROM THE WATER BY DD 806.

11. PERSONNEL REQUIRING RESCUE (NAME-LAST FIRST INITIAL)	GIVE REASON FOR RESCUE	FACTORS COMPLICATING RESCUE ATTEMPT (Physical condition, ignorance of equipment, sea state, etc.)
SIMONIC, ROBERT J.	EJECTED FROM A-7	AT TIME OF RESCUE ATTEMPT PILOT WAS EITHER DEAD OR IN VERY WEAKEND CONDITION. ONLY ONE SIDE OF SURVIVAL VEST WAS INFLATED, TANGLED IN SHROUD LINES.

12. REMARKS: (Training of rescue team or crew, communication equipments/techniques, retrieval equipments/techniques, rescue vehicle)

NO EQUIPMENT OR COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED. PILOTS AND CREW RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY AND ARRIVED ON SCENE AND HAD SWIMMER IN WATER IN 10 MINUTES AFTER ALERT WAS RECEIVED. PILOTS CONDITION AND ENTANGLEMENT IN SHROUD LINES MADE RETRIEVAL IMPOSSIBLE FOR SWIMMER. RETRIEVAL SUBSEQUENTLY MADE BY BOAT FROM DD 806.

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: Narratives of search, location and retrieving—Survivor's statements

14. NAME AND TITLE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL: (b) (6) [redacted]

SIGNATURE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL: (b) (6) [redacted]

15. NAME AND TITLE OF COMMANDING OFFICIAL: LCDR, (b) (6) [redacted] MnC HELSUPPRON ONE DET65

ENCLOSURE (10)

STATEMENT OF LCDR, (b) (6) [redacted] PILOT OF ANGEL 83

At approximately 2046 while flying plane guard for USS Enterprise we were alerted that a pilot had ejected from an A-7 5 miles aft of the ship on a bearing of 150°. We immediately departed for the area and arrived at 2052. The downed pilot's strobe light was visable, sighted from a distance of 1-1½ miles, and after flying over the scene to verify the position, we made a 360° turn, dropped a MK 25 smoke light to use as a reference and made an approach to the smoke light with my hover lights on. We came to a 40 foot hover about 25 yards from the pilot. Due to the lack of a horizon and poor visibility caused by a low layer of haze, we elected to have the swimmer enter the water by hoist rather than have him jump from the aircraft. Once in the water the swimmer proceeded to the pilot and attempted to release him from the parachute. This was not possible, as each time the swimmer attempted to release the lines from the lower part of the pilots body, his head would sag into the water. Realizing this, the swimmer concentrated on holding the pilots head out of the water in an effort to keep him from drowning. During this time the helicopter was hovering at 40-60 feet altitude and approximately 50 yards away. Twice we moved closer to the scene but each time the swimmer waved us away. After we had been hovering for about 10 minutes we realized that the swimmer would not be able to retrieve the pilot. We then radioed the Enterprise and told them to have the Higbee DD 806, which was rapidly closing the area, get a boat in the water to assist. When the boat was in the water we dropped a signal MK 25 smoke light and broke hover. We continued to orbit the scene at 200' until the pilot and swimmer were in the boat at approximately 2128. At this time we returned to Enterprise, picked up two doctors and returned to the Higbee where the doctors were lowered to attend the pilot. The pilot was subsequently pronounced dead.

The doppler in angel 83 was inoperative which required a manual approach and hover. Although this is not a desirable situation, particulary on a dark night with no horizon, we encountered no particular difficulty in the approach and hover phases of the operation.

The coordination of the crew was outstanding in all respects and the efforts of the co-pilot, first crewman, and swimmer indicated to a high degree the proficiency and professionalism required for such a demanding mission. In addition the response by the Higbee, DD 806, was outstanding. They arrived on scene shortly after the helicopter and made all of their facilities immediately available to assist in the rescue.

(b) (6) [redacted]

STATEMENT OF LTJG, (b) (6) [redacted] CO-PILOT OF ANGEL 83

Angel 83 was established in the night plane guard pattern at 2046 when we received a call from the tower that a pilot had ejected 5 miles aft of Enterprise. We proceeded direct to the search area with heading given by the ship. We spotted the pilots strobe light at 2052 approximately one mile distance. The strobe light made it possible to go directly to the downed pilot without spending any time in an actual search pattern. We made a pass over the pilot with our landing lights on. We returned, dropped a smoke and initiated our approach to the water. The swimmer was in the water at 2055. At this time we could see the pilot making some movements. We moved our hover away from the swimmer as he was swimming to the survivor. We positioned our lights so they would illuminate the area around the pilot without blinding the swimmer. I turned off the pilots UHF radio mixer switches to make it possible for the pilot to receive ungarbled directions from the crewman. Enterprise called to inform us that a destroyer was inbound to us and I held him at our nine o'clock position. The ship started to arc around us so as to arrive closer to the swimmer and pilot. At this time we saw that it was impossible for the swimmer to remove all of the shroud lines from the pilot. We called Enterprise to request any assistance that the destroyer could offer. They launched a whale boat and we dropped another smoke into the water. Meanwhile we were keeping Enterprise informed of all the action taking place. The whale boat also had some difficulty removing the shroud lines from the pilot. When the pilot was aboard the boat we were directed to proceed back to the Enterprise to pick up a doctor. We flew back to Higbee at 2139 with two doctors, picked up our swimmer from the destroyer and landed aboard Enterprise at 2215.

(b) (6) [redacted]

LTJG USNR

STATEMENT OF AMSAN (b) (6) [redacted], 1st CREWMAN OF ANGEL 83

At approximately 2046 we were flying plane guard in Helo 83 when we received word that a pilot had ejected approximately 5 miles from the ship. At about 2052 the strobe light of the pilot was seen.

We made our first pass and I dropped our first smoke light. The survivor seemed to be OK. He had his head out of the water and seemed to be trying to tread water but it was a weak sort of an attempt. He was badly entangled in his parachute and shroud lines. The chute was sinking and seemed to be pulling him under. On our second approach I lowered the swimmer down the cable to the survivor. We backed off from the swimmer and survivor to keep the rotor wash off them. The swimmer tried to free the pilot from his chute but was having little luck. He was too badly entangled. Approximately 10-15-minutes later a whale boat from out escort destroyer came to our assistance and helped the swimmer with the pilot. They seemed to be having difficulty with his chute too. We then left, after they headed back towards the destroyer, to pick up the doctors back on the Enterprise.

After we transfered the doctor to the destroyer and picked up our crewman we resumed duties as plane guard for the USS Enterprise and landed at 2215.

(b) (6) [redacted]

AMSAN

STATEMENT OF AMSAN (b) (6) [redacted], 2nd CREWMAN OF ANGEL 83

Angel 83 was notified of ejection at approximately 2046. Survivor of ejection was spotted when the flashes from his strobe light were seen at 2052. On the first helo approach, a marker flare was dropped and the survivor was weakly paddling his arms in a effort to keep afloat.

I, (b) (6) [redacted] was lowered into the water and swam to the survivor. Upon reaching the survivor I noticed he slowed his paddling efforts and his head fell slightly forward. I checked his oxygen mask and found it loose but not completely off, so I removed it. At this time he seemed to be semi-conscious and dazed. I checked him for any apparent injuries and found none.

The survivor had his strobe light on and his life vest inflated. His vest didn't seem to be giving him very much flotation, and his life raft was not deployed.

I proceeded to dis-entangle the shroud lines of his chute from around his neck and shoulders and started towing him away from his chute. The chute itself was tangled around his legs and I had to stop and untangle it, then resume my effort to tow him away so I could get at the shroud lines which were wrapped around his feet, legs and body.

I turned my strobe light on to mark the location for the helo and illuminate the area. In order to untangle the shroud lines from his feet I had to dive under him. When I was under him I noticed he was beginning to sink so I came to the top and held him up. I dove down three times to try to loosen him from the shroud lines, each time he started to sink and I was forced to surface and hold him up. I also tried to cut the lines with my knife but that also failed.

I abandoned trying to disentangle his legs when I caught sight of the whale boat from the destroyer and tried to hold the survivors head above water. I inflated my life vest and put the survivors head on my shoulder, with my free hand I waved the helo off and treaded water until a swimmer from the whale boat came to assist me in bringing the survivor closer. Several times the survivors head slipped from my shoulder and I had to reposition it.

Some trouble was encountered in taking the survivor aboard the whale boat because of the parachute and shroud lines around his body. When the survivor and myself were aboard the boat one of the crew started artifical resusitation and continued while the rest of the crew looked for a second man thought to be involved. When it was determined the survivor was in need of a resusitor the boat came along side the destroyer and the survivor and myself were transferred to it.

Later the helo transferred a doctor to the destroyer and picked me up. We then returned to our plane guard duty and landed aboard the USS Enterprise at 2215.

(b) (6) [redacted]

AMSAN

Statement of LCDR (b) (6) [redacted], USN, VA-146 Assistant Maintenance Officer, concerning aircraft accident of A7B BUNO 154459 occuring 7 December 1968.

A7B BUNO 154459 was received on 3 September 1968 from Attack Squadron ONE TWENTY-TWO. The aircraft had an ESCAPAC 1C2 ejection seat installed, serial number 234. The aircraft and seat had accumulated 89.2 flight hours since Navy acceptance. A first calender inspection was conducted by this Squadron from 25 to 29 November 1968.

Engine Data: TF30-P8 serial number P664337 had accumulated 74 hours since Navy acceptance on 16 July 1968. This Engine was installed in BUNO 154459 10 October 1968 after undergoing repair for an oil leak at NAS Lemoore Intermediate Maintenance Activity. This repair included the incorporation of Interim Power Plant Change 199, 24 September 1968.

Seat Data: This DAC ESCAPAC 1C2, serial number 234 had a MK7 MOD2 catapult rocket installed. The catapult rocket, serial number 1048, was installed by VA-146 13 September 1968. The associated explosive devices were of proper MK and MOD and none had reached expiration date.

The Seat was equipped with an MD-10 parachute, serial number 166666 which was repacked by VA-146 on 29 November 1968. The MSSK-6A seat pan, serial number 306 was due for inspection on 13 December 1968.

Hydraulic System Data: Interim Airframe Change 66; Modification of A7 UHF Actuator Cylinder Assembly, was incorporated in BUNO 154459 on 30 August 1968. Interim Airframe Change 50; Installation of UHF Actuator Hydraulic Pressure Line Check Valves and Interim Airframe Bulletin 54; Synchronization of UHF Cylinder Servo Valve, were completed by NARF Alameda field team on 22 September 1968. Interim Accessory Bulletin Number 125, Revision A, Amendment 1; Crack Inspection of UHF Power Control Cylinder, was performed concurrently with the first calender inspection by VA-146.

A review of BUNO 154459 Maintenance records reveal no unusual trend of discrepancies that might have a bearing on this accident. There were no outstanding discrepancies that would adversely affect the safe flight of BUNO 154459.

(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR USN

Enclosure (11)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3760.6F

Statement of LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] VA-146 Survival Officer concerning aircraft accident of A7B BUNO 154459 occuring 7 December 1968

The aircraft was equipped with a Douglas ESCAPAC 1C2 ejection seat and a NB-10 parachute.

Pilot was recovered in the water with the following survival equipment: fully equiped SV-1 survival vest; pilots strobe light; Mk3-C life vest; APH-6 hard hat; A-13 oxygen mask with sierra fittings; NB-10 parachute; RSSK-8A survival kit; Nomex flight coveralls; aviators boots; anti-G suit; MA-2 torso harness. Pertinent items are discussed below.

Pilots strobe light (light marker distress, FSN 6230-067-5209) was mounted on his torso harness and was on and operating properly. The helo pilot and the whaleboat coxswain had no difficulty locating the pilot by his strobe light.

Pilots Mk3-C life vest was not fully inflated. When recovered the back and right side cover was still closed. The left hand air bottle had been pulled. The right hand air bottle had not been pulled and safety wire was still installed. The one bladder which was inflated had a small 1/8 inch hole in the left side. The air pressure was not sufficient to open up the right side cover or the cover in the back of the life vest. The left side of the bladder did open up the left side of the life vest cover. The right hand air bottle was pulled by the accident board and when initiated operated properly.

The life vest was re-packed and put on a torso harness by the accident board. When the left bottle was pulled the air pressure available, due to the small 1/8 inch hole, was sufficient to open only the left side cover. The back cover and right cover remained closed.

Pilots APH-6 hard hat and A-13 oxygen mask were on. The mask was on and loosely fitted when the helo crewman got to the pilot. The pilots hard hat had a two inch tear in the center of the visor shield and a similar crack in the clear visor. The colored visor was undamaged.

The RSSK-8A (Rigid Seat Survival Kit) was recovered intact, the case was bent slightly on one side. The case had not been opened. When the manual kit release handle was pulled by the accident board the kit opened properly. The emergency oxygen bottle in the RSSK-8A had been deplosted and was initiated by the seat automatic lanyard.

The NB-10 parachute was recovered and was flown to the Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility, El Centro for testing and evaluation. The parachute container was not recovered.

(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR USN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 5510.6F

ENCLOSURE (12)

U. S. NAVAL AEROSPACE RECOVERY FACILITY
EL CENTRO, CALIFORNIA 92243

IN REPLY REFER TO:
ENF-4/8/vd
FA01
Ser 1466
26 DEC 1968

From: Commanding Officer, Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility
To: Commanding Officer, VA 146, Naval Air Station, Lemoore, California 93245

Subj: Parachute Assembly, Serial 166666, and Associated Survival Equipment; inspection report on

Ref: (a) Telcon between VA 146 (LCDR (b) (6)) and NAVAERORECOVFAC (Code ENQ) on 16 Dec 1968 concerning AAR 2-69A of VA 146

Encl: (1) Equipment as received (Photo)
(2) Pilot Parachute bridle (Photo)
(3) Parachute canopy S/N 166666 (Photo)
(4) Cross connector strap assemblies (Photo)
(5) Ripcord housing and cable (Photo)
(6) Rigid seat survival kit (Photo)
(7) Extraneous MIL-C-5040 Type III, Nylon cord (Photo)
(8) Ripcord grip retainer clip (Photo)
(9) Right riser assembly (Photo)

1. As requested during the course of telcon (reference (a)), this Facility conducted an inspection on subject equipment reported to have been used during an emergency ejection from an A-7B aircraft.

2. Enclosure (1) photographs depict the parachute assembly and associated equipment as received for inspection. The following comments are offered as a result of that inspection:

a. The pilot parachute was not damaged; but did show indication that it probably experienced some load by the fact that the knot at each end of the bridle was tighter than normal for being hand-tied. (Enclosure (2)).

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11ND-COM-5216/15 (REV. 5-67)

ENCLOSURE (13)

b. The parachute canopy, enclosure (3), showed only damage attributable to the recovery operation, such as all the suspension lines were cut randomly, some cut fabric, minor pulled threads, dirt and stains. There was no damage such as burns or tears to indicate that an operational malfunction of the canopy occurred.

c. The cross-connector straps, enclosure (4), at the riser-suspension connector links did not show any signs of having been stressed. When these straps are stressed at canopy inflation they normally are squeezed into the small opening between the two legs of the connector link. The opening, $\frac{1}{4}$ to 3/8-inch wide, then usually causes a semi-permanent set in the one-inch wide strap.

d. The manual ripcord assembly, enclosure (5), showed the typical kink of the cable above the top locking pin that occurs when the automatic actuator opens the container. Thus it may be concluded that the container was opened automatically and not manually. The recovery of the manual ripcord assembly also supports this conclusion in that the manual ripcord assembly is normally not recovered unless the crewmember takes particular effort to stow the assembly after manual operation. The housing of the manual ripcord assembly was fractured immediately above the ferrule at the clamp end and bent outboard at about a 30 degree angle and bent aft at about a 15 degree angle.

e. The rigid seat survival kit, enclosure (6), had an outboard bow at the center of the right side edge of both the lid and base sections. The mating halves of the aluminum extrusion that form the edges of the lid and base had indentations that could have been made by a compressive force being applied when the lid and base were not properly aligned. Also, the two slots at the rear of the kit for the webbing that attaches the kit to the parachute container, showed that the parachute pack retention fittings were forcecully pulled out.

f. Found entangled with the suspension lines was another piece of MIL-C-5040 type III nylon cord, enclosure (7), approximately 46 inches

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in length that had been cut almost at the center. This cord had different colored identification core threads than the suspension lines or the lanyard for disconnecting the ripcord housing clamp. The two halves of this cord were fairly clean, as were the cut portions of suspension line that remained with the canopy, when compared to those cut portions of suspension lines that were separated from the canopy. Thus the possibility exists that these two halves of this extra line were entangled with the suspension lines.

g. The cover over the ripcord grip retainer clip, enclosure (8), had the stitching broken at the outboard side. The stitching attaching the retainer clip to the backing webbing, part number 60A125E7-8, was strained so that the two outboard stitches were relatively loose.

h. The right riser assembly, enclosure (9), had a mild abrasion condition at approximately mid length on the top surface.

3. From the information given in the above comments it is concluded that the following sequence of actions may have occurred:

a. The ejection from the aircraft and the separation from the seat probably occurred in a normal manner with the automatic parachute actuator being armed at seat separation.

b. At the end of the 2-second time delay, the actuator opened the parachute container and the pilot parachute deployed to start extracting the main canopy.

c. The main canopy did not reach full deployment and inflation prior to water impact . The reason full inflation was not reached may have been either lack of sufficient altitude, or the entanglement of the extra piece of cord may have prevented the suspension lines from exiting their stowage loops until water impact.

d. At water impact velocity component was probably high. The bend on the right side of the survival kit indicated this side struck first, possibly with the body in an approximate feet first position. As the assembly entered the water the hydraulic drag on the parachute container caused the straps and hardware attaching the

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

survival kit to the parachute container to be pulled from the survival kit. Damage to the survival kit indicated that the parachute container was forced to the rear and upward.

e. Evidence clearly showed that the ripcord was pulled by the automatic actuator.

4. The loss of the parachute container and automatic actuator preclude the possibility of a more definite determination of the sequence of operation of the parachute assembly.

5. All material will be retained in bonded storage at NAVAERORECOVFAC (Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility), El Centro, California 92243, for 90 days unless otherwise directed.

H. B. DAVIS
Acting

Copy to: (w/o encl.)
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR-411121) and (AIR-531)
COMNAVAIRPAC
NAVSAFECEN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES




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M. STEINTHAL & CO., INC.
NEW YORK



ENCLOSURE (C)







ENCLOSURE (9)

70 | 01
72 | RM
70A
721

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Naval Air Rework Facility
Alameda, California 94501

NARF-316-SW
Ser 3298
5 December 1968

AIR MAIL

From: Commanding Officer, Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda
To: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters (AIR-411141)

Subj: A-7 aircraft, unit horizontal tail cylinders; synchronization check of

Ref: (a) NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ msg 132258Z Nov 1968 (NOTAL)
(b) NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC msg 191949Z Nov 1968
(c) NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ msg 112153Z Oct 1968 (A-7 IAFB 54) (NOTAL)

Encl: (1) Data on Aircraft and Installed Cylinders (2)
(2) Results of Recheck of Cylinder Synchronization (In-Service Aircraft) (2)
(3) Results of Recheck of Cylinder Synchronization (Spares) (2)

1. Reference (a) requested that a field team perform a recheck of the UHT (unit horizontal tail) cylinder synchronization on in-service aircraft and spare units, and the results of this recheck be forwarded with comments. Reference (b) requested this Facility take reference (a) for action.

2. This Facility recently completed the synchronization recheck requested. Enclosure (1) gives pertinent data on the aircraft and installed cylinders. Enclosure (2) contains the results of cylinder synchronization recheck for in-service aircraft. After the aircraft accumulated the flight hours indicated, 25 of 37 cylinders were found to be out of synchronization. Readjustment of the sleeve and slider assembly linkage was made to bring pressures within the limits prescribed in the Field Instructions of reference (c).

3. Enclosure (3) gives the results of a recheck of two RFI cylinders which were subjected to normal handling and transportation abuse. Both cylinders were found to have synchronization pressures out of limits, indicating extreme sensitivity of the sleeve and slider assembly to minor bumps and jarring motion.

CERTIFIED TO BE CORRECT:
(b) (6)
[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (14)

4. Based on results of this investigation, it is believed that many aircraft are operating with cylinder synchronization pressures beyond the prescribed limits. Reference (c) states such a condition may lead to failure of the cylinder barrel. No flight discrepancies have been reported. Ling-Temco-Vought, Vought Aeronautics Division, having considerable service experience and data on these cylinders, as well as those on the F-8 aircraft, should be requested to investigate further all aspects of the problem and make recommendations on inspection requirements for service aircraft.

(b) (6)
[redacted]

By direction

Copy to: (w/1 copy encl (1) thru (3))
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMNAVAIRLANT
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC (21122)
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
COMFAIRALAMEDA
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
NAVAIREWORKFAC JAX (323)
NAVAIREWORKFAC NORVA
NAS NORIS
NAS LEMOORE
VA-37
VA-105
VA-146
VA-215

ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON D. C. 20305

REPORT OF POST-MORTEM BIOCHEMICAL FINDINGS ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT FATALITY

IDENTIFICATION

SINONIC. ROBERT J 35YRS 1304490
LCDR USN
NM SAN DIEGO CALIF
29 JAN 69 A68-498 AP FROZEN T
RUSH L20

A7B VA-146 12-7-68

TO
Chief, Laboratory Service
U.S. Naval Hospital
San Diego, California

cc
CO, USNASC, Norfolk, Va. 23511
CNO OP-057, Wash., D. C. 20360

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA: AIRCRAFT TYPE: AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER:

Crash Site: 32°00' N lat & 118°01' W. long. about 6 mi. aft of USS Enterprise

A-7

2. TOXICOLOGY:

A. CARBON MONOXIDE

BLOOD OR TISSUE CONCENTRATION EXPRESSED AS CARBOXYHEMOGLOBIN SATURATION IS . . . . . BLOOD - None found %

TEST NOT PERFORMED (SEE REMARKS BELOW) . . . . . [redacted]

CARBOXYHEMOGLOBIN SATURATIONS OF 10% OR ABOVE ARE CONSIDERED ELEVATED VALUES.

B. LACTIC ACID

THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM LACTIC ACID CONCENTRATION IS . . . . . BRAIN - 399 mmol

TEST NOT PERFORMED (SEE REMARKS) . . . . . [redacted]

VALUES OVER 200 mmol ARE CONSIDERED TO BE INDICATIVE OF CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM HYPOXIA. THIS MAY BE DUE TO ONE OF SEVERAL CAUSES: (1) HIGH ALTITUDE EXPOSURE TO LOW OXYGEN TENSION; (2) REDUCED OXYGEN SUPPLY; (3) PROLONGED SHOCK; (4) TRAUMATIC INJURIES WHICH IMPAIR ADEQUATE OXYGENATION AND/OR CIRCULATION OF BLOOD TO THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM.

NON ELEVATED VALUES DO NOT RULE OUT HYPOXIA AS A CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT

C. ALCOHOL

ETHYL ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION IS . . . . . BLOOD AND BRAIN - None found mg%

TEST NOT PERFORMED (SEE REMARKS) . . . . . [redacted]

D. DRUGS

DETERMINATION FOR DRUGS OR POISONS WILL BE DONE ON REQUEST FROM THE SUBMITTING FACILITY.

E. REMARKS

Condition of specimen: Good

NOTE: FROZEN TISSUE WILL BE HELD FOR TWENTY (20) DAYS. IF SPECIAL STUDIES OR FURTHER INFORMATION ARE DESIRED, SUBMIT REQUEST BY MOST EXPEDIENT MEANS. CONSULTATION SERVICE FROM THE AEROSPACE BRANCH, AFIP, IS AVAILABLE ON 24 HOUR BASIS. CALL WASHINGTON, D. C., RANDOLPH 3-1300 OR RANDOLPH 3-1000, EXTENSION [redacted]

3. EXAMINATION AND REPORT BY: COL [redacted] MC, USA

4. DATE OF REPORT: 7 February 1969

5. APPROVED FOR THE DIRECTOR: [redacted] Captain, MC, USN

6. SIGNATURE: [redacted]

AFIP FORM [redacted] (1 OCT 66)

68124710 2

SIMONIC, ROBERT J 1304490
26 MAR 70 A68-498 A SB

Chief of Laboratory Service
U. S. Naval Hospital
San Diego, California 92134

PAF/EJC/ri

JUL 1 5 1970

F

cc: NAVSAFECEN, Norfolk, Virginia
CNO, OP-05F

1. Aircraft accident, A7B, 154439, unsuccessful ejection, air-to-water, survival equipment failure, pilot.
2. (b) (6) [redacted]
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

(b) (6) [redacted]
Colonel, MC, USA
Chief, Division F

Examination and report by:

CDR (b) (6) [redacted], MC, USN/RSR

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCI[illegible], INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 1[illegible]

OPNAV FORM 3750-8 (REV. 3-63) — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.* — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity): ATTACK SQUADRON ONE FOUR SIX, FPO, SAN FRANCISCO 96601
2. MOR NUMBER: 2-69
3. LEAVE BLANK:
4. TYPE OF MISHAP: [X] ACCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT [ ] INCIDENT
5. TIME & ZONE: 2045U
6. DATE: 7 DEC 1968
7. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION: 32°00'N 118°01'W
8. MODEL A/C: A7B
9. BUNO: 154459
10. NO. OF OCCUPANTS: 1
11. DAMAGE CODE: ALFA
12. UNIT OPERATING A/C: VA-146

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED NAME (Last, first and middle initial)	14. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	15. RANK/RATE	16. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT ABOARD A/C	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT AT MISHAP	18. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL	19. PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED FOR FLIGHT	20. BRANCH OF SERVICE	21. INJURY CODE	22. DISPOSITION
A. SIMONIC, Robert J.	VA-146	LCDR	(b) (6) [redacted]	Pilot		22NOV 1967	Yes	USN	A	P
B.										
C.										
D.										

23. CLARIFICATION OF ITEMS 13-22 WHEN NECESSARY: N/A

24. MODEL-OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	25. BUNO	26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	27. UNIT OPERATING A/C	28. DAMAGE CODE	29. MOR NO.
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

30. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP (Use additional 8 x 10½ sheets if required)

The PILOT, LCDR Robert J. SIMONIC, launched from USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65) at 1856U for a night rocket firing mission in A7B BUNO 154459, MODEX 305. According to the pilot's wingman, the mission went as breifed until the two aircraft separated preparatory to meeting their individual marshall requirements. At 2036, shortly after reaching marshall, the PILOT of 305 transmitted that he had experienced a PC-2 hydraulic failure and he requested permission to either divert to a shore facility or to land abcard ship immediately. The PILOT was cleared to head inbound to the ship. The PILOT indicated at approximately 2044 that he was having difficulty holding the nose of the aircraft up and expressed doubt that he would be able to keep the plane in the air. The ship asked 305 what altitude it was at and the PILOT replied that he was at 3500 feet and that he was ejecting. Ejection took place at approximately 2045 six miles aft of the ship. The base recovery course was 360 degrees with ship's speed 24 knots. The plane guard Helo was dispatched to the scene immediately. The Helo crew could readily see the PILOT'S flashing strobe light and the Helo proceeded straight to the downed pilot. After one identification pass and one pass to drop a smoke flare, the Helo established a hover and at 2053 the swimmer entered the water. The PILOT appeared unconscious from the outset, with his head just above the surface

31. PRIMARY CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD: MATERIAL FAILURE: PC-2 FAILURE FOLLOWED BY PROBABLE PC-1 FAILURE

32. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD: N/A

33. POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD: N/A

34. HAVE ALL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD? IF NO, EXPLAIN. YES [X] NO [ ]

35. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST: [X] ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED [ ] DRAWINGS SKETCHES, PHOTOS [ ] SURVIVORS NARRATIVES [X] WIT[redacted] [X] CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS [X] REQUIRED COPIES FURNISHED

36. [illegible] (Name & [illegible] of medical officer): (b) (6) [redacted] LCDR MC USNR — DATE: 13 DEC 1968

37. FO[illegible] (Signature of appointing authority): (b [redacted] CDR USN — DATE: 13 DEC 1968

ENCLOSURE (15)

OP-607 — U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—[illegible]

ITEM A-30 (Continued)

of the water. He was severely entangled in his parachute shroud lines. The swimmer was unable to free the PILOT from the shroud lines and at the same time keep the PILOT'S head above water. At 2117, a whale-boat from the USS HIGBEE, DD-806, arrived on the scene and the PILOT was cut free of the shroud lines and he and the swimmer were taken aboard. The PILOT was limp and had no detectable pulse or spontaneous respirations when taken into the whale-boat. Mouth to mouth resuscitation and closed chest cardiac massage were initiated and continued in Sick Bay aboard the destroyer by Flight Surgeons from the USS ENTERPRISE all to no avail. The PILOT was pronounced dead at 2215.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 2

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. — *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.*

SECTION B - FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OR RELATING TO MISHAP BY PHASE OF MISHAP *(List in order in accordance with Section B of inst.)*

1. FACTORS	2. PHASE OF MISHAP (See code at right) A	E	S	R
NONE				

PHASE CODE:
A - ACCIDENT
E - ESCAPE/EGRESS
S - SURVIVAL
R - RESCUE

FACTOR WEIGHT:
M - MAJOR
C - CONTRIBUTING
Q - QUESTIONABLE OR POSSIBLE

REMARKS

SEE AEROMEDICAL CONCLUSION'S AND RECOMMENDATIONS SECTION FOR DISCUSSION.

SECTION C AIR CREW DATA

1. FLIGHT TIME LAST 30 DAYS *(All models)*	25.2
2. FLIGHT TIME LAST 24 HOURS *(All models)*	4.1
3. NO. FLIGHTS LAST 24 HOURS *(Include present flight)*	2.0
4. TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	1.8
5. TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ALL MODELS	3535.2

FLIGHT TIME	6. TOTAL	7. LAST 30	8. 60 DAYS	9. 90 DAYS
THIS MODEL	357.6	25.2	46.0	79.3

10. NO. GROUNDINGS PAST YEAR	0
11. NO. DAYS GROUNDED PAST YEAR	0

12. DATES AND TYPES OF PRIOR MISHAPS

None.

13. NO. HRS. IN A DUTY STATUS LAST 24 HRS.	12
14. DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF MISHAP	Forward

15. LOCATION AT TIME OF MISHAP

COCKPIT

SECTION D ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (Compare with health record)



AGE	35
HEIGHT	(b) (6) [redacted] IN.
WEIGHT	LB.
A. SITTING HEIGHT	IN.
B. TRUNK HEIGHT	IN.
C. FUNCTIONAL REACH	IN.
D. BUTTOCK - KNEE	IN.
E. LEG LENGTH	IN.
F. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID)	IN.

16. LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS

SPECIMEN		TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	1.			TISSUE: (CNS)		
	2.	N/A		MUSCLE	N/A	
	3.			VISCERA		
URINE				OTHER:		
G.I. CONTENT						

17. X-RAY RESULTS

SEE PAGE # 4

HOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-69	A7-B	154459	PILOT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

SIMONIC, ROBERT J.

OP-09F

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—685073

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 3

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-88 (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.*

SECTION E — INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE 8 PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION
TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL
IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP

TIME	
5 DECEMBER 68	
1018-1229	Flight from NAS Miramar to NAS Lemoore
RON AT LEMOORE - DETAILS UNAVAILABLE	
6 DECEMBER 68	
1300-1400	Brief for flight to ship
1452-1613	NAS Lemoore to CVAN-65
1630-1800	Squadron Activities
1800-1830	Evening Meal
2000-2330	Squadron and Personal Activities

TIME	
7 DECEMBER 68	
0745-0930	Arose
0815-0845	Breakfast
0945-1100	Brief for flight
1128-1345	RESCAP MISSION
1615-1645	Evening Meal
1700-1800	Brief for flight
1856 -	Launch for NIGHT ROCKET FIRING MISSION
ACCIDENT PHASE	
2045	EJECTED
ESCAPE PHASE	
2045	ESCAPE PHASE
SURVIVAL PHASE	
2045-2117	Pilot in water
2117-	Pilot taken aboard whale boat
2122	Pilot put aboard Destroyer
2122-2215	Resuscitory Efforts
2215-	Pilot Pronounced Dead

TIME OF RESCUE 2117

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-69	A7-B	154459	PILOT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: SIMONIC, ROBERT J.

OP-03F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1968—704720

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCI[illegible], INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4

OPNAV FORM 3750-6C (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION F — PATHOLOGICAL DATA (Refer to Section F of instructions.)

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION: A F

2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS: NONE

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: [ ] NO [ ] YES DURATION: UNKNOWN

4. DROWNED: [X]

5. ASPHYXIATED: [ ]

6. SHOCK: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE N/A

7. EXPOSURE: [ ] MILD [X] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: NONE

9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: N/A

10. PLACE OF HOSPITALIZATION: N/A

11. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE REASON: [ ] NO [ ] YES N/A

12. DURATION (See instruction): N/A

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: DROWNING

14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH: N/A

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: [ ] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT [X] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT [ ] MEDICAL OFFICER

16. [ ] PROTOCOL ATTACHED [X] WILL BE FORWARDED

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED P5065" USED? [X] YES [ ] NO

18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON: N/A

19.

	INJURIES	PHASE SUSTAINED A	E	S	R	CAUSE AND MECHANISM (If unknown, theorize)
1.	(b) (6) [redacted]		X			(b) (6) [redacted]
2.			X			
3.			X			
4.			X			

See Aeromedical Conclusions and Recommendations Section and Autopsy Protocol for additional information and discussion.

20. REMARKS

N/A

BOB NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-69	A7-B	154459	PILOT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: SIMONIC, ROBERT J.

OP-510

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—685972

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C[illegible]CIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCID[illegible] — PAGE 4A

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (REV. 3-65)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION F *(Continued)*

SURFACE INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING AND SHADING AFFECTED AREAS ALL LACERATIONS, ABRASIONS, CONTUSIONS, PUNCTURE WOUNDS, SPRAINS AND BURNS

RECORD ALL INJURIES NO MATTER HOW TRIVIAL, WHETHER PATIENT LIVED OR DIED

(b) (6)

[redacted]

DETAILS OF SKULL FRACTURES AND BRAIN INJURY. DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY.

1. ALL FRACTURES, BY TYPE *(Simple, depressed, or indirect, etc.)* 2. SITES OF BRAIN LESIONS, IF ANY. 3. DISLOCATIONS OF MANDIBLE.

N/A



SQR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-69	A7-B	154459	PILOT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

SIMONIC, ROBERT J.

GP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—713296

SECTION F (Continued) SKELETAL INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING
ALL FRACTURES BY TYPE (Simple, compound, comminuted, etc.) AND DISLOCATIONS INDICATING DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY: 1. ALL FRACTURES OF SPINAL COLUMN (Simple, compressed, etc.)
2. DISLOCATION AND DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT. 3. SITES OF CORD DAMAGE, IF ANY.

DETAILS OF SPINAL INJURIES

(b) (6)

[redacted]

HOB NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-69	A7-B	154459	PILOT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

SIMONIC, ROBERT J.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8F (REV. 2-65) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions

SECTION G ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION G OF INSTRUCTION: PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE S-SURVIVAL R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. REQUIRED	4. AVAILABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10½ plain paper if needed.)
"NOMEX" Flight Suit		Y	AESR	AESR	AESR		
Flight Boots-Steel Toed		Y	AESR	AESR	AESR		
Identification Tags		Y	AESR	AESR	AESR		
APH-6A Helmet		Y	AESR	AESR	AESR		
Integrated Torso Harness		Y	AESR	AESR	AESR		
MK-3C Life Preserver		Y	AESR	SR	*	*	MK-3C INFLATED ON LEFT SIDE ONLY. SEE SURVIVAL NARRATIVE FOR DISCUSSION
Escapac IC-2 Ejection Seat		Y	AE	AE	AE		
NB-10 Parachute and Container		Y	AESR	E	E		
RSSK-8 Seat Pan with Scott U-Tube Bailout Bottle, PK-2 Raft and Survival Gear		Y	AESR	AESR			
MK-13 MOD 0 Flares		Y	AESR	SR			
MK-31 MOD 0 Pencil Flares		Y	AESR	SR			
SDU-5/E Strobe Light		Y	AESR	SR	SR		

SECTION H NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE, EGRESS, SURVIVAL, AND RESCUE PHASES:

The PILOT indicated to the ship that his altitude was 3500, just prior to the ejection, and that he could not keep the nose of the aircraft up. The altitude at the time of ejection was presumably nose down, perhaps 30° or more. The PILOT's seat and parachute apparently functioned normally. The PILOT did not remove his oxygen mask, fully activate his MK3-C, or deploy his raft from the seat pan. The MK3-C CO_2 cartridge had been activated on the left, but not on the right. The Velco case in the back of the MK3-C was closed and the bladder inside this portion had not been inflated. There was a 1/8 inch laceration into the left compartment which effectively allowed complete deflation of the compartment. It is not known whether this laceration was sustained on water impact or when the PILOT was taken aboard the whale-boat. The swimmer states that the MK3-C was partially inflated, but that it was providing no effective floatation. The PILOT's helmet was secure on the PILOT's head and the oxygen mask was fastened tightly to the left side of the helmet and loosely to the right side. The swimmer removed the PILOT's mask. The swimmer did not attempt to release the seat pan and inflate the raft as the pack was positioned over the PILOT's back entangled in shroud lines and the swimmer was concerned that raft deployment and inflation would further entangle and compromise the PILOT. The PILOT's strobe light was on from the onset, and was the single essential item in locating the downed PILOT. It is a matter of conjecture whether the PILOT may have turned the strobe light on prior to ejection or whether water impact may have turned it on. It seems doubtful that the PILOT turned the strobe light on in the water before removing his mask or fully activating his MK3-C. The PILOT's Koch fittings were secure and had not been released. Both fittings

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-69	A7-B	154459	PILOT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

SIMONIC, ROBERT J.

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964-712968

SECTION H (Continued)

worked normally when examined. The bailout oxygen bottle read empty when examined, indicating normal function. It is doubtful that the PILOT was alive or salvageable even at the time when the Helo swimmer reached him, which was within 10 minutes of the ejection. The swimmer states that there were masses of shroud lines around the PILOT'S neck, torso, legs, and feet. There was also a portion of parachute canopy wrapped around the PILOT'S right lower leg. Examination of the parachute revealed it to be structurally intact and undamaged except where cut free from the PILOT.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 6

OPNAV FORM 3750-6G (REV. 2-63) — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions* — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION I — DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

[X] WATER [ ] LAND [ ] OTHER

2. TYPE OF EGRESS

[X] EJECTION [ ] BAILOUT [ ] UNDERWATER [ ] NORMAL [ ] OTHER *(State type)*

S	E		REMARKS
		3. NOT ATTEMPTED	
		4. ATTEMPTED	
	X	5. ACCOMPLISHED	
		6. THRU CANOPY	
YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
	X	7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	
	X	8. DURING EGRESS	
X		9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	SEE SURVIVAL NARRATIVE FOR DETAILS

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED: ESCAPAC IC-2

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT: [ ] PRIMARY [ ] SECONDARY [ ] OTHER — UNKNOWN

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION: N/A

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN [ ] FORWARD [ ] AFT [ ] OTHER — UNKNOWN

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT: NOSE DOWN 30° OR MORE

15. AIRSPEED: 250 KNOTS E

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET): ABOVE SEA LEVEL 3500 ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY 3500

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING: UNKNOWN

18. WEIGHT: (b) (6) [redacted]

19. TIME IN WATER: 32 MINUTES

20. TIME IN RAFT: N/A

21. WIND VELOCITY: 090 3 KNOTS

22. WAVE HEIGHT: LESS THAN 1 FOOT

23. WAVE INTERVAL: UNKNOWN

24. AIR TEMPERATURE: 57°F

25. WATER TEMPERATURE: 59°F

26. VISIBILITY: 7 MILES

27. ALERTING FACTORS: PILOT TRANSMITTED EJECTING

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE: RADAR CONTACT FROM SHIP TACAN DISTANCE AND BEARING FROM PILOT.

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR: PILOT'S SDU-5/E STROBE LIGHT

30. N/A

31. N/A

32. N/A

33. N/A

34. N/A

35. N/A

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE? *(If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue)*

[X] NO [ ] YES

SECTION J — TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC 7 NOV 1966 EJECTION TOWER 7 NOV 1966 EJECTION SEAT 7 NOV 1966 SURVIVAL

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? *(If yes, explain)*

[X] NO [ ] YES

BOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-69	A7-B	154459	PILOT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: SIMONIC, Robert J.

OP-09F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—712266

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED-SEE OPNAVINST 3750.6F FOR INSTRUCTIONS

AEROMEDICAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Intensive investigation and analysis of all the factors pertinent to this mishap have found the following areas to be deserving of comment.

1. The pilot was physically qualified and aeronautically adapted for flight. He was well-rested, well-nourished, and under no undue emotional stresses. He was an experienced Naval Aviator both in total time accrued and in time in type aircraft.

2. It is the Flight Surgeon's opinion that the pilot was at the very edge of the safe margin in the ejection seat envelope in this mishap. Preliminary post-mortem data obtained by phone from the examining pathologist (autopsy protocol will be forwarded upon receipt) in conjunction with the injury analysis already described definitely establish that the pilot contacted the water with significantly greater impact than one would receive in a "normal" parachute rate of descent. It is also known, however, that the pilot's impact force was not extreme and cannot by itself be considered fatal in degree. From all available evidence the ejection system functioned normally and the pilot did have a good chute. It is felt that the pilot did obtain chute deployment and billowing, but that he struck the surface of the water before he had time to decelerate to a normal rate of descent. The pilot was probably rendered unconscious by impact and was unable to take any effective measures to promote his own water survival. The fact that the pilot's oxygen mask was in place, the MK-3C not fully activated, and the seat-pan and life-raft not deployed are further indications that the pilot did not have any useful consciousness in the water, nor, indeed, any measureable time during parachute descent.

As in any ejection sequence where the edge of the envelope is reached, any device which adds seconds or milliseconds to the envelope may well be responsible for survival. The addition of an explosive parachute canopy opening device such as is incorporated in the NB-11 type parachute may well have made survival in this mishap possible. It is recommended that continuing manufacture and distribution of the NB-11 parachute be expedited with all due haste.

3. The reason why the pilot was at the edge of his ejection seat envelope is certainly a matter of conjecture. A substantial sink rate and nose-down attitude (possibly far more than 30 degrees) could have made ejection from even 3,500 feet marginal. The possibility of pilot error in reading or reporting altitude prior to ejection exists, but can only be suspected. The possibility that the pilot may have stayed too long with his aircraft in an unsalvageable situation exists. Existence of such tendencies is borne out by the analysis of many other mishaps reported in the literature, where the individual involved is frequently a more experienced senior aviator.

All pilots must carefully examine their own tendencies to stay with a rapidly deteriorating evolution for what might potentially be a fatal "last effort" at recovery.

4. Althouth it is not felt that the pilot activated even the left side of his MK-3C (probable activation on impact) the need for a life preserver with the capability to keep the survivor's head out of the water is readily apparent.

The recently developed LPA-1 life preserver appears to have such desirable characteristics and it is recommended that its distribution be expedited.

5. The MK-3C life preserver worn by the pilot was carefully examined and re-tested in a packed condition. Re-packing and activation of the left toggle again did not cause that portion of the bladder in the posterior Velco case to become inflated. It was, therefore, determined that the minute laceration on the left side of the preserver allowed immediate rapid decompression of the compartment filled by the left CO_2 bottle. The close proximity of the bladder laceration to one of the metallic snaps (used by the wearer to attatch the left and right sides of the preserver in front) makes it most probable that the laceration was caused by the sharp edge of the snap on impact at the same instant that the bladder was expanding following impact activation of the left toggle. Such an occurence gave the pilot no effective floatation whatsoever and contributed to his subsequent drowning.

124A

CZCSLA821
RTTUZYUW RUWJMUA0121 3592304-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 242304Z DEC 68
FM COMNAVAIRPAC
TO RUWMHMA/ATKRON ONE FOUR SIX
INFO RUCILSA/COMNAVSAFECEN
RUWMHVA/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUWMHVA/USS ENTERPRISE
RUWMHMA/COMATKCARAIRWING NINE
ZEN1/COMCARDIV ONE
BT
UNCLAS
VA-146 AAR 2-69A
A. YOUR 232340Z DEC 68
1. AS REQUESTED IN REF (A), FIVE DAY EXTENSION GRANTED FOR SUBJECT AAR REPORT.
BT
#0121

Records

2423046

A7B/154459 VA-146 2-69A 12-7-68

NNNNZCZCNASCB022B500
RTTUZYUW RUWNHMA0055 3582340-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 232340Z DEC 68
FM ATKRON ONE FOUR SIX
TO RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO ZEN/COMATKCARAIRWING NINE
RUWMHVA/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUWNHVA/USS ENTERPRISE
RUWJMUA/COMCARDIV ONE
RUCILSA/NAVSAFECEN
BT
UNCLAS
VA-146 AAR 2-69A
1. REQUEST FIVE DAY EXTENSION FOR SUBMISSION OF SUBJ AAR.
2. EXTENSION REQUESTED TO ALLOW RECEIPT OF DIR FROM NAVAL AEROSPACE FACILITY, EL CENTRO.
BT
0055

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Records

Dec

Simonic

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A7B/154459 VA-146 2-69A 12-7-68

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PTTUZYUW RUWMHMA0070 3561957-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 11195BZ DEC 68
FM ATKRON ONE FOUR SIX
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVSAFECEN
RUEBBNB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
INFO RUWNMDA/COMTWELVE
RUWJHEA/COMELEVEN
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUWMHVA/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUWMHVA/COMCARDIV ONE
ZEN/COMATKCARAIRWING NINE
RUEBBNB/CHNAVMAT
ZEN/ATKRON ONE TWO TWO
RUCLSKA/ATKRON ONE SEVEN FOUR
RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUWJABA/DAS NORTON AFB
RUWTAIB/NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
ZEN/NAS LEMOORE
RUEBJFA/BUPERS
RUEBPDA/DIR AFIP

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Supp AAR

PAGE TWO RUWMHMA0070 UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
RUWMHVA/USS ENTERPRISE
ZEN/NAVHOSP LEMOORE
BT
UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6F
B. ENTERPRISE 080908Z DEC 68
1. 7 DECEMBER 1968, 2045U, NIGHT
2. 31-51N, 118-05W AT SEA
3. A7B, 154459
4. VA-146, C-69A
5. BASED ON INITIAL INVESTIGATION CHANGE THE FOLLOWING PORTIONS OF PARAGRAPHS INDICATED OF REF B. PARA 6, ALTITUDE APPROX 3000 FEET; PARA 14, PROBABLE PC-1 FAILURE FOLLOWED.
BT
0070

8/24/72

NNNNZCZCNASCA985SLA28T
PTTUZYUW RUWMMFM0129 3430908-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 080908Z DEC 68 ZYO RUKSSBB
FM USS ENTERPRISE
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVSAFECEN
RUEBBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
INFO RUWMMDA/COMTWELVE
RUWJHEA/COMELEVEN
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUWMHVA/COMFAIRALAMEDA
ZEN/COMCARDIV ONE
ZEN/COMATKCARAIRWING NINE
RUEBBHB/CHNAVMAT
RUWMHMA/ATKRON ONE TWO TWO
RUWMHMA/ATKRON ONE SEVEN FOUR
RUHNBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUWJABA.DAS NORTON AFB CALIFORNIA
RUWTATA/NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
RUWMHMA/NAS LEMOORE
RUEBJFA/BUPERS
RUEDPDA/DIR AFIP
RUWJMUA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPPAC
BT
UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NAVY PRELIMINARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAV 3750.6F
M 7 DECEMBER 1968, 2045U, NIGHT.
2. 31-51N, 118-05W AT SEA
3. A7B, 154459
4. VA-146, 2-69A
5. ALFA, LOST AT SEA
6. SIMONIC, ROBERT J., LCDR (b) (6) [redacted], USN, 1310, ACTIVE, ALFA. TOTAL PILOT HOURS 3531. TOTAL HOURS IN TYPE 353. TOTAL HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 83. ESCAPAC 1C, ALTITUDE APPROX 2500 FEET, ATTITUDE AFD AIRSPEED UNKNOWN.
7. NA
8. NA
9. NIGHT ROCKET HOP. 1.8 HOURS, VFR, ENTERPRISE.
10. CARRIER CONTROLLED APPROACH
11. WHILE IN MARSHALL PILOT REPORTED PC-2 SYSTEM FAILURE TO CARRIER CONROLLER. DURING SUBSEQUENT CCA APPROACH, AT ABOUT 5 MILES FROM SHIP, PILOT STATED "I CAN'T KEEP IT UP, I'M GETTING OUT". HELO WAS ON THE SCENE IN 10 MINUTES AND PUT CREWMAN IN THE WATER. CREWMAN STATES PILOT BADLY ENTANGLED IN PARACHUTE. CREWMAN WAS UNABLE TO FREE PILOT FROM PARACHUTE. DESTROYER PUT WHALEBOAT IN THE WATER AND PICKED PILOT UP. RESUSCITATION EFFORTS UNSUCCESSFUL. PILOT DECLARED DEAD ABOUT 2215U BY DOCTOR.
12. WIND DIRECTION 277 DEGREES TRUE, 9 KNOTS; SEA STATE CALM, TWO FOOT WELLS; CLOUD COVERAGE EIGHT TENTHS; CEILING 12 HUNDRED THIN BROKEN; TEMPARTURE 57 DEGREES; DEW POINT 54 DEGREES; VISIBILITY SEVEN MILES.
13. NA
14. PC-2 SYSTEM FAILED. POSSIBLE PC-1 FAILURE FOLLOWED.
15. NA
16. NA
17. (b) (6) [redacted] LCDR, ASO, (b) (6) [redacted]
BT

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-ACTION-

A-A-R

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A7B/154459 VA-146-269A 12-7-68 0809082/DEC.

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