AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CARD NO. 1
SND 3982 (Rev. 6-57) (Part I)

AUG 18 1958 RECD

CODED LOGGED VERIFIED PUNCHED REVIEWED REPUNCHED

1			IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (LINE NUMBER)	
2 - 6			ACCIDENT DATE	10 7 1 7 5 8
7 - 11			MODEL AIRCRAFT	F 9 F 8 B
12 - 17			BUREAU NUMBER	1 4 1 1 6 9
18 - 20			UNIT (REPORTING CUSTODIAN)	A 0 9
21 - 22			TYPE DUTY	3 1
23			MAJOR COMMAND	1 3
24 - 26			TYPE OF FLIGHT	1 A 7
27			ACCIDENT DAMAGE	A
28			AIRCRAFT DAMAGE	A
29			ACCIDENT INJURY	A
30			AIRCRAFT INJURY	A
31		I-N-J-U-R-Y D-A-T-A	NUMBER OF (A) INJURIES	1
32			NUMBER OF (B) INJURIES	
33			NUMBER OF (C) INJURIES	
34			NUMBER OF (D) INJURIES	
35			NUMBER OF (E) INJURIES	
36			NUMBER OF (L or M) INJURIES	
37 - 38		A-C-C-I-D-E-N-T D-A-T-A	ACCIDENT TYPE (PRIMARY)	B 6
39 - 40			ACCIDENT TYPE (SECONDARY)	
41			CLEARANCE	2
42 - 45			ACCIDENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	0 0 [illegible]
46 - 47		P-H-A-S-E	GENERAL	4 4
48			SPECIFIC	7
49 - 50			TYPE OF OPERATION	3
51	CONTRIBUTING FACTORS UNSAFE ACTS AND/OR UNSAFE CONDITIONS	C-A-U-S-E F-A-C-T-O-R-S	~~PRIMARY CAUSE~~ 1st factor	1
52			SECONDARY CAUSE	
53			INVOLVED FACTORS	
54 - 55		P-I-L-O-T E-R-R-O-R	FIRST PILOT ERROR	0 5
56 - 57			SECOND PILOT ERROR	0 3
58 - 59			THIRD PILOT ERROR	X V
60 - 61		O-T-H-E-R P-E-R-S-O-N-N-E-L	PRIMARY OTHER PERSONNEL ERROR	
62 - 63			SECONDARY OTHER PERSONNEL ERROR	
64		M-A-T-E-R-I-A-L U-N-S-A-F-E C-O-N-D-I-T-I-O-N	PRIMARY MAJOR COMPONENT	
65			SECONDARY MAJOR COMPONENT	
66			DESIGN	
67			AIRBASE	
68			AIRWAYS (MISCELLANEOUS)	
69			WEATHER AT ACCIDENT (GR 1)	
70			WEATHER ENROUTE (GR 2)	
71			TYPE INCIDENT	
72			SPECIAL DATA	"X" 5
73			NO. OF OTHER A/C INVOLVED	
74			SPECIAL CONDITIONS	[illegible]
75			REL. WIND DIR. & VELOCITY	
76			FACILITY DATA (GR 1)	
77			FACILITY DATA (GR 2)	
78			FACILITY DATA (GR 3)	
79			TIME OF DAY	[illegible]
80			IBM CONTROL PUNCH	1

NAVY—DPPO 5N2 Rev.1

CARD NUMBER 2
PERSONNEL DATA CARD
SND 3983 (Rev. 2-58)

NOTE TO CODER: All personnel involved in aircraft accident are to be coded.

2

SPECIAL DATA	SPECIAL CONDITIONS	ACCIDENT DATE	MODEL AIRCRAFT	BUREAU NUMBER	UNIT	TYPE OF DUTY	MAJ. COMM.	LOCATION OF ACCIDENT	DAMAGE
5 X	6	7 1 7 5 8	F 9 F 8	1 4 1 1 6 9	A Ø 9	Ø 9	3	A 6 M O J A V	H
1	2	3 4 5 6 7	8 9 10 11	12 13 14 15 16 17	18 19 20	21 22	23	24 25 26 27 28 29 30	31

	INJURY	NAME (Personnel Involved) Last and Initials	POSITION	RANK/RATE	AGE	FILE OR SERVICE NUMBER	BR. OF SER.	STATUS	ACCIDENT DATA: PRI. ACCT. TYPE	PHASE GEN.	TYP. OPR.	PRI. CAUSE	SEC. CAUSE	PILOT ERROR: FIRST	SECOND	THIRD	OTHER CAUSAL FACTORS	PILOT DATA: TOTAL PILOT TIME	TOTAL JET TIME	TOTAL PILOT TIME IN MODEL	LAST 3 MO.	YRS. EXP.	INST. TIME	NIGHT TIME	TOTAL CV LANDING
	32	33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42	43	44	45	46 47 48 49 50 51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61 62	63 64	65 66	67 68	69 70	71 72	73 74	75	76 77	78	79 80
19	A	L I T T L E J E	1	6	2	(b) (6) [redacted]	6	A	B	6	4	4	3	1		0 5	0 3	X ✓		Ø 2	1 8	Ø 8	4 4	[illegible]	Ø	
2																									
3																									
4																									
5																									
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7																									
8																									
9																									
10																									
11																									
12																									
13																									
14																									
15																									
	32	33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42	43	44	45	46 47 48 49 50 51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61 62	63 64	65 66	67 68	69 70	71 72	73 74	75	76 77	78	79 80

NAVY—OPPG SND

FF4-1/A25
Serial:
00 9926

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARAGRAPH 69, OPNAVINST 3750.6C

2 SEP 1958

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on CO, VMA-311 AAR ser 2-58 concerning F9F-8B BUNO 141169 accident occurring 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE

From: Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (MA-61)
(2) Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VMA-311 AAR ser 2-58

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, and in the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements.

(b) (6)
[redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
NAVAVSAFCEN (2)
CMC(Code AAF)
CINCPACFLT
CG, AIRFMFPAC
CG, THIRD MAW
CO, MAG-15
CO, VMA-311

3

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 69
OPNAVINSTR 3750.6C

FF13-5
11:phw
A25-1
25 AUG 1958

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VMA-311 AAR ser 2-58, concerning F9F-8B, BuNo. 141169, accident occurring 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE

From: Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-57)
Via: (1) Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(2) Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Major Aircraft Accident Report, case of Second Lieutenant James E. LITTLE (b) (6) 7333, USMCR

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3750.6C

1. Forwarded concurring with the report subject to the following comment.

2. The Commanding General, Third Marine Aircraft Wing, is requested to have a resume prepared and submitted in accordance with instructions contained in paragraph 42.c.(4)(b), and paragraph 47. of reference (a).

S. S. JACK

Copy to:
CMC (AAP)
BuAer (MA-61)
NavAvnSafCen (2)(Airmail)
ComNavAirPac
CinCPacFlt
CG, 3d MAW
CO, MAG-15
CO, VMA-311
BAR, Grumman Aircraft Corp.,
Bethpage, L.I., N. Y.

4

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
in accordance with para 65
of OPNAV INST 3750.6C

61:CEM:kef
11 SEP 1958

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on Supplementary Report (Addendum #1) to VMA-311 AAR ser 2-58 concerning F9F-8B, 141169, accident occurring 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Supplementary Information (Addendum #1) to VMA-311 AAR ser 2-58

Ref: (c) OPNAV INST 3750.6C

1. Readdressed and forwarded in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 47 of reference (c).

J. G. Ennis
J. G. ENNIS

Copies to:
CMC(Code AAP)
BuAer (MA-61)
NavAvnSafCen (2 cc air mail)
CinCPacFlt
ComNavAirPac
CG, AirFMFPac
BAR, GAC, Bethpage, L.I., N.Y.
CO, MAG-15
CO, VMA-311

5

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
in accordance with para 69
of OPNAV INST 3750.6C

61:CEM:kef
15 AUG 1958

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VMA-311 AAR serial 2-58, concerning F9F-8B, 141169, accident occurring 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commanding General, Aircraft Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(2) Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(3) Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VMA-311 AAR ser 2-58

1. Forwarded concurring in the report and in the comments contained in the first and second endorsements.

T. G. Ennis

T. G. ENNIS

Copies to:
CMC (Code AAF)
BuAer (MA-61)
NavAvnSafCen (2 cc airmail)
CinCPacFlt
ComNavAirPac
CG, AirFMFPac
BAR Bethpage
CO, MAG-15
CO, VMA-311

6

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARAGRAPH 69, OPNAVINST 3750.6C

AvnSafO:CHS:eam
A25

SEC 3 - 1958

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on Supplementary Report to VMA-311 AAR serial 2-58 concerning F9F-8B, BuNo. 141169, accident occurring 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group-15
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
(2) Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(3) Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(4) Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Supplemental information on Major Aircraft Accident Report, Case of Second Lieutenant James E. LITTLE, (b) (6) 7333 USMCR

1. Forwarded.

T. V. MURTO, Jr.

Copies to:
BuAer (MA-61)
CMC (Code AAP)
CinCPacFlt
ComNavAirPac
USNavAvnSafCen (2cc AirMail)
BAR Gethpage
CG AIRFMFPAC
CG 3d MAW
CO VMA-311

7

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARAGRAPH 69, OPNAVINST 3750.6C

AvnSafO:CHS:eam
A25

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VMA-311 AAR serial 2-58 concerning F9F-8B, BuNo. 141168 accident occurring 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group-15
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
(2) Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(3) Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(4) Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Major Aircraft Accident Report, Case of Second Lieutenant James E. LITTLE, (b) (6) 7333 USMCR

1. Forwarded, concurring in the comments, conclusions, and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board Report and the first endorsement.

2. The preliminary report of the DIR mentioned in Part VI page 5 of the AAR has been recieved. The Board and the 1st Endorser feel that the information it contains does not change their comments, conclusions, nor recommendations. Its pertinent part is quoted here:

"Preliminary examination indicates aircraft in flying tail position with actuator functioning normally. Stabilizer position was 2 3/4 degrees nose-up at time of impact. Less than 1 degree nose-up on electrical trim. Tachometer indicates RPM between 80 and 100 percent. Photograph of turbine wheel shows RPM to be less than 100 percent. Attitude gyro indicates aircraft crashed in 30 degree dive with left wing down 20 degrees."

3. Pilots must be continually impressed with the necessity of avoiding air to air tactics or other aerobatic maneuvers when below established minimum altitudes.

4. The following amplifying remarks are made:

a. The personnel safety equiptment used was not effective in preventing fatality due to the nature of the accident.

b. The aircraft wreckage was turned over to MCAAS Mojave for disposal.

8

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARAGRAPH 69, OPNAVIST 3750.6C

AvnSafO:CHS:eam
A25
[illegible] 1958

5. It is noted that the enclosures are not in the sequence that they are referred to in the account as required by OPNAVINST 3750.6C.

T. V. MURTO, JR.

Copies to:
BuAer (MA-61)
CMC (Code AAP)
CinCPacFlt
ComNavAirPac
USNavAvnSafCen (2cc AirMail
B/R Bethpage
CG AIRFMFPAC
CG 3dMAW
CO VMA-311

9

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARA 69, OPNAV INST 3750.6C

S-3:DDR:bem
A25
4 September 1958

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Supplementary Report to VMA-311 AAR 2-58 concerning F9F-8B, BuNo 141169 accident occurring on 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Attack Squadron 311
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-57)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 15
(2) Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
(3) Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(4) Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(5) Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center, Norfolk, 11, Virginia

Subj: Supplemental information on VMA-311 AAR serial 2-58, case of Second Lieutenant James E. LITTLE (b) (6) /7333 USMCR

1. Forwarded.

2. The subject report is not signed by Lt. (b) (6) (MC) USNR due to his recent deployment overseas. Lt. (b) (6) did not sign this report as he was released from active duty on 15 August 1958.

D. D. Rickabaugh
D. D. RICKABAUGH

Copy to:
CMC (AAP)
ComNavAirPac
US NavAvnSafCen (2) (Airmail)
BuAer (MA 61)
CG 3d MAW
CG AirFMFPac
CinC PacFlt
BAR, Bethpage, L. I., N. Y.

10

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARA 69, OPNAV INST 3750.6C

S-3:DDR:rdw
A25
1 August 1958

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VMA-311 AAR 2-58 concerning F9F-8B, BuNo 141169, accident occurring 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Attack Squadron 311
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 15
(2) Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
(3) Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(4) Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(5) Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center, Norfolk, 11, Virginia

Subj: Major Aircraft Accident Report, case of Second Lieutenant James E. LITTLE (b) (6) 7333 USMCR

1. Forwarded concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board.

2. This squadron has an active program of closely monitoring the training and progress of individual pilots. A jacket of flight critiques is kept on each newly designated pilot. These critique sheets are filled in by the flight leader immediately after each flight. This jacket is maintained until the individual is considered a qualified section leader. This system affords all supervisory personnel full opportunity to observe the progress of each pilot. Periodically, operations, safety and training personnel study the individual flight jackets and evaluate the critique sheets entered therein for each flight.

3. Normal systematic checking of Lieutenant LITTLE's critique sheets failed to disclose any dangerous trends in his progress. Lieutenant LITTLE on one occasion inadvertently pulled the throttle to the off position on a tactics flight and flamed out the engine. He utilized correct technique in his air-start procedures to get the engine started and when questioned on this circumstance he seemed conscientiously concerned and readily admitted his error. All Lieutenant LITTLE's critique sheets showed he was believed to be an above average pilot by all flight leaders who had evaluated his work.

4. Lieutenant LITTLE was thought to be an enthusiastic and aggressive aviator. It is believed that on the occasion of the accident Lieutenant LITTLE allowed this enthusiasm to overrule his better judgement and to spur him to leave his proper place of orbit, which he himself had announced he would maintain, to make a pass on another aircraft. His eagerness in the executions of the ensuing tactical maneuvers drove him into attempting a diving turn from which he was unable to recover.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARA 6q, OPNAV INST 3750.6C

S-3:DDR:rdw
A25
1 August 1958

5. Flight safety and flight discipline are constantly emphasized in this squadron. Prompt action is immediately taken in each reported breach of flight discipline. It must be noted that the early stages of a pilot's career require closer supervision than any other time. However, this supervision must be tempered with judgement and tactfulness as far as the individual is concerned. A repressive system of supervision could very well discourage the attainment of our training goal - a confident, capable and aggressive attack pilot.

D. D. Rickabaugh
D. D. RICKABAUGH
Acting

Copy to:
CMC (AAP)
ComNavAirPac
US NavAvnSafCen (2) (Airmail)
BuAer
CG 3d MAW
CG AirFMFPac
CinC PacFlt
BAR, Bethpage, L. I., N. Y.

10

STATEMENT HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARA 69, OPNAV INST 3750.6C

S-3:PWM:bcm
A25
4 September 1958

From: VMA-311 Aircraft Accident Board
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op57)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Attack Squadron 311
(2) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 15
(3) Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
(4) Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(5) Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(6) Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center, Norfolk, Ill, Virginia

Subj: Supplemental report on VMA-311 AAR 2-58 concerning F9F-8B, BuNo 141169 accident occurring 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE

Ref: (a) VMA-311 AAR 2-58
(b) Fourth Endorsement on VMA-311 AAR 2-58

Encl: (1) Resume of Pilot's total flying experience

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted to supplement information in reference (a) as requested by reference (b).

(b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] Major USMC
Operations Officer

(b) (6) [redacted] Captain USMC
Maintenance Officer

(b) (6) [redacted] LtMC USNR
Flight Surgeon

(b) (6) [redacted] Captain USMC
Asst. Operations Officer

(b) (6) [redacted]
(b) (6) [redacted] Captain USMC
Electronics Officer

(b) (6) [redacted] 1stLt. USMCR
Safety Officer

Copy to:
CMC (AAP)
ComNavAirPac
US NavAvnSafCen (2) (Airmail)
BuAer
CG 3d MAW
CG AirFMFPac
CinC PacFlt
BAR, Bethpage, L. I., N. Y.

13

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARA 69, OPNAV INST 3750.6C

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT on VMA-311 AAR serial 2-58 concerning F9F-8B, BuNo 141169 accident occurring on 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE

Resume of Lt. LITTLE's total flying experience:

1. Total Flight time 395.1

2. Total Jet time 188.7

3. From 10 October 1956 to 30 September 1957 while attached to Naval Air Basic Training Command as a student undergoing instruction, he flew 55.4 hours in the T34B aircraft and 151.0 hours in the T28B aircraft.

4. From 18 October 1957 to 9 November 1957 he flew 41.6 hours in the TV-2 type aircraft in the Naval Air Advance Training Command as a Student Naval Aviator.

5. Lt. LITTLE was designated a Naval Aviator on 1 November 1957.

6. From 4 December 1957 to 22 January 1958 while in a training status he flew 58.2 hours in F9F-2 aircraft in the Naval Air Advance Training Command.

7. As an Attack pilot attached to VMA-311 from 24 February 1958 to 17 July 1958 he flew 88.9 hours in the F9F-8 aircraft.

8. During the entire period of his flying career Lt. LITTLE was never assigned to a proficiency flying billet but was either in a training or operational billet.

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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (REV. 11-55)
PAGE 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 69 OPNAV INST 3750.6C

OPNAV REPORT 3750-4

PART I – GENERAL

SECTION A – IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD CONVENED BY: Marine Attack Squadron 311
2. DATE OF ACCIDENT: 17 July 1958 TIME: 1510T
3. AAR SERIAL NO.: 2-58
4. TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Op-57)
5. ENCLOSURES: (1) Flt. (b) (6) Statement
(2) Flt. Mbrs. Statement (a thru c)
(3) Ground Witness' Statement (a - e)
(4) Support Personnel's Stmt. (a - b)
(5) Diagrams & Report of Scene (a - d)
(6) Photographs (a through j)
(7) Flight Schedule
(8) VMA-311 Flt.Ldr. Brief. X list
(9) Medical Officer's Report (orig only)
6. VIA: (1) C.O. Marine Aircraft Group 15
(2) C.G., 3D Marine Aircraft Wing
(3) C.G., Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pac
(4) Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(5)
(6)
(LAST: COMMANDER, U. S. NAV. AV. SAFETY CENTER
7. REPORTING CUSTODIAN (if different than item number 1): - - -
8. ACTIVITY OPERATING AIRCRAFT (if different than item 7): - - -
9. KIND OF FLT.: 1A7
10. TIME OF DAY: ☐ DAWN ☒ DAY ☐ DUSK ☐ NIGHT
11. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT: 9½ Mi. NE MCAAS Mojave
12. ELEV. ABOVE SEA LEVEL: 2520'
13. PLACE OF LAST TAKE-OFF: MCAS El Toro
14. CLEARED FROM MCAS El Toro TO MCAS El Toro
15. TYPE CLEARANCE: ☐ IFR ☒ VFR ☒ LOCAL ☐ OPERATIONAL ☐ AIRWAYS ☐ DIRECT ☐ OTHER, Specify

AIRCRAFT

16. TIME IN FLT.: 0/38
17. TYPE ACCIDENT: B-6 (Collision-Ground)
18. PHASE OF FLIGHT: (4) In-Flight
19. MODEL: F9F-8B
20. SERIAL NO.: 141169
21. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT: ☒ A. ☐ B. ☐ C. ☐ D.
22. DOL. COST: 350,000
23. AIRSPEED (kts): 400-450 est
24. A/C WT.: 16,600 est
25. LIST MODEL, SER. NRS, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (complete separate OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C): NONE

SECTION B – PERSONNEL INFORMATION

PILOT AND CO-PILOT

1. PERSONNEL	2. NAME (last, first and middle initial)	3. RANK RATE	4. SERV. NO.	5. DESIGNATOR	6. DATE DESIG. NATED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	AGE
PILOT (PERSON AT CONTROLS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT)	LITTLE, James E.	2dLt	(b) (6)	USMCR 7333	1Nov57	(b) (6)	21
CO-PILOT							

8. PERSONNEL	9. OPERATIONAL FLT. TRAINER AVAILABLE?	USED?	10. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	11. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD
PILOT	☒ YES ☐ NO	☒ YES ☐ NO	Marine Attack Squadron 311	☒ STANDARD ☐ SPECIAL
CO-PILOT	☐ YES ☐ NO	☐ YES ☐ NO		☐ STANDARD ☐ SPECIAL

TOTAL PILOT HOURS

ITEM		PILOT	CO-PILOT	ITEM	PILOT	CO-PILOT	STUDENT
ALL MODELS		395.1		CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	6/0		
ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MOS.		246.1		FCLP LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	106/0		
ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MOS.		47.9		INSTRUMENT HOURS, LAST 3 MONTHS	0.4		
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	88.9		NIGHT HOURS, LAST 3 MOS.	7.3		
	OFT/CPT	6/0	- -				
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	88.9		(jet accidents only) TOTAL JET PILOT HOURS	188.7		
	OFT/CPT	6/0	- -				
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	47.9		DATE LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	7/16/58		
	OFT/CPT	1/0	- -	DURATION LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL			

ALL PERSONNEL

NAME (last, first and middle)	DNA	RANK RATE	FILE SERVICE NO.	ORG. TO WHICH ATTACHED	INJURY CODE	BILLET	POSITION
1. LITTLE, James E.	X	2dLt	(b) (6)	VMA-311	A	Pilot	Cockpit
2.							
3.							
4.							
5.							

15

(if additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (REV. 11-55) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 69, OPNAV INST 3750.6C OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PAGE 2

SECTION C - WEATHER

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE	OUTSIDE AIR	RUNWAY	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTINGS
CAVU	30	240 - 15		85		42	29.89

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, icing levels, state of sea, etc., if pertinent to accident)

NA

SECTION D - CAUSE FACTORS

ITEM		ITEM		ITEM	
PILOT FACTOR	X	LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER FACTOR		MATERIAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION	
CREW FACTOR		OTHER PERSONNEL FACTOR Specify		DESIGN	
SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL FACTOR		ADMINISTRATIVE FACTOR		ROLLING AND PITCHING DECK/ROUGH SEAS	
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL FACTOR		AIRPORT OR CARRIER FACILITIES		UNDETERMINED	
SERVICING PERSONNEL FACTOR		WEATHER		OTHER, Specify	

SECTION E - DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD DEPLOYED CARRIERS (Complete following Section on Pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED	2. DAY-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	3. DAY-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS
NA	NA	NA
4. INSTRUMENT HRS. LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT	5. NIGHT-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	6. NIGHT-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS
NA	NA	NA

PART II – MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

SECTION A – AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE DATA

1. AIRCRAFT HISTORY	DATE OF MANUFACTURE	SERVICE TOUR	MONTHS IN THIS TOUR	TOTAL NO. OF OVERHAULS	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	TYPE CHECK LAST PERFORMED	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST CHECK	NO. OF DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
		ENGINE MODEL	SERIAL NO. OF ENGINE		NA				
2. ENGINE HISTORY NO. 1									
NO. 2									
NO. 3									
NO. 4									

3. GENERAL

a. DID FIRE OCCUR: ☐ BEFORE ACCIDENT ☒ AFTER ACCIDENT ☐ DID NOT OCCUR

b. DID EXPLOSION OCCUR IN FLIGHT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

C. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ AMP FOR SERIAL NA

D. HAS DIR BEEN REQUESTED? ☐ YES ☐ NO NA

E. FAILED COMPONENTS INVOLVED NA

CHECK BELOW ITEMS PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT

NA

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a. ☐ AIRCRAFT DESIGN

b. ☐ AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT

c. ☐ MAINTENANCE

d. ☐ UNDETERMINED

e. ☐ TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION

f. ☐ OTHER, Specify NA

g. ☐ SURFACE FACILITIES

h. ☐ HUMAN ENGINEERING (e.g. cockpit configurations)

4. ENGINE DATA

A. ALTITUDE AT MALFUNCTION	B. AIR SPEED (kts)	C. OPERATING TEMPERATURE	D. WEIGHT OF AIRCRAFT	E. C.G.(% MAC)	F. KIND OF FUEL	G. FUEL PRESSURE
NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

H. EVIDENCE OF FUEL CONTAMINATION NA

I. CAUSE OF ENGINE FAILURE OR FLAMEOUT NA

J. FUEL CONTROL REGULATOR/CARBURETOR (List Stock and Ser. nos., give time since new or overhauled) NA

K. EXTERNAL STORES ABOARD A/C Aero 4B Bomb Container

(if additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

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[illegible]ECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCO[illegible]ANCE WITH [illegible]RA 69, OPNAV INST. 3750.6C

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART II – MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA (Cont'd)

SECTION B – FACILITIES DATA

1. GEN. (CK. BASIC FACILITIES INVOLVED, DESCRIBE EFFECT ON ACCIDENT IN THE ANALYSIS SECTION)

NOT APPLICABLE

a. ☐ CLEARANCE AUTHORITY
b. ☐ FLIGHT PLANNING INFORMATION SOURCE
c. ☐ LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, etc.)
d. ☐ TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER (Field or Ship)
e. ☐ APPROACH AND ENROUTE AIDS TO NAVIGATION
f. ☐ RUNWAY WATCH
g. ☐ LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER
w. ☐ OTHER, Specify
h. ☐ RUNWAY
i. ☐ WATER LANDING AREA
j. ☐ APPROACH ZONE
k. ☐ END ZONE
l. ☐ SHOULDERS
m. ☐ TAXIWAY
n. ☐ PARKING AREA
o. ☐ EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR (Runway)
p. ☐ AIRCRAFT SERVICING, HANDLING & DIRECTING (Field or Ship)
q. ☐ CRASH AND RESCUE
r. ☐ SEARCH AND RESCUE
s. ☐ CATAPULT
t. ☐ ARRESTING GEAR (Carrier)
u. ☐ BARRIER OR BARRICADE (Field or Ship)
v. ☐ FLIGHT DECK

2. SHIPS DATA

a. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR | B. PRESSURE SETTINGS | C. WIND OVER DECK | D. RELATIVE HEADWIND | E. APPROACH SPEED (SPN-12 READING)

F. MARK NUMBER | G. MODEL NO. | H. LOCATION ON SHIP: NOT APPLICABLE | I. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND CONFIGURATION USED

J. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

K. THIS PORTION SHALL BE COMPLETED WHENEVER (1) A MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES ARRESTING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT, OR (2) AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES MALFUNCTIONING OF ARRESTING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT. MINOR ACCIDENTS OR ROUTINE DAMAGE TO CABLES, WELDINGS AND OTHER EXPENDABLE COMPONENTS NEED NOT BE REPORTED.

ENGAGED	DECK RUNOUT (FT.)	RAM TRAVEL (IN.)	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	COMMENTS (for cable failure specify number of landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT				NOT APPLICABLE			
BARRIER							
BARRIER							
BARRICADE							

PART III – REMARKS (continue on separate pages if necessary)

PART	SECTION	ITEM

Copy Distrib
2cc Direct
NAVAVNSFECEN
1cc Direct
BUAER (MA-61)
CMC (AAP)
COMNAVAIRPAC
CG 3d MAW
CG AIRFMFPAC
GinCPacFlt
BAR Bethpage

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ADDITIONAL AAR BOARD MEMBERS

(b) (6) [redacted] Capt. USMC Elect. Officer

(b) (6) [redacted] 1st Lt USMCR Squadron Safety Officer

(b) (6) [redacted] Government Property $ NONE

(b) Private Property NONE

Date Submitted to C.O. 11Aug58

PART IV – SIGNATURES OF

(b) (6) [redacted] Major USMC Ops Off (member) UNIT BILLET

(b) (6) [redacted] Capt. USMC Maint. Off (member) UNIT BILLET

(b) (6) [redacted] LtMC USNR (flight surgeon member)

(b) (6) [redacted] Capt USMC Ass't Ops Off UNIT BILLET

PART V. - The Accident

a. On 17 July 1958, 2nd Lt. James E. LITTLE, was scheduled as number four (4) man, of a four (4) plane flight, on a glide bombing mission on Target 72 (Bulldog Target) near MCAAS Mojave, California (enclosure (7)). A flight briefing for glide bombing and division tactics, in which Lt. LITTLE was present, was thorough and approximately 40 minutes in duration, and conducted in accordance with the check-off list provided in the squadron briefing room (enclosure (8)). Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] was briefed to act as bogie during the Tactics phase of the flight.

b. When the flight was in takeoff position, the flight leader was forced to abort due to defective brakes, and passed the lead to the alternate flight leader. The flight departed from MCAS El Toro at 1430T and proceeded to Target Seventy-Two (72) as briefed.

c. After two (2) uneventful bombing runs on Target Seventy-Two (72), Lt. LITTLE requested a radio check from other members of the flight and finally transmitted that his receiver was apparently inoperative, whereupon, he stated that he would orbit the target at 15,000 feet. Lt. LITTLE was observed orbiting over the target area on at least two (2) occasions by Lt. (b) (6) the flight leader, (enclosure (2b)). At approximately 1500T Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] number two (2) man in the flight was on the downwind leg to the target when he observed an F9F-8 apparently making a pass at him. The unidentified F9F-8 aircraft closed to within 4,000 feet then broke off and up to Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] 6 o'clock position. At this time Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] also saw a second F9F-8 that appeared to be making a run on the first, (enclosure (2c)). Concurrently Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] was approaching the target area from the North East, letting down to an altitude of about 13,000 feet - 14,000 feet where he proceeded in a left hand orbit to await completion of the bombing mission, (enclosure (2)). It may have been this aircraft that Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] observed. At approximately 1510T while orbiting Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] observed an F9F-8 approaching his 7 o'clock position, (enclosure (5a)). This aircraft passed under and to his outside making a steep turn to the right, then a sharp reversal to the left, to an approximate heading of west. The aircraft was then observed by Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] to hesitate momentarily, continue the roll to the left, andcommence a fairly steep dive towards the South East of Bulldog Target. At this time Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] estimated his own altitude to be between 10,000 and 12,000 feet. He took his eyes off the other aircraft for a few seconds and when he again observed this aircraft, it appeared very low, then, a flash of fire and black smoke emerged from the ground indicating the aircraft had collided with the ground and exploded. ~~Immediately upon collision with the ground~~ Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] immediately switched to guard frequency and gave a crash report. The aircraft configuration at time of impact was landing gear up, dive brakes up, wing flaps up and the engine was operating at a high power setting. Crash equipment reached the scene and extinguished a few small fires in the impact area, (enclosure (3e)).

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 69, OPNAV INST. 3750.6C

PART VI. Damage to Aircraft

F9F-8P BuNo 141169 collided with the ground, the left wing slightly down 20° - 25° nose down attitude and at an angle of impact of 45° - 60°. The aircraft did not skip or bounce but the left wing striking the ground first caused the aircraft to pivot slightly to the right about its longitudinal axis. Explosion and fire with almost complete disintegration followed as the engine traveled forward, rupturing the main fuel cells. The flash fire of the explosion scorched an area to the right and forward of the point of impact due to torquing motion and the surface winds which were from the South-West. (See Encl 6B). The crater caused by the collision, contained a few large parts of the aircraft such as the lower section of the tail containing the arresting hook assembly, rear section of the LH outer wing panel, four (4) 20 MM guns, left wing main spar (See Encl 6C). Parts not visible in Enclosure 6C but contained within the crater 5 feet to 12 feet were the fuel control, LH and RH dive brake actuating cylinders (retracted position), LH and RH speed brake actuating cylinders (retracted position) and the LH main landing gear assembly with actuating cylinder in a retracted position. The remainder of the aircraft wreckage was strewn forward of the impact point on heading of 267° to 330° with the canopy actuating cylinder thrown 435 feet, which was the furthest part from the impact point (Encl 6F). The engine turbine assembly was found near the canopy actuating cylinder. Aircraft speed, power settings, and attitude could not be accurately determined prior to collision as all instruments recovered were severely damaged. A priority DIR (Disassembly Inspection Report) on the Airspeed Indicator, tachometer, attitude Gyro, TPT Indicator, Oxygen Regulator, stabilizer actuator and shift sector assembly was submitted by message to BAMR West Dist on 22 July 1958, requesting instrument readings and hydraulic tail settings at time of impact. (VMA311 222035Z July 1958). DIR items were flown to NAS Alameda on 28 July 1958. Reports will be forwarded when received.

PART VII. The Investigation

a. The investigation revealed the following:

(1) Lt. LITTLE joined VMA-311 on 8 February 1958. He was designated a Naval Aviator on 31 October 1957, completed flight training on 25 January 1958. His overall grade was 53, on the ATB scoring system, which places his relative standing at the top of the middle 38%. A resume of his total flight time is as follows:

(a) Total flight time	395.1
(b) Total F9F-8 time	88.9
(c) Total F9F-8 time last 90 days	47.9
(d) Total F9F-8 time last 30 days	20.8
(e) Total glide bombing flights in the squadron	9
(f) No record of previous accidents	

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 69, OPNAV INST. 3750.6C

(2) The weather at the time of the accident was clear with 30 miles visibility.

(3) The pilot had 7½ hours sleep the night prior to the accident and had eaten properly the day of the accident.

(4) The aircraft involved had previously been flown that morning and was preflighted prior to LT. LITTLE's flight and determined to be up for flight. (Enclosure (4b)).

(5) In the ten (10) previous discrepancy sheets, (part B's), one grounding discrepancy was noted which was number one (1) inverter out. This was replaced before the next flight.

(6) The flight was an authorized scheduled glide bomb training mission which was properly briefed. (Enclosure (8)).

(7) All members of the flight were well qualified and capable of performing this type of mission.

(8) The flight proceeded in a normal manner until LT. LITTLE reported radio receiver failure. At this time LT. LITTLE attempted to establish radio contact with other members of the flight and being unable to, announced that he would climb to 15,000 feet and orbit the target. This was LT. LITTLE's last transmission.

(9) LT. LITTLE was observed orbiting above the bombing pattern, (SOP for communication failure), on two (2) occasions by other members of his flight after his initial call.

(10) LT. (b) (6) [redacted] observed two (2) Cougars a short time before the accident.

(11) LT. (b) (6) [redacted] observed a Cougar approaching from his 0700 position which passed by, made a few turns entered a steep dive and later crashed. (Enclosure (2),(4a)).

(12) There were three (3) eye witnesses on the ground who stated that they observed the crash. Their position relative to the crash scene is depicted in enclosure (5a).

(13) Two (2) of the witnesses in one location observed the destroyed aircraft enter its dive which appeared so steep to them that they debated as to whether the aircraft would recover. One (1) of these witnesses noticed that the aircraft rolled wing over wing prior to entering the fatal dive. (Enclosure (3a,b)).

(14) The third (3) eye witness in a different location observed only the last part of the dive which appeared steep to him. (Enclosure (3c)).

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 69, OPNAV INST. 3750.6C

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(15) The altitude at which the two (2) witnesses observed the aircraft enter its dive was estimated to be approximately 10,000 feet. (Enclosure (3e,b)).

(16) Investigation of the crash scene and analysis of various parts recovered revealed that the aircraft collided with the ground in a relatively flat attitude, (about 20° to 25° nose down), and in a slight left wing down attitude, but the angle of impact was approximately 45° to 60°. The heading of the aircraft upon contact was 255°. (Enclosures 5b and 6d).

(17) The aircraft exploded immediately after contact with the ground.

(18) The tail actuator system revealed 0° electrical trim. (Enclosure (6i)).

(19) The engine was operating at the time of impact. (Enclosure (6h)).

(20) The aircraft was in the hydraulic tail configuration.

(21) The canopy actuating cylinder was in the closed position, (enclosure (6j)), and the face curtain was still rolled up within the head rest assembly.

(22) No crash fire report was made because no rescue or fire fighting was performed. (See Enclosure (3e)).

PART VIII. The Analysis

a. Personnel factors - Interviews with LT. LITTLE's roommates failed to disclose any information which would tend to bear out the possibility of his having any apprehension or misgivings about this hop or about flying in general. He was known to have an aggressive spirit while flying but was not considered careless or foolhardy. A review of his squadron flight jacket disclosed that he received average to above average critiques from all of his flight leaders. He had successfully completed five (5) hours of emergency procedures in the F9F-8 O.F.T. on 2 April 1958.

LT. LITTLE was properly rested prior to the flight and his flight record indicates that he was fully qualified to fly the mission assigned.

The plane captain who assisted LT. LITTLE into the plane prior to the accident stated that he appeared normal in all respects and that he was properly strapped in. (Enclosure (4B)).

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARA 69, OPNAV INST. 3750.6C

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The flight proceeded to the target area and all members of the flight made the first two runs in the normal manner. At this time LT. LITTLE called the other members of his flight for a radio check. It is apparent that he received no answer, because he called both LT. (b) (6) and LT. (b) (6) At this time he made the transmission that he would orbit the target at 15,000 feet. He was observed orbiting on at least two (2) occasions by LT. (b) (6). These incidences tend to support the promise of the board that he was in full command of his faculties up to this time. What follows is pure conjecture based on the foregoing facts, and events that took place after this time.

There have been many instances of unidentified aircraft flying through the target restricted area and the bombing pattern at all altitudes. These violations have been reported to the group operations office at MCAS El Toro and to the operations department at MCAS Mojave. Various unsuccessful attempts have been made to identify these aircraft without deviating a great amount from the pattern itself, and it is highly conceivable that LT. LITTLE attempted to do this very thing. While orbiting he apparently spotted LT. (b) (6) flying adjacent to the area and took it upon himself to investigate. Since LT. (b) (6) states that at this time he was entering the orbit at a relatively slow air speed it is possible that LT. LITTLE overran him, and recognizing the color markings of LT. (b) (6) aircraft, decided to perform an evasive maneuver which accounts for the two (2) steep turns and the dive observed by Miss (b) as rolling maneuvers. Further, assuming that he was trying to keep LT. (b) (6) in sight, he inadvertently extended his dive to the point from which it was impossible to recover. However, analysis of the wreckage and the attitude of the aircraft relative to the flight path indicates that he was attempting a recovery. It appears that the aircraft had high "G" forces applied to it prior to contact with the ground. No emergency was declared at any time during the flight.

b. Supervisory factors - The proper procedure to be followed in the event of radio failure is in the Squadron flight-doctrine manual, and this procedure was covered in the briefing prior to the hop. Since LT. LITTLE observed this procedure for at least a portion of the flight, it is concluded that he understood it. Furthermore, since this squadron is constantly participating in dive bombing missions, the hazards of maneuvering near the ground are continually reemphasized. Therefore, the board feels that supervision on the squadron level was adequate and has no bearing on the accident.

c. Material factor - Examination of the wreckage revealed no mechanical malfunction or material failure prior to the crash that could be pertinent as to the cause of the accident.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 69, OPNAV INST. 3750.6C

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PART IX. Comments & Recommendations

COMMENTS:

a. The cause of this accident was pilot factor in that Lt. LITTLE failed to continue orbiting the target as briefed. While radio receiver failure was the reason for Lt. LITTLE not continuing with the assigned mission, this did not constitute a maintenance or material factor, nor was it pertinent to the accident.

b. Lt. LITTLE was considered to be an above average young pilot by the flight leaders with whom he had flown in this squadron. He was very aggressive on previous tactic flights and it appears that his enthusiasm and aggressiveness overcame his better judgment and caution commensurate with safe flight, in that he failed to realize, until to late the precarious position into which he had maneuvered himself.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. All pilots must be impressed with the necessity of strict adherence to squadron doctrine and SOP'S in situations which deviate from a normal mission. While good look-out doctrine is vital in high performance aircraft, the pilot's scan must include instrument reference for positive orentation due to the deceptive effect on speed and altitude encountered over flat uninhabited terrain or water during maneuvers where visual references are limited.

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 69, OPNAV INST. 3750.6C

Statement of First Lieut-nant (b) (6) [redacted] #7335 USMCR concerning accident involving F9F-8B, BuNo 141169, occurring on 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE

At approximately 1500T I arrived in the Mojave local flying area in WL-8, BuNo 141168, having just completed a successful test flight on the aircraft. At this time I was letting down North East of the Bulldog restricted area at a low power setting to conserve fuel. I had just switched to channel 9 and heard a statement made by someone in the flight utilizing Bulldog Target, "to climb and orbit at 15,000 feet." I later recognized this person as Lt. (b) (6) who was in control of Bully Flight. I continued my descent to about 13,000 - 14,000 feet where I set up a left hand orbit to await the completion of the flight on Bulldog Target. When Bully Flight had finished the bombing mission and had completed the rendezvous I was to make a run on one or the other section to give the flight "Fluid-4" tactics practice on the way to Palmdale, as was pre-briefed. During the next five minutes or so I heard Lt. (b) (6) and Lt. (b) (6) calling in and off target and occassionally caught glimpses of them in the bombing pattern.

At about 1510T I noted that my fuel, which I had been monitoring closely, was now down to about 2800 pounds. At this time I was passing through a heading of about 330° and noticed a Cougar closing at my 0700 position slightly low. I watched the aircraft approach till it was fairly close at which time I pulled the nose up and banked left. The Cougar approaching slid under me and to the outside because of his higher air speed. I then rolled around so as to be inside his turn to the left. I observed that the aircraft had the familiar red wing tip markings characteristic of VMA-311 aircraft but did not see an identifying modex number. The pilot in the Cougar then rolled to the right and pulled the plane around approximately 90° - 120° of turn to the right, at the end of which he reversed sharply to the left and continued back around towards the initial heading. I followed but fell behind as I had not yet added power. Once back to an approximate heading of West the pilot in the other aircraft seemed to hesitate momentarily in a slight left wing down attitude. I began to slide outside his turn to the right as I was now down to about 2600 pounds and was going to return home.

The pilot in the lead Cougar then rolled the aircraft over to the left and commenced what appeared to be a fairly steep dive towards the South and East of the Bulldog area. I estimate my altitude at this time to have been between 10,000 and 12,000 feet. I then looked away from the aircraft for several seconds and when I looked back towards the area where I thought the aircraft had gone I was unable to immediately establish his position. I rolled over more steeply, left wing down and noted the Cougar at approximately my 0830 position and quite low. I thought at this time that the other plane appeared quite low and then I started to look away again when I caught the flash and black smoke.

I immediately shifted to Guard frequency and called Mojave Tower giving my identification and the crash report. I then proceeded to Mojave and landed.

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARTS 69 OPNAVINST 1950.3C

During the time I was in the Mojave area I heard only the transmissions of the two men on the Bulldog Target. While I was orbiting I observed several other aircraft in the general vicinity of the Bulldog Target area.

I am a Naval Aviator with 1080.0 hours total flight time and approximately 600.0 hours in the F9F-8.

(b) (6) [redacted]

The above statement is considered a true and credible account of events as they occurred.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Major USMC

ENCLOSURE (1) to VMA-311 AAR 2-58

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARTS 6-9 OPNAVISE 2750 P.C.

Statement of First Lieutenant (b) (6) [redacted] 7333 USMC, concerning accident involving F9F-8B, BuNo 141169, occurring on 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE.

On 17 July 1958 at 1300, I started briefing "Bully" flight for a glide bombing hop. The members of the flight were (1) Lt. (b) (6) (Flight Leader), (2) Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] (3) Lt. (b) (6) (Section Leader), and (4) Lt. LITTLE.

The briefing started at 1300 and a briefing check list was used. We were to use the call sign "BULLY", and were to light off so as to be airborne at 1400 (This was later changed to 1430 due to aircraft availability). We were to turn up and check in on our squadron tactical channel, go to unpaired for taxi, and to channel 5 prior to reaching the duty runway. We were to make section take-offs and climb out enroute to the target in a fluid four formation.

In the event of a radio failure after take-off we were to orbit the target in the direction of the bombing pattern at 12,000 feet, keeping the other members of the formation in sight. The person with radio trouble could be picked up by his section leader or wingman while the others proceed ED [illegible] back to the base.

I briefed that I would call Mojave Tower, get us cleared to the target and then call the target with our line-up. Then the target would tell us which target we were to use and the direction of the pattern. I would repeat this and have the other members of the flight acknowledge the transmissions. We were to roll in on our bombing run at 12,600 feet with [illegible] knots, [illegible], and speed brakes down. The target altitude was briefed as [illegible] feet. We were to have 89 mils lead, pickle at 6600 feet, and be out of [illegible] feet.

I briefed that we were supposed to have about [illegible] knots of [illegible] and we might have to use 120 mils lead. I was to make 9 runs if possible, or my last run the other members of the flight were to rendezvous on me and then go back to the fluid four formation for return to the base. If we were jumped by our pre-briefed bogie the section not under attack was to try to tail turns for the section under attack so as to get the bogie off and at the same time get on the bogie's tail. We were to maintain the integrity of the flight at all times. This was emphasized when the question was asked by Lt. LITTLE, "Can I get on his tail." I answered, "No that he would have to stay with his section in [illegible]."

I briefed for a sharp break, good interval, and good landing. The alternate flight leader was to be Lt. (b) (6) Down pilot procedures were to be that the wingman or section leader stay down over the down aircraft and the others go high and transmit MAYDAY. Our fuel bingo was to be 2300 pounds. I asked any questions and there were none.

We left the ready room about 1400, lit off, checked in, taxied out, and took the duty runway about 1435. When my wingman and I turned up both of my brakes were very spongy and weak so I called that I was aborting and for the alternate flight leader to take over. The tower cleared the flight to take off and I returned to the line.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PART 69 OPNAVINST 3750.6C

I am a Naval Aviator with 580.7 hours total flight time and approximately 240.0 hours in the F9F-8.

(b) (6) [redacted]

The above statement is considered a true and credible account of events as they occurred.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Major USMC

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 69 OPNAVINST 5720.8C

ENCLOSURE (3a) to VMA-311 AAR 2-58

Statement of First Lieutenant (b) (6) [redacted] /7333 USMCR, concerning accident involving F9F-8P, BuNo 141169, occurring on 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE.

The flight was a scheduled bombing hop at target 72. Lt. (b) [redacted] was the flight leader. The briefing was conducted according to the squadron briefing card. Lt. (b) (6) covered in detail the procedure to be used in case of radio failure. Anyone losing a radio while on target was to climb to 14,000 feet and orbit over the target keeping the rest of the flight in sight. When the rest of the flight was through bombing, the wingman or the section leader of the plane which had the radio failure would climb up and pick him up. Lt. (b) (6) also stated that in case the flight was jumped by another aircraft that division integrity would be kept at all times.

I was told by Lt. (b) (6) that if he couldn't go that I was to take the flight. Lt. (b) (6) was unable to take off and turned over the lead to me while on the duty runway. The flight was conducted as briefed. All checks required while airborne were made by me.

After two runs on target 72, Lt. LITTLE tried to establish contact with Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] answered him, then Lt. LITTLE called me for a radio check and I answered him. He apparently did not read me for he then said he did not have a radio and would climb to 15,000 and orbit over the target. I saw him climb up to orbit and also saw him orbiting while I was in bombing pattern for approximately 20 minutes when the crashed occurred. Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] who was in WL 8 was in the area and gave the crash call approximately 1510. I did not see the aircraft crash as I was just pulling off from a bombing run. I turned down wind and then saw the smoke from the crash. I went to Guard channel and reported the crash to Mojave tower. I orbited at 8,000 feet until the rescue aircraft was at the scene. I was instructed by Mojave tower to land at Mojave which I did. I did not receive any more transmissions from Lt. LITTLE after he went up to orbit over the target.

I am a Naval Aviator with 506.8 hours total flight time and approximately 165.0 hours in the F9F-8.

(b) (6) [redacted]

The above statement is considered a true and credible account of events as they occurred.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Major USMC

ENCLOSURE (2 b) to VMA-311 AAR 2-58

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA-69 OPNAVINST 3750.6C

Statement of Second Lieutenant (b) (6) [redacted] 7333 USMCR, concerning accident involving F9F-8B, BuNo 141169, occurring on 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE.

At 1300, 17 July 1958, I arrived in the briefing room for briefing for a scheduled glide bombing hop. The line up for the hop was Lt. (b) (6) myself Lt. (b) (6) and Lt. LITTLE. The briefing for the hop was conducted by Lt. (b) (6) and lasted approximately fourty (40) minutes. The briefing covered the glide bombing procedures, take-off, climb out, return, and emergency procedures. Lt. (b) (6) was very explicit about radio failure, (man with radio failure, climb to 14,000 feet over target and orbit until picked up wingman), and down plane procedures. Lt. (b) [redacted] followed the SOP briefing check off list.

After leaving the ready room at 1400, we went to the line shack, signed off the aircraft, preflighted, lit off, taxied, and after clearance from the tower lined up on the duty runway which was 25. After the 100% run up prior to take off Lt. (b) (6) cocked off to the right, called the tower and stated that he would not be taking the hop and that WL 18 (Lt. (b) (6) would. This had been pre-briefed, Lt. (b) (6) was the alternate flight leader.

Lt. (b) [redacted] took off, I followed and Lt. LITTLE was then number 3. The climb out to target 72 went as briefed. Over the target after checking in with Mojave tower and Bulldog target we commenced normal "live" glide bombing runs. After my second run I heard Lt. LITTLE call the leader "Bully 3, radio check, over." Bully 1 came back with "Bully 3, this is 1, I read you loud and clear." Lt. LITTLE evidently not receiving then called, "Bully 2, this is Bully 3, do you read over." I answered "Bully 3, 2, I read you loud and clear, over." Lt. LITTLE then came back saying "evidently my receiver is out, I am leaving the pattern and will orbit." I didn't catch the altitude he gave but supposed it to be 14,000 feet.

Lt. (b) [redacted] and myself continued making runs. On my fifth or sixth run while flying down wind at approximately 10,000 feet I spotted an F9F-8 which appeared to be making a dummy gunnery run on me. It continued in to about 1,000 feet, broke off and pulled up and to my rear. At this time I spotted a second F9F-8 coming in on the first. I reported this to Lt. (b) [redacted] over the radio at this time which was approximately 1500. I continued making bombing runs until approximately 1510 when I heard over the radio, "crash crash crash, [illegible]." I reported my eighth bombing run, turned [illegible] and spotted black smoke rising from a point on the deck approximately four miles north east of the target 72 restricted area. I then joined on Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] wing and we orbited the scene of the crash, varying our altitude from 10 to 17 thousand. At the time I didn't believe that it was Lt. LITTLE that was down, and I don't believe, that Lt. (b) [redacted] did either. I saw several bogies, and called them out. Lt. (b) [redacted] and I flew over to one of them, but it turned out to be a TV-2, another I recognized was an FJ-4. There were one or two more bogies, but we didn't get close enough to recognize their type.

We orbited the scene for about 25 minutes. Lt. (b) (6) called for my fuel state twice, and when I registered approximately 2300 lbs we started to return to El Toro. Mojave tower called and told us operations wanted us to land at Mojave. At 1545 we landed at Mojave.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 4.0 OPNAVINST 3750.6 C

I am a Naval Aviator with 355.3 hours total flight time and approximately 130.0 hours in the [redacted]

(b) (6)

The above statement is considered a true and credible account of events as they occurred.

(b) (6)

Major USMC

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ENCLOSURE (2c) to VMA-311 MAR 2-58

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER 69 OPNAVINST 3710.8 C

18 July 1958

STATEMENT OF MISS (b) (6) [redacted]

As I was reading inside the cabin, I heard unusual airplane sounds which aroused my curiosity. I did not suspect trouble. I thought of unusual numbers or of planes flying nearer to us than usual and ran outside saying "What in the world goes on?"

I looked up into the sky to the south-south east and spotted two planes seemingly quite close together. I glanced around to see if there were a third in the group. Didn't see a third. When I glanced back at the two, one was rolling wing over wing at least twice. I thought first it might be stunting although I have never seen any plane on the bombing range behave in such fashion.

I was about to say to my sister, "He's stunting!" Then the plane seemed to go into a dive. We are used to watching the bombing patterns over the target four miles south of us and are used to the sounds they make.

The dive seemed so nearly vertical and the altitude so low for such an angle that I said, "Oh! he'll never make it!" My sister calmly reassured me, "Oh, yes he will!"

But the dive continued without leveling out in the least. I yelled, "He's going to hit." Florence agreed, "Yes, he is!" In another second or two or three he hit almost nose down and flames burst up high at once.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Upon interviewing the witness it was found that she had a very limited aeronautical background. All Air Travel had been accomplished in commercial multi-engine aircraft.

The above statement is considered a true and credible account of events as they occurred.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Major, USMC

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 6-P OPNAVINST 3750.6C

18 July 1958

STATEMENT OF (b) (6) [redacted]
(b) (6) [redacted]

At about 3:15 p.m. July 17, 1958, I was attracted by the unusually loud and continuous noise of jets. I saw three (I thought) jets which were circuling in what seemed to me to be an unusually small area. This was not the same area in which we have observed regular bombing practice. If there were only two, one of them completed a circle in a very short time. One jet circled under the other. I did not see it roll--was watching the other plane at the moment. When my sister said, "He's falling!" I looked back at the lower plane, which was losing altitude, and replied, "Oh, he'll come out of it." Then the jet turned nose down and plummetted to the ground.

As to altitude--the best I can say is that we estimated our distance from the crach to be about a mile and a half, as the crow flies, and we were watching the jets at an angle of approximately 35 degrees.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Retired Writer

Upon interviewing the witness, it was found that she had a very limited aeronautical background. All air travel had been accomplished in commercial multi-engine aircraft.

The above statement is considered
a true and credible account of events
as they occurred.
(b) (6) [redacted]

Major, USMC

ENCLOSURE (3b) to VMA-311 AAR 2-58

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 47 OPNAVINST 3750.6 C

21 July 1958

STATEMENT OF (b) (6) [redacted]

On July 17, 1958 at approximately 3:00 p.m., I was walking near the intersection of Randsburs Mojave Road and Neuralia Road at California City when I heard the roar of a jet engine overhead. Suddenly the normal roar seemed to change to high pitch scream. I looked up and saw a jet aircraft traveling west in an extremely steep dive moving at a high rate of speed. I watched the jet until it hit the earth about 2 miles distant and exploded upon impact. At that instant I looked at my watch which indicated the time to be 3:05 p.m. During its downward descent, the wings were level and all portions of the plane appeared to be intact. The forgoing is submitted to the best of my knowledge and observation.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Upon interviewing the witness it was found that Mr. (b) (6) had a very limited aeronautical background. He had flown about 25 hours in single engine civilian type aircraft.

The above statement is considered a true and credible account of events as they occurred.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Major, USMC

ENCLOSURE (3c) to VMA-311 AAR 2-58

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARTS 4-9 OPNAVINST 3750.6 C

Statement of First Lieutenant (b) (6) [redacted] /7333 USMCR, ODO NCAAS Mojave, California, concerning accident involving F9F-8B, BuNo 141169, occurring on 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE.

I was Operations Duty Officer Thursday, 17 July 1958. At 1510 the tower rang the crash phone and siren. Over the crash phone the tower operator reported an aircraft crash on Bulldog Target.

I proceeded to the tower where I could see a column of smoke rising from the target area. Immediately, I dispatched the station crash crew, ambulance and security vehicles to the scene of the accident. One of the station Rescue Helicopters was in the air; it immediately proceeded to the accident.

In approximately four minutes the second station helicopter left for the scene of the accident with a flight surgeon aboard.

WL-8 landed at Mojave. From the pilot I learned that it was WL-1, who was one of a flight of VMA-311 aircraft operation on Bulldog target, that had crashed.

I am a Naval Aviator with 951.7 logged pilot hours.

(b) (6) [redacted]

The above statement is considered a true and credible account of events as they occurred.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Major USMC

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 6-5 OPNAVINST 3750.6C

18 July 1958

STATEMENT OF TECHNICAL SERGEANT (b) (6) [redacted] U. S. Marine Corps

Approximately 2211Z, 17 July 1958, the crash phone rang. The information was mayday over bulldog target. I, Sergeant (b) (6), proceeded to bulldog target with crash truck MB-2 immediately. Then proceeded directly to the scene of crash, with aid of helicopter. Upon arrival at scene of accident, it was noted that the aircraft had exploded. The crash truck MB-5 stationed at bulldog target had arrived at the scene of crash and was extinguishing small fires when I arrived. The remains of the pilot was scattered. No rescue was performed. The small fires were extinguished and crash truck MB-5 was left at scene of accident for safety purposes.

(b) (6)
[redacted]

Technical Sergeant (b) (6) [redacted] is presently the non-commissioned officer in charge of the crash crew at MCAAS Mojave, Mojave California

The above statement is considered a true and credible account of events as they occurred.

(b) (6)
[redacted]

Major, USMC

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ENCLOSURE (3a) to VMA-311 AAR 2-58

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 67 OPNAVINST 3750.6C

Statement of Captain (b) (6) [redacted] [illegible] concerning accident involving F9F-8B, BuNo 141169, occurring on 17 July 1958, pilot [illegible]

Prior to the accident, F9F-8B BuNo 141169 had flown a total of 1035.[illegible] hours in the twenty-nine (29) months of its first service tour.

A First Intermediate (FPM) Inspection on the airframe was completed 28 June 1958. Total engine time since new/OH was 620.3 hours with a Major Inspection completed by HAMS-15 on [illegible] June 1958. This aircraft had flown 22.7 hours since the last periodic inspection. The last ten (10) discrepancy reports (Part B) examined indicated only one (1) grounding discrepancy which required the replacement of the number one inverter on 15 July 1958. All applicable F9F Aircraft Service Changes in the Urgent Category had been incorporated with the exception of F9F ASC 359D which was on order at the time.

The Airplane Weighing Record (Chart [illegible]) was brought up to a current status by the Squadron Weight and Balance Officer on 29 December 1957. It is the opinion of this officer that F9F-8B BuNo 141169 was in satisfactory mechanical condition with no known discrepancies. On 28 July 1958, parts salvaged from F9F-8B BuNo 141169 were flown to NAS Alameda for Priority DIR (Auth: [illegible] Dist [illegible]); Airspeed Indicator, Tachometer, Attitude Gyro, [illegible] Indicator, Oxygen Regulator, Stabilizer Actuator and Hydraulic Tail Shift Sector. Instrument reading and flying tail settings at the time of the crash will be forwarded upon completion of DIR.

I am the Maintenance Officer of VMA-311 and have acted as such for the past two (2) years.

(b) (6) [redacted]

The above statement is considered a true and credible account of events as they occurred.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Major USMC

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 6-9 SPNAVNST 3750.6C

ENCLOSURE (4a) to VMA-311 AAR 2-58

Statement of Private First Class (b) (6) [redacted] 6412 USMC concerning accident involving F9F-8B, BuNo 141169, occurring on 17 July 1958, pilot LITTLE

I was plane captain for Lt. LITTLE about 1400, 17 July 1958. In my preflight of the aircraft there were no visual defects, hydralic fluid and engine oil were at the proper level, oxygen and air bottles were full.

When Lt. LITTLE made his normal preflight of the aircraft his physical apperance didn't seem any different than when I have assisted him on previous flights.

In strapping him in his sholder harness, safety belt, oxygen hose, G-suit, bail out bottle and radio cords were all attached properly.

I have been a plane captain for the past nine (9) months in this command.

(b) (6) [redacted]

The above statement is considered a true and credible account of events as they occurred.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Major USMC

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ENCLOSURE (46) to VMA-311 AAR 2-58

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARTI 4.9 OPNAVINST 3750.6 C

1. INITIAL OBSERVATION OF (L) BY (Z); APPROX: 14,000 FT.
2. (Z) PULLS UP & LEFT WHILE (L) GOES PAST RIGHT SIDE
3. (L) TURNS 90°-120° TO RIGHT, FOLLOWED BY (Z)
4. (L) REVERSES SHARPLY BACK TO LEFT FOLLOWED BY (Z) FALL'G BEHIND
5. (L) STOPS TURN TO LEFT, HESITATES MOMENTARILY AS (Z) SLIDES TO RIGHT. 10,000-12,000 FT.
6. (L) COMMENCES SHARP DIVING TURN TO LEFT & (Z) CONTINUES AHEAD TAKING EVES PRIMARY FROM (L)
7. (Z) LOOK'S AGAIN, LOCATE'S (L) JUST PRIOR TO OBSERVING FLASH OF EXPLOSION 8.

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ENCLOSURE (5A) TO VMA-311 AAR-2-58



ENCLOSURE (5B) TO VMA-311. AAR-2-58

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 4-1 OPNAVINST 3750.6



SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARTS 6-8 OPNAVINST A5510.93

ENCLOSURE (5C) TO VMA-311 AAR-2-58

DESCRIPTIVE LEGEND FOR DIAGRAM AND PARTIAL INVENTORY OF PARTS OF AIRCRAFT PRECEDE

A. Hole created by fuselage of aircraft striking the ground. Length 22 feet, width 6 feet in the widest place, depth about 6 feet with parts discovered to a depth of approximately [illegible] feet in the sand.

B. Imprint left by the left wing. Dimensions approximately 22 feet long, 5 feet wide at the widest point and 1 foot deep average depth.

C. Imprint of the right wing. 22 feet long, 3 feet wide, 4 to 6 inches deep.

Aircraft heading determined by imprints in the ground was 255° magnetic. Numerous parts from the nose and cockpit sections were found along a heading of 267° from the point of impact (see parts diagram).

(1) Lower portion of tail section containing arresting gear assembly
(2) Aft section of outer left wing panel
(3) Leading edge of left wing
(4) Dive brake cylinders enclosed.
(5) Fuel control
(6) Guns (4)
(6a) Labs control boxes and battery pieces

ENCLOSURE (5b) to VMA-311 [illegible]2-58

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 69 OPNAVINST 3760.8C

[illegible]

[illegible]

7. Lower portion of tail section
8. Left vertical stabilizer with [illegible]
9. Aft section of right wing
10. Leading edge of right wing
11. Remainder of engine compressor
12. Altimeter
13. One Hardman helmet fitting, indication of oxygen mask secured to helmet
14. Main parts of engine, [illegible] chambers
15. Starboard landing [illegible]
16. Pilot's safety [illegible] (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] and left [illegible] FH-2 raft
17. Nose ballast weights
18. Oil filler neck with [illegible]
19. Mach indicator
20. Oil pump
21. Armor plate from behind [illegible]
22. Nose section, top [illegible]
23. One ID tag
24. In-flight refueling [illegible]
25. Other instruments [illegible] panel, (b) (6) [redacted] right [illegible]
26. One Hardman helmet fitting indicating oxygen mask secured to helmet and one ID tag.
27. Piece of helmet
28. Top section fuselage near [illegible]
29. Parts from nose section, including a large portion wiring for instruments
30. One oxygen bottle
31. Part of fuselage
32. Rear fuel cell capacitance probe
33. Oxygen bottle
34. Canopy parts
35. Engine turbine [illegible]
36. Wiring and aircraft control rigging
37. Main fuel cell capacitance unit
38. Canopy actuating cylinder in closed position

40

ENCLOSURE (5c) to VMA-311 [illegible] 2-58

SPECIAL [illegible] REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAGE 69 OPNAVINST 3750.8C

AEROLOGICAL OFFICE
MARINE CORPS AUXILIARY AIR STATION
MOJAVE, CALIFORNIA

CRASH REPORT

DATE 17 July 1958

TIME 2210 Z

The following weather observation was taken immediately following the crash of the designated aircraft.

PILOT _____ RANK _____ ORGAN _____

Type of Plane _____ Bu. No. _____

Place of Crash _____

Number of Planes Involved _____

Sky (Weather) Clear

Ceiling Unlimited feet Visibility 10 miles

Cloud amount: High NONE Middle NONE Low NONE

Dry Bulb Temp 82.0 °F Wet Bulb Temp 60.0 °F

Dew Point 42 °F Relative Humidity 14 %

Wind Direction 250 degrees true Wind Speed 5 Knots

Gusts at time of crash NONE Knots

Highest gust past 15 minutes NONE Knots

Altimeter Setting 29.87 Inches

Pressure (Sea Level) 1007.7 Mbs.

State of landing area Dry

REMARKS: Weather past 30 minutes, i.e. Ltng-Rain-Fog-Smoke, Thunder-etc.

(b) (6) [redacted]
Observer

Sgt
Rank

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ENCLOSURE: (5d) to VMA-311 AAR 2-58

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARTS 64 OPNAVINST 3750.5 C

MARINE ATTACK SQUADRON 311
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 15
3D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
AIRTRAFT, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION
EL TORO (SANTA ANA), CALIFORNIA

FLIGHT SCHEDULE
17 July 1958

OB NO	MISSION	FUEL	ORDNANCE	LT	PILOTS	LNINF	TO	TOT	CHOCK
1	MPQ EL CENTRO	FULL	2 100# GP	27 21	(b) (6) [redacted]	0630	0730	0800	0900
2	GLIDE BOMB (72) & SEC TACTIC	FULL	8 MINS	2 5 10 15	[redacted]	0830	0930	1000	1100
3	MPQ EL CENTRO	FULL	2 100# GP	1 16	(b) (6) [redacted]	0830	0930	1000	1100
4	GLIDE BOMB (72)	FULL	8 MINS	7 12 11	(b) (6) [redacted]	0900	1000	1030	1130
5	MPQ EL CENTRO	FULL	2 100# GP	21 15	(b) (6) [redacted]	1030	1130	1200	1300
6	GLIDE BOMB (72)	FULL	8 MINS	5 17 12 7	(b) (6) [redacted]	1230	1330	1400	1500
7	FAM III	FULL	NONE	13 22	(b) (6) [redacted]	1345	1345		1615
8	GLIDE BOMB (72)	FULL	8 MINS	21 13	(b) (6) [redacted]	1300	1400	1430	1530
				CRASHED	LITTLE				
9	FAM V (AREA CK OUT)	FULL	NONE	14 13	(b) (6) [redacted]	1315	1415		1615
10	TACTICS	FULL	NONE	17 13	[redacted]	1330	1430		1615
11	TEST		NONE	10	(b) (6) [redacted]		0930		1115
12	TEST		NONE	8	[redacted]		1400		1530
13	MAJ-MYL & RETURN		NONE	11	[redacted]		1725		1835
	ALERT STANDBY DIVISION				(b) (6) [redacted]				
	MOFT:				(b) (6) [redacted]		1300		1400
	LINKS:				[redacted]		1430		1600

SDO: 2ndLt (b) [redacted]
RDO: 1045-1145 (b) (6) [redacted]
1500-1615

(b) (6) [redacted]
1stLt, USMC
Flight Officer

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA-69 OPNAVINST 3750.8C

ENCLOSURE (7) TO VMA-311 AAR 2-58

VMA 311 FLIGHT LEADER'S BRIEFING CHECKLIST

1. THIS FLIGHT WILL: USE THE CALL SIGN _____
LEAVE THE READY ROOM AT _____
LIGHT OFF AT _____
TAKE OFF AT _____
LAND AT _____
TARGET _____
CONTROLLERS _____

2. TURN UP ON SQUADRON TACTICAL, CHECK IN ON FLIGHT LEADER'S CALL, GO TO GROUND CONTROL FOR TAXI, & TOWER FOR TAKE OFF.

3. TAKE OFF INSTRUCTIONS, CALL WHEN AIRBORNE, AND CHANNEL CHANGE.

4. RENDEZVOUS AND CLIMBOUT INSTRUCTIONS: FORMATION ENROUTE.

5. CHANNEL CHANGES; CHECK IN PROCEDURE; PROCEDURE IN CASE OF COMMUNICATIONS BREAK DOWN.

6. WEATHER INSTRUCTIONS; PENETRATION, GCA, FUEL REQUIREMENTS, INDIVIDUAL OR FORMATION, IFF INSTRUCTIONS.

7. PRIOR TO ATTACK, ARMAMENT SWITCHES, DUMP TANKS, VOICE CALLS, RADIO FAILURE.

8. ATTACK, SIGNALS, SUN, WIND, SPEED, CONFIGURATION, ALTITUDES, HEADINGS, RECOVERY, TERRAIN & ELEVATION, NUMBER OF RUNS.

9. RETIREMENT, DIRECTION, SPEED, POWER, ALTITUDE, LAST PLANE CALL OFF, RENDEZVOUS & SWITCHES SAFE.

10. MINIMUM FUEL REQUIREMENTS, BINGOS.

11. RETURN TO FIELD, ALTITUDE, FORMATION, APPROACH: GCA, ADF, FCA.

12. BREAK AND LANDING, FIVE SECONDS FOR BREAK INTERVAL, TIGHT PATTERN, LANDINGS.

13. EARLY ABORT AIRCRAFT INSTRUCTIONS: SPARES.

14. ALTERNATE FLIGHT LEADERS.

15. DOWN PILOT PROCEDURES, CAP PROCEDURES AND BINGOS, EMERGENCY FIELDS.

16. TIME CHECK.

17. INSTRUMENT TRAINING INSTRUCTIONS.

18. ANY QUESTION.

ENCLOSURE (8) to VMA-311 SAR 2-58

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 6-9 OPNAVINST 3750.6 C

NAV FORM 3750-8 (REV. 1-54)

SUMMARIES OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT, INJURIES AND CAUSE

DIRECTIONS

1. Use separate form for each person
2. Under Injury Cause, use following key

Class "A" Fatal injury, is considered for reporting procedure as one that results in death prior to submission of the Aircraft Accident Report.
Class "B" Critical injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury which threatens to result in death within five injuries sustained in the accident or from complications thereof. Critical injuries resulting in death within 30 days shall be reported if listed in the original addressees.
Class "C" Serious injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury less than critical but definitely requiring five or more days hospitalization involving medical treatment but from which the individual will be expected to recover. Unexpected critical conditions or complications excepted.

Issued to this category which results in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addressees.
Class "D" Minor injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury less than serious.
Class "E" No injury.
Class "F" Unknown injury - lost and presumed drowned.
Class "G" Unknown injury - missing.
1. Under disposition, use following key:
"D" - Deceased
"G" - grounded
"W" - Treated and released to duty
"H" - hospitalized
"I" - remains recovered
"R" - remains not recovered

1. NAME	2. RANK	3. AGE	4. [illegible]	5. [illegible]
LITTLE, James Irvine (b) [redacted]	2nd LT	21	(b)	(b)

6. SEAT NO.	7. [illegible]
A	I

8. SEAT ASSIGNED PLANE, OR SEAT/PAYLOAD: Pilot

9. SEAT POSITION DURING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Cockpit

11. SAFETY EQUIPMENT	MODEL/TYPE	AVAILABLE	USED	NOT USED	DAMAGED	LOST
SHOULDER HARNESS Safety V type		X	X		X	
LAP BELT Safety Auto Release		X	X		X	
INERTIA REEL Node 0-3903		X	X		X	
"G" SUIT	S-2	X	X		X	
HELMET	APH-5	X	X		X	
OXYGEN MASK	A 13 A	X	X		X	
GOGGLES Visor	APH-5	X	X		X	
SHOES (type) N-1	Field	X	X		X	
FLIGHT SUIT, OTHER THAN "G" (type)	Summer	X	X		X	
EXPOSURE SUIT (type) Not applicable						
OTHER (specify) Gloves		X	X		X	

WAS OXYGEN BEING USED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown ☐ YES ☐ NO

PRESSURIZATION: ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YES, OXYGEN SUPPLY PRESSURE PRIOR TO FLIGHT: 1500 PSI

AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown PSI

WAS OXYGEN EQUIPMENT PRE-FLIGHTED BY PILOT: ☐ YES ☐ NO

IN SHOULDER HARNESS USED	LOCKED	UNLOCKED	RIGHT	BLACK
	Unknown			

☐ PRESSED FORWARD AGAINST HARNESS Unknown ☐ PRESSED AGAINST SEAT BACK

ON IMPACT	SAFETY BELT	LOCKED	TIGHT	BLACK
		X	Unknown	

12. COMMENT ON EFFECTIVENESS (Entries of "No," "Poor," "as designed," etc., will not be accepted. If any equipment failed, describe failure and probable cause). Use additional sheet, if necessary.

See addendum #3.

IN CASE OF BURNS, FREEZING, OR FROSTBITE: LIST ALL CLOTHING WORN. USE ADDITIONAL SHEET, IF NECESSARY.

13. POST CRASH EXAMINATION

IF DEAD, LIST PRIMARY CAUSE (multiple injuries, as stated): INJURIES, MULTIPLE EXTREME

INTERNAL INJURIES

AUTOPSY FINDINGS, IF PERFORMED: See addendum #4.

IF HOSPITALIZED, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: PLACE

ESTIMATED LENGTH OF HOSPITALIZATION

LIST THE EXTERNAL PHYSICAL DAMAGE PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION (AS INDICATED BELOW)

CARBON MONOXIDE-BLOOD TEST RESULTS: 45

IF DRUGGED, REASON

ESTIMATED LENGTH OF DISABILITY

14. INJURIES

BURNS / FROSTBITE	DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD
	AREA	HEAD (ventral)	(dorsal)		TRUNK (ventral)	(dorsal)		EXTREMITIES (upper)	(lower)	

(b) (6) [redacted]

UNCONSCIOUSNESS ☐ SHORT DURATION, LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ DEEP COMA

HEAD INJURIES: CEREBRAL CONCUSSION ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL — MINOR FACIAL INJURIES — MAJOR FACIAL INJURIES

MINOR EYE INJURIES ☐ RIGHT EYE ☐ LEFT EYE — MAJOR EYE INJURIES ☐ RIGHT EYE ☐ LEFT EYE

TYPE / BONES	SKULL CRANIAL	SKULL FACIAL	VERTEBRAE (specify) CERV	THOR	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX	SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM LEFT	UPPER ARM RIGHT	FORE ARM LEFT	FORE ARM RIGHT	HAND LEFT	HAND RIGHT	UPPER LEG LEFT	UPPER LEG RIGHT	LOWER LEG LEFT	LOWER LEG RIGHT	FOOT LEFT	FOOT RIGHT
SIMPLE FRACTURE																						
COMPOUND FRACTURE																						
COMMINUTED FRACTURE																						
DISLOCATION		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE	
															HAND						FOOT	

AMPUTATIONS - STATE PARTS

AREA OF INVOLVEMENT		LACERATIONS MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	ABRASIONS MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES (upper)										
EXTREMITIES (lower)										

☐ UNCONSCIOUS

SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

CONCUSSION: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

16. CAUSE OF INJURIES (Give opinion as to cause of each injury indicated above. Give specific cause of aircraft involved. Entries of "No," "None," "Pertinent to impact," or "Undetermined" with no amplification will not be accepted. Use additional sheet, if necessary.)

See addendum #4.

MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS AND GROUND ACCIDENTS

OPNAV FORM 3750-R (REV. 2-54)
(Supersedes OPNAV Form 3750-R)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. This report shall be filed in the event of an aircraft accident/incident which involves one or more of the following:

Death — Ditching
Injury — Water Crash
Bail-out or Ejection (attempted or successful)
Whenever physiological or psychological factors are involved
Aircraft Ground Accidents resulting in serious injury

2. Completion of the form shall be the responsibility of the flight surgeon.
3. For type accident and damage code refer to OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6A.
4. This form shall be prepared in quadruplicate. One copy shall be turned over to the Aircraft Accident Board (or the Survival and Intelligence Officer in the case of combat incidents), and the original shall be air mailed (regular mail within 250 miles of Washington, D.C.) direct to Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57) Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. within 4 working days following the accident. The third copy shall be mailed direct to Safety Equipment Branch, BUAER, Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. The fourth copy shall be forwarded direct via air mail (regular mail within 250 miles of Norfolk, Va.) to the U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Activity, Naval Air Station, Norfolk 11, Virginia. Where more than one aircraft is involved, separate form must be completed for each aircraft wherein one or more of the requirements in paragraph 1. above are applicable. (Additional copies may be prepared for use of squadron flight surgeon and other interested individuals)

1. FROM (Ship or station address): MCAS, El Toro (Santa Ana), Calif.
2. SERIAL NO.: 12-58
3. ACCIDENT OCCURRED (Geographic location): 9 miles NE MCAS, Mojave, Cal.
4. TIME (Local): 1510
5. DATE: 7-17-58
6. PLANE COVERED BY THIS REPORT: MODEL F9F-8B; NO. NO. 141169; NO. OCCUPANTS 1; UNIT OPERATING AIRCRAFT: VMA-311, MCAS, El Toro; TYPE ACCIDENT 8-6; DAMAGE A
7. OTHER PLANE (s) Involved: MODEL; NO. NO.; NO. OCCUPANTS; UNIT OPERATING AIRCRAFT; DAMAGE
8. NAME OF PILOT IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT (Last, First, Middle): LITTLE, James Irvine; UNIT PILOT ATTACHED TO: VMA-311, MCAS, El Toro
9. FLIGHT SURGEONS CHECK LIST: [X] ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED; [ ] SURVIVORS NARRATIVES; [ ] PHOTOS AS REQUIRED; [X] RECOMMENDATIONS; [X] COPIES FURNISHED
10. REPORT FILED BY: (b) (6) [redacted] LT MC USN; SIGNATURE; DATE: 1 August 1958
11. FORWARDED: D. D. RICHARAUER MAJ MC USMC, Acting; SIGNATURE; DATE: 1 August 1958
12. [X] AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT [ ] AIRCRAFT INCIDENT [ ] COMBAT INCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT

13. ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION

INCLUDE HERE A PARAGRAPH GIVING A BRIEF BUT FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF DESCRIBING THE ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. INCLUDE ANY PERTINENT DATA ON WEATHER, ESTIMATED OR KNOWN ALTITUDE OF THE AIRCRAFT, ANGLE OF IMPACT, SPEED ON IMPACT, ATTITUDE OF IMPACT, ETC. ATTACH DIAGRAMS WHEN PERTINENT.

See addendum #1.

14. PILOT FACTORS (Check pertinent pilot factors listed below)

	PILOT	CO-PILOT		PILOT	CO-PILOT
IN CONTROL AT TIME OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT	Yes		HYPOXIA SUSPECTED	No	
AMOUNT OF FLIGHT TIME IN LAST 24 HOURS	2 hr.		CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING SUSPECTED	No	
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS IN LAST 24 HOURS	2		FAULTY VISION	No	
NUMBER HOURS DUTY IN LAST 24 HOURS	8		AEROEMBOLISM	No	
HOURS SINCE LAST FULL MEAL	8 *		BLACKOUT, GREYOUT, REDOUT	Unknown	
TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	0.6 hrs.		VERTIGO	Unknown	
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	395.1		NIGHT BLINDNESS	No	
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME IN MODEL	88.5		FATIGUE	No	
NUMBER PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS	None		DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES	No	
DATE OF LAST ACCIDENT			UNFAMILIARITY IN TYPE AIRCRAFT	No	
NUMBER DAYS GROUNDED IN LAST MONTH	None		ANXIETY REACTION	No	
DATE LAST LOW PRESSURE INDOCTRINATION	7-25-57		LAST CER (date and score) 6-6-57	5 10	
AMOUNT SLEEP IN LAST 24 HOURS	7½ hrs.		OTHER PERTINENT FACTORS IN ACCIDENT (describe below)		

15. COMMENTS ON ITEMS CHECKED UNDER ITEM 14 WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. WHEN APPLICABLE, COMMENT BELOW ON ANY OF THE ABOVE FACTORS AFFECTING CREW MEMBERS OR PASSENGERS.

* It is known that LT LITTLE had an average breakfast at 0700. It is undetermined whether or not he had lunch, however he was not prone to omit this meal.

(b) (5) [redacted]

SURVIVORS NARRATIVES: See addendum #2.

Enclosure (9)

ADDENDUM #1: ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION

This accident occurred on 17 July 1958. Briefing for the flight, which was to be a routine glide bombing mission, commenced at 1300. Members of the flight were 1st LT (b) (6) (flight leader), 2nd LT (b) (6) 1st LT (b) (6) (section leader) and 2nd LT J. E. LITTLE. A briefing check list was used and, as is routine, instructions were given to cover the possibility of radio failure. On this particular mission it was briefed that in the event of a radio failure after take-off the pilot would climb to 14,000 feet and orbit the target. It was also briefed that at the completion of their glide bombing runs a bogie would be in the area. If attacked by this bogie the flight was to maintain division integrity at all times. The section not under attack was to call turns for the attacked section and at the same time attempt to "get on the bogie's tail." No individual tactics were to be attempted. During this briefing LT LITTLE seemed normal in every way to his fellow aviators.

Following briefing the flight was held up for a short time due to aircraft availability, however at 1435 the flight took the duty runway at MCAS, El Toro. There the aircraft turned up to 100%. LT (b) (6) brakes did not hold so he aborted the hop and LT (b) assumed the duties of flight leader as had been briefed. The three remaining aircraft took off and made a normal climb out. Upon reaching the Mojave area the flight checked in first with MCAAS, Mojave tower and then with Bulldog target and commenced making normal glide bombing runs.

After LT LITTLE had made two runs on the target he apparently developed radio trouble. He was heard to call LT (b) "Bully 1, this is Bully 3. Radio check." LT (b) answered "Bully 3, this is Bully 1. I read you loud and clear." LT LITTLE then called LT (b) (6) "Bully 2, this is Bully 3. Do you read? Over." LT (b) (6) answered, "Bully 3, this is Bully 2. I read you loud and clear." Following this LT LITTLE was heard to say, "Apparently my receiver is out. I am leaving the pattern and will orbit at 15,000 feet." LT LITTLE's radio transmissions were completed in a calm and normal fashion according to those who overheard them. Following the above transmissions the other two aircraft continued glide bombing runs on the target. LT (b) saw the third aircraft climb and commence orbiting. Later he again saw an aircraft orbiting the target at approximately the assigned altitude.

At approximately 1500 LT (b) (6) (also of VMA-311) arrived in the Mojave area. He had taken off from El Toro on a test flight and it had been planned that if his aircraft tested out normally he would go to the Mojave area and give Bully flight some tactics practice on their return trip to El Toro. At approximately 1510 he noted a Cougar closing at 7 O'Clock slightly lower than he was. When this aircraft was fairly close LT (b) (6) pulled his nose up and banked to the left. The other aircraft slid under and outside his turn and he noted that it had the markings of a VMA-311 aircraft (nose color, wing tip color, etc.) but did not see the call letters or number. As the other aircraft passed LT (b) (6) he rolled inside its turn to the left. The other aircraft then rolled to the right and pulled around approximately 90° to 120° turn, at the end of which he reversed sharply back to the left. LT (b) (6) followed but fell behind. The other aircraft hesitated slightly and LT (b) (6) began to slide outside its turn to the left, as he was low on fuel and intended to return to El Toro. He then saw the other aircraft roll to the left and commence a fairly steep dive. The altitude at which these maneuvers were done was approximately 10-12,000 feet. The next time LT (b) (6) saw the aircraft it had looked very low. Just as he was turning his head back forward he saw a flash as the other aircraft struck the ground.

From examination of the wreckage the following points can be derived. The aircraft's attitude on impact was slightly left wing down and nose down about 20° to 25°, while its angle of descent was estimated at approximately 45° to 60°. Its heading was 256° while its flight path was 268°. Speed on impact was estimated at 350 to 400 knots. The aircraft exploded almost instantly upon impact, scattering wreckage over the area forward of its flight path. The canopy actuating cylinder was found at 440 feet from the point of impact, this being the fartherest distance any part was thrown. The canopy actuating cylinder had not been actuated. The face curtain was found still rolled up. The pilot was killed instantly.

ADDENDUM #2

This addendum includes information requested in section "C", OPNAV Form 3750-8A (Rev 5-58)

(b) (5)

[redacted]

C-25 Debts. Lt Little owed money on a hi-fi set, tape recorder, TV set and a car. He was able to meet his payments however, and used his debts as a topic for joking. (b) (5)

C-31 Mechanical problems. Although Lt Little had receiver trouble with his radio (b) (5)
(b) (5)

C-38 Personality traits. (b) (5)
(b) (5) On 26 June 1958, while flying tactics, in an attempt to keep from over-shooting, Lt Little accidentally pulled the throttle "around the horn" and flamed out. He went through flight procedures very smoothly and successfully relit his aircraft in a short period, (b) (5) When asked whether he had thought of a minimum altitude to eject, he replied that he had not.

(b) (5)

[redacted]

ADDENDUM #2 TO MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS AND GROUND ACCIDENTS, SERIAL #12-58

ADDENDUM #3: SAFETY EQUIPMENT

1. The lap belt and shoulder harness were found at Point B close to the (b) (6) [redacted] ejection seat (See Enclosure 1). The lap belt had been fired, presumably at intact. The barometric parachute release actuating cable was still attached to the left half of the lap belt. Lap belt and shoulder harness were badly burned.

2. Parts of the harness 3 suits were found torn from the body but within a few feet of it.

3. The partially burned right glove was found at Point C (b) (6) [redacted] (b) [redacted]. The left glove was found on the left hand. It must be assumed that the pilot was wearing both gloves.

NOTE: The following portion of addendum #3 contains pertinent information requested in Section G, OPNAV Form 3750-8B and C (Rev 5-58).

1. Mask type A 13 A - never found.
2. Equipped with Hardman hardware.
3. Regulator: oxygen serial #3814 Fed. #R6680-033-4778 YECP.
4. No modifications.
5. Unknown whether the oxygen equipment was pre-flighted.
9. It is felt that oxygen was being used at the time of the accident, since the mask was on. This is indicated by the fact that both male parts of the Hardman hardware were found in the hardhat portions of this accessory. One was broken free from its strap and one had been sheared at its base.
10. Selector setting unknown. Part of the oxygen regulator has been sent to O & R for analysis, however.
11. All oxygen equipment necessary for this flight was available.
12. As far as is known the oxygen mask was never removed during the flight.
18. Life vest was not inflated.
25. AFH-5 hardhat.
26. Modifications: (1) Hardman hardware. (2) Nape strap.
27. No other modifications.
30. Parachute assembly - Nav. Seat Type NS-3.
31. Replaced 3 June 1958.
32. H2 Emergency Bailout Equipment.
33. Irwin MKV Barometric Release, Serial #4358.
35. Apparently activated on blast.
37. Chute partially deployed and burned.
54. Pilot had 1 hour squadron lecture in parachute training in April and 1 hour in May.

From Section H OPNAV Form 3750-8D (Rev 5-58) the following fact is of importance: No attempt was made to eject.

ADDENDUM #3 TO MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS AND GROUND ACCIDENTS, SERIAL #12-58.

ADDENDUM #4

Enclosure number one (1) shows the location of the various parts of the body and flight gear. (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (5)

ADDENDUM #4 TO MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS AND GROUND ACCIDENTS, SERIAL #12-58

ADDENDUM #5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(b) (5)

[redacted]

It is recommended that squadrons stress a safe altitude for tactics. It shouls be stressed that no aircraft should go below this altitude to elude the attack of another aircraft.

ADDENDUM #6:

This addendum contains information requested in Section B, OPNAV Form 3750-8 (Rev 5-58).

Did the Flight Surgeon:

1. Visit the scene of the mishap? Yes

2. Participate fully in the field investigation? Yes

3. Participate fully in the deliberations of the A/C accident board? Yes

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF HOURS SPENT BY THE FLIGHT SURGEON:

1. In the field investigation: Eight (8) hours at scene.

2. In board delibertaions: Four (4) hours.

3. In preparation of this report: 38 hours interviewing and preparing report.

ADDENDUM #6 TO MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS AND GROUND ACCIDENTS, SERIAL #12-58.

ADDENDUM #7

This addendum contains information requested in section E, OPNAV Form 3750-8H (Rev 5-58)

Pilot factor was the only factor checked in part 1, section D of the AAR. The analysis part VIII states that Lt Little's record indicated that he was fully qualified to fly the mission assigned, and that he appeared normal to all whom he encountered prior to the take-off. It states that assuming he was trying to keep Lt (b) (6) in sight, he inadvertently extended his dive to the point from which it was impossible to recover. It further states that analysis of the wreckage and the attitude of the aircraft relative to the flight path indicate that he was attempting a recovery.

ADDENDUM #7 TO MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS AND GROUND ACCIDENTS, SERIAL #12-58

Enclosure (1)



ENCLOSURE (1) TO MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS AND GROUND ACCIDENTS, SERIAL #12-58.



Canopy actuating cylinder found closed (A), 146 yards from point of initial impact. Enclosure (6j).

SPECIAL HANDLIN
IN ACCORDANCE W
OPNAVINST 3750.6

CANOPY ACTUATING
AAR VMA 311-2-

6j

Stabilizer actuating assembly indicating 0° electric trim, (A).
Enclosure (6I)

69

Crash scene looking in flight path direction.
(A) initial point of impact. (B) is left wing
main spar. (C) part of left wing. (D) Tail section.
Enclosure (6e)

Crash Scene Looking S. W. ENCLOSURE 6g
AIR VMA 311 22-58



58

Crash Scene Looking East [illegible]

69

65

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA [illegible],
OPNAVINST 3750.6C

CRASH SCENE LOOKI[illegible]
AAR VMA 311-2-[illegible]

6E



CRASH SCENE VIEWED FROM
BU #141169, TSF-[illegible]
AAR VMA 311-2[illegible]



Aerial View of Crash Site.
Arrow indicates flight path of
A/C prior to crash. Enclosure (6c)

6c


A
C
B
N

Aerial View of Crash Scene looking north.
Arrow indicates flight path prior to crash.
Enclosure (6a)