NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: REVIEWED: LOGGED: PUNCHED: VERIFIED:

4 MAR 1968

CARD 1

RECORD IDENTIFICATION																																								
Date													Aircraft Model																								Time of Mishap			
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Source	Don't Count	Enemy Action	Mission Modif.		Basic Mission	Design Number			Series Symbol	Model Code		AIRCRAFT BUREAU NUMBER						Reporting Custodian			Type Duty			Major Command	CONDITION	LOCAL TIME			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	7	1	Ø	Ø	8	1	Ø	3	Ø	1	2					F	Ø	Ø	4	B	1	3	1	5	Ø	4	7	4	1	6	5	3	2	1	1	2	Ø	9	4	Ø

											Location										FAC. RWAY DESCRIP.						FAC. SHIP DESCRIP.											
																																LOC'N						
Acdt. Dmg.	Acft. Dmg.	Acdt. Inj.	Acft. Inj.	Hull Number			Kind of Flight			Clearance	NAME CODE							Bearing From		Dist. From	Distance	Area	Runway Heading		Length	WAS DUTY RWY USED?	Ship Type	Ship Course		Ship Speed		Initial Contact	Final Rest		Trans. Code	Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
A	A	L	L				1	A	1	2	B	5	[illegible]	C	U	B	1	1	9	Q															A	Ø	1	Ø

CLOSED

CARD 2

RELATIVE WIND							Alt. of Emergency																														
Direction		Velocity		Density Altitude			Above Terrain			Pressure Altitude			Acft. Gross Weight						Fiscal Year		Fleets and Maws.																
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
										1	7	0	Ø	Ø	4	Ø			6	8	Ø	7															

			PROPERTY DAMAGE COST							Aircraft Injury Summary																				
										TOTAL INJURIES "A" "U" "L"				"A" Injuries				"U" Injuries				"L" Injuries								
			Gov't.			Non Gov't.			Total Occupants This Acft.		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
			Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	2	Ø	1	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	1	Ø	Ø	A	Ø	2	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: H REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 3

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Aircraft Injury Summary (cont'd)																												
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		"B" Injuries				"C" Injuries				"D" Injuries				"E" Injuries				"F" Injuries				"G" Injuries				Total Injuries				No. Occupants All Acft. Involved		
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day							Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy		Navy		Non Navy				
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
6	7	1	Ø	Ø	8	1	Ø	3	Ø	1	Ø	1	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	3	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	3

ESCAPE SYS. DATA																																									
Sys.	Comp-onent	Spec. Data																	Pri Acdt. Type		Pri Phase of Operation			1st Acdt. Type		1st Phase of Operation			2nd Acdt. Type		2nd Phase of Operation			Trans. Code	Card No.					
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80				
B	Ø	Ø	A																D	3	4	4	7	D	3	4	4	7	G	3	4	4	7	A	Ø	3	Ø				

CARD 4

		3rd Acdt. Type		3rd Phase of Operation			Type Operations		Contributing Causes							Pilot Error Causal Fac.						Pilot Factor After Fact.		Other Personnel Causal Factor						Other Pers. Factor After Fact		Inv. Mat. Comp. 1st Causal Factor					
																First		Second		Third				First		Second		Third				Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49		
		B	1	A	2		3		1							H	Ø	H	5	Ø	9																		

Involved Mat. Comp. (cont'd.)												Material Fact. After Fact						Acft. Design Comp. Causal Factor						DESIGN C.F.					
2nd Causal Factor						3rd Causal Factor																							
Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Special Equipment	Pilot Equipment		Trans. Code	Card No.	
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																											A	Ø	4	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 2 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: 4 REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 6

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Weather Causal Factor						Facility Causal Factor	Facility Fact. After Fact	Environ. Factor									Cause + Factor Primary							Cause + Factor 1st Possible						
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number																			Misc							Misc.						
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day																								Wx					Fact	Wx					Fact	
																												Pers					Factor	Pers					Factor	
																												Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
6	7	1	0	0	8	1	0	3	0	1																		1					H	5							

Cause + Factor 2nd Possible							Cause + Factor 3rd Possible							Cause + Factor 4th Possible							Special Attention	Special Data and Conditions												Trans. Code	Card Number		
Misc							Misc							Misc																								
Wx					Fact		Wx					Fact		Wx					Fact																			
Pers					Factor		Pers					Factor		Pers					Factor																			
Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.																			
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																						8	A	B	M	G								A	0	6	0

CARD 8

								3M — Material Special Data																																	
								First				Second				Third				Fourth				Fifth				Maneu. Prior To Occur.	OPERATOR INCAPACITATED C.F.										
								Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code			Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code			Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code			Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code			Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code														
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

																																		Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												0	8	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 3 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [initials] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 11

RECORD IDENTIFICATION

Date: Cal. Yr.		Date: Mo.		Date: Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	1	0	0	8	1	0	3	0	1

Controlling LSO's Carrier Pass Description

	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position
Start	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Middle	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
In-Close	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
Ramp	33	34	35	36	37	38	39

C L C P D (cont'd) — TOUCH-DOWN

Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position
40	41	42	43	44	45	46

Columns 47–76: blank

Trans. Code	Card Number		
77	78	79	80
	1	1	0

CARD 12

Columns 12–49: blank

Columns 50–61: blank

File or Serial Number (Pilot)	Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Trans. Code	Card Number		
62–68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
[redacted]	5	1	6	2	A	1	B	2	A	1	2	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 4 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [signature] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 13

RECORD IDENTIFICATION: Date: Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Pilot Factor Inv.	Service Tour	Instrument Card
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14
6	7	1	0	0	8	1	0	3	0	1	1		2

Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 6 Months		Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 12 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 6 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 12 Months		Time All Models Total		Time All Models Last 3 Months		Time This Model Total		Time This Model Last 3 Months	
15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
						0	2	0	8	0	6	5	2	0	6

Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Number of → Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model	
31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
1	0	1	1	6	8	A	A	5	9	9

Carrier Landings: Total Nite This Model		This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days											
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57
5	6														

File or Serial Number (Co-Pilot)							Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Service Tour	Instr. Card		Trans. Code	Card Number		
58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																			A	1	3	0

CARD 14

Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 6 Months		Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 12 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 6 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 12 Months		Time All Models Total		Time All Models Last 3 Months		Time This Model Total		Time This Model Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33

Number of Carrier Landings: Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model		Total Nite This Model		This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days						
34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

					File or Serial Number (Instr. Plt. in Other A/C)							Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Service Tour	Instr. Card					Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												1	4	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 5 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ✓ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Emerg. Syst. Train.				Instrument Trainer				Time All Models				Time This Model																			
Date																																										
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report		Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Number of Carrier → Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model	Total Nite This Model		
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	7	1	0	0	8	1	0	3	0	1																													

Landings																																										
This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days				This Individual in Acft.		Name (Instr. Plt. in Other Acft.)																				Number of Personnel Records								Trans. Code		Card Number		
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																													0	2						A	1	5	8

CARD 16

P		File or Serial Number (All Persons)		Name		Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Card Code 65	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
P									(b) (6) [redacted]						

28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49																					
									5	1	6	2	A	1	B	2	8	5																								

Equip 1					Equip 2					Equip 3					Equip 4																											
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number																				
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80												
L	5	7	1	M		0	1	3	2	M	2	H	0	1	1	I	B	J	0	1	1	I	B		0	1	A	1	6	8												

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 6 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ✓ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 17

RECORD IDENTIFICATION										
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	1	0	0	8	1	0	3	0	1

Equip 5						Equip 6						Equip 7						Equip 8						Equip 9					
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
K	5	1	1	I	B	J	8	1	1	I	4	R	G	0	0	N	W	N	2					B	0				

Equip 10								Equip 11						Equip 12						Equip 13						Equip 14											
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data		Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number	
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
0	4							5	J					5	1					5	2					D	A						0	1	A	1	7	8

CARD 18

Equip 15						Equip 16						Equip 17						Equip 18						Equip 19						Equip 20						
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
S	H					0	3					0	4					0	9					0	6												

Equip 21						Equip 22						Equip 23						Equip 24											
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data		Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number	
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																									0	1	A	1	8	8

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 7 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 21

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 45						Equip 46						Equip 47						Equip 48										
Date																																							
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report		Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Card Code 46		ACFT DESCRIPT	MISHAP DESCRIPTION	Topogat Mishap
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	7	1	Ø	Ø	8	1	Ø	3	Ø	1																									6	6	A	A	I

Type of Egress	Eject. Info.	Egress Problems: Prior			During			Subsequent			Type/Mod. Eject. Seat		Firing Method Seq. Eject.	Seat Position	Altitude/Manev. A/C at Exit	Altitude When Ejected	Airspeed		Weight		Alt. Chute Open	In Crash Area	Time in Water		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
		Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob																			
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
A	T											H			D	E		D		D	E	D	U	2	4	Ø	2	2	Ø			2	5	Ø	1	A	2	1	8

CARD 22

Time in Rath	Vertebral Fractures				Eject. Fatal Causes: Pri.	Sec.	Injury	Combat Zone										Card Code 67		Wind Velocity in Knots		Wave Height	Wave Interval in Seconds	Visibility	Air Temperature		Water Temperature		Alerting Factors: 1st Factor	2nd Factor	3rd Factor	Located Site	Survivor Left Site	Means of Locating			
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
								B										6	7	1	Ø	1	3	3	8	4	8	2	E	B		H		A	D		

Survival Factors		Fatals Time Lapse From: Mishap to Site Locat.	Site Locate to Victim	Mishap to Death	Time Lapse Last Training: Low Press. Chamber	Eject. Tower	Eject. Seat	Survival	Training Factors																					Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
					H	H	H	H	B																Ø	1	A	2	2	8

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 8 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 23

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											CARD CODE 68		Time of Day				Rescue Vehicle		Rescue Vehicles				No. Personnel To Rescue	No. Personnel Rescued	Rescue Vehicles Back-Up		Actual Water Temperature		Actual Air Temperature		Sea Cond.		Gen. Wx. Cond.	Wind Velocity (Knots)		Rescue Equip. Used			
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number				Mishap	Rescue Report	Rescue Locate	ACC/ABAN	Location	Duty	Model/Type	Model/Type	Model/Type	Model/Type			Model/Type	Model/Type					Wave Height	Wave Interval							
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day																																			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	7	1	0	0	8	1	0	3	0	1	6	8	1	1	1	1	C	B	7	8	0	Z	1	1	D	A	8	2	8	4	C	C	C	0	8	P			

RESCUE TEAM TRAIN'G		COMM EQUIP'T TECH		RETRIEV EQUIP/ TECH		RESCUE TEAM WORK F.		Rescue Site Topography	Res. Vehic. Dist. to Scene	Time Lapse Mishap To Alert		Alert Prob		Methods of Alert			Time Lapse Alert to Depart.	Departure Delays																Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
						A		E	F	0	5			E	H		B																	0	1	A	2	3	0

CARD 24

CARD CODE 69		Time Lapse Alert to Locate		Prob. Enroute		Vehicle Failed To Reach Scene	Failure Reason	Time Lapse Locate to Reach		Locator Means				Prob. Locating		Survivors Signalling Problems			Rescue Problems								Rescue Problems										
				Prob	Prob					Primary									Vehicle	Individual	Problems						Vehicle	Individual	Problems								
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
6	9	4	5					1	0	1	4							X	0	Z	A	W					7	8	F								

Rescue Problems								Rescue Problems								Rescue Close Out									Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
Vehicle	Individual	Problems						Vehicle	Individual	Problems						Vehicle	Individual	Close Out Code												
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																7	8	B							0	1	A	2	4	0

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 9 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ✓ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 25

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Survivor's																														
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Problems				Condit.		Time Lapse Reach to Rescue		Time Lapse Mishap to Rescue Completion		Rescue Recommend		CARD CODE 73		Weight			Height		Age		Sitting Height Nearest 1/4 Inch			Trunk Height Nearest 1/4 Inch			Functional Reach Nearest 1/4 Inch		
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day											During	After																										
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	7	1	0	0	8	1	0	3	0	1	E	M	U		B	B	0	8	7	8			7	3	1	5	2	6	9	2	3	3	6	3	2	5	3			

Buttock Knee Nearest 1/4 Inch			Leg Length Nearest 1/4 Inch					Bideltoid Nearest 1/4 Inch			CARD CODE 74		Role of Indiv. in Cause	Supervisory Factors: Inadequate Briefing	ORD/LEFT ON FLT SET CAP	Poor Crew Coordination	Other	Pre-Flight Factors: Faulty Flight Plan	Faulty A/C Pre-Flight	Faulty Prep. Pers. Equip.	Hurried Departure	Delayed Departure	Inadequate Wx. Analysis	Other	Experience Trng. Factors: Inadequate Transition	LIMITED TOTAL EXPERIENCE	LIMIT RECENT EXPERIENCE	FAIL TO USE ACCEPT PROC.	Other					Person Sequence Number		Trans. Codes			Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
8	3	1	4	3	8			1	8		7	4																					0	1	A	2	5	8

CARD 27

Design Factors: Design of Inst/Controls	Location of Inst/Controls	Failure of Inst/Controls	COCKPIT LIGHTING Runway	Lighting	Lighting Other A/C	PERSONAL EQU INTERFERENCE	WORK SPACE INCOMPAT. W/MAN	Other	Communication Problems: MISINTERPRET COMM	DISRUPTED COMM.	Language Barrier	Noise Interference	Other	Environmental Factors: ACCELERATION FOR IN FLIGHT	DECOMPRESS ION	Vibration	Glare	Smoke Fumes	Heat	Cold	Wind Blast	VISIBILITY RESTRICTIONS: Wx Haze Dark	Icing Window Fog	DUST WIND SMOKE	WX OTHER THAN VISIBILITY	Other	CARD CODE 75		Psycho Physiological Factors: Food Poisoning	Motion Sickness	Other Acute Illness	OTH PHY EXIST DISEASE/DEFECT	Get "Homeitis"	Hangover	Sleep Deprivation FATIGUE, OTHER Missed Meals		
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
																											7	5										

Psycho Physiological Factors (cont'd): DRUGS PRESCR MEDICAL DR.	Drugs, Other	Alcohol	Visual illusions	HALLUCINATIONS	UNCONSCIOUS NESS	DISORIENTAT ION VERTIGO	Hypoxia	Hyper-Ventilation	Dysbarism	CO Poisoning	Boredom	Inattention	Channelized Attention	Distraction	PREOCCUPATIN PERS. PROB.	EXCESSIVE MOT ATION TO SKC	Over Confidence	Lack of Self-Confidence	LACK OF CONF ENCE IN EQUIP	Apprehension	Panic	Other				Person Sequence Number		Trans. Codes		Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												2	7	8

PERSONNEL 1 OF 8

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 14 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: H REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED ____

CARD 29

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Other Factors To Be Considered																CARD CODE 77		Disposition	Body Position	Direction Facing	Physical Defects Post Crash Exam.								
Date					Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number			HABIT INTERFE	WRONG CONT. CORPUS OF CONTR. OTHER	Misread Instruments	MISINTERPRET INSTRUMENTS	MISLED BY PAUL INSTRUM.	VIS. REST. BY EQUIP. STRUCT.	Task Over-Saturation	Inadequate Good/Timing	Misjudged Speed/Dist.	WRONG COURS OF ACTION	DELAY TAKING NEC ACTION	VIOLATION OF PLT. DISCIP	Navigational Error	Inadvertant Operation	Other						VISUAL ACUITY OR NONE	Hearing	Cardio-Vascular	NEUROMUSCUL SKELETAL	Gastro-Intestinal	Respiratory	Urogenital	Other Abnormal	REASON FOR GROUNDING
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	7	1	0	0	8	1	0	3	0	1										P						7	7	3	1	1	0								1

Estimated Duration of Grounding	Pri. Cause of Death Diagnosis Number	Autopsy			Lab Toxicological Test On								ULTRA-VIOL OR OTH SPECIAL INVESTIG	CARD CODE 78		Unconsciousness	Internal Injury				Cerebral Concussion	Facial Injuries	Intra Oral Injuries	Eye Injuries							Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
		Preformed	Protocol	Conducted By	Blood or None	Urine	GI Contents	CNS Contents	Muscle Tissue	Visceral Tissue	Other						Head, Neck or Nose	Thorax	Abdomen	Other																		
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
5	6															8	7	8	2	0				0	1	0	0							0	1	A	2	9	8

CARD 30

Fractures																				Dis-Locations																							
Group A									Group B									Group A										Group B														
Cranial or Nose	Facial	Cervical	Thoracic	Lumbar	Sacral	Coccygeal	Shoulder Girdle	Rib	Pelvis or Nose	Upper Arm	Lower Arm	Hand Incl. Fingers	Upper Leg	Lower Leg	Foot Incl. Toes	Other Fractures	Jaw or Nose	Cervical Vertebral	Thoracic Vertebral	Lumbar Vertebral	Sacral Vertebral	Coccygeal Vertebral	Shoulder Girdle	Ribs	Pelvis	Shoulder or Nose	Elbow	Wrist	Hand Fingers	Hip	Knee	Ankle	Foot Toes	Other Dislocations	CARD CODE 79							
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49					
0									0								0										3				10				7	9						

Amputations/ Avulsions					Soft Tissue Injuries																																		
						Group A												Group B																					
HEAD, NECK OR NONE	Trunk	Upper Extrem.	Lower Extrem.	Other	LACERATIONS OR NONE	C.S.S. Head	Abrasions Head	LACERAT NECK	C.S.S. Neck	Abrasions Neck	LACERAT THORAX	C.S.S. Thorax	ABRASIONS THORAX	LACERATIONS ABDOM/NONE	C.S.S. Abdomen	Abrasions Abdomen	LACERAT UP EXTR.	C.S.S. UP EXTREME	ABRASIONS UP EXTR.	LACERAT LOW EXTR.	C.S.S. LOW EXTREME	ABRASIONS LOW EXTR.	Other S.T. Injuries	Asphyxiation Suspected	Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80									
0					0																8			0	0	1	A	3	8	8									

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 11 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 31

RECORD IDENTIFICATION																																							
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Asphyxiation Established	Shock Reported	Exposure	Burns/Frostbite	Control Characters																								
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day																																			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	7	1	Ø	Ø	8	1	Ø	3	Ø	1				Ø																									

																																		Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																																		Ø	1	A	3	1	[illegible]

(THIS SPACE BLANK)

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 12 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: *[initials]* REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION – Date: Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	1	Ø	Ø	8	1	Ø	3	Ø	1

Emerg. Syst. Train.: Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Instrument Trainer: Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Time All Models: Total		Last 3 Months		Time This Model: Total		Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Number of Carrier: Total		Day		Nite		Total Day This Model		Total Nite This Model	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40					

Landings: This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days				This Individual in Acft.			Name (Instr. Plt. in Other Acft.)																				Number of Personnel Records							Trans. Code	Card Number		
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																																					1	5	6

CARD 16

P								File or Serial Number (All Persons)							Name										Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Card Code 65				
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
P								[redacted]							A	R	M	S	T	R	O	N	G		5	1			4	2	L	2	6	5			

Equip 1: Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Equip 2: Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Equip 3: Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data		Equip 4: Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed Special Data			Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
H	Ø					J	1					K	5					J	8						Ø	2	A	1	6	Ø

PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 13 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: 4 REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 17

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 5						Equip 6						Equip 7						Equip 8						Equip 9					
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day																																				
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	7	1	Ø	Ø	8	1	Ø	3	Ø	1	D	C					N	3					B	Ø					Q	4					Q	1				

Equip 10								Equip 11						Equip 12						Equip 13						Equip 14										
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data		Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
S	2																																Ø	2	A	1	7	1

CARD 18

Equip 15						Equip 16						Equip 17						Equip 18						Equip 19						Equip 20						
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

Equip 21						Equip 22						Equip 23						Equip 24										
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number	
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												1	8	1

PERSONNEL 3 OF 3

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 14 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: H REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 21

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 45						Equip 46						Equip 47						Equip 48										
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Card Code 66		ACFT DESCRIPT	MISHAP DESCRIPTOR	Topsgat Mishap
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day																																			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	7	1	Ø	Ø	8	1	Ø	3	Ø	1																									6	6	A	A	I

Type of Egress	Eject. Info.	Egress Problems: Prior Prob	Prior Prob	Prior Prob	During Prob	During Prob	During Prob	Subsequent Prob	Subsequent Prob	Subsequent Prob	Type/Mod. Eject. Seat		Firing Method Seq. Eject.	Seat Position	Attitude/Maneu. A/C at Exit	Attitude When Ejected	Airspeed		Weight		Alt. Chute Open	In Crash Area	Time In Water		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
A	R																	D				D	U	2	4	Ø								Ø	2	A	2	1	6

CARD 22

Time in Raft		Vertebral Fractures				Eject. Fatal Causes: Pri.	Sec.	Injury	Combat Zone									Card Code 67		Wind Velocity in Knots		Wave Height	Wave Interval in Seconds	Visibility	Air Temperature		Water Temperature		Alerting Factors: 1st Factor	2nd Factor	3rd Factor	Located Site	Survivor Left Site	Means of Locating			
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
						H		L										6	7	1	Ø	2	3	3	8	4	8	2	E	B		H		C			

Survival Factors		Fatals Time Lapse From: Mishap to Site Locat.	Site Locate to Victim	Mishap to Death	Time Lapse Last Training: Low Press. Chamber	Eject. Tower	Eject. Seat	Survival	Training Factors																		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
					C	I	I	I	B																Ø	2	A	2	2	6

PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 15 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: H REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 25

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Survivor's Problems				Survivor's Condit.																						
Date: Cal. Yr.	Date: Mo.	Date: Day	Type Report	Log Line Number			Aircraft Number								During	After	Time Lapse Reach to Rescue		Time Lapse Mishap to Rescue Completion		Rescue Recommend		CARD CODE 73		Weight			Height		Age		Sitting Height Nearest 1/4 Inch		Trunk Height Nearest 1/4 Inch			Functional Reach Nearest 1/4 Inch		
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	7	1	Ø	Ø	8	1	Ø	3	Ø	1													7	3																

Buttock Knee Nearest 1/4 Inch			Leg Length Nearest 1/4 Inch					Bideltoid Nearest 1/4 Inch			CARD CODE 74		Role of Indiv. in Cause	Supervisory Factors: Inadequate Briefing	Supervisory Factors: ORD/LEFT ON PLT BEF CAP	Supervisory Factors: Poor Crew Coordination	Supervisory Factors: Other	Pre-Flight Factors: Faulty Flight Plan	Pre-Flight Factors: Faulty A/C Pre-Flight	Pre-Flight Factors: Faulty Prep. Pers. Equip.	Pre-Flight Factors: Hurried Departure	Pre-Flight Factors: Delayed Departure	Pre-Flight Factors: Inadequate Wx. Analysis	Pre-Flight Factors: Other	Experience Trng. Factors: Inadequate Transition	Experience Trng. Factors: LIMITED TOTAL EXPERIENCE	Experience Trng. Factors: LIMIT RECENT EXPERIENCE	Experience Trng. Factors: FAIL TO USE ACCEPT PROC.	Experience Trng. Factors: Other				Person Sequence Number		Trans. Codes	Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
											7	4																					Ø	2	A	2	5	1

CARD 27

Design Factors: Design of Inst/Controls	Design Factors: Location of Inst/Controls	Design Factors: Failure of Inst/Controls	Design Factors: COCKPIT LIGHTING	Design Factors: Runway Lighting	Design Factors: Lighting Other A/C	Design Factors: PERSONAL EQU INTERFERENCE	Design Factors: WORK SPACE INCOMPAT. W/MAN	Design Factors: Other	Communication Problems: MISINTERPRET COMM	Communication Problems: DISRUPTED COMM	Communication Problems: Language Barrier	Communication Problems: Noise Interference	Communication Problems: Other	Environmental Factors: ACCELERATION FOR IN FLIGHT	Environmental Factors: DECOMPRESS ION	Environmental Factors: Vibration	Environmental Factors: Glare	Environmental Factors: Smoke Fumes	Environmental Factors: Heat	Environmental Factors: Cold	Environmental Factors: Wind Blast	Visibility Restrictions: Wx Haze Dark	Visibility Restrictions: Icing Window Fog	Visibility Restrictions: DUSTWIND SMOKE	Visibility Restrictions: WX OTHER THAN VISIBILY	Visibility Restrictions: Other	CARD CODE 75		Psycho Physiological Factors: Food Poisoning	Psycho Physiological Factors: Motion Sickness	Psycho Physiological Factors: Other Acute Illness	Psycho Physiological Factors: OTH PHE EXIST DISEASE/DEFECT	Psycho Physiological Factors: Get "Homesick"	Psycho Physiological Factors: Hangover	Psycho Physiological Factors: Sleep Deprivation	Psycho Physiological Factors: FATIGUE, OTHER	Psycho Physiological Factors: Missed Meals
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
																											7	5									

Psycho Physiological Factors (cont'd): DRUGS PRESCR MEDICAL DR.	Drugs, Other	Alcohol	Visual Illusions	HALLUCATIONS	UNCONSCIOUS NESS	DISORIENTAT ION VERTIGO	Hypoxia	Hyper-Ventilation	Dysbarism	CO Poisoning	Boredom	Inattention	Channelized Attention	Distraction	PREOCCUPATIN PERS. PROB.	EXCESSIVE MOT ATION TO SUC	Over Confidence	Lack of Self-Confidence	LACK OF CONF ENCE IN EQUIP	Apprehension	Panic	Other			Person Sequence Number		Trans. Codes	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												2	7	1

PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 16 OF 17

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED ____

CARD 29

RECORD IDENTIFICATION: Date: Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	1	0	0	8	1	0	3	0	1

Other Factors To Be Considered: HABIT INTERFE WRONG CONT.	CONFUS OF CONTR. OTHER	Misread Instruments	MISINTERPRET INSTRUMENTS	MISLED BY FAUL INSTRUM.	VIS. REST. BY EQUIP. STRUCT.	Task Over-Saturation	Inadequate Good/Timing	Misjudged Speed/Dist.	WRONG COURS OF ACTION	DELAY TAKING NEC ACTION	VIOLATION OF FLT. DISCIP	Navigational Error	Inadvertent Operation	Other	CARD CODE 77		Disposition	Body Position	Direction Facing	Physical Defects Post Crash Exam.: VISUAL ACUITY OR NONE	Hearing	Cardio-Vascular	NEUROMUSCUL SKELETAL	Gastro-Intestinal	Respiratory	Urogenital	Other Abnormal	REASON FOR GROUNDING
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
															7	7	5	1	1	0								

Estimated Duration of Grounding		Pri. Cause of Death Diagnosis Number				Autopsy: Preformed	Protocol	Conducted By	Lab Toxicological Test On: Blood or None	Urine	GI Contents	CNS Contents	Muscle Tissue	Visceral Tissue	Other	ULTRA-VIOL OR OTH SPECIAL INVESTIG	CARD CODE 78		Unconsciousness	Internal Injury: Head, Neck or None	Thorax	Abdomen	Other	Cerebral Concussion	Facial Injuries	Intra Oral Injuries	Eye Injuries						Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
		8	6	0	1												7	8																0	3	A	2	9	[illegible]

CARD 30

Fractures, Group A: Cranial or None	Facial	Cervical	Thoracic	Lumbar	Sacral	Coccygeal	Shoulder Girdle	Rib	Fractures, Group B: Pelvis or None	Upper Arm	Lower Arm	Hand Incl. Fingers	Upper Leg	Lower Leg	Foot Incl. Toes	Other Fractures
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28

Dis-Locations, Group A: Jaw or None	Cervical Vertebrel	Thoracic Vertebrel	Lumbar Vertebrel	Saccral Vertebrel	Coccygeal Vertebrel	Shoulder Girdle	Ribs	Pelvis	Dis-Locations, Group B: Shoulder or None	Elbow	Wrist	Hand Fingers	Hip	Knee	Ankle	Foot Toes	Other Dislocations	CARD CODE 79		
29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
																		7	[illegible]	

Amputations/Avulsions: HEAD, NECK OR NONE	Trunk	Upper Extrem.	Lower Extrem.	Other	Soft Tissue Injuries, Group A: LACERATIONS OR NONE	C.S.S. Head	Abrasions Head	LACERAT NECK	C.S.S. Neck	Abrasions Neck	LACERAT THORAX	C.S.S. Thorax	ABRASIONS THORAX	Soft Tissue Injuries, Group B: LACERATIONS ABDOM/NONE	C.S.S. Abdomen	Abrasions Abdomen	LACERAT UP EXTR	C.S.S. UP EXTREME	ABRASIONS UP EXTR	LACERAT LOW EXTR	C.S.S. LOW EXTREME	ABRASIONS LOW EXTR	Other S.T. Injuries	Asphyxiation Suspected	Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												3	[illegible]	[illegible]

PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 17 OF 17

I. D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 Typ Brief	13 Narr	14 File	15 I. D.	69 Cl.	70 71 72 73 Orig. Use	75 76 Tot-Cds	77 78 Trans. Code
	6	7	1 0	0 8	1 0	3	1	N	N	N	1	1 1	A

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf.

TYPE BRIEFS CODES
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. CODED _____ REVIEWED _____ KEY PUNCHED _____ VERIFIED _____

CARD NO.	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
01	DURING COMBAT MANEUVER TACTICS PILOT LOWERED FLAPS F
02	O 5. ACFT GOT INTO STALL, AOA 30 UNITS. PILOT PUSHED
03	OVER, WING DROPPED TO APPROX 160 DEG ANGLE OF BANK, P
04	ILOT THEN DEPLOYED DRAG CHUTE WHICH STREAMED. ALT 17M
05	FT AT START OF STALL. PASSING 7M FT FLT LEADER CALLE
06	D FOR CREW TO EJECT. RIO EJEC 7M FT, PILOT AT 6M FT.
07	RIO SEEN STRUGGLING IN WATER AND WENT DOWN BEFORE RES
08	CUED. PILOT PICKED UP BY FISHING BOAT. PILOT ERROR-FA
09	ILED TO PICK UP FLAPS AS PART OF STALL RECOVERY AND P
10	REMATURE DEPLOYMENT OF DRAG CHUTE. SUSPECT RIO FAILED
11	△TO INFLATE MK-3C- RIO FIRST FLT IN F-4.
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	

VN.

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: RECORDS DEPT.

DATE 10-1-68

TO: (1) CODING SECT N.W.P.
(2) REC. CONT. BRANCH
(3) ADPE DIV 4 OCT 1968
(4) REC. CONT. BRANCH

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq. No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen. Data Sect. of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq. No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq. No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.										
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYPE REPT	LOG NUMBER		AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	1	Ø	Ø	8	1	Ø	3	Ø	1

(b) (6) [redacted]

F4-B

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL. OF FLD. START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS				PERSON SEQ. NUMBER		FIELD LENGTH		DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)										TAPE REC DIV. NO.	TRANS. CODE
				12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29		
1	EQUIPMENT 3	16	67	Ø	9	2	8	Ø	1	Ø	1	Δ											
				30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47		
2																							
				48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	77
3																						Ø	1	M

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV. may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6) [redacted]

ORIGINATORS SIGNATURE

I. D. Number	Yr. (1 2)	Mo. (3 4)	Day (5 6)	Typ (7)	Log (8 9)	Typ Brief (10)	Narr (13)	File (14)	I. D. (15)	CL (69)	Orig. Use (70 71 72 73)	Tot-Cds (75 76)	Trans. Code (77 78)
	6	7	1	0	8	3	N	N	N	1	E	12	A

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf.

TYPE BRIEFS
CODES
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. 11 12 CODED _____ REVIEWED _____ KEY PUNCHED _____ VERIFIED _____

01	NFO BORROWED FLT GEAR & RECVD A CHECKOUT IN ITS USG.
02	THIS WAS HIS FIRST FLT IN AN F4. HE EJEC AT 7M AND WA
03	S OBS IN HIS CHUTE AND ALSO IN THE WATER. HE APPARENT
04	LY BECAME TANGLED IN SHROUD LINES & WAS LOST AT SEA.
05	HIS PK2 RAFT WAS NOT SIGHTED. PLT EJEC AT 6M FT BY PU
06	LLING CURTAIN WITH LEFT HAND. REQD 2 PULLS BEFORE SEA
07	T FIRED. LEFT ARM & LEG INJ DUE TO FLAILING. HELMET &
08	MASK BOTH LOST WHEN SUBJECTED TO WINDBLAST. HE & RAF
09	T GOT TANGLED IN SHROUD LINES BUT WAS ABLE TO DISENTA
10	NGLE WITH USE OF RT HAND. HE FLOATED IN MK-3C & HELD
11	ON TO RAFT WITH RT ARM. PICKED UP BY OUTRIGGER CANOE
12	& LATER PICKED UP BY HU-16 FROM CANOE.
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	

11 12 CARD NO.

R&DP-1 (Rev. 10-67)

Dispatch Code Sheets

Acft Accidents Only

Coded [illegible] Date 11-[illegible]

Logged [illegible] Date 11-[illegible]

Punched [illegible] Date 7 NOV 1967

Card No. 010	Codes	Card Columns
RECORD INDENT (Common all cards)	6 7 1 0 0 8 1 0 3 0 1	01-11
SOURCE	5	12
DON'T COUNT		13
ENEMY ACTION		14
AIRCRAFT MODEL	F 0 0 4 B	15-21
MODEL CODE	1 3	22-23
AIRCRAFT BUNO.	1 5 0 4 7 4	24-29
REPORTING CUSTODIAN	1 6 5	30-32
TYPE DUTY	3 2 1	33-35
MAJOR COMMAND	1	36
TIME OF DAY	2 0 9 4 8	37-41
ACCIDENT DAMAGE	A	42
AIRCRAFT DAMAGE	A	43
ACCIDENT INJURY	L	44
AIRCRAFT INJURY	L	45
HULL NO.	A 4 3	46-48
KIND OF FLIGHT	1 A 1	49-51
LOCATION (Name code)	B 5 P L P N S	53-59
TRANSACTION CODE	A	77
CARD NO.	0 1 0	78-80

Codes
No environmental
Code R a S
use this
location
see Mr. B
a Evelyn

Card No. 020

FLEET & MARINE AIR WINGS		33-34
TOTAL "A-U-L" NAVY INJURIES	0 1	61-63
TOTAL "A-U-L" NON-NAVY INJURIES		65-66
TRANSACTION CODE	A	77
CARD NO.	0 2 0	78-80

Card No. 030	Codes	Card Columns
PRIMARY ACCIDENT TYPE	D C	62-63
PRIMARY PHASE OF OPERATIONS	4 4 1	64-66
TRANSACTION CODE	A	77
CARD NO.	0 3 0	78-80

Card No. 040		
TYPE OPERATIONS	3	19-20
CONTRIBUTING CAUSES	1	21-22
TRANSACTION CODE	A	77
CARD NO.	0 4 0	78-80

Card No. 060		
PRIMARY CAUSE	1	29
SPECIAL DATA & CONDITIONS	8 A M	65-69
TRANSACTION CODE	A	77
CARD NO.	0 6 0	78-80

Card No. 150		
NO. OF PERSONNEL RECORDS	0 1	70-71
TRANSACTION CODE	A	77
CARD NO.	1 5 0	78-80

Card No. 160		
P.	P	12
PILOT'S NAME	(b) (6) [redacted]	27-36
STATUS	A	41
TRANSACTION CODE	A	77
CARD NO.	1 6 0	78-80

R&DP-26(3/68)

AAR ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSE-OUT FORM

March 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: VF-161 (Activity) AAR 2-68 (Number) concerning F4B (ACFT Model)

BUNO 150474 occurring 10-8-67 (Date) pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

Ref: (a) Code 50 MEMO of 20 Mar 1968

1. In accordance with reference (a), a close-out letter will not be prepared on subject AAR.

Respectfully,

(b) (6) [redacted]

Head, Records Division

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE OUT" LETTER ON ORIGINAL REVIEW

NOTE: 1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DEPT: None

[illegible] 201
INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPT: Primary cause is pilot error in technique in that he allowed is airplane to enter a stall condition through improper use of flaps. Also he failed to use proper procedures for recovery from post stall gyrations. [illegible]/32

INITIAL/CODE

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to Correction to		Action Required	Complete Code/Date
3750-1			/
DIR			/
Misc. Items for Action or Correction			
To Code	From Code/Date	11-7-67 Casualty report in Conf. file. No other msg. available.	

CLOSED

29 MAR 1968

UNIT VF-161

MODEL F4B

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

BUNO 150474

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT.	INTER DEPT. ROUTING CODE/INIT.
	M&M		3 4	O	/ / / /
	AERO MED	3-5-68			WP / / / /

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS, FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS:

REMARKS:

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NASC _____ (15 calendar days)

EXTENSIONS _____

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT. DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT.	INTER DEPT. ROUTING
A&R					/ / /

NASC ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI	DEPT.	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT.
1	R&S			
2	M&M			
3	ADMIN			

ROUTING AFTER CLOSE OUT

DEPT.	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER DEPT. ROUTING
AEROMED				/ / /

NOTES: 1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder.

2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch.

3. Any Department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

3750
80/ 1294

20 FEB 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-161 AAR ser 2-68A concerning F4B BuNo 150474 accident occurring 8 October 1967, pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VF-161 AAR ser 2-68A

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements.

2. It is noted that none of the endorsements show complete copy to distribution. By copy of this endorsement, all previous endorsers are requested to ensure that all holders of advance copies of the report are mailed a copy of their endorsement.

3. The failure of the PK-2 pararaft inflation valve to remain open, which resulted in a partially inflated pararaft, will be corrected by Air Crew Systems Change 74 Revision A. This change incorporates a new Bendix valve which will preclude partial inflation. This valve has only recently become available.

(b) (6) [redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMCARDIV 3
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
COMFAIRWESTPAC
CO FITRON ONE SIX ONE
CO USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43)
OIC VAW-111 DET 34

ORIGINAL

FB3/CVA/31:jid
3000
Ser 54
7 February 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAV INST 3750.6 SERIES

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-161 Accident Serial 2-68A, concerning F4B BUNO 150474, of 8 OCT 67, Pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Commander Carrier Division THREE
To: Commander Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the board as modified by subsequent endorsements.

2. This correspondence was delayed because of an administrative oversight.

M. G. O'Neill
M. G. O'NEILL
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
CO, USS CORAL SEA
COMATKCARAIRWING FIFTEEN
OIC, VAW ONE ONE ONE
CO, FITRON ONE SIX ONE

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

CVA43:04
3750
Ser 5156
18 DEC 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAV INST 3750.6 SERIES

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-161, Accident Serial 2-68A, concerning F4B, BUNO 150474, of 8 OCT 1967, pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Commanding Officer, USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43)
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in and re-emphasizing the importance of the recommendation of paragraph 2 of the third endorsement that air combat maneuvering training be undertaken only by fully qualified air crews.

2. The November 1967 issue of "CROSSFEED" describes a flat spin from which an F4 pilot was unable to recover. Both the drag chute and the spin chute streamed without effect in the spinning F4's wake. The spin accident reported in the AAR by VF-161 cannot be identified as a flat spin; however, it is noted that LEJG (b) (6) [redacted] found himself in a spin without having received any aerodynamic "warnings." The discussion of F4 spins in the above mentioned "CROSSFEED" and the accident reported herein both indicate a need for more information on spin characteristics of the F4B aircraft. It is understood that a NATOPS change is forthcoming which will discuss spins to a far better degree. It is recommended that this change be expedited.

3. COMNAVAIRPAC is herewith added as a via addressee.

W. H. Shawcross
W. H. SHAWCROSS

Copy to:
OIC, VAW 111
COMATKCARAIRWING FIFTEEN
COMTASKFORCE SEVEN SEVEN
COMSEVENTHFLT
CO FITRON 161

ORIGINAL

ATTACK CARRIER AIR WING FIFTEEN
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 96601

IN REPLY REFER TO:
FF12/CVW15
3750/TFB:ws
Ser: 459
25 November 1967

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDNACE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VF-161, Accident Serial 2-68A, concerning F-4B, BuNo 150474, of 8 OCT 1967, pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Commander Attack Carrier Air Wing FIFTEEN
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43)
(2) Commander Carrier Division THREE

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the findings of the Board as modified by the First Endorser.

2. It is further recommended that Tactical Flights in high performance aircraft be undertaken by experienced aircrews only. While not causal to this accident, it is prudent and highly advisable to utilize fully qualified aircrewman during all air combat maneuvering training flights.

3. It is not possible to reconstruct the facts surrounding the death of LTJG ARMSTRONG, (b) (5) [redacted] (b) (5) [redacted] (b) (5) [redacted]

4. In accordance with direction from higher authority cancel as via and add as copy to addressees Commander Task Force SEVEN SEVEN and Commander SEVENTH Fleet.

J. B. Linder
J. B. LINDER

Copy to:
CTF 77
COMSEVENTHFLT
CO, FITRON 161

ORIGINAL

20 NOV 1967

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VF-161 AAR Serial 2-68A, 8 OCT 1967, F4B, BUNO 150474, Pilot: (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Officer in Charge, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE HUNDRED ELEVEN, Detachment THIRTY-FOUR
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander, Attack Carrier Air Wing FIFTEEN
(2) Commanding Officer, USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43)
(3) Commander, Carrier Division THREE
(4) Commander, Task Force SEVEN SEVEN
(5) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

(b) (6) [redacted]

ORIGINAL

0 0

00
3750
28 October 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VF-161 AAR Serial 2-68A, 8 OCT 67, F4D, BUNO 150474,
Pilot: (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron ONE SIX ONE
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Officer in Charge, Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE ONE ONE
(2) Commander, Attack Carrier Air Wing FIFTEEN
(3) Commanding Officer, USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43)
(4) Commander, Carrier Division THREE
(5) Commander, Task Force SEVEN SEVEN
(6) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident; forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

2. Concur with recommendation number one. The use of one-half flaps in the air combat maneuvering (ACM) environment is an advanced technique. The tactical feasibility of flaps in the F4 is advantageous in few encounters. The squadron airplanes were received after completion of ACM training and just prior to deployment. They had just completed modification in the Heavy Weight/Shoehorn program. The Heavy Weight modification includes ailerons that deflect 16½ degrees down when one-half or full flaps are selected. The ailerons continue to function as originally designed even though drooped. Those airplanes with drooped ailerons fly slower but also stall more abruptly at the slower speeds. As we gain experience with the drooped aileron F4 we realize that particular attention must be given to the handling of this airplane in the approach to the stall. Once smooth airflow over the wing and tail is lost the stall is deeper and apparently takes longer to recover from than with the unmodified F4. Also, altitude loss is greater in the recovery. Early deployment of the drag chute could inhibit the airplane's acceleration. If early initiation of the spin recovery controls is added to the above, the stall may become a progressive stall or develop into a spin.

3. Concur with recommendation number two that the face curtain be used with both hands firmly grasping the handle to prevent wind blast damage. Additional emphasis will also be given on placing the leg restraint garters around the calf of the leg to prevent leg flailing on ejection.

4. LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] has had no previous accidents since commencing flying in August 1964. He is an excellent aviator, considered to be one of the finest young pilots in the squadron. LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] volunteered for combat in Vietnam with this squadron after he completed a successful Mediterranean cruise. During the CONUS training cycle and first combat line period on Yankee Station, he performed in a highly professional and cool manner as the Commanding Officer's wingman. During ACM training in CONUS and combat flights over the highly defended areas of

Vietnam, LTJG (b) (6) flew the airplane to the limits of its performance envelope consistently and safely.

(b) (5), (b) (6)

[redacted]

6. The squadron Standard Operating Procedure has been rewritten to direct that half flaps will not be used in ACM. Increased emphasis on slow flight and approach to the stall with the drooped aileron F4 is being given when off the line. Additional time is being spent in aerobatic flight prior to ACM review. Briefings prior to ACM positively express not to allow the drooped aileron airplane to stall by judicious use of nose position, power, and stick position.

7. The last squadron safety survey was taken in January 1967.

R. J. Schulte

R. J. SCHULTE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with
Para. 3A, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, or later edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART 1 GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY: CO, FITRON ONE SIX ONE
2. SERIAL NO: 2-68A
3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP: 0809402Z/OCT
4. MODEL AIRCRAFT: F4B
5. BUREAU NUMBER: 150474
6. TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
7. VIA: CO, FITRON ONE SIX ONE
OIC, VAW-111, DET 34
CVW-15
USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43)
COMCARDIV THREE
CTF-77
8.
9. LOCATION OF MISHAP: 190°/58NM NAS CUBI PT
10. DAMAGE: A
11. TIME OF DAY: DAY
12. TIME IN FLIGHT: 0.6
13. FLIGHT CODE: 1A1
14. CLEARED FROM: NAS CUBI PT TO: NAS CUBI PT
15. TYPE CLEARANCE: VFR LOCAL
16. AIRSPEED: 240 KCAS P
17. A/C WEIGHT: 40,000# 30%
18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP: STALL/SPIN
19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP: 6,000 ft. TERRAIN: WATER
20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C): N/A

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
X	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL		17. WEATHER
X	2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4. PILOT OTHER (Specify)		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
	5. CREW		13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
	6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, U.S. MIRROR)		22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)		23. UNDETERMINED
	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)		16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)		24. OTHER (Specify)

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2. [illegible]	3. [illegible]	4. [illegible]	5. [illegible]	6. [illegible]	7. [illegible]	8. [illegible]	9. [illegible]	10. [illegible]
PILOT (at controls of flying aircraft) (b) (6) [redacted]	LTJG	(b) (6) [redacted]	1310	USN	(b) (6) [redacted]	2	PILOT	F/C	B

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS		845	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	136 / 56
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		316		IN MODEL	128 / 56
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		64	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	42 / 83
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	526		IN MODEL	42 / 83
	OFT/OPT	4 / 2	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	9.8 / 0.0
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	316		IN MODEL	9.8 / 0.0
	OFT/OPT	0 / 2	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	11.0 /
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	64		IN MODEL	11.0 /
	OFT/OPT	0 / 2	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (If jet mishap) HELOS (If helo mishap)		686
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK		4/28/66 SAT	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	29 SEP 67
				DURATION	1.6
			23. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		STANDARD

OTHER PERSONNEL

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. [illegible]	27. [illegible]	28. [illegible]	29. [illegible]	30. [illegible]	31. [illegible]	32. [illegible]	33. [illegible]
ARMSTRONG, Wayne A.	-	LTJG	USNR	(b) (6) [redacted]	VAW-111 DET 34	L	NFO	R/C

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 2

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 46, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV FORM 3750-1

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

A. A/C HISTORY

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST PAR OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK

B. ENGINE HISTORY

1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR REQUESTED?	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)									
(2)									
(3)									
(4)									

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

1. COMPONENT INVOLVED (NOMENCLATURE)	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OVERHAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. FUR/AMPEX
(1)							
(2)							
(3)							
(4)							

D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS

1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED	
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURES

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE

8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT ☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED	10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL ☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL	14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS

INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/BMEP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE

INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. AMPLIFIER SERIAL NUMBER _____
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP _____ Info RUEC on DIR request this para. to OPNAV/FIRST REPORT
3. OTHER Preliminary/supplementary MSG 080540Z OCT 67
4. RESCUE REPORT, DRT 2, (b) (6), CLARK AFB 081239Z OCT 67
5. USS CORAL SEA, 111518Z OCT 67

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) PART

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR	2. PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND DIRECTION	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH/END SPEED
6. MARK NUMBER	7. MODEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION OF SHIP	9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND WIRELESS ARRESTER	

10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

G. SHIPS DATA

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDING LAST 30 DAYS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY OUTSIDE AIR	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
NONE	10				

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, icing level, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate)
ONE TENTH SCTD AT 3,000-5,000 HIGH BROKEN

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS
I	A	7	COMSEVENTHFLT
III		2	1CC NAVPLANTREPO STL 1CC C.O. NARF, EL CENTRO, CALIF. 92244 1CC O-IN-C VAW-111, DET 34 1CC C.O. VAW-111

2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
2CC NAVAVNSAFECN DIRECT (AAR)
1CC BUSEPS DIRECT (AAR)
1CC CVW-15
1CC USS CORAL SEA
1CC COMFAIRMIRAMAR
1CC COMFAIRWESTPAC
1CC COMNAVAIRPAC
1CC COMCARDIV 3
1CC CTF-77
1CC COMSEVENTHFLT

COST DAMAGE TO: 3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY 4. PRIVATE PROPERTY UNKNOWN 5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO. 23 OCT 1967

PART IV SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

1. SENIOR MEMBER (b) (6) [redacted] LCDR (b) (6) OPERATIONS OFFICER UNIT BILLET

2. MEMBER (b) (6) LCDR [redacted] MAINTENANCE OFFICER UNIT BILLET

3. MEMBER (b) (6) LT [redacted] MC, USN

3. MEMBER (b) (6) LT [redacted] SAFETY OFFICER UNIT BILLET

* When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

OP-OSF

PART V - THE ACCIDENT

On a combination area familiarization and air to air tactics flight the section of aircraft had spent approximately thirty minutes looking over the local area. They commenced their first tactics engagement at approximately 18,00 feet. The aircraft turned into one another, NL 206 going low and NL 207 going high. NL 206 accelerated to approximately 500 KTS and leveled out at approximately 10,000 feet. After passing each other the aircraft turned back to pass again head on. This time NL 206 went high and NL 207 went low. At the top of this maneuver NL 206 was at an estimated 17,000 feet at approximately 220 KCAS and he selected half flaps. NL 206 hung in this position awaiting the completion of NL 207's maneuvers. Suddenly the pilot felt he was losing control of his aircraft and noticed his angle of attack at 30 units (see ENCLOSURE (2)). NL 206 applied flight control corrections for a post stall gyration and the aircraft assumed a nose low attitude. The angle of attack remained at 30 units and commenced a slow roll to an inverted position. The pilot felt he was entering a spin and deployed the para-brake, the angle of attack momentarily decreased to 28 units but increased to 30 units. The wingman saw the para-brake deploy but fail to blossom (see ENCLOSURE (3)). The pilot initiated a spin recovery for a right spin. The aircraft failed to respond to the controls and at this time the flight leader was calling for the crewmembers to eject (see ENCLOSURES (3) and (4)). The pilot of NL 206 called for the crewmember to eject and noted 6,000' on the altimeter. After hearing the rear seat eject, the pilot initiated ejection by the primary means. The pilot noted the delay during canopy jettison and was conscious of the secondary effort to fire the seat. The pilot states that the ejection seemed violent but apparently normal. The Martin-Baker seat functioned normally and the pilot noted the NFO's parachute fully blossomed and apparently normal in all respects.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

PART VI - THE DAMAGE

The aircraft was intact prior to collision with the ground. Upon impact, the aircraft exploded and was completely destroyed (see ENCLOSURE (5)).

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

PART VII - INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

1. Personnel Factors

a. Pilot Factors: LTJG (b) (6) allowed his aircraft to get into a stalled condition of flight. His use of ½ flaps is considered to be a major cause factor in that their use probably contributed to the original condition and subsequently hindered his acceleration. In this case, rapid acceleration to a speed above stall was essential to enable him to recover. His use of the para-brake is considered to have been premature and this also would tend to inhibit acceleration. Use of the para-brake is prescribed by NATOPS as a spin recovery procedure but only after 1½ to 2 turns of a post stall gyration. LTJG (b) (6) had not yet met this condition.

b. Maintenance, servicing and ground handling personnel factors: None considered to be contributing cause factors.

c. Supervisory Factors:

(1) LTJG (b) (6) is an extremely proficient aviator. He spent almost the entire training period with the squadron and had the benefit of the squadron deployment to Fallon and the squadron tactics syllabus. He was in excellent physical condition and considered well qualified in all respects.

LTJG ARMSTRONG was a qualified NFO currently assigned to a squadron flying E-1B aircraft. He had 802 flight hours but only 2.4 of these were in jet aircraft. He had successfully completed ejection seat training in 1964 and had a low pressure chamber check out in 1967. He had successfully completed the Airpac Deep Water Environmental Survival training course in 1965 and his annual maintenance swim in 1967. He had a thorough check out of the flight gear he borrowed, the cockpit, and the seat just prior to the flight.

It can only be assumed that LTJG ARMSTRONG was injured in some manner which prevented him from inflating his MK3C life vest. His PK2 raft was not sighted by overhead observers. Standard practice would be to deploy the raft in the parachute descent. His failure to do so is assumed to be due to incapacitation or unfamiliarity with the Scott survival kit.

(2) NL 206 and 207 were conducting an authorized scheduled flight. The conduct of the flight was well briefed. LTJG ARMSTRONG was adequately briefed concerning his duties and the use of the equipment peculiar to the F4B aircraft (see ENCLOSURES (3) and (4)).

Upon investigation of the accident and the subsequent rescue attempt, only two problem areas were uncovered. The first; there was some confusion over UHF guard frequency due to excessive transmissions and failure initially for anyone to state that he was the on scene commander. The other problem was that LTJG (b) (6) tried

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

one survival radio (AN/PRC-63) and subsequently discarded it because he could not hear it. He then used his second radio to try to contact airborne aircraft. He did at one time talk to a P-2V but the beeper from his discarded radio impeded communications.

(3) Maintenance personnel training, qualification and/or proficiency are not considered to be contributing factors.

(4) Maintenance supervision is not considered to be a contributing factor.

2. Material Failure or Malfunctions: The possibility of a material failure or malfunction was considered by the board. There were no outstanding discrepancies on the aircraft that could have related to the accident and NL 206 had only recently completed a calendar major inspection (see ENCLOSURE (6)). There was nothing in any of the statements or upon inspection of the wreckage that would lead the board to suspect a failure or malfunction. The vapor streaming from NL 206 (see ENCLOSURE (4)) was evaluated to be fuel streaming due to de-selection of afterburner at a slow CAS.

3. Facilities: Not considered to be a con ributing factor to the accident. The Air Force HU-16B dispatched from Clark Air Force Base arrived expeditiously and carried out their rescue duties in a professional manner. Helicopters were on the scene almost immediately and searched the area until night fall with negative results.

4. NATOPS:

a. NATOPS procedures were not a factor.

b. The fact that LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] did not select his flaps to the up position is considered to be a cause factor. Selecting flaps and gear to the up position is part of the NATOPS stall/spin recovery procedures and was not complied with in this case.

c. The board concurs that a NATOPS change is called for as outlined in Part IX, recommendation number one. A change proposal will be submitted in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9 series.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

PART VIII - CONCLUSIONS

It is the conclusion of the board that LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] flew his aircraft into a stalled condition from which he was unable to recover. The largest contributing factor was his use of half flaps, as stated in PART VII. It is felt that this inhibited his acceleration, therefore prohibiting him from breaking the stall and executing a recovery.

In slotted stabilator equipped aircraft, such as NL 206, a stall is reached with the flaps down and gear up at an indicated angle of attack of 21 units. This is opposed to 27 units clean configuration and 24 units landing configuration. The rudder shaker stall warning comes on at 21.3 units angle of attack. This was not felt by LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] nor did he notice any wing rock or buffet prior to the stall. This plus the fact that the aircraft was nose low, yet apparently not accelerating, tended to confuse him.

Had he selected the flaps to the up position, his acceleration would have been more rapid and he may have been able to recover.

It is further concluded that LTJG ARMSTRONG drowned due to his failure to inflate his MK3C. This failure is assumed to be caused by one or both of the following conditions: his incapacitation from injuries sustained during ejection or water entry; his preoccupation with entanglement in the parachute shroud lines, simply forgetting his flotation equipment.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

PART IX - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the NATOPS stall/spin recovery procedure be changed to further emphasize the necessity of selecting flaps and landing gear to the up position. Also that this step in the recovery procedure be placed in the post stall gyration phase. This seems to be of particular importance in slotted stabilator equipped aircraft.

2. That the use of the face curtain, as the primary means of ejection, be re-emphasized to all crew members. This is an important consideration in preventing flailing or wind blast injury.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

INDEX OF ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE (1)	MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT
ENCLOSURE (2)	STATEMENT OF PILOT
ENCLOSURE (3)	STATEMENT OF FLIGHT LEADER
ENCLOSURE (4)	STATEMENT OF FLIGHT LEADER'S RIO
ENCLOSURE (5)	PHOTO OF IMPACT AREA
ENCLOSURE (6)	STATEMENT OF MAINTENANCE OFFICER
ENCLOSURE (7)	STATEMENT OF SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT OFFICER
ENCLOSURE (8)	PILOT'S FLIGHT TIME RESUME
ENCLOSURE (9)	RESCUE REPORT (OPNAV FORM 3750-13)
ENCLOSURE (10)	RESCUE OPENING/SUSPENDING MESSAGE (NAVWEPS FORM 11135/1 NOT AVAILABLE) ORIGINAL ONLY
ENCLOSURE (11)	USS CORAL SEA MESSAGE 111518Z OCT 67 ORIGINAL ONLY

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C [redacted]CIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - [redacted] 1

OPNAV FORM 3750-8 (REV. 3-63) — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.* — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity)	2. MOR NUMBER	3. LEAVE BLANK
VF-161, FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 96601	2-68A	

4. TYPE OF MISHAP	5. TIME & ZONE	6. DATE	7. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
[X] ACCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT [ ] INCIDENT	0947H	8 OCT 67	190 degrees/58 miles from NAS Cubi Pt., R.P.

8. MODEL A/C	9. BUNO	10. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	11. DAMAGE CODE	12. UNIT OPERATING A/C
F-4B	150474	2	ALPHA	VF-161

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED NAME (Last, first and middle initial)	14. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	15. RANK/RATE	16. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT ABOARD A/C	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT AT MISHAP	18. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL	19. PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED FOR FLIGHT	20. BRANCH OF SERVICE	21. INJURY CODE	22. DISPOSITION
A. (b) (6) [redacted]	VF-161	LTJG	(b) (6) [redacted] 1310	Pilot		12AUG67	Yes	USN	B	G
B. ARMSTRONG, Wayne A.	VAW-111, Det 34	LTJG	(b) (6) [redacted] 1325	RIO	RIO	19MAY67	Yes	USNR	L	U
C.										
D.										

23. CLARIFICATION OF ITEMS 13-22 WHEN NECESSARY

Individual "B" was an NFO assigned to a unit normally flying the E-1B aircraft.

24. MODEL-OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	25. BUNO	26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	27. UNIT OPERATING A/C	28. DAMAGE CODE	29. MOR NO.
NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

30. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP (*Use additional 8 x 10½ sheets if required*)

The flight was to be a one and one-half hour area familiarization combined with fighter tactics between two F4B Phantom aircraft. The lead aircraft was piloted by LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] USN with LTJG (b) (6) [redacted], USNR as Radar Intercept Officer. The wingman was LTJG (b) (6) [redacted], USN with LTJG Wayne A. ARMSTRONG, USNR as RIO. The preflight briefing was thorough and included spin recovery techniques. In addition, a special session on survival procedures was given LTJG ARMSTRONG by LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] when he checked out his flight gear and again when they got to the airplane.

The flight launched at approximately 0915 local time from NAS Cubi Pt., R.P. in nearly clear weather, rendezvoused and cruised about Luzon flying over the inactive volcano, Taal. When both aircraft had burned down to an acceptable fuel weight they headed for a safe area to engage in air combat maneuvering. When over the South China Sea at approximately 18,000 feet the two broke apart to begin a run-in on each other to start the contest as is normally done when practicing fighter tactics. On turning in, both planes began to climb in a scissors maneuver, the wingman climbing higher. As his aircraft began to slow down he selected half flaps to aid him at the slower speed. The aircraft was apparently allowed to stall and began to lose altitude rapidly in a spin, As the aircraft passed 10,000 feet without regaining control, the flight leader who had watched the evolution called for the crewmen to eject. Two good parachutes were observed. The aircraft was seen to impact on the northern tip of Lubang Island on the 190 degree radial, 58 miles from NAS Cubi Point, R.P.

31. PRIMARY CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

Pilot error in technique/judgement.

32. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

Pilot deviation from NATOPS procedures.

33. POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

None

34. HAVE ALL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD? IF NO, EXPLAIN. YES [X] NO [ ]

35. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST

[X] ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED [ ] DRAWINGS SKETCHES, PHOTOS [X] SURVIVORS NARRATIVES [ ] WITNESS STATEMENTS [X] CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS [X] REQUIRED COPIES FURNISHED

36. [illegible] (Name & signature of medical officer) — DATE

(b) (6) [redacted]

LT MC USN

37. [illegible] (Name & signature of appointing authority) — DATE

R J Schulte

R. J. SCHULTE

CDR USN

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C[redacted]CIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PA[redacted]2

OPNAV FORM 3750-6A (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. — *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.* OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION B - FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OR RELATING TO MISHAP BY PHASE OF MISHAP *(List in order in accordance with Section B of inst.)*

1. FACTORS	2. PHASE OF MISHAP (See code at right) A	E	S	R
1. Allowed aircraft to stall.	C			
2. Failure to properly recover from "Post Stall Gyration".	M			

PHASE CODE: A - ACCIDENT; E - ESCAPE/EGRESS; S - SURVIVAL; R - RESCUE

FACTOR WEIGHT: M - MAJOR; C - CONTRIBUTING; Q - QUESTIONABLE OR POSSIBLE

REMARKS

SECTION C AIR CREW DATA

1. FLIGHT TIME LAST 30 DAYS *(All models)*	24.5
2. FLIGHT TIME LAST 24 HOURS *(All models)*	1.6
3. NO. FLIGHTS LAST 24 HOURS *(Include present flight)*	1.0
4. TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	1.6
5. TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ALL MODELS	845.0

FLIGHT TIME	6. TOTAL	7. LAST 30	8. 60 DAYS	9. 90 DAYS
THIS MODEL	526.0	24.5	48.0	64.0

10. NO. GROUNDINGS PAST YEAR	1.0
11. NO. DAYS GROUNDED PAST YEAR	16

12. DATES AND TYPES OF PRIOR MISHAPS

None

13. NO. HRS. IN A DUTY STATUS LAST 24 HRS.	1.5
14. DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF MISHAP	Forward

15. LOCATION AT TIME OF MISHAP

Front Seat

SECTION D ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (Compare with health record)



AGE (b) (6) [redacted]

HEIGHT [redacted] IN.

WEIGHT [redacted] LB.

A. SITTING HEIGHT [redacted] IN.

B. TRUNK HEIGHT [redacted] IN.

C. FUNCTIONAL REACH [redacted] IN.

D. BUTTOCK - KNEE [redacted] IN.

E. LEG LENGTH [redacted] IN.

F. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID) [redacted] IN.

16. NOT APPLICABLE

LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS

SPECIMEN		TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	1.			TISSUE: (CNS)		
	2.			MUSCLE		
	3.			VISCERA		
URINE				OTHER:		
G.I. CONTENT						

17. X-RAY RESULTS (b) (6) [redacted]

NON NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-60A	F-4B	150474	Pilot

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6) [redacted]

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—[illegible]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 2

OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. — *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.* OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION B - FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OR RELATING TO MISHAP BY PHASE OF MISHAP *(List in order in accordance with Section B of Inst.)*

1. FACTORS	2. PHASE OF MISHAP (See code at right) A	E	S	R	PHASE CODE: A - ACCIDENT, E - ESCAPE/EGRESS, S - SURVIVAL, R - RESCUE; FACTOR WEIGHT: M - MAJOR, C - CONTRIBUTING, Q - QUESTIONABLE OR POSSIBLE
Not Required					REMARKS

SECTION C AIR CREW DATA

1. FLIGHT TIME LAST 30 DAYS *(All models)*	30.0
2. FLIGHT TIME LAST 24 HOURS *(All models)*	0.0
3. NO. FLIGHTS LAST 24 HOURS *(Include present flight)*	0.0
4. TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	0.0
5. TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ALL MODELS	802.0

FLIGHT TIME THIS MODEL	6. TOTAL	7. LAST 30	8. 60 DAYS	9. 90 DAYS
	0.0	NA	NA	NA

10. NO. GROUNDINGS PAST YEAR	0.0
11. NO. DAYS GROUNDED PAST YEAR	0.0

12. DATES AND TYPES OF PRIOR MISHAPS

None

13. NO. HRS. IN A DUTY STATUS LAST 24 HRS.	0.0
14. DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF MISHAP	Forward

15. LOCATION AT TIME OF MISHAP

Rear Seat

SECTION D ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (Compare with health record)

THIS INFORMATION NOT CONTAINED IN INDIVIDUAL'S HEALTH RECORD.

AGE	
HEIGHT	IN.
WEIGHT	LB.
A. SITTING HEIGHT	IN.
B. TRUNK HEIGHT	IN.
C. FUNCTIONAL REACH	IN.
D. BUTTOCK - KNEE	IN.
E. LEG LENGTH	IN.
F. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID)	IN.

16. NOT APPLICABLE

LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS

SPECIMEN		TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	1.			TISSUE: (CNS)		
	2.			MUSCLE		
	3.			VISCERA		
URINE				OTHER:		
G.I. CONTENT						

17. X-RAY RESULTS

NOT APPLICABLE

MOB NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-68A	F-4B	150474	Naval Flight Officer

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

ARMSTRONG, Wayne A.

OP-007

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—[illegible]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/[redacted]CIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - P[redacted]

OPNAV FORM 5750-6B (REV. 5-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — See OPNAVINST 5750.6E for instructions. OPNAV REPORT 5750-7

SECTION E

INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE 8 PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION
TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL
IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP

TIME	
6 OCT 67	
0930	In bed - Bangkok, Thailand.
1100	Arose (Shower, Shave)
1130	Breakfast
1200	Went Shopping
1400	Ate Lunch (1) Hamburger Steak (2) Green Beans (3) Potatoes (4) Salad (5) Irish Coffee - (Irish Whiskey)
1600	To Airport (Bangkok) in route Subic Bay, P.I.
2100	Ate Dinner (1) Steak (2) Potatoes (3) Beans Went to sleep on Plane.
7 OCT 67	
0040	Arrived Subic Bay.
0115	Arrived U.S.S. CORAL SEA (CVA-43)
0130	Went to sleep.
1100	Arose (Shower, Shave)
1130	Ate Lunch (1) Beef Stroggonoff with Rice.
1215	Went Shopping.
1545	Returned to Ship (CVA-43)
1600	Went to bed.
1815	Arose (Shower, Shave)
1900	Left Ship
2000	Arrived "O" Club 1 Drink before Dinner (Scotch on the Rocks)
2045	Ate Dinner (1) N.Y. Cut Steak (2) Potatoes (3) Beans (4) Salad (5) Wine, 1 glass (MED)
2130	Danced (Approx. 3 Scotch on the Rocks)

TIME	
8 OCT 67	Departed "O" Club
0030	
0100	Arrived U.S.S. CORAL SEA (CVA-43) via taxi.
0115	Went to bed.
0745	Arose (Shower, Shave)
0755	Briefed
0845	Manned Aircraft.
0900	Take Off.
ACCIDENT PHASE	
0930	Stall, Spin, Eject.
ESCAPE PHASE	
0931	Ejected, Chute deployed, landed in Bay.
0955	Pick-up by Natives in Outrigger Fishing Boat.
1015	Pick-up by Air Force HU16 - Albertross.
SURVIVAL PHASE	

TIME OF RESCUE 1015 8 OCT 67

MOS NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-60A	F-4B	150474	Pilot

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (b) (6) [redacted]

OP-507

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—713000

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/[illegible]CCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - P[illegible]3

OPNAV FORM 3750-6B (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions. OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION E

INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE 8 PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION
TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL
IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP

TIME	
6 OCT 67	
1000	Slept until 1200
1230-1300	Ate Lunch
1300-1700	Shopping, Swimming
1700-1730	Dinner
2000-2200	Watched Movie
2230	Went to bed.
7 OCT 67	
1030-1100	Brunch
1500-1700	Played Handball
1730-1800	Dinner
1800-2000	Slept
2000-2200	"O" Club. Drank 3 Gin & Tonics.
2230	Went to bed.
8 OCT 67	
0630	Arose, Shower, Shave.
0755	Briefed
0845	Manned Aircraft
0900	Take Off.

TIME	
ACCIDENT PHASE	
0930	Aircraft Stall, Spin, Eject.
ESCAPE PHASE	
0931	Ejected, Chute deployed.
SURVIVAL PHASE	
0935	Apparently drowned due to possible injury or to fouling in Shroud lines.

TIME OF RESCUE Not rescued.

MOS NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-60A	F-4B	150474	Naval Flight Officer

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL
ARMSTRONG, Wayne A.

P-007

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—712500

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8C (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.*

SECTION F PATHOLOGICAL DATA *(Refer to Section F of instructions.)*

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION: BRAVO, GOLF

2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS: NONE

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: [X] NO [ ] YES DURATION:

4. DROWNED [ ]

5. ASPHYXIATED [ ]

(b) (6) [redacted]

7. EXPOSURE [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: NA

9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]

10. PLACE OF HOSPITAL: U. S. S. NAVAL HOSPITAL SUBIC BAY, R.P.

11. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: [ ] NO [X] YES

12. DURATION *(See instruction)*: 8 weeks

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: NA [ ] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT [ ] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT [ ] MEDICAL OFFICER

16. [ ] PROTOCOL ATTACHED [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED P5065" USED? [ ] YES [ ] NO NA

18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON: NA

19. INJURIES	PHASE SUSTAINED A	E	S	R	CAUSE AND MECHANISM *(If unknown, theorize)*
(b) (6) [redacted]		X			(b) (6) [redacted]
		X			
(b) (6) [redacted]		X			

20. REMARKS

None.

MOD NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-66A	F-4B	150474	Pilot

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6) [redacted]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4

OPNAV FORM 3750-6C (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.* OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION F

PATHOLOGICAL DATA *(Refer to Section F of instructions.)*

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION: LIMA, UNIFORM

2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS: NONE

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ NO ☐ YES DURATION: UNKNOWN, POSSIBLE

4. DROWNED: XXX

5. ASPHYXIATED: ☐

6. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

7. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION:

9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS:

10. PLACE OF HOSPITALIZATION:

11. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE REASON: ☐ NO ☐ YES

12. DURATION *(See instruction)*:

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: UNKNOWN

14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH: ——————

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: ☐ PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT ☐ PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT ☐ MEDICAL OFFICER

16. ☐ PROTOCOL ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED P5065" USED? ☐ YES XXX NO

18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON: REMAINS NOT RECOVERED

19.

INJURIES	PHASE SUSTAINED A	E	S	R	CAUSE AND MECHANISM *(If unknown, theorize)*

20. REMARKS

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-661	F-4B	150474	Naval Flight Officer

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: ARMSTRONG, Wayne A.

OF-307

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—[illegible]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 4A OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION F *(Continued)* SURFACE INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING AND SHADING AFFECTED AREAS
ALL LACERATIONS, ABRASIONS, CONTUSIONS, PUNCTURE WOUNDS, SPRAINS AND BURNS

RECORD ALL INJURIES NO MATTER HOW TRIVIAL, WHETHER PATIENT LIVED OR DIED

(b) (6)

[redacted]

DETAILS OF SKULL FRACTURES AND BRAIN INJURY. DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY
1. ALL FRACTURES, BY TYPE *(Simple, depressed, or indirect, etc.)* 2. SITES OF BRAIN LESIONS, IF ANY. 3. DISLOCATIONS OF MANDIBLE.

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-68A	F-4B	150474	Pilot

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6) [redacted]

OP-OEF

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964-722-[illegible]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/[illegible]CCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT [illegible]AGE 48

OPNAV FORM 3750-6E (Rev. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED See OPNAVINST 3750-6E for instructions. OPNAV REPORT 3750-[illegible]

SECTION F (Continued)

SKELETAL INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING
ALL FRACTURES BY TYPE (Simple, compound, comminuted, etc.) AND DISLOCATIONS INDICATING DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY: 1. ALL FRACTURES OF SPINAL COLUMN (Simple, compressed, etc.)
2. DISLOCATION AND DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT. 3. SITES OF CORD DAMAGE, IF ANY.

DETAILS OF SPINAL INJURIES

NONE

[illegible] NO.	MODEL A/C	[illegible]	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-60A	F-4B	19[illegible]	Pilot

[illegible] OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6) [redacted]

[illegible]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5

OPNAV FORM 5750-5F (REV. 5-63) OPNAV REPORT 5750-

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions

SECTION G

ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION G OF INSTRUCTION:

PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE S-SURVIVAL R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. REQUIRED	4. AVAILABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10½ plain paper if needed.)
* Helmet APH-6	See additional sheet	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	*Came off and lost on ejecti
* Regulator (Robertshaw 226-2[illegible]4-3)		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
* Oxygen Mask		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
* ARDC Hose		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Torso Harness		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
MK-3C		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
G-Suit		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Strobe Light		Yes	Yes	No	No		
SV-2 Vest		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Survival Knife		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Shroud Cutter		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Radio PRC 63		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
SHEK 2 Part 1&2		Yes	Yes	No	No		
Pen Light		Yes	Yes	No	No		
Whistle		Yes	Yes	No	No		
Matrix Light		Yes	Yes	No			
Mirror		Yes	Yes	No			
# Raft PK-2		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	?	#The toggle on th CO_2 bottle w not fully opened and the CO_2 cylinder still had ½ charge. Therefore the PK-2 Raft only half inflated.

SECTION H

NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

This section done on additional enclosure.

BOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-4[illegible]	F-4B	15[illegible]474	Pilot

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6) [redacted]

THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT LISTED ON PAGE 5 HAD BEEN MADE ACCORDING TO EXISTING DIRECTIONS:

C&S EQUIPMENT CHANGE 4

C&S EQUIPMENT CHANGE 5

C&S EQUIPMENT CHANGE 21, AMEND 1

C&S EQUIPMENT CHANGE 29

C&S EQUIPMENT CHANGE 30

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 9

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 21, AMEND 1

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 25, AMEND 1

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 32

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 55

A/C SYSTEMS BULLETIN 43

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 66

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 73

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 74

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 78

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 99

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 107

SECTION G — ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION G OF INSTRUCTION: PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE S-SURVIVAL R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. REQUIRED	4. AVAILABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10½ plain paper if needed.)
Helmet APH-6	See additional sheet.	Yes	Yes	Yes	?	?	
Regulator(Robert Shaw 226-2[illegible]4-3)		Yes	Yes	Yes	?	?	
Oxygen Mask		Yes	Yes	Yes	?	?	
ARDC Hose		Yes	Yes	Yes	?	?	
Torso Harness(MA-2)		Yes	Yes	Yes	?	?	
MK-3C		Yes	Yes	Yes	?	?	
G-Suit		Yes	Yes	Yes	?	?	
Strobe Light		Yes	Yes	Yes	?	?	
Raft PK-2		Yes	Yes	Yes	?	?	Floatation gear was apparently
Shroud Cutter		Yes	Yes	Yes	?	?	never deployed by the individua resulting in his drowning.

SECTION H — NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

MDR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-68A	F-4B	15[illegible]74	Naval Flight Officer

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL
ARMSTRONG, Wayne A.

THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT LISTED ON PAGE 5 HAD BEEN MADE ACCORDING TO EXISTING DIRECTIONS:

C&S EQUIPMENT CHANGE 4

C&S EQUIPMENT CHANGE 5

C&S EQUIPMENT CHANGE 21, AMEND 1

C&S EQUIPMENT CHANGE 29

C&S EQUIPMENT CHANGE 30

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 9

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 21, AMEND 1

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 25, AMEND 1

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 32

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 55

A/C SYSTEMS BULLETIN 43

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 66

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 73

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 74

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 78

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 99

A/C SYSTEMS CHANGE 107

SECTION H, PAGE 5. MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT.

Upon giving the signal to eject LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] immediately heard his RIO's ejection blast. He then reached for his own face curtain and pulled. He recalls giving one pull which caused the canopy to jettison and partially dislodged the grip with the left hand. When he pulled once again the seat fired however he still did not have a good grip with the left hand and he felt it flail during the ejection. (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted]

While still 2 or 3ØØ feet up he deployed his seat pack with PK-2 life raft and pulled the toggles inflating his Mark 3-C life vest. On striking the water he immediately found he and his life raft were fouled in the parachute shroud lines but had no difficulty disentangling himself (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted]. Furthermore, the PK-2 life raft was found to be only about one-half inflated. (b) (6) [redacted] he floated in the Mark 3-C and held onto the PK-2 raft until picked up by natives fishermen in an Outrigger Canoe some 2Ø-25 minutes later. After 2Ø minutes with the Natives an Air Force HU-16 Albatross arrived, made a water landing and picked him up. A 15 minute water taxi search was made looking for the other crewman, however he had apparently disappeared beneath the surface of the water.

The RIO was observed by LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] and by the crew of the other F-4B to have a "good Chute". He was later observed in the water approximately one-half mile from the Pilot apparently struggling with his parachute shroud lines in which he was entangled. Neither his Mark 3-C or his PK-2 life raft was ever observed to be inflated. Since the body of the RIO was never recovered it can only be assumed that he drowned either because injuries suffered during egress prevented him from deploying his floation gear or because he simply neglected this vital step until too late while fighting to free himself from the shroud lines. Later searches by Helicopters, Boats and divers revealed only a torn piece of the outer protective covering of his Mark 3-C life vest which held no clue as the reason for his loss. It is emphasized that LTJG ARMSTRONG had received a complete check-out on all the F-4B survival procedures prior to the flight.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 6

OPNAV FORM 3750-6G (REV. 3-63)

OPNAV REPORT 3750

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INST 3750AE for instructions

SECTION I

DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

[X] WATER [ ] LAND [ ] OTHER

2. TYPE OF EGRESS

[X] EJECTION [ ] BAILOUT [ ] UNDERWATER [X] NORMAL [ ] OTHER (State type)

S	E		REMARKS
		3. NOT ATTEMPTED	
	X	4. ATTEMPTED	
	X	5. ACCOMPLISHED	Helmet came off, APH-6.
		6. THRU CANOPY	
(YES)	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	
		8. DURING EGRESS	* Poor grip on face curtain handle [redacted]
	X	9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS *	

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED: Martin Baker H5A

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT: [X] PRIMARY [ ] SECONDARY [ ] OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION: Normal

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION: [X] UP [ ] DOWN [ ] FORWARD [ ] AFT [ ] OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT: 60 degrees, Nose low

15. AIRSPEED: 240Kts.Indicate

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET): ABOVE SEA LEVEL 6,000 ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY 6,000

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING: Unknown

18. WEIGHT: Approx. 220 lbs

19. TIME IN WATER: 25 minutes

20. TIME IN RAFT: 20 minutes in Native Outrigger Boat

21. WIND VELOCITY: 10 Knots

22. WAVE HEIGHT: 1-2 feet

23. WAVE INTERVAL: 2/3/4 seconds

24. AIR TEMPERATURE: 84° F

25. WATER TEMPERATURE: 82° F

26. VISIBILITY: 10 miles

27. ALERTING FACTORS: Flight Leader radioed to NAS Cubi Point for SAR assistance.

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE: Flight Leader's TACAN bearing from NAS Cubi Point.

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR: Pilot waved at Air Force HU-16 from Native Outrigger Canoe. Pilot used PRT-63 Radio to inform HU-16 crew of injuries.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE? (If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue)

[X] NO [ ] YES

SECTION J

TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC 22 NOV 65 EJECTION TOWER 22 NOV 65 EJECTION SEAT 22 NOV 65 SURVIVAL 23 NOV 65

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? (If yes, explain)

[X] NO [ ] YES

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-66A	F-4B	153474	Pilot

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

[redacted]

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF AIR ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 6

OPNAV FORM 3750-6G (REV. 3-63) OPNAV REPORT 3750-

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION I — DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

[X] WATER [ ] LAND [ ] OTHER

2. TYPE OF EGRESS

[X] EJECTION [ ] BAILOUT [ ] UNDERWATER [X] NORMAL [ ] OTHER (*State type*)

S	E		REMARKS
		3. NOT ATTEMPTED	
	X	4. ATTEMPTED	
	X	5. ACCOMPLISHED	
		6. THRU CANOPY	
(YES)	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	
		8. DURING EGRESS	
X		9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	Individual not recovered. Probably drowned, reason unknown.

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED: Martin Baker H5A

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT: UNKNOWN [ ] PRIMARY [ ] SECONDARY [ ] OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION: Probably Normal

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION: UNKNOWN [ ] UP [ ] DOWN [ ] FORWARD [ ] AFT [ ] OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT: 60 degrees, Nose down

15. AIRSPEED: 240 kts. Indicated

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET): ABOVE SEA LEVEL 6,000 ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY 6,000

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING: UNKNOWN

18. WEIGHT: UNKNOWN

19. TIME IN WATER: 2/3 feet/4 seconds

20. TIME IN RAFT: NA

21. WIND VELOCITY: 10 Knots

22. WAVE HEIGHT: 1-2 feet

23. WAVE INTERVAL: 84° F

24. AIR TEMPERATURE: 82° F

25. WATER TEMPERATURE: 82° F

26. VISIBILITY: 10 miles

27. ALERTING FACTORS: Flight Leader radioed to NAS Cubi Point for SAR assistance.

28. METHOD OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE: Flight Leader's TACAN bearing from NAS Cubi Point.

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR: Not located.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE? (*If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue*)

[ ] NO [ ] YES Unable to locate body.

SECTION J — TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC 10 APR 67 EJECTION TOWER 20 MAR 64 EJECTION SEAT 20 MAR 64 SURVIVAL Maint. Swim JUL 66 Deep Water AUG 65

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? (*If yes, explain*)

[X] NO [ ] YES

BOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
2-60A	F-4B	150474	Naval Flight Officer

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: ARMSTRONG, Wayne A.

NP-057

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—712000

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusions and recommendations of this Flight Surgeon are the same as those of the Aircraft Accident Board.

(b) (6) [redacted]

LT MC USN

Statement of LTJG [redacted] USN, [redacted]/1210, concerning VF-161 AAR Serial 2-68A of 8 October 1967, F4B, BUNO 150474, pilot: [redacted]

The hop was briefed to include thirty minutes of area familiarization, followed by two or three ACM engagements, fuel permitting. Stall/spin recovery technique was briefed.

Individual take-offs were performed and, after rendezvous, we spent twenty-five minutes flying in free cruise over the islands. Finally, our fuel down to approximately 12000#, we commenced a climb to 20,000'. Passing 15,000', we split and then turned in at about 18,000' with two to three miles separation.

Initially, I turned in level then allowed my nose to drop below the horizon and accelerated to about 500 knots. NL 207 remained at 18,000' and started a hard port turn as we met head on. I turned hard to port also and momentarily lost sight of NL 207. Regaining visual contact, I reversed to starboard in a climbing turn and rolled out abeam NL 207, co-direction, about ten degrees nose high, at 220 knots, and about 17,000'. With my wings level, I selected half flaps and watched NL 207 for his next move. Suddenly, the plane felt awkward and unresponsive. I returned to the cockpit to find the angle of attack pegged at thirty units. There was no wing rock or buffet prior to this. Ailerons and rudders already neutral, I eased the stick forward and allowed the nose to fall approximately thirty degrees below the horizon. The angle of attack remained at thirty units and the airspeed at about 240 knots. The left wing began to fall through and as I reached a position of about 160 degrees angle of bank, I deselected afterburner and deployed the drag chute, and although I was incapable of observing the deployment, outside observers noted that instead of deploying normally, the chute streamed. However, my nose dropped another five degrees and the angle of attack momentarily dropped to twenty-eight units. The angle of attack quickly returned to thirty units and the aircraft began rolling slowly back to the right. At no time were negative G's noted on the aircraft. I now felt that this was the onset of a fully developed spin, and applied full left rudder. At this point NL 207 called: "You are in a spin! Eject! Eject!"

The aircraft was still fully stalled at 240 knots approximately fifty degrees nose down. I called "Eject! Eject!" to my RIO, noted the aircraft to be rolling to the right passing wings level at 7,000 feet. I heard a bang, indicating that my RIO had initiated ejection, noted a six in the altimeter window, and initiated ejection by use of the face curtain.

Ejection was violent and I had not achieved a good grip on the face curtain. [redacted] by the time I found myself in the chute. I observed the aircraft explode directly beneath me and saw my RIO's chute about 1,000 feet below me to seaward. During the descent, I realized that I would land in the water and located my Koch fittings. I attempted to use my

ENCLOSURE (2)

primary radio but mistakenly decided that it was inoperative. This was due to the volume being full down and I was unable to hear the beeper. I observed my RIO to enter the water, then, at about 1000 feet, deployed my seat pack and heard my raft inflate. I then inflated both sides of my MA3C and entered the water. Entry was gentle and (b) (6) [redacted]. I was able to release both Koch fittings with my right hand. My raft was only partially inflated and I was unable to get aboard. I waved to the orbiting aircraft, draped my right arm over the raft and waited. My chute remained under me the entire time but presented no real problem. In a short time, I was picked up by four natives in an outrigger and was transferred, via raft, to an Air Force albatross. I attempted to direct the pilot to my best estimate of my RIO's position. This taxi search was unsuccessful and I was flown to Cubi Point.

It is also significant that I was able to contact the SAR aircraft with my secondary radio while in the outrigger. I informed them of my injuries.

(b) (5) [redacted]

Once the stall had occurred, there was little, if any, response to movement of the control surfaces. (b) (5) [redacted]

(b) (5) [redacted]

(b) (5) [redacted]

I have been a designated Naval Aviator for two years and have 845.3 hours of flight time of which 500 hours are in the F4B aircraft.

(b) (6) [redacted]

LTJG USN

ENCLOSURE (2)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of LCDR [redacted] (b) (6) USN, [redacted] (b) (6) /1310, concerning VF-161 AAR Serial 2-68A of 8 October 1967, F4B, BUNO 150474, pilot: [redacted] (b) (6)

At 0730 the morning of 8 OCT 1967, my flight commenced briefing for a combined local area check out and an air to air tactics flight. A thorough briefing was conducted emphasising the following points: aircraft positioning for the area check out, fuel status, rules of engagement for the tactics phase, spin recovery, ejection procedures in the event of lost intercom, and return to the field. Because LTJG ARMSTRONG had not flown in the F4 prior to this, special attention was given to him on his requirements in the back seat. He stated he wanted to do what the RIO did and would like to operate the radios. At the completion of my portion of the flight brief, LTJG [redacted] (b) (6) my regular RIO, sat down and gave LTJG ARMSTRONG a complete briefing from the RIO standpoint.

When we manned our aircraft LTJG [redacted] (b) (6) again went over the ejection seat and ejection procedures, preflighted the seat and strapped LTJG ARMSTRONG in himself. NL 207 and NL 206 finally became airborne at approximately 0915. A normal rendezvous was executed and the flight proceeded as briefed. After approximately 30 minutes had passed and we had completed the low level portion of the flight a fuel state was given between aircraft and a climb commenced to altitude for the second portion of the flight.

Upon passing through 18,000 a split was called and each aircraft broke 45° from the climb heading and reaching 3-4 miles separation. NL 207 called for the flight to turn in, which also was the call to commence the tactics portion of the flight. The aircraft passed approximately head on with NL 207 high and NL 206 going low. After passing each other the two aircraft reversed and again turned into each other. This time NL 207 going low and NL 206 going high in somewhat of a vertical scissors.

Again as the aircraft passed each other and reversed I noticed NL 206 was very high approximately 2-3,000 feet higher than NL 207. I started my climb back into my wingman (NL 206) and realized he was not turning back into me but just climbing. I had both burners ignited by this time and climbing at 270 KTS trying to maintain the tactical advantage I had achieved on the first turn.

I next noticed NL 206 start a very slow left turn into NL 207 who by this time was approximately 2,000 feet below NL 206 and had approximately 15,000 feet of altitude. NL 206 continued the left turn until he had rolled inverted and seemed to fall in a very slight nose down attitude with a lot of white vapor trailing from aft of the aircraft. As NL 206 continued to fall inverted I noticed the nose of the aircraft finally fall to approximately 30-40° nose down.

ENCLOSURE (3)

At this same time I noticed the drag chute come out streaming but failed to deploy. Just as the drag chute came out, the aircraft (NL 206) rolled to an upright position with the nose pointing straight down. By this time I estimated NL 206 to be approaching 10M and realized that he could not recover control of the aircraft in time to successfully pull it out of the dive. Both myself and my RIO transmitted several times to "eject" and to "get out of that thing". When the aircraft crashed it was going straight down and seemed to be travelling at a very high rate of speed. There was one large explosion when NL 206 crashed but no fire followed.

Up to this point I had not witnessed any ejection from NL 206 even though we never lost sight of the aircraft and had visually followed it all the way down to the crash. I told my RIO to switch to Guard Channel and broadcast a MAYDAY and just as he called the first MAYDAY I looked up and saw two parachutes one approximately 2-300 feet higher than the other. NL 207 altitude at this time was approximately 6500 feet. We notified Cubi Pt. tower that there were two good chutes and to expedite getting a recovery aircraft out to the area. NL 207 continued to fly in lazy circles around the two parachutes until both crewmen were in the water.

As the occupants and parachutes entered the water I flew over fairly low and I noticed both persons moving in the water in an apparent attempt to free themselves from their chutes. It appeared that both crewmen had successfully entered the water and that both of them had inflated their MK-3 life vest.

After the second or third pass over the two survivors I noticed that one of them had gotten his raft out and was hanging on to it. The other crewman appeared to have become entangled in his shroud lines and could be seen moving in the water. On approximately the fifth pass I saw the Philippine fishermen approaching the crewman hanging on to his raft so I headed towards the other one. On this pass I could not locate either the crewman or his parachute. I made several more passes but to no avail. Other Philippine fishermen in swimming gear were diving into the area where the second crewman was last seen but apparently they could find no trace of him.

I returned to NAS Cubi Pt. and requested a helo to take me back to the scene. I returned to the scene at approximately 1120 and the fishermen were still searching. I landed at the crash site and remained there until relieved the following day.

I have been a designated Naval Aviator for 11½ years and have accumulated 3350 hours. 265 hours of which are in the F4.

(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (3)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of LTJG (b) (6) [redacted], USNR, (b) (6) [redacted]/1325, concerning VF-161, AAR Serial 2-68A of 8 October 1967, F4B, BUNO 150474, pilot: (b) (6) [redacted]

On the morning of 8 October 1967, LCDR (b) (6) [redacted], LTJG ARMSTRONG and I were in the squadron ready room at 0730. After confirming the fact that LTJG ARMSTRONG was to fly with LTJG (b) (6) [redacted], I proceeded to get LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] flight gear for LTJG ARMSTRONG. (They were approximately of the same stature.) At this time LTJG ARMSTRONG and myself looked over the flight gear, which was stored under LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] seat in the ready room, and LTJG ARMSTRONG tried on the "G" suit. We were both satisfied with the fit and then LTJG ARMSTRONG took the suit off. A few minutes later LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] appeared and the briefing commenced.

LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] was the briefing officer. The composition of the flight was covered and the frequency plan discussed with all the required frequencies noted and their order of use briefed.

The next major point was the overall conduct of the flight. It was agreed that we would man aircraft after the brief and take off as soon as time permitted, rather than waiting for the scheduled 0930. It was also agreed that I would make all the required radio transmissions for the flight and that I would call for individual taxi clearances to be followed by a section takeoff. The flight was then briefed for a low level flight over the islands to take pictures and for area familiarization. After the area-fam portion of the hop, the flight was to proceed south of Cubi Pt. clear of restricted areas and engage in some air combat maneuvering to give the pilots a chance to "get the feel" of the airplane after a few days of no flying.

The pilots discussed the tactics and the altitude of engagement with 5,000' minimum altitude limitation.

After the tactics had been discussed LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] asked LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] what his procedures would be if he found himself in a spin. LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] immediately answered with the F4B published spin recovery technique, to the satisfaction of the briefing officer.

At this point LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] asked LTJG ARMSTRONG to confirm that he had previously flown in ejection seat aircraft prior to this flight. LTJG ARMSTRONG answered in the affirmative.

Then LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] briefed ARMSTRONG on the specific F4B procedures for ejection in uncontrolled flight. Also the specific communication signals between pilot and RIO were discussed. I stated at this time that I would also give LTJG ARMSTRONG a thorough check out in the rear seat before the flight.

We received our aircraft assignments at this time and LTJG ARMSTONG and I went to the rear of the ready room and looked over the route we were to follow and I picked up a navigation chart of the area.

Then I asked LTJG ARMSTRONG to get his flight gear on and told him that I would do the same and then meet him in the ready room again to go over the flight gear. I went out to the passageway, returned and found LTJG ARMSTRONG just starting to don his torso harness. I asked if he needed any help and he replied that he had it "figured out". Just the same I helped him don it and routed his "G" suit line for him. After he cinched up the harness, I asked if it was comfortable enough and he moved around slightly and said that it was.

After this I showed him the position of the toggles used to inflate the MK-3C and the location of the flares. Also the strobe light, pencil flares and flaregun on his harness as well as the shroud cutter secured to his "G" suit were pointed out to him. He appeared satisfied with their location and then I obtained LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] hard hat and mask for him. He checked their fit and the exhalation of the mask. We were both satisfied with its fit. After the yellow sheets were checked the four of us proceeded to the flight line.

When we arrived at the line LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] and I went to NL 207 and deposited our hard hats and navigation gear. LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] started to pre-flight the aircraft and I went over to NL 206 to give LTJG ARMSTRONG a check out in the rear cockpit.

LTJG ARMSTRONG and I climbed up on the aircraft and I went through the pre-flight procedures for the ejection seat and pulled out all the safety pins except the face curtain pin. While I was pulling the pins I pointed out all the pertinent operational levers and handles on the seat and explained their functions and operation to him.

After this I climbed into the cockpit of NL 206 and while he observed from the intake duct I went through the cockpit switches and set them up properly for him. I commenced with and explained the use of the ICS, C/B panel, the switches for the UHF and ICS, the radar on/off switch and the hand control unit for the radar. Then I pulled out the hand control unit, the radar console, and the radar control box explaining how they were stowed automatically by cartridge generated gases if they were inadvertently left out before ejection. I asked him if he wanted to try operating the radar, but he stated he would rather look out and see the sights.

The next portion of the cockpit that was covered was the UHF control box and oxygen on/off switch. At this point I got out of the cockpit and asked him to climb in so he could start strapping in and get the last portion of my brief.

Also at this time LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] had finished his pre-flight and was setting up the cockpit. He asked me to set up the ICS control box for "hot mike" operation so LTJG ARMSTRONG wouldn't have to set it. I stated that I had already done so.

ENCLOSURE (4)

Then I returned to LTJG ARMSTRONG and explained the use of the guillotine handle, on the seat, in case a rapid egress on the ground was necessary and how to free himself from the parachute once the guillotine was fired. Also the Scott Kit deployment handle and its proper operation were pointed out at this time. The fact that a life raft was inside along with other survival gear was also noted. The canopy jettison handles, their operation and sequence of use was also pointed out.

At this time we commenced strapping him into the seat. We started with the leg restraint lines. He had no difficulty in putting them on and we moved on to the lap belts. He had a little difficulty in operating the rocket jet fittings and I showed him their proper operation. LTJG ARMSTRONG worked them for a few times until he was satisfied and then hooked them up and cinched them tight.

At this time the plane captain brought up the helmet and oxygen mask. I attached his "G" suit, oxygen mask to the upper block, turned on the oxygen and we both checked the mask out to our satisfaction. After this we attached his Koch fittings to his torso harness. By this time he had his gloves on and worked the fittings rather clumsily. I showed him their proper operation once again and he worked the mechanisms two or three times and attached them. I showed him their operation once more by pointing out that they worked better with tension on them and then finally attached them to his torso harness.

He appeared satisfied with their operation and at this point the plane captain gave him his hard hat. I plugged in his earphone connection after he had donned the helmet. After this I left his aircraft and proceeded to NL 207 to strap in and prepare for takeoff.

NL 206 and NL 207 departed NAS Cubi Point at approximately 0910H. Shortly thereafter the flight rendezvoused and proceeded on a low level mission across the island of Corregidor to Taal Lake. After circling the lake, the flight proceeded on a westerly heading of approximately 270 until it crossed the coastline of the island of Luzon. At this time the flight started a gradual climb to an altitude of approximately 10-15 thousand feet. As the flight approached the North Eastern side of Lubang Island, the flight leader broke off the wingman to set up a pre-briefed air combat maneuvering engagement. After obtaining the required amount of separation, the aircraft turned toward one another. Both aircraft then nosed over to pick up additional airspeed and then pulled up in a scissors type manouver. NL 206 continued up well above NL 207 and seemed to be waiting for our aircraft (NL 207) to complete the maneuver so that he could gain the advantage. As NL 207 started down, NL 206 was still above us. NL 206 appeared to have a nose high attitude and was quite slow. At this time NL 206 appeared to hang in the air momentarily and then the left wing appeared to drop and the nose fell through. At this time, a

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

great amount of white vapor appeared behind the aircraft and continued for approximately 5 or 6 seconds. NL 206 continued in a nose down attitude (approximately 20-30°) and appeared to be picking up airspeed. Just a few seconds after the white vapor disappeared, the drag chute was deployed and appeared to stream. The aircraft did not appear to be in a fully developed spin as it passed our altitude of approximately 15 thousand feet. The aircraft appeared to be under control but was now falling even more rapidly with the nose still pointing down in the initial attitude.

As NL 206 continued downward it became evident that the chances of recovery from his nose down high speed descent were becoming marginal and the pilot's efforts to pull it out were not succeeding. At this time I was certain that the aircraft was going to crash, as it was now well below us with no change in attitude and the chances of ejection were becoming marginal also. At this time our A/C came out with several calls for the crew to eject, but the aircraft continued downward with no ejection attempt being observed by us. Shortly thereafter NL 206 impacted on the northern tip of the island of Lubang. NL 207 put out a MAYDAY call at this time and descended to the scene of the crash and orbited overhead. After the first orbit we spotted one parachute and shortly thereafter a second one. The two chutes appeared normal in all respects but the condition of the personnel could not be determined. One of the parachutes landed a few hundred yards off shore from the northern tip of Lubang Island and the second parachute drifted approximately ½ mile farther out to sea.

After circling the two parachutes in the water, the status of the crewmen still could not be determined. However, both were quite close to the submerged parachutes and the shroud lines, and the possibility of entanglement seemed great. As we continued circling the area, we continued our MAYDAY calls and informed the tower at Cubi Pt. and the GCI site, Yardstick, of the situation.

After a few orbits over the downed crew it appeared that the one farthest from land was entangled in his shroud lines and was having difficulty in freeing himself from them.

When several more orbits had been completed one of the crewmen (the closest to land) had managed to inflate his raft and appeared to be clinging to it. The crewman in the middle of the channel apparently was not able to free himself from his entanglement and may have been dragged down by his singking parachute. He was not re-sighted by us.

A P-2V had joined in the search by this time and several other SAR units were on the way. Our fuel supply was getting low and after relinquishing the on-the-scene SAR command role to the P-2 we departed the area and returned to Cubi Point.

I have been a designated NFO for three years and have accumulated 948 flying hours. 856 of these are in the rear seat of the F4B.

(b) (6) [redacted]

LTJG USNR ENCLOSURE (4)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of LCDR (b) (6) [redacted], (b) (6) [redacted]/1310, USN, Aircraft Maintenance Officer, concerning VF-161 AAR Serial 2-68A, 8 October 1967, F4B, BUNO 150474, pilot: (b) (6) [redacted]

F4B BUNO 150474 (NL 206) was on its fourth service tour. The aircraft had accumulated 1414.4 hours since new, 83.8 hours since its last progressive rework, and 17.1 hours since calendar major inspection. There were no outstanding discrepancies on the aircraft that are considered to be applicable to the accident.

(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] USNR, (b) (6) [redacted] 1325, Survival Equipment Officer, concerning VF-161 AAR Serial 2-68A of 8 October 1967, F4B, BUNO 150474, pilot: (b) (6) [redacted]

PILOT EJECTION

LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] ejected after telling the NFO to eject at an approximate altitude of 6,000 feet. The seat was not full down and the face curtain was used. The leg restraint straps were worn above the calf.

The ejection sequence was normal although the pilot feels it took an extremely long time before seat separation. This could be caused by two things as final separation was automatic:

1. Excessive "G" Forces immediately after ejection.

2. A faulty barometer device.

Note: The barometer devices were checked 9/12/67 and the setting was 11,600 feet.

In ejection the pilot lost both his helmet and mask, the oxygen hose remained attached to his torso harness and showed evidence of extreme forces which broke the metal elbow connecting the oxygen hose and the mask.

The pilot inflated the PK2 raft and the MK3C while descending in the chute. The PK2 raft did not fully inflate due to failure of the inflation valve to remain open.

The MK3C inflated properly, however the pilot noted when he was in the water that the snap connectors had separated and the MK3C spread out. It still provided excellent flotation qualities. The pilot thought the connectors had broken but further investigation revealed one broken, and the other intact but presumed unfastened.

RIO EJECTION

The pilot told the NFO to eject, heard what he thought was the NFO ejecting and ejected himself.

The NFO ejection sequence was presumed to be normal and a good chute was sighted by the pilot and the flight leader.

The NFO was lost at sea.

The right side of the NFO's MK3C envelope was recovered with the snaps and plastic Cotter Pin intact. The envelope had been ripped away from the MK3C in the three connecting places. This would expose the MK3C although it may not have been inflated.

ENCLOSURE (7)

F4B BUNO 150424, MODEX HL 206
MARTIN BAKER SEATS

PILOT'S SEAT
Model - MKH5A
Serial 113-112

NFO SEAT
Model - MKH5A
Serial 116-113

Aircrew Systems Bulletin incorporated in both seats: Numbers 4, 19, 24, 30, 36, 49, 56, 63, 74, 99 (Number 34 in rear seat only)

Aircrew Systems Bulletin not incorporated in either seat: Number 30, Mod of the eye end of the stabilizer drouge. To prevent deterioration by sunlight. Unable to make change aboard ship.

Number 34 - override pin to prevent seat bucket from dropping - maintenance change.

MARTIN BAKER SEAT CARTRIDGE EXPIRATION DATES

PILOT'S SEAT	EXPIRATION	LOT NO.	RIO SEAT	EXPIRATION	LOT NO.
Secondary	9-68	U143	Secondary	5-68	U143
Lower Secondary	9-68	U143	Lower Secondary	5-68	U143
Seat Aft			Seat Aft		
Initiator	9-69	U143	Initiator	5-68	U143
Seat Primary	9-68	U143	Seat Primary	9-68	U143
Guillotine	9-69	U183	Guillotine	3-68	U122
Drouge	9-68	U143	Drouge	5-68	U143

FAILED COMPONENTS:

Pilot's seat: None suspected
NFO's seat: None suspected

(b) (6) [redacted]

ENCLOSURE (7)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

RESUME OF PILOT'S FLYING EXPERIENCE

COMMAND ATTACHED	PERIOD ASSIGNED	AIRCRAFT MODEL	FLIGHT HOURS	CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	OPERATIONAL/ PROFICIENCY
VT-1	AUG 64 OCT 64	T-34	31.7	0/0	OPERATIONAL
VT-2/3	NOV 64 MAY 65	T-28	119.5	5/0	OPERATIONAL
VT-25	JUN 65 AUG 65	TF-9 AF-9	117.0	3/0	OPERATIONAL
VT-26	SEP 65	F-11	25.4	0/0	OPERATIONAL
VA-43	OCT 65 NOV 65	TF-9	17.2	0/0	OPERATIONAL
VF-101	DEC 65 MAY 66	TF-9 F-4	112.1	10/6	OPERATIONAL
VF-84	MAY 66 FEB 67	F-4	243.2	86/41	OPERATIONAL
VF-161	MAR 67 OCT 67	F-4	180.8	37/9	OPERATIONAL

ENCLOSURE (8)

RESCUE REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-13 (3-63) IA-0107-601-7230

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E
INSTRUCTIONS: SEE REVERSE

OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL 3750-14

1. FROM: COMMANDING OFFICER FITRON ONE SIX ONE	2. DATE OF MISHAP: 10/8/67 — 3A. DATE OF RESCUE: 10/8/67
3. LOCATION AND DUTIES OF RESCUE VEHICLE: CLARK AFB, ALERT SAR	4. RESCUE VEHICLE (Type/model): HU-16B
5. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: 5A. IN RESCUE VEHICLE OR ON RESCUE TEAM: 7 — 5B. TO BE RESCUED: 2 — 5C. RESCUED: 1	6. RESCUE BACK UP MEANS: H-2, H-19, H-46

7. TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Local Date Time Group)

7A. Alert Received: 0945	Method: UHF GUARD
7B. Vehicle Departed: 1000	Distance to Scene: 91 NM
7C. Arrived on Scene: 1030	Search Required: NONE
7D. Located Survivor: 1030	Method of Locating: VECTORED BY ON SCENE AIRCRAFT
7E. Began Retrieval: 1040	What Was Sighted First: NATIVE FISHING BOAT WITH SURVIVOR
7F. Ended Retrieval: 1048	Subsequently: WATER TAXI SEARCH FOR 15 MINUTES
7G. Survivor(s) Disembarked: 1138	Location (If different from Item 3): NAS CUBI POINT

8. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RESCUE SITE

8A. WATER TEMPERATURE	AIR TEMPERATURE	WIND VELOCITY
82 °F	84 °F	220/8

8B. SEA STATE/WAVE HEIGHT/FREQUENCY, TERRAIN DESCRIPTION: 2/3FT./4

9. EQUIPMENTS ACTUALLY USED DURING RESCUE: SIX (6) MAN RAFT PARA RESCUE TEAM IN WET SUITS

10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final outcome of rescue attempt, i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATING, RETRIEVING, POST-RETRIEVAL)

SOME DIFFICULTY ENCOUNTERED IN TRANSFERING SURVIVOR WITH (b) (6) [redacted] FROM NATIVE FISHING BOAT TO 6 MAN RAFT AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO HU-16 IN THE WATER.

11. PERSONNEL REQUIRING RESCUE (NAME-LAST FIRST INITIAL)	GIVE REASON FOR RESCUE	FACTORS COMPLICATING RESCUE ATTEMPT (Physical condition, ignorance of equipment, sea state, etc.)
(b) (6) [redacted]	DOWN AT SEA	(b) (6) [redacted]
ARMSTRONG, WAYNE A.	DOWN AT SEA	NOT RECOVERED

12. REMARKS: (Training of rescue teams or crews, communication equipments/technique, retrieval equipments/techniques, rescue vehicle)

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: Narratives of search, location and retrieving—Survivor's statements

14. NAME AND TITLE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL: LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] SENIOR MEMBER (b) (6) [redacted]

15. NAME AND TITLE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL: CDR R. J. SCHULTE COMMANDING OFF

SIGNATURE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL: RJ Schulte

ENCLOSURE (9)

O 081239Z OCT 67
FM DET 2 PARRK CLARK AB PI
TO HQ USAF WASH DC
AFCP WASH DC
MAC
MCP SCOTT AFB ILL
CINCPACAF
ARSCP ORLANDO AFB FLA
PARRC HICKAM AFB HAW
13AF DOCC CLARK ABPI
636CSG DOBO CLARK ABPI
31ST ARRSQ CLARK AB PI
RESUCE COORDINATION CENTER MANSLA INTL AP
COMSEVENTHFLT
USS CORAL SEA VR 161
COMNAVPHPL SANGLEY PT NAS PI
USS REEVES
COMPHILSEC SANGLEY PT NAS PI
CUBI AIR OPS
NAVAL AIR STATION CUBI PT PI
CTF 77.0
BT
UNCLAS DSAR 00207. FOR HQ USAF (AFXOPFH)
MAC (MAOCOA), CINCPACAF (DOCC-R),PARRC (PROOP)
1. RUSCUE OPENING/SUSPENDING REPORT
2. 13 AF JRCC 51 - 08 OCT 1967
3. 08 OCT 1967
4. A. USN F-4C
   B. VFR - LOCAL
   C. S/E
   D. GREY - UNK
   E. USA
   F. USN - VF-161
   G. LT. (JG) (b) (6) [redacted]
   H. TWO
   I. NORMAL SEAT SURVIVAL PACK, LIFE RAFT AND RADIOS
5. 31ST ARRS 08/0148Z
6. S/E
7. 31ST ARRS HU-16 08/0148Z
8. ALERT HU - 16 AIRBORNE 08/0200Z
9. 13;52N 120:05E (190 DRG RADIAL 58NM FROM CUBI TACAN)
10. A. WEATHER EXCELLENT. REPORTED 1500FT SCATTERED, HIGH SCATTERED
       VIS 15NM WIND 120/03 KTS
    B. SAME AS A. - SEA STATE TWOFT. SWELLS, PRIMARY 220 DRG SECONDARY
       260 DRG 3 FT SWELLS, 4 SEC PERIOD

ENCLOSURE (10)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

11. 13 AF JRCC - MAJ. (b) (6) [redacted]
12. COMNAVPHIL, 31ARRS, CUBI PT NAS AIR OPERATION - 13 AF AIR DEFENSE NET
13. DOWNED AIRCRAFTS WINGMAN. 08/0146Z
14. 31ST ARRS HU - 16 WATER LANDING 08/0348Z
15. A. 2/0/1/0/1/0
    B. 2/1/0/0/0/0
16. AIRLIFTED TO CUBI NAS, R.P. FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT
17. 31 ARRS HU-16 3/5 PLUS 52 HH-43 4/4 PLUS 45
    USCG HU-16 2/6 PLUS 12
    PACAF JUNGLE SURVIVAL SCHOOL HELO H-19 (UNAVAIL CUBI NAS.)
    6200MW C-47 3/2 PLUS 00
    USN P-2 UNAVAIL CUBI NAS.
    USN P-3 UNAVAIL CUBI NAS.
    USAF F 102 1/1 PLUS 10
    USN HELO UNAVAIL CUBI NAS
18. 0/0/1/0/0/0/0/3
19. S/E
20. A. 100 SQ MILE AREA CENTERED ON SURVIVORS POSITION. 100 OCT EFFECTIVE DUE MULTIPLE COVERAGE BY FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT AND IDEAL WEATHER, SEA CONDITIONS.
    B. ONE RECOVERED NO ONTHER SIGHTINGS
    F. THE DOWNED AIRCRAFTS WINGMAN WHO IS ALSO THE FLYING SAFETY OFFICER OF VF 161, LT CDR (b) (6) [redacted], STATED HE RECOMMENDS SUSPENSION SINCE HE FELT FURTHER SEARCH WOULD PROVE FUTILE CUBI AIR OPS, LT CDR (b) (6) [redacted], AFTER INTERROGATING THE SURVIVOR, CONCURED COMNAVPHIL CONCURS.
20. B. THE CLARK AB SECONDARY CRASH NET ALERTED THE 31ST ARRSQ THAT AN F4C HAD CRASHED A LUBANG ISLAND, R.P. THE ALERT HU-16 WAS IMMEDIATELY SCRABLED. THE LUBANG RADAR SITE REPORTED THE MAYDAY FROM THE WINGMAN OF AN USN F4C ON A LOCAL TNG FLIGHT. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED APPROXIMATELY TWO NM NORTH OF LUBANG AIR FIELD BUT BOTH CREW MEMBERS HAD BAILED OUT. THE WINGMAN LT. CDR. (b) (6) [redacted], REPORTED TWO GOOD CHUTES. THE 31ST HU-16 WAS AIRBORNE 08/0200Z. CONTINUOUS VISUAL CONTACT WAS MAINTAINED WITH SURVIVORS BY THE F4, A USN P-3 AND THE USAF HU-16. THE P-3 DROPPED A RAFT TO THE SURVIVOR. THERE WERE 7 OR MORE BANKAS (FISHING BOATS) IN THE AREA AT ALL TIMES. AF RESCUE 304 ARRIVED ON SCENE AND MADE A WATER LANDING AT 08/0333Z. THE PILOT HAD BEEN PICKED UP BY A BANKA BUT WAS TRANFERED TO THE HU-16 FOR EVACUATION TO CUBI PT. NAS. (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] WHEN QUESTIONED HE STATED THE OBSERVER HAD A GOOD CHUTE AND HAD ENTERED THE WATER APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF MILE AWAY, BUT THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT AFTER REACING THE SURFACE. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE OBSERVER WAS NOT QUALIFIED IN THE AIRCRAFT AND HAD ONLY HAD THE "WARDROOM" BRIEFING ON THE SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT. LTCDR. (b) (6) [redacted] THE PILOT OF THE WING F4 AND SQUARDRON FLYING SAFETY OFFICER, WAS FLOWN FROM CUBI NAS TO LUBANG ABOARD A USAF H-19 TO ASSIST IN SEARCH OPERATIONS.

ENCLOSURE (20)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

HE STATED THAT HE HAD WATCHED BOTH PILOT AND OBSERVER BAIL OUT, DESCEND AND ENTER THE WATER. HE HAD MAINTAINED VISUAL CONTACT WITH BOTH MEN FOR APPROXIMATELY FIVE MINUTES. BUT THE OBSERVER APPEARED TO BE HAVING DIFFICULTY SINCE HE WAS UNDER HIS CHUTE CANOPY AFTER HITTING THE WATER HE SEEMED TO BE TANGLED IN THE SHROUD LINES. CDR (b) (6) [redacted] STATED THAT HE HAD BOTH MEN IN SIGHT, THEN AFTER MAKING A TURN THE OBSERVER JUST WASN'T THERE ANYMORE. HE DID MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE OTHER MAN UNTIL HE WAS RELIEVED ON SCENE BY THE USN P-3. A THOROUGH SEARCH WAS MADE OF THE AREA USING FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING ACFT. THE NUMEROUS BANKA BOATS WERE CHECKED BY HELO FOR ANY INFORMATION. NEGATIVE RESULTS. CDR (b) (6) [redacted] STATED THAT IN VIEW OF THE EXTENSIVE SEARCH PERFORMED UNDER IDEAL WEATHER AND SEA CONDITIONS WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS AND PIN POINT LOCATION OF THE DISTRESSED INDIVIDUALS; HIS OWN OBSERVATIONS; AND THE LACK OF ANY SIGN OF THE OBSERVER HE FELT FURTHER SEARCH WAS FUTILE. THE CUBI PT. NAS AIR OPERATIONS DUTY OFFICER LTCDR (b) (6) [redacted] CONCURED. SEARCH WAS SUSPENDED 08/0715Z.

BT

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

NAVAL MESSAGE

(b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] CDR, USN

DRAFTED BY (b) (6) [redacted] CDR, USN

PHONE EXT NR 202

PAGE 1 OF 1

PAGES

DATE 11 OCTOBER 1967

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ROUTED BY

CHECKED BY

MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (OCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
	111511	ACTION				XXXX		
		INFO					XXXXX	

FROM: USS CORAL SEA
TO: DET TWO PARRK CLARK AB PI

INFO: HQ USAF WASH DC
AFCPWASH DC
CINCPACAF
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMNAVPHPL SANGLEY PT NAS PI
NAVAL AIR STATION CUBI PT PI
CTF SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO

BT
UNCLAS

REDUCE OPENING/SUSPENDING REPORT

A. DET TWO PARRK CLARK AB PI 081239Z OCT 67

1. COMMAND APPRECIATES PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE RESPONSE DURING SAR INCIDENT OF 8 OCT.

2. FOLLOWING CORRECTIONS TO REF A ARE SUBMITTED FOR RECORD PURPOSES:

A. AIRCRAFT TYPE: F4B VICE F4C

B. CREWMEN IN ACCOMPTING AIRCRAFT DID NOT WITNESS ACTUAL EJECTIONS. CHUTES WERE OBSERVED IN AIR AFTER CRASH OF AIRCRAFT.

C. BOTH CREWMAN OBSERVED IN WATER. NEITHER WAS COVERED BY CHUTE.

D. DISCREPENCY EXISTS IN PARA 20 B OF REF A IN THAT THE STATEMENT ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY PILOT (b) (6) [redacted] CONCERNING QUALIFICATION OF ARMSTRONG WAS IN FACT, NEVER MADE. BRIEFING FOR FLIGHT WAS CONDUCTED TWO HOURS PRIOR TO FLIGHT BY THE FLIGHT LEADER IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE DIRECTIVES.

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE/TIME GROUP (OCT)

ENCLOSURE (11)

ACAN-15

OTTUZYUW RUWJMUA 6761 2811346-UUUU--RUCIJUA
ZNR UUUUU REROUTE OF RUMFUS 312 0805402
~~[illegible]~~-T-RCVW FOUR VEROXO

ZOV RUCIJUA

CZCUMA649
OFTUZYUW RUHHROA0678 2811340-UUUU--RUWJMUA.
ZNR UUUUU ZOV RUMFCR 161C 2811300
RUEOPDA-T-DIR AFIP
RUWJMUA-T-RCVW FOUR
VVV FFB215VV USA491
OO RUMFCR
DE RUMFUS 312 2810542
ZNR UUUUU
O P 080540Z OCT 67
FM USS CORAL SEA
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVSAFCEN
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOM
RUWJMUA/COMFAIR SAN DIEGO
RUMFUP/USS ORISKANY
RUWJMUA/VAW ONE ONE ONE
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUWJAPA/COMFAIRMIRAMAR
RUHGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUWJAPA/RCVW ONE TWO
RUMFCR/RCVW FOUR
RUMFM/DEPUTY COMFAIRWESTPAC
RUCIHHA/NAVPLANTREPC STL
RUMFCR/DIR AFIP
ZEN/COMCARDIV SEVEN
BT
UNCLAS ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
PRELIMINARY/SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6F
1. 8 OCT 67, 0940H, DAY

PRIORITY

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8 OCT 67 13 46Z

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VF-161

F-4B/150474 VF-161 2-68A 10-8-67

PAGE TWO RUMFUS 312 UNCLAS
2. F4B, 150474, VF-161, 2-68A
3. 190 DEGREES 58NM NAS CUBI POINT
4. [redacted] (b) (6), LTJG, [redacted] (b) (6) USN, 1310 ACTIVE, B
5. WAYNE A. ARMSTRONG, LTJG, [redacted] (b) (6), USNR, 1325 ACTIVE, VAW-111
DET-34 USS ORISKANY, L, NFO
6. ALFA, AIRCRAFT EXPLODED ON IMPACT WITH GROUND
7. LOCAL AREA FAM AND TACTICS, 00 PLUS 35
8. STALL/SPIN
9. AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN AIR TO AIR COMBAT PRACTICE. A HEAD ON PASS AT 15,000 FT SIGNALED COMMENCEMENT OF AIR COMBAT MANEUVERING BETWEEN 2 ACFT. SUBJ ACFT UNLOADED AND ACCELERATED TO 550 KCAS THEN PULLED UP INTO VERTICAL YO-YO. AT APPROX 20,000 FT, 200 KCAS IN A NOSE HIGH TURN PILOT LOST CONTROL AND NOTED 30 UNITS ANGLE ATTACK. WHEN CONTROL COULD NOT BE REGAINED, THE DRAG CHUTE WAS DEPLOYED. A NOSE LOW ATTITUDE WAS ACHIEVED BUT CONTROL COULD NOT BE REGAINED. THE FLIGHT LEADER CALLED TO EJECT AND THE PILOT NOTED 6,000 FT MSL. THE PILOT TOLD THE NFO TO EJECT AND THEN DID SO HIMSELF.
10. 30-50-SCATTERED, HIGH BROKEN, 10 MILES VIS, SEA STATE 2, 84 DEG AIR TEMP, 82 DEG WATER TEMP.
11. NONE

PAGE THREE RUMFUS 312 UNCLAS
12. NONE
13. MARTIN BAKER H-5A. NO FAILURES SUSPECTED. PILOTS PK-2 ONLY HALF INFLATED, PILOTS HELMET COME OFF DURING EJECTION (APH-6, NAPE STRAP INSTALLED AND CHIN STRAP CINCHED TIGHT). AIRCRAFT AT 6000 FT MSL, APPROX 240 KCAS, 60 DEG NOSE LOW, PILOT WAS WEARING FIVE AND ONE HALF LB SURVIVAL VEST. NFO WAS OBSERVED IN HIS CHUTE AND CHUTE OBSERVED IN WATER. NFO NOT RECOVERED, SEARCH STILL IN PROGRESS.
14. NONE
15. NONE
BT

CNAP 80-A- FULL INT-X CFSD FACSFAC VAW- 111
-X- -X- -X-

080540Z OCT67RJ

NNNN

OCT 67 13 45 Z