RECORDS CODE SHEET
ID 4535 (Rev. 3-59)

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

GENERAL (Card No. 1)

Field	Code	Columns
Bureau Number	1 4 2 8 4 5	16-21
Reporting Custodian	1 5 4	22-24
Type of Duty	2 1	25-26
Major Command	1	27
Aircraft Damage	A	28
Aircraft Injury	E	29
Maneuver prior to Accident	G	30
First Accident type	G 6	31-32
First Accident phase	4 1	33-35
Second Accident type	B 1	36-37
Second Accident Phase	A 2	38-40
Type of Operation	3	41-42
Contributing Cause Factors	3	43-47
Pilot Factor, First		48-49
Pilot Factor, Second		50-51
Pilot Factor, Third		52-53
First other Personnel Factor		54-55
Second other Personnel Factor		56-57
Primary Major Material Factor	T	58
Secondary Major Material Factor		59
Design		60
Facilities		61
Special Data & Cond.	1 G 8 D	62-68
Type of Incident		69
Avoidable Incident or Ground Accident ("R")		70
No Personnel Card ("R")		80

SUPPLEMENTARY (Card No. 2)

Field	Code	Columns
Weather		16-21
Kind of Flight	1 L	22-24
Relative Wind		27
Clearance	3	28
Time of Day	2	29
Number of other Aircraft		30
Altitude of Occurrence	4 Ø Ø	33-35
Distance from Field	Coded on forced landings only	38-40
Length of Runway		41-42
Field Elevation		43-45
Non-Navy Injury ("R")		47
Number of "A" or "L" or "M" Injury		48-49
Number of "B" Injury		50-51
Number of "C" Injury		52-53
Number of "D" Injury		54-55
Number of "E" Injury	Ø 1	56-57
Location	A 1 E L C T R	62-68
Facility Data	9	69-74

ACCIDENT DAMAGE: A (9)

I.D. NO.: 9 1 3 1 Ø 1 Ø 3 (1 YR; 2-3 MO; 4-5 DAY; 6 TYP; 7-8 SEQ) — Don't Count / Enemy Action / Other Aircraft

ACCIDENT INJURY: E (10)

Model: A 4 D 2 (11-15)

FISCAL YEAR: Ø (75)

SPECIAL ATTN: ("X"): X

Model Code: Ø 4 (76-77)

IBM: The above Fields are to be punched in all Coded Cards

PERSONNEL STATISTICS (Card No. 3)

File Number → [redacted]

Pilot Name (16 17 18 19 20 21) [redacted]

(22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31)

Rank/Rate	Br Service	Age	Yrs Experience	Status	Position	Inj-to Ind	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Trainer Utilization	Instr. Card	Total Time All Models	All Models 3 Months	All Series This Model	All Ser Mod 3 Months	CV Landings	Instrument Hours	Nite Hours	Jet Total or Time Helo
5	2	6	1	A	1	5	2	2	1 5	7	Ø 8	Ø 9	3 9	Ø 9		Ø 1	Ø 6	5 7
32	36	37	40	42	46	47	49	51	52-53	55	56-57	58-59	62-63	65-66	68	69-70	71-72	73-74

2nd Pilot Name (16 17 18 19 20 21)

File Number →

IBM: PERSONNEL CODED ON REVERSE SIDE ☐

IBM 1-21

FF4-1/3750
Serial:
80/ 762

27 JAN 1960

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARAGRAPH 70, OPNAVINST 3750.6D

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on ATKRON 112 AAR ser 2-59 concerning A4D-2 BUNO 142845 accident occurring 10 December 1959 pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-05F)
Via: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: ATKRON 112 AAR ser 2-59

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, and in the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements.

2. Since this accident, the J-65 engines have been restricted to 480 hours on any blades in the first three stages of the compressor. In addition, uncoated blades have been ordered removed from service.

(b) (6) [redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
BUWEPS
NAVAVSAFCEN (2) (Airmail)
CINCPACFLT
COMFAIRSANDIEGO
CO NPU EL CENTRO
COMCARAIRGRU 11
CO ATKRON 112
CO ATKRON 113
BUWEPS REP EL SEGUNDO
BUWEPS REP WOODBRIDGE
CO ATKRON 94
CO ATKRON 55
CO ATKRON 56
CO ATKRON 125
CO ATKRON 126
CO ATKRON 93
CO ATKRON 153
CO ATKRON 155

RECEIVED
FEB 1 1960
NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

FF7/3750
Serial:
80/116
JAN 18 1960

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARAGRAPH 70, OPNAV INST 3750.6D

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VA-112 AAR ser 2-59 concerning A4D-2 BUNO 142845 accident occurring 10 December 1959, Pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Commander Fleet Air San Diego
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-05F)
Via: (1) Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
(2) Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VA-112 Aircraft Accident Report ser 2-59

Ref: (a) OPNAV INST 3750.6D

1. Forwarded, concurring in general with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, and the remarks contained in the first endorsement.

2. Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron ONE HUNDRED TWELVE is directed to forward a supplementary report in accordance with paragraph 47 of reference (a) if the Disassembly Inspection Report or the report from the Naval Parachute Unit so warrant.

3. The following administrative errors were noted:

(a) The time shown in item 16, section A Part I of the report form should be "0 / 24" vice "0.4".

(b) The first endorsement does not show a copy distribution as required by paragraph 46 h of reference (a).

Copy to:
COMNAVAVSAFCEN (2)
BUWEPS (AER-21)
CINCPACFLT
COMNAVAIRPAC
BUWEPS REP EL SEGUNDO
BUWEPS REP WOODRIDGE
CO, NPU, El Centro
CO, VA-112, CO, VA-113, CO, VA-94,
CO, VA-55, CO, VA-56, CO, VA-125,
CO, VA-126, CO, VA-93, CO, VA-153,
CO, VA-155

Robert E. C. Jones
ROBERT E. C. JONES
CHIEF OF STAFF

3

ORIGINAL

6

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
PARA. 70, OPNAV INST. 3750.6D

FF12/ComCVG-11/3750
00/mn
Ser: 180-60
7 January 1960

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VA-112 AAR Ser 2-59 concerning A4D-2 BuNo 142845 accident occurring 10 December 1959, pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Commander, Carrier Air Group ELEVEN
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air San Diego
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet

Subj: VA-112 AAR Report Ser 2-59

1. Forwarded, concurring with the comments and recommendations of the Accident Board and the First Endorsement.

R. F. CYR

Copy to:
NAVAVSAFCEN (2) Airmail
BUAER
CINCPACFLT
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRSDIEGO
BAR EL SEGUNDO
BAR WOODRIDGE
OINC NPU EL CENTRO
VA-113, VA-94, VA-125
VA-126, VA-55, VA-56,
VA-153, VA-155, VA-93

5

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

FF12-VA112
Ser: 485
31 December 1959

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARAGRAPH 70. OPNAV INST 3750.6D

FIRST ENDORSEMENT ON VA-112 AAR ser 2-59 concerning A4D-2 BUNO 142845
accident occuring 10 December 1959, pilot (b) (6) [redacted]

From: Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron ONE ONE TWO
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Air Group ELEVEN
(2) Commander Fleet Air San Diego
(3) Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VA-112 Aircraft Accident Report ser 2-59

1. Forwarded concurring in the AAR Board's comments and recommendations.

2. All pilots in this squadron had been advised to eject at 10,000 feet unless special circumstances dictated otherwise. LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] has been commended for his professional handling of this emergency, however the advantages of a higher ejection altitude were reiterated.

3. (b) (5) [redacted] It is recommended that the tower personnel concerned be more thoroughly indoctrinated in the capabilities of aircraft without a functioning powerplant.

4. It should be noted that squadron SOP requires either a chase pilot or radar flight monitoring for all test flights in addition to a standard knee-pad test flight data card.

C. J. Lee

C. J. LEE

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (Rev. 5-58) PAGE 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6C.

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART I - GENERAL

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. A/C ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY: Commanding Officer VA-112

2. DATE OF ACCIDENT: 10 Dec. 1959 TIME (LZ): 1600U

3. SERIAL NUMBER: 2-59

4. TO: Chief of Naval Operations

5. VIA: (1) CVG-11
(2) COMFAIRSDIEGO
(3) COMNAVAIRPAC
(4)
(5)
(6)
(LAST) Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

6. ENCLOSURES: (1) Pilot Statements
(2) Photographs
(3) Medical Officer's Report (Orig. Only)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

7. REPORTING CUSTODIAN (if different than item 3. above): VA-112

8. ACTIVITY OPERATING A/C (if different than item 7.): SAME

9. KIND OF FLIGHT: 111

10. TIME OF DAY: [ ] DAWN [X] DAY [ ] DUSK [ ] NIGHT

11. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT: 23 WNW ALF El Centro

12. ELEVATION ABOVE SEA LEVEL: 0

13. PLACE OF LAST TAKE-OFF: NAS MIRAMAR

14. CLEARED FROM: NAS MIRAMAR TO: NAS MIRAMAR

15. TYPE CLEARANCE: [ ] IFR [ ] VFR [ ] DVFR [X] LOCAL [ ] OPERATIONAL [ ] AIRWAYS [ ] DIRECT [ ] OTHER (specify)

16. TIME IN FLIGHT: 0.4

17. TYPE ACCIDENT: FI (Collision ground)

18. PHASE OF FLIGHT: In Flight

A/C

19. MODEL: A4D-2

20. SERIAL NO.: 142845

21. DAMAGE TO A/C: [X] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E [ ] F

22. DOLLAR COST: $484,000

23. AIRSPEED (Kts.): 220

24. A/C WEIGHT: 13,500 lbs.

25. LIST MODEL, SER. NR, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete on OPNAV FORM 3750-1 for each A/C involved): NONE

	1. NAME (Last, first and middle initials)	2. RANK RATE	3. FILE SERVICE NO.	4. DESIGNATION	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7. YEARS OF EXP. DNA	8. BILLET	9. POSITION	10. INJURY CODE
PILOT (Complete at time of accident)	(b) (6) [redacted]	LTJG.	(b) (6) [redacted]	1315	USNR	25	1½	Pilot	Cockpit	E
CO-PILOT										

PERSONNEL		8. OFT - OPERATIONAL FLIGHT TRAINER AVAILABLE	8. OFT - OPERATIONAL FLIGHT TRAINER USED	9. OFT - COCKPIT PROCEDURES TRAINER AVAILABLE	9. OFT - COCKPIT PROCEDURES TRAINER USED	10. UNIT TO WHICH PERSONNEL ARE ATTACHED	11. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD
PILOT	YES	X	X	X	X	VA-112	[X] STANDARD [ ] SPECIAL
	NO						
CO-PILOT	YES						[ ] STANDARD [ ] SPECIAL
	NO						

SECTION B - PERSONNEL DATA

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

No.	ITEM		PILOT	CO-PILOT
	ALL MODELS		802	
	ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		339	
	ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		97	
	ALL SERIES THIS MODEL (Item 19)	A/C	396	
		OFT / CPT	15	
	ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	306	
		OFT / CPT	12	
	ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	96	
		OFT / CPT	3	

ITEM		PILOT	CO-PILOT
CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT		9/0	
FCLP LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT		130/0	
INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS		0.4	
NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS		6.2	
TOTAL HELO. HOURS (Helo. AAR only)			
TOTAL JET HOURS (JET AAR only)		579	
LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	9-Dec-59	
	DURATION	3.3	

6

OTHER PERSONNEL

12. NAME (Last, first and middle initials)	DNA	RANK RATE	FILE/SERVICE NO.	ORG. TO WHICH ATTACHED	INJURY CODE	BILLET	POSITION
1.							
2.							
3.							
4.							
5.							

ORIGINAL

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

C. WEATHER

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. WIND DIRECTION & VELOCITY (relative)	4. TEMPERATURE	OUTSIDE AIR	RUNWAY	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (Winds aloft, icing levels, sea state, etc., if pertinent to accident)

D. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

√	FACTOR	√	FACTOR	√	FACTOR
	PILOT		LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		MATERIAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION
	CREW		OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		DESIGN
	SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		ADMINISTRATIVE		ROLLING AND PITCHING DECK/ ROUGH SEAS
	MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		AIRPORT OR CARRIER FACILITIES		UNDETERMINED
	SERVICING PERSONNEL		WEATHER		OTHER (Specify)

E. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD DEPLOYED CARRIER (Complete following section on Pilot.)

1. DATE DEPLOYED	2. DAY - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	3. DAY - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS
4. INSTRUMENT HRS. LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT	5. NIGHT - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	6. NIGHT - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS

PART II - MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

SECTION A - AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE DATA

1. A/C HISTORY

DATE OF MANUFACTURE	SERVICE TOUR	MONTHS IN THIS TOUR	TOTAL NO. OF OVERHAULS	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	TYPE CHECK LAST PERFORMED	FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	NO. OF DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK

2. ENGINE HISTORY

		ENGINE MODEL	ENGINE SERIAL NO.					
	1							
	2							
	3							
	4							

3. GENERAL

a. DID FIRE OCCUR? ☐ BEFORE ACCIDENT ☐ AFTER ACCIDENT ☐ DID NOT OCCUR

b. DID EXPLOSION OCCUR IN FLIGHT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

c. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ AMP FOR SERIAL

d. HAS DIR BEEN REQUESTED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

e. FAILED COMPONENTS INVOLVED

SECTION B - MAINT. AND ENG. FACTORS

CHECK ITEMS PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT

a. ☐ A/C DESIGN
b. ☐ A/C EQUIPMENT
c. ☐ MAINTENANCE
d. ☐ UNDETERMINED
e. ☐ TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
f. ☐ OTHER (Specify)
g. ☐ SURFACE FACILITIES
h. ☐ HUMAN ENGINEERING (e.g., Cockpit configurations, etc.)

7

C. OTHER DATA

a. ALTITUDE AT MALFUNCTION	b. AIRSPEED Etc.	c. OPERATING TEMP.	d. WEIGHT OF A/C	e. C.G. (% MAC)	f. KIND OF FUEL	g. FUEL PRESSURE

h. EVIDENCE OF FUEL CONTAMINATION

i. CAUSE OF ENGINE FAILURE OR FLAMEOUT

j. FUEL CONTROL REGULATOR/CARBURETOR (List stock and serial nos., give time since new or overhauled)

k. EXTERNAL STORES ABOARD A/C

(If additional space is necessary, attach additional sheets)

ORIGINAL

OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (Rev. 5-58)
PAGE 2

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

C. WEATHER

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. WIND DIRECTION & VELOCITY (relative)	4. TEMPERATURE OUTSIDE AIR	RUNWAY	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
Clear	15	NA	66	NA	30	30.04

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (Winds aloft, icing levels, sea state, etc., if pertinent to accident)
NONE

D. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
	PILOT		LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER	X	MATERIAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION
	CREW		OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		DESIGN
	SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		ADMINISTRATIVE		ROLLING AND PITCHING DECK/ ROUGH SEAS
	MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		AIRPORT OR CARRIER FACILITIES		UNDETERMINED
	SERVICING PERSONNEL		WEATHER		OTHER (Specify)

E. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD DEPLOYED CARRIER (Complete following section on Pilot.)

1. DATE DEPLOYED	2. DAY - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	3. DAY - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS
4. INSTRUMENT HRS. LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT	5. NIGHT - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	6. NIGHT - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS

PART II - MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

1. A/C HISTORY

DATE OF MANUFACTURE	SERVICE TOUR	MONTHS IN THIS TOUR	TOTAL NO. OF OVERHAULS	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	TYPE CHECK LAST PERFORMED	FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	NO. OF DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
9-22-58	1	14	0	———	310.7	Inter.	34.0	58

2. ENGINE HISTORY

	ENGINE MODEL	ENGINE SERIAL NO.						
1 Unknown	J65-W16A	M612096	1	166.5	170	Inter.	34.0	58
2								
3								
4								

3. GENERAL

A. DID FIRE OCCUR?
[ ] BEFORE ACCIDENT [X] AFTER ACCIDENT [ ] DID NOT OCCUR

B. DID EXPLOSION OCCUR IN FLIGHT?
[X] YES [ ] NO

C. CHECK IF APPLICABLE
[ ] MAP FOR SERIAL

D. HAS SIR BEEN REQUESTED?
[X] YES [ ] NO

E. FAILED COMPONENTS INVOLVED
Engine and some accessories

4. MAINT. AND ENG. FACTORS

CHECK ITEMS PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT

a. [ ] A/C DESIGN
b. [X] A/C EQUIPMENT
c. [ ] MAINTENANCE
d. [ ] UNDETERMINED
e. [ ] TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
f. [ ] OTHER (Specify)
g. [ ] SURFACE FACILITIES
h. [ ] HUMAN ENGINEERING (e.g., Cockpit configurations, etc.)

5. OTHER DATA

a. ALTITUDE AT MALFUNCTION	b. AIRSPEED	c. OPERATING TEMP.	d. WEIGHT OF A/C	e. C.G. (% MAC)	f. KIND OF FUEL	g. FUEL PRESSURE
40,000 ft/	220 Kts.	Normal	13,500 #	NA	JP-4	Normal

h. EVIDENCE OF FUEL CONTAMINATION
NA

i. CAUSE OF ENGINE FAILURE OR FLAMEOUT
3rd Stage Compressor Blade P/N 225483

j. FUEL CONTROL, REGULATOR/CARBURETOR (List stock and set nos., give time since new or overhauled)
[illegible]-674-3435-HBPD/H-510088 186.9 Hrs.

k. EXTERNAL STORES ABOARD A/C
Two 300 Gal. Tanks

(If additional space is necessary, attach additional sheets)

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

OPNAV [illegible] (Rev. [illegible])
PAGE 3

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV REPORT [illegible]

PART II - MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA (cont'd)

SECTION B - FACILITIES DATA

1. GENERAL - 3 BASIC FACILITIES INVOLVED. DESCRIBE EFFECT ON ACCIDENT IN THE ANALYSIS SECTION OF THE REPORT

	a. CLEARANCE AUTHORITY		i. WATER LANDING AREA		g. CRASH AND RESCUE
	b. FLIGHT PLANNING INFORMATION SOURCE		j. APPROACH ZONE		h. SEARCH AND RESCUE
	c. LANDING AIDS (CCA, CCA, [illegible])		k. END ZONE (Overrun)		i. CATAPULT
	d. TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER (field or ship)		l. SHOULDERS		j. ARRESTING GEAR (Carrier)
	e. APPROACH AND ENROUTE AIDS TO NAVIGATION		m. TAXIWAY		k. BARRIER OR BARRICADE (field or ship)
	f. RUNWAY WATCH		n. PARKING AREA		l. FLIGHT DECK
	g. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		o. EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR (Runway)		m. MIRROR
	h. RUNWAY		p. A/C SERVICING, HANDLING AND DIRECTING (field or ship)		OTHER (Specify)

a. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR		b. PRESSURE SETTINGS	c. WIND OVER DECK	d. RELATIVE HEADWIND	e. APPROACH SPEED (OPS-12 READING)
f. MARK NUMBER	g. MODEL NUMBER	h. LOCATION ON SHIP	i. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND CONFIGURATION USED		
j. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED					

2. SHIPS DATA

k. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) a major aircraft accident involves arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Minor accidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable components need not be reported.

ENGAGED	DECK RUNOUT (FT.)	RAM TRAVEL (IN.)	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE: SOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE: RATIO	CONSTANT RUN-OUT (WT. LBS.)	ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	COMMENTS (for cable failure specify number of landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER							
BARRIER							
BARRICADE							

PART	SECTION	ITEM	PART III REMARKS (Continue on additional sheets)
II	A	5	CAUSE OF ACCIDENT IS BELIEVED TO BE STRESS CORROSION WITH SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF A THIRD STAGE COMPRESSOR BLADE P/N 225483 WHICH HAD 563 HOURS OF OPERATION. THIRD STAGE BLADES HAD 398 HOURS OF OPERATION WHEN INSTALLED IN THIS ENGINE. DIR REPORT FROM OVERHAUL AND REPAIR, ALAMEDA, WILL AMPLIFY.

COPY DISTRIBUTION

2cc. NAVAVNSAFECEN DIRECT
1cc. BUAER DIRECT
CINCPACFLT
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRSDIEGO, CVG-11
BAR EL SEGUNDO
BAR WOODRIDGE, N.J.
OINC NPT, EL CENTRO
VA112, VA113, VA94, VA-93
VA125, VA126, VA55,
VA56, VA153, VA155.

COST DAMAGE TO: GOVERNMENT PROPERTY $ NONE | PRIVATE PROPERTY NONE | DATE SUBMITTED TO C.O.

PART IV - SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR, Operations UNIT BILLET

(b) (6) [redacted]

LT, Maintenance UNIT BILLET

(b) (6) [redacted]

[redacted], CVG-11

(b) (6) [redacted]

[redacted]SN, Safety UNIT BILLET

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

V THE ACCIDENT

1. On 10 December 1959 at 1535, BUNO 142845 departed NAS Miramar on an acceptance test flight. Preflight checks were normal and the pilot commenced a climb to 40,000 feet. During the climb the pilot made contact with the local GCI unit to check out the IFF equipment. At 40,000 feet a turn was commenced to ascertain positive radar control and when the aircraft was rolled wings level, the pilot experienced an explosion and immediately noted the TPT at 900°C.

2. The pilot reported the explosion to the GCI site and switched to guard frequency. TPT remained the same at idle RPM so the pilot secured the engine with the throttle and extended the speed brakes arriving over ALF El Centro in a clean configuration at 27,000 feet. At 25,000 feet the radio cut out so the emergency generator was extended giving power to the radio. During the descent, oil pressure was 13 psi. and all engine indications were reported on guard frequency.

3. At 18,000 feet an airstart was attempted in primary fuel control which resulted in a 900°C TPT at idle RPM so the pilot again secured the engine with the throttle. The pilot shifted to manuel fuel control and at 10,000 feet attempted a second airstart which resulted in 900°C TPT and idle RPM so the engine was secured with the throttle and preparation made for ejection. At no time did the fire warning light illuminate. At 5000 feet the pilot ejected from the aircraft and was picked up by the personnel working the targets adjacent to ALF El Centro.

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 70 OF OPNAVINST 3750.6D."

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

VI DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

1. The pilot ejected at 5000' and the aircraft made contact with the ground in a flat attitude approximately 23 miles west northwest of NAF El Centro. The aircraft broke up on impact and was completely demolished with parts located up to one-half mile from the point of impact. The engine was recovered and sent to Alameda for disassembly and inspection to determine the cause of the engine malfunction.

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 70 OF OPNAVINST 3750.6D."

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

VII THE INVESTIGATION

1. A/D-2 BUNO 142845 was accepted by the Navy on 9-24-58 and by VA-112 on 12-4-59 from FAGUPAC. Investigation of the aircraft log books disclosed the following statistics:

Total hours on the aircraft	310.7
Interim rework	21 August 1958
Hours since rework	101.1
Last check (Intermediate)	23 October 1959
Hours since last check	34.0
Total hours on the engine	170
Engine model	J65-W16A
Serial number	W612096
Engine Hours since last overhaul	166.5
Overhauls	ONE (1)
Hours on third stage blades	563
Carrier landings	0
Field landings	310
Labs manuevers	UNKNOWN

The aircraft service changes on the essential list that were not incorporated are # 53, 113 and 123.

2. The aircraft was accepted and ferried from MCAAS Yuma on 4 December 1959 and was inspected by the squadron prior to the first flight on 10 December 1959.

a. Pre-flighting the aircraft revealed no discrepancies. After take-off, the pilot contacted GCI for an IFF check and upon reaching 40,000 ft. was instructed to commence a 360° turn for positive identification.

b. Shortly after rolling out of the turn the pilot experienced an engine explosion and noted the rise of TPT to 900° while operating at 99% RPM.

c. The pilot immediately reduced throttle to idle, reported the explosion and high TPT to GCI and switched to guard frequency.

d. Speed brakes were extended, engine secured with the throttle and descent made to arrive over ALF El Centro in a clean configuration during which time reports were made to El Centro tower on guard frequency.

e. At approximately 23,000 ft. the emergency generator was extended since the UHF radio was fading out.

f. An airstart was attempted in primary fuel control at 20,000 ft. which resulted in a 900°C TPT at idle RPM so the engine was secured with the throttle.

g. At 10,000 ft. a second airstart was commenced in manual fuel control which resulted a 900°C TPT at idle RPM so the engine was again secured with the throttle and preparations made by the pilot for ejection.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 70 OF OPNAVINST 3750.6D

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

2. Pilot ejection occurred at 5,000 ft. and 180K using the zero delay lanyard and was normal, the pilot landing without injury.

4. The aircraft made contact with the ground in a flat attitude approximately 23 miles WNW of El Centro and was destroyed on impact.

3. The Accident Board examined the crash scene the morning following the crash. Salvage efforts recovered the engine and some associated accessories which were shipped to Overhaul and Repair, Alameda, for disassembly and inspection on 13 December 1959. The accident board with the technical assistance of a Naval Aviation Safety Center representative, Douglas Aircraft Company and Curtis-Wright representatives and Overhaul and Repair, Alameda, revealed the following facts:

a. The engine had seized prior to aircraft impact with the ground.

b. All engine bearings indicated satisfactory operation and were not the cause of the accident.

c. The part that failed was a third stage compressor blade, B/N 225483, with resultant compressor wipe out of the fourth and fifth stage and ultimate engine seizure.

d. Examination of the parachute showed three tears in the canopy.

3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 70 OF OPNAVINST 3750.6D

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

VIII THE ANALYSIS

1. Preliminary information from Overhaul and Repair, Alameda, indicates that the failed third stage compressor blade, P/N 225483, had no fatigue indication and it is believed that stress corrosion was the cause of the failure. The blade, however, has been sent to the Naval Aviation Safety Center, Norfolk, for further examination.

2. The third stage blades had 398 hours of operation prior to being placed in the engine at the time of overhaul and subsequently operated 165 hours for a total of 563 hours at failure.

3. The complete disassembly inspection report will be released by Overhaul and Repair, Alameda, at a later date.

4. The zero delay lanyard was used although the pilot ejected at 5000 feet and the three tears in the parachute canopy are believed to have been caused by initial parachute deployment prior to seat separation. The parachute was sent to the Naval Parachute Facility at El Centro for determination of the cause.

IN ACCORDANCE

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

IX COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is the conclusion of the board that the cause of the aircraft explosion and resulting engine seizure was failure of a third stage compressor blade.

2. In view of the number of failures due to stress corrosion, it is recommended that the establishment of a limiting operating time for the first three compressor stages be investigated.

3. The continued heavy traffic adjacent to and in the vicinity of ALF El Centro indicates the need for a rescue helicopter stationed at El Centro in order to expedite rescue operations.

[illegible] HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE [illegible] TO OF [illegible] 3750.[illegible]

ORIGINAL

U. S. NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK 11 VIRGINIA

NASC/62/rjb
Ser: 33
7 January 1960

From: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
To: Chief, Bureau of Weapons

Subj: NASC Investigation of Aircraft Accident Involving A4D-2, BUNO 142485 occurring on 10 December 1959

1. At approximately 1535, 10 December 1959, A4D-2, BUNO 142485, assigned to VA-112 and piloted by LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] USN took off from NAS Miramar, California. The mission of the flight was to perform an acceptance check. Pre-flight and takeoff were normal. Climb to altitude was normal until 40,000' altitude was reached. Shortly after reaching 40,000', the pilot heard a muffled explosion followed by a rise in tailpipe temperature to 900°, the maximum temperature. The pilot informed the local GCI Unit of his difficulty and retarded the throttle to idle. The temperature remained the same and the engine was subsequently shut down. A descent was made over El Centro to 27,000' where an emergency relight was attempted in primary fuel system. Relight indications were normal but the engine would not accellerate above idle RPM and again the temperature was pegged at 900°. The pilot shut down the engine. Another relight was attempted at 10,000' in manual fuel system and again the RPM increased to idle but the tailpipe temperature went to full 900°. The pilot stop-cocked the engine and notified the GCI Unit he would eject at 5,000'.

2. The ejection was successful with all emergency egress equipment functioning satisfactorily. The aircraft crashed approximately 12 miles north of Plaster City, California. The Air Force helicopter stationed at NAF El Centro was in a down status and the pilot was eventually rescued by surface transportation. This aircraft was equipped with a zero delay lanyard which was integrated in the normal manner. The zero delay lanyard functioned satisfactorily and the pilot reported that parachute opening appeared to happen prior to the cessation of his upward oscillations. There were three slight tears in the parachute, but it could not be ascertained whether this was caused by seat-parachute entanglement or as a result of impact with some other object.

3. The engine, a J65-W16A, serial number 612096, was removed to Alameda, Calif. for disassembly and inspection. Investigation revealed that one third-stage compressor blade had failed with resultant wipe-out of all fourth and fifth stage compressor blades and complete engine seizure prior to impact. All main bearings were satisfactory with no indications of failure. Laboratory analysis of the failed third stage compressor blade, P/N 225483, indicated the cause of failure appeared to be stress rupture and not a result of fatigue. A review of engine records disclosed that the total compressor blade time was 563 hours. The engine had been overhauled by O&R Alameda on 5 January 1960, and had accumulated a total of 170 hours. The third stage blades were installed at last overhaul with 398 hours total time.

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6D"

4. In view of action taken by BUWEPS MSG 241458Z of December 1959, which restricted operation of J65 engine first three stage compressor rotor blades to a maximum of 480 hours, no further recommendations are considered necessary at this time.

L.W. Mather

L.W. MATHER
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
CNO (OP-05F)
COMNAVAIRPAC
BUWEPS (5 copies)
CNATRA (5 copies)
FLTTRAGRU GTMO
CARAIRGRU 12
VA-112
BUWEPSREP EL SEGUNDO
RIC WOODRIDGE

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6D"

ORIGINAL

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
PILOT - LTJG (b) (6) [redacted]
AIRCRAFT - A4D-2 BUNO 142845

STATEMENT OF PILOT

On the afternoon of December 10th I was told to perform an acceptance check on NH 211 BUNO 142845. Preflight was normal, and I had enough time to perform a manual fuel check in the chocks and also on the duty runway. Take-off was at 1535; instruments read normal and continued to read normal on the climb-out. Approaching 35M, I throttled back to 99% bringing the TPT from 655 to 650 and continued the climb. At the time I was checking the IFF with a GCI site, and upon reaching 40M, I started a turn. Upon rolling out of this turn, GCI told me they had positive contact. Almost immediately I heard an explosion behind me, and the TPT pegged at 900°. I told GCI that I had an explosion and left their channel "20" for "Guard channel" and retarded the throttle to idle.

The temperature remained the same, and I shut the engine down. I extended speed brakes and let down, arriving over El Centro at 27M where I brought my speed brakes in. Since squadron S.O.P. forbids flame out approaches, I continued heading toward the Salton Sea. At approximately 25M the radio cut out and I extended the emergency generator and immediately regained whe radio. During this time I gave all calls to El Centro, telling them of my position and indications in the cockpit which were: explosion, pegged TPT, oil pressure and Flip Flop gage out. The oil pressure direct reading was 13 psi and with the engine shut down there was no fire warning light. At 18M I tried a relight in primary fuel and in about 20 seconds received a light-off sending the TPT to the peg: 900°. RPM remained at idle, and I shut her down advising that I would try another relight and would eject at 5,000 feet if not successful.

I headed 250° to pass north of the El Centro targets 103 and 103A, and at 10,000 tried another light-off in emergency fuel. The aircraft lite off quicker this time, giving the same indications, and I again shut down. I told El Centro that I was ejecting and answered several querries as to position, etc. Approaching 5,000 I turned IFF to emergency since I assumed I was still being followed by the original GCI site, turned off the engine cut-off master switch, pulled my radio connections and ejected. I had a zero delay lanyard and it seemed to me my chute opened before my upward oscilations had stopped.

I landed about 1 mile east of the aircraft and was immediately spotted by aircraft. The first vehicle to arrive was from the target approximately 20 minutes after I landed and together we went to the accident where I remained until relieved by security watches.

(b) (5) [redacted]

LTJG USNR

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 70 OF OPNAVINST 3750.6D"

ENCLOSURE (1)

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
PILOT - LTJG (b) (6) [redacted]
AIRCRAFT - A4D-2 BUNO 142845

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

At approximately 1600, 10 December 1959, while climbing through 40,000 feet in an F4D-1 in the vicinity of Mt. Palomar, I heard a MAYDAY transmission from the pilot of WALLEYE 211. He reported that he was near El Centro at 27,000 feet, that he had just experienced an engine explosion, accompanied by a rise in temperature to 900 degrees, and that he was shutting down. I immediately commenced a high speed descent toward El Centro to be of assistance, if possible.

The pilot continued to communicate his situation to El Centro Tower, giving successive position reports and advising them of the action he was taking, the readings of pertinent instruments, etc. The pilot reported attempting an air start at about 19,000 feet without success. He reported no oil pressure rise and an excessive temperature reading of about 700 degrees at this time and further stated that he suspected a fuel system malfunction.

A short time later, the pilot reported that he was preparing to eject, but that he would attempt one more air start first. He subsequently reported commencing what proved to be another unsuccessful air start at 9,000 feet. On completion of this attempt, the pilot reported that he would complete his preparations for ejection and would make no further transmissions until just prior to pulling the curtain.

At this time El Centro Tower made an ill-advised transmission requesting the pilot's position, base of origin for the flight, and bureau number. Although rapidly approaching critical ejection altitude, the pilot responded with the information requested. On learning that the pilot was in the vicinity of targets 103 and 103A, El Centro Tower then told him to clear the area because the targets were in use. The pilot informed the tower that he was unable to comply and asked that the target pattern aircraft be cleared instead. Upon receiving the tower's acknowledgment, the pilot reported his altitude to be 5,300 feet and moments later that he was ejecting.

I was descending through 6,500 feet just west of the above targets when I heard the pilot's 5,300 feet report. Almost simultaneously I picked him up visually at my 10 o'clock position at a distance of 2 to 3 miles. Seconds later I observed his ejection and very rapid chute deployment, with no apparent loss of altitude. The plane nosed over straight ahead with no wing drop, describing a steep trajectory similar to that of a bomb released in level flight until it struck the ground about 3 or 4 miles WNW of the above targets.

As soon as I observed the pilot's ejection, I transmitted this fact to El Centro Tower and informed them that I would orbit and provide further information and assistance. I circled the pilot throughout his descent, and observed him land and disengage his parachute harness with no apparent difficulty. The pilot landed approximately a mile from the impact point of the aircraft.

ORIGINAL

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 70 OF OPNAVINST 3750.6D"

ENCLOSURE (1)

ORIGINAL

I remained over the downed pilot preparing to assist the rescue helicopter to the position. However, before the helicopter, which was en route from MCAAS YUMA, reached El Centro some trucks moved into the area. I marked the pilot's position by shallow dives and he released signalling flares to assist them in locating him. Two trucks and a jeep, apparently from the targets, picked the pilot up at about 1640 and I requested and received permission to return to NAS Miramar.

(b) (5) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]

CDR USN

Designated Naval Aviator for 18 years with 3500 total flight hours and over 1000 jet hours.

ORIGINAL

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 70 OF OPNAVINST 3750.6D"

ENCLOSURE (1)

1. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	2. REPORT NO	3. DATE	4. ASSEMBLY NOMENCLATURE
NAS ALAMEDA, CALIFORNIA (O[redacted]	13		Engine

5. ASSEMBLY	6. ASSEMBLY	7. MFGR'S CODE	8. DATE REMOVED	9. ENGINE	10. ENGINE
MOD J65-W16A	SER W612096	66640	12 Dec 1959	MOD —	SER —

11. TOTAL HOURS	12. HOURS SINCE LAST O/H	13. DATE LAST O/H	14. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	15. NO PREV O/H'S
170.9	165.4	9 Jan 1959	NAS ALAMEDA	1

16. REASON FOR REMOVAL CODE	17. OPERATING ACTIVITY	18. AMPFUR/AAR/FLIGA	19. AC/MISSILE	20. AC/MISSILE
Failure in flight 4Z	VA-112	SER 350	MOD A4D-2	BUNO 142845

24. DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS (Include name of Primary Part Failure) [CODE]

Ref; (a) BUWEPSFLTREADREP WESTDIST msg 142030Z Dec 1959
(b) NAS Alameda msg 152225Z Dec 1959

Encl: (1) NAS Alameda photo MAA-50634
(2) NAS Alameda photo MAA-50635
(3) NAS Alameda photo MAA-50627
(4) NAS Alameda photo MAA-50632
(5) NAS Alameda photo MAA-50629
(6) NAS Alameda photo MAA-50631
(7) NAS Alameda photo MAA-50630
(8) NAS Alameda photo MAA-50628
(9) NAS Alameda photo MAA-50633

AAR

Inroutine

21. PRIMARY PART FAILURE	COND.
NO 225483	070

22. PARTS REMOVED	COND.
NO.	

12/10/59

23. APPLICABLE BULS., CHGS., ETC., INCORPORATED		
NUMBER	YES	NO
J65 EB 111 Rev A		X

DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS:

1. Engine was received in a mutilated condition. Investigation revealed the following:

a. Enclosure (1) shows turbine rotor rear hub impact damage on heat shield and no indications of turbine rotor rotation.

Page 1 of 2

PRIORITY

27. SIGNATURE	28. TITLE	29. DATE
(b) (6) [redacted]	POWER PLANT ENGR SUPT	4 Jan 1960

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT NAVAER-2491 (REV 1-58)

b. Enclosure (2) shows the rear main bearing as having been satisfactory prior to impact. The outer race of the bearing was broken at disassembly in order to see the internal condition. This showed the bearing roller tracking in the normal position. All turbine rotor blades were accounted for but showed heavy metalization.

c. Enclosure (3) shows the rear view of the 1st stage turbine stator blades heavily contaminated with metalization. Also shown is the condition of the turbine shroud.

d. Enclosure (4) shows the center main bearing support and the compressor exit guide vanes. The exit guide vanes have metalization.

e. Enclosure (5) shows the center main bearing and parts of the center main bearing support. The center main bearing was satisfactory prior to impact and was tracking normally.

f. Enclosure (6) shows the front main bearing and parts of the inner power take-off. The front main bearing was satisfactory prior to impact. Front main bearing inner and outer nuts were in their proper position and tablocked.

g. Enclosure (7) shows sections of the compressor case. Damage shown on the case between the stator blades is from broken compressor blades rather than compressor rotor blade tip scoring.

h. Enclosure (8) shows the compressor rotor assembly. The 2nd and 3rd stage disc assemblies were burned off during the investigation in order to recover the failed 3rd stage blade. The severe damage to the compressor caused the seizing of the engine and zero RPM's. All 4th stage compressor rotor blades were wiped out at the blade tang rivet holes. Some 5th stage compressor rotor blades were wiped out at the blade tang rivet holes and some at the blade platform. The wiping out of the 4th and 5th stage compressor rotor blades caused most of the metalization in the turbine section.

i. Enclosure (9) shows a section of the first 3 compressor rotor blades. The 1st and 2nd stage blades have no rotational damage at the leading or trailing edge. The 3rd stage blades, all but the failed blade, show rotational damage to the trailing edge of the blades.

2. One 3rd stage compressor rotor blade P/N 225483 is believed to have failed from stress corrosion. The remaining part of the failed blade measured approximately 2 inches at the leading edge above the blade platform and 1/4 inch at the trailing edge above the blade platform. The failed blade butt was the only blade that retained its original contour. The compressor blades were painted with Nupon Grey.

3. CONCLUSIONS: It is believed failure of the 3rd stage compressor rotor blade P/N 225483 was caused by stress corrosion and was the primary cause of the engine failure. The failed blade butt was taken to the Naval Aviation Safety Center, Norfolk, Virginia by LCDR (b) (6) for further investigation. Time on blade was 563 hours.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that a service limit be established for first 3 stage compressor rotor blades not having J65 Engine Bulletin No. 111 revision A complied with.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 1
OPNAV FORM 3750-8 (Rev. 5-58)
OPNAV REPORT 3750-7
See OPNAVINST. 3750.6C for instructions - SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity)	2. MIR NUMBER
VA-112, NAS Miramar, California	2-59

3. (b) (6) [redacted] of Medical Officer	DATE	4. SUBMITTED (Name and Signature of Appointing Authority)	DATE
(b) (6) [redacted] LT MC USNR		C.J. LEE, CDR USN	

5. TYPE OF MISHAP	6. TIME AND ZONE	7. DATE	8. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
X ACCIDENT / GROUND ACCIDENT / INCIDENT	1600T	10 DEC 1959	23 miles WNW ALF El Centro

9. MODEL A/C	10. BUNO	11. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	12. TYPE ACCDT.	13. DAMAGE CODE	14. UNIT OPERATING A/C
A4D-2	142845	One	F-1	Alpha	VA-112

15. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED - USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED. NAME (Last, first and middle initials)	16. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	17. RANK, RATE	18. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR	19. BILLET	20. BRANCH OF SERVICE	21. INJURY CODE	22. DISPOSITION
IN CONTROL OF A/C (b) (6) [redacted]	VA-112	LTJG	(b) (6) [redacted] 1315	Pilot	USNR	E	E
b.							
c.							
d.							

23. CLASSIFICATION OF ITEMS 15-23 WHEN NECESSARY

24. MODEL - OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	25. BUNO	26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	27. UNIT OPERATING A/C	28. DAMAGE CODE	29. REPORT NO.

30. DETAILED NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF ACCIDENT (Use additional 8 X 10½ plain sheets if required)

On 10 December 1959 at 1535T LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] departed NAS Miramar in A4D-2 BUNO 142845 on an acceptance test flight. Preflight checks were normal, and after take off the pilot commenced a climb to 40,000 feet. During the climb he made contact with the local GCI unit to check out electronic gear, and at 40,000 feet a turn was commenced to ascertain positive radar control. When the aircraft was rolled wings level the pilot experienced an explosion and immediately noted TPT at 900° C.

LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] reported the explosion to the GCI site and then switched to guard frequency. TPT remained the same at idle RPM so the pilot secured the engine with the throttle and extended the speed brakes, arriving over ALF El Centro in a clean configuration at 27,000 feet. At 25,000 feet the radio cut out so the emergency generator was extended restoring power to the radio. During the descent oil pressure was 13psi and the pilot reported all engine indications on guard frequency.

At 18,000 feet an air start was attempted in primary fuel control which resulted in a 900° C TPT at idle RPM so the pilot again secured the engine with the throttle. Then he shifted to manual fuel control and at 10,000 feet attempted a second air start which still resulted in 900° C TPT at idle so the engine was secured and preparation made for ejection. At no time did the fire warning light illuminate.

The pilot ejected normally from the aircraft at 5,000 feet with 180 kts IAS. His aircraft was equiped with a zero delay parachute opening lanyard and LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] reports that his parachute seemed to have deployed before his upward momentum had ceased.

(Continued on Addendum)

SECTION B - MEDICAL OFFICER'S QUESTIONNAIRE

YES	NO	DID THE FLIGHT SURGEON:	(If "NO" state reason in space below.)
	X	1. VISIT THE SCENE OF THE MISHAP?	On deployment with another squadron at time of the accident.
	X	2. PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE FIELD INVESTIGATION?	Wreakage was removed to a distant facility for analysis.
X		3. PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD?	

GIVE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF HOURS SPENT BY THE FLIGHT SURGEON:	4. IN FIELD INVESTIGATION	5. IN BOARD DELIBERATIONS	6. IN PREPARATION OF THIS REPORT
	0	1	8

7. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST

X ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED — X SURVIVORS' NARRATIVES — X PHOTOS — X CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS — X REQUIRED COPIES FURNISHED

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—[illegible]

Special handling required in accordance with Para. 70, OPNAVINST 3750.6D.

Addendum to Narrative Account of Accident, Page 1:

This opinion is substantiated by the report of another pilot who was flying in the area and who observed LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] ejection (see statement enclosures).

The pilot retained all personal gear and, after a gentle descent, landed in the vicinity of El Centro targets 103 and 103A, about one mile east of where his plane crashed. He was uninjured and separated easily from his parachute. He was soon picked up by crews working in the target area. To assist the ground personnel in locating his exact position, the pilot ignited one night flare and four daylight flares, finding them to function satisfactorily.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 2

OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (Rev. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): (b) (6) [redacted]

MODEL A/C: A4D-2

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS	E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:				SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight				29. Expeditings/Delays
			2. "G" forces				30. Weather
			3. Environmental stress - External				31. Mechanical Problems
			4. - Internal				32. Social and working relationships
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression				33. Personal conflict
			6. Diet				34. Regulations
			7. Fatigue				35. Facilities
			8. Hypoxia				36. Navigation
			9. Related illness				37. Duty assignment
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions				38. Personality traits
			11. Hyperventilation				NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			12. Drugs				39. Faulty attention
			13. Physical state				40. Poor judgment
			14. OTHER:				41. Forgetfulness
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:				42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			15. Personal equipment				
			16. Displays and/or controls				
			17. Work arrangement				
			18. Working environment				
			19. Habit interference				TRAINING FACTORS:
			20. OTHER:				43. Physiological training
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)				44. Emergency Procedures training
			21. Pregnancy				45. Survival and rescue training
			22. Illness or death				46. Refresher training
			23. Arguments				47. Transition training
			24. Elated/Depressed state				48. OTHER:
			25. Personal habits - Drinking				
			26. - Sex				
			27. - Gambling				
			28. - Debts				

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (Fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	23.1	7. Total time in model	400
2. Flight time last 24 hours	0.4	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	None
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	One	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	None
4. Time at controls this flight	0.4		
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	11 [redacted]		
6. Total flight time	802		

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As rendered from Part I, Sect. B and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e., 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

(See addendum)

ADDENDUM to Section E, Page 2 in case of MOR 2-59, VA-112, AAD-2 BuNo. 142845:

Examination of the recovered parts revealed that the engine had seized prior to aircraft impact with the ground. All engine bearings indicated satisfactory operation and were not the cause of the accident. The part that failed was a third stage compressor blade, P/N 225483, with resultant compressor wipe out of the fourth and fifth stage and ultimate engine seizure. Preliminary studies have revealed no fatigue indication of this blade and it is believed that stress corrosion was the cause of the failure. Investigation is continuing to establish a more positive reason for the blade failure.

Several tears, stains and grease marks were noted in the parachute canopy and these are indicated in enclosure # 3 and illustrated in enclosure # 4. The triangular tears, puckers of the cloth along the tear line and grease marks perpendicular to the line of tear indicate that these tears were caused by a forceful and relatively sharp object. The pilot was wearing a yellow helmet and the yellow stains on the chute are probably helmet paint. The zero delay lanyard was used and the pilot believes that the parachute deployed while he was still in his upward trajectory. A reliable witness near the ejection site reported a "rapid chute deployment with no apparent loss of altitude" following the ejection. During his descent the pilot noted one triangular and two straight tears in the canopy, all of which were in close proximity. It is my opinion that the chute deployed prior to seat separation, that the yellow stains on the chute resulted from friction between the helmet and the chute and that some of the tears in the chute were rendered by one or more relatively sharp, greasy objects connected to the seat. The parachute was sent to the Naval Parachute Facility at El Centro for their evaluation.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 3
OPNAV FORM 3750-88 (5-68)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, First, Middle): (b) (6) [redacted]

MODEL A/C: A4D-2

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO	DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT
1. Shoulder harness	X		MB-5	X			X	
2. Lap belt	X		MB-5	X			X	
3. Inertia reel	X		S5446306-507	X			X	
4. G-Suit	X		Z-3	X			X	
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		X						Pressure suits not available to this squadron.
6. Exposure suit	X		Mark-4		X			
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		Orange, summer	X			X	
8. Helmet	X		Navy APH-5	X			X	
9. Goggles/Eyeshield	X		APH-5, integrated	X			X	
10. Shoes	X		Boondockers	X			X	
11. Gloves	X		Summer	X			X	
12. Life vest	X		MK-3C flotation		X			
13. Life raft	X		PK-2		X			
14. OTHER:								
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		Mark 13, Mod.0	X			X	
16. - Flare (Day)	X		Mark 13, Mod.0	X			X	
17. - Dye marker	X		Sea dye marker M-2		X			
18. - Radio		X						
19. - Flashlight	X		Pocket flash		X			
20. - Mirror	X		PK-2		X			
21. OTHER: Neck Scarf	X		Fluorescent orange	X			X	
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		Sheath	X			X	
23. - First aid kit	X		PSK-2		X			
24. - Shelter	X		Poncho		X			
25. - Food	X		PSK-2		X			
26. OTHER:								
27. RESCUE - Vehicle	X		Ground crew truck	X			X	
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher								
29. OTHER:								

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: A13-A
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Harness suspension
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: Flannell 1773-3
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: None
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER: [X] YES [ ] NO
6. IF NO, WHY NOT:
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK: None
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT 4.5 LITERS (Liquid) ____ P.S.I. (Gas); TIME OF ACCIDENT 4.0 LITERS (Liquid) ____ P.S.I. (Gas)
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCIDT: [X] YES [ ] NO
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING: [X] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY: [X] YES [ ] NO
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON: [X] NO [ ] YES

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Rocket jet
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Manual
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED? When parachute reached the ground
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE: [ ] YES [X] NO
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE: [ ] YES [X] NO
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [X] NO

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-8C)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4
OPNAV FORM 3750-8C (5-55)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): (b) (6) [redacted]

MODEL A/C: AAD-2

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE: MB-5

20. INTEGRATED? [X] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON: None

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [X] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [X] OTHER Civilian rigger

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [X] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET: Navy APH-5

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS: Hardman fittings, nape strap

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM: None

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [X] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [X] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: MB-5

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 11-4-59

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN: Horseshoe bailout bottle 5542498

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type): [ ] NONE 1000C with zero delay lanyard

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY: [X] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION: [ ] MANUAL [X] AUTOMATIC?

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [X] YES [ ] NO

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: 5000 FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [X] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING: Legs high

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING: See enclosure # 3.

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [X] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (List in [illegible]): Clear 7 kts of wind

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Flat desert

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED? [X] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [ ] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY: [X] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [X] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY: None

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS: [ ] TIGHT [X] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES [X] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type): [ ] NONE AAD-2 seat pan

53. WAS PARARAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [X] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE Routine lectures, training films, ejection seat check-out

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARARAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON:

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [X] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [X] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:

60. DID ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS. [X] NO [ ] YES

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD.: [X] NO [ ] YES

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MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 5
OPNAV FORM 3750-83 (Rev. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF PERSONNEL (Last, First, Middle) [redacted]

MODEL A/C: AAD-2

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
		1. EJECTION - Attempted	
	X	2. - Accomplished	
		3. - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
	X	4. - Prior to	
	X	5. - During	
	X	6. - Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	Cartridge type
		8. BAILOUT - Attempted	
		- Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet): ABOVE SEA LEVEL 5,000 ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY 4,875

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Level flight

11. AIRSPEED: 180kts IAS

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [X] GROUND [ ] WATER

13. CONTROLLED? [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [X] OFF

15. WHEELS: [X] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [X] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [X] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE

19. AIR TEMP.: 66 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: °F

21. A/C FLOATED: SEC.

22. TIME IN WATER

23. TIME IN PART

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [✓] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

	COMMUNICATIONS:		MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:
X	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
	31. Witnesses at scene		51. Items used as clothing
	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
X	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
	34. Auditory signal devices		ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:
	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
	TRAVEL:		55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
	SHELTER:		MORALE:
	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
	WATER SOURCE:		FOOD SOURCE:
	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.		SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67.
	49. OTHER:		

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Special handling required in accordance with Para. 70, OPNAVINST 3750.6D.

Addendum to Section H, Page 5:

H 30. The pilot reported the nature of his difficulty and his position prior to ejection via radio.

H 33. The pilot ignited flares to help guide the target crew personnel to his site of landing. The flares functioned satisfactorily.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 6

OPNAV FORM 3750-8E (Rev. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION I - PATHOLOGICAL FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for POST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): (b) (6) [redacted]

MODEL A/C: AAD-2

2. AGE: 25

3. HEIGHT: (b) [redacted] INCHES

4. WEIGHT: (b) [redacted]

5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Strapped in seat facing forward

6. INJURY CODE: E

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMPLICATED																						
DIS-LOCATION		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE	
															HAND						FOOT	

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION: None

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. ☐ DROWNED

19. ☐ ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

22. ☐ BURNS ☐ FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD

AREA	HEAD (ventral	Dorsal)	TRUNK (ventral	Dorsal)	ARMS	LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: ☐ NONE ☐ COMPLETE

LIVE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: ☐ YES ☒ NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1294)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS

27. GROUNDED IF YES GIVE REASON: ☐ YES ☒ NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (See Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1294) NO.

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

32. PROTOCOL: ☐ ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: ☐ PATHOLOGIST ☐ FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", NAVMED P-1287.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1			TISSUE: (CONT)		
2			- MUSCLE		
3			- VISCERA		
URINE			OTHER:		
G-I CONTENTS					

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—[illegible]

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 70, OPNAV INST 3750.6D"

MOR 2-59, VA-112, A4D-2 BuNo. 142845:

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The cause of the aircraft explosion and resulting engine seizure was the failure of a third stage compressor blade.

2. The parachute deployed prior to seat separation with resulting minor tears in the canopy.

3. The unruffled manner in which the pilot handled this emergency, the thoroughness of his evaluation, and the objectivity of his analysis reflect commendable composure, forethought and training.

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 70, OPNAV INST 3750.6D"

MDR 2-59, VA-112, A4D-2 BuNo. 142845:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the feasibility of establishing a limiting operating time for the first three compressor stages be investigated.

2. That a rescue helicopter be stationed at AAF El Centro in order to expedite rescue operations during periods of heavy traffic as presently exist adjacent to and in the vicinity of El Centro.



ENCLOSURE (7) TO DIR 13





ENCLOSURE (4) to DIR 13

Center Main Brg.

ENCLOSURE (5) TO DIR 13

ENCLOSURE (6) TO DIR 12

ENCLOSURE (7) * DIR 13



ENCLOSURE (1) TO DIR 17



NPU _____ SERIAL NO 120998 MANU DATE AUG 58

INSP. DATE 12-17-59 INSPECTOR _____

REMARKS

(1) Yellow Stain

(2) Grease

(3) 3" tear in Gore #3, D Panel

(4) 12" triangular tear in Gore #9, A Panel

(5) 3" tear in Gore #12, C Panel

(6) 3" tear in Gore #14, C Panel

(7) 12" tear in Gore #16, C Panel

(8) 4" tear in Gore #18, C Panel

(9) 4" tear in Gore #17, C Panel

Enclosure #3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Paragraph 70, OPNAV INST 3750.6D. VA-112 AAR 2-59, A4D-2 BUNO 142845, Accident occuring 10 December 1959. Pilot: (b) (6) [redacted] View showing Triangular Tear of Parachute located in Panel C. Gore 16. ENCLOSURE 4

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Paragraph 70, OPNAV INST 3750.6D
VA-112 AAR 2-59, A4D-2 BUNO 142845, Accident occurring 10 December 1959. Pilot:
[redacted] View showing METALIZATION OF TAIL PIPE TURKEY FEATHERS.

ENCLOSURE 2-1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Paragraph 70, OPNAV INST 3750.6D
VA-112 MAR 2-59, AAD-2 BUNO 142845, Accident occurring 10 December 1959, Pilot:
[redacted] View showing DISTRIBUTION OF CRASH WRECKAGE. ENCLOSURE 2-2

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Paragraph 70, OPNAV INST 3750.6D
VA-112 AAR 2-59, A4D-2 BUNO 142845, Accident occurring 10 December 1959. Pilot:
[redacted] View showing TOP OF COMPRESSOR BLADE SCRATCHED FROM RUBBING AGAINST
COMPRESSOR CASE.

ENCLOSURE 2-4