AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
IDENTIFICATION
NO.

00622

NAVAL SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

111A1/gr
Ser 1863
23 Dec 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR

Subj: VF-124 AAR ser 3-69A concerning F-8C BuNo 147001 accident occurring 12 August 1968, pilot OHNEMUS

1. The subject report and all endorsements have been reviewed. Concur with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. The cause of this accident has been recorded as UNDETERMINED with PILOT (improper instrument procedures) as a probable contributing factor.

(b) (6) [redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
CNO (OP 534)
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E) (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
CO NAS MIRAMAR
COMRCVW-12
NAVPRO DALLAS
DIR AFIP

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

R&DP-8 (11-67)

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE OUT" LETTER ON ORIGINAL REVIEW

NOTE: 1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DEPARTMENT: None

RDW 126
INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPARTMENT:

None

2
INITIAL/CODE

R&DP-7 (11-67)

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to: Correction to		Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1			/
DIR			/
Misc Items for Action or Correction			
To Code	From Code/Date		
	/ 10-15-68	Hard-coded by ORIGINAL REC'D. RDS	/
	511 / 11/15/68		/
511	512 / 8/15/70	FINAL REVIEW COMPLETED. FILE IN CLOSED FILE. BTS	/
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	17 AUG 1970	CLOSED	/
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R&DP-27(4/68)

UNIT VF-124
MODEL F8C
BUNO 147001

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING:
	M&M		12-4	O	
	AERO-MED	12-2-68	12/3/68	JWB	

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS:
REMARKS:

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NAVAVNSAFECEN 18 DEC 1968
EXTENSIONS

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
AOA	5 Dec 68		18 Dec 68	Lgg	

NAVAVNSAFECEN ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT
1	R&DP			
2	M&M			
3	ADMIN			

ROUTING AFTER CLOSE-OUT

DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
AERO-MED				

NOTES: 1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder.

2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch.

3. Any department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

LETTER OF AGREEMENT
between
FAA MIRAMAR RATCC AND NAS MIRAMAR

SUBJECT: Release of Aircraft to Military Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) and Tower at NAS Miramar.

1. Purpose: This Agreement establishes procedures for transferring control jurisdiction of aircraft to Miramar Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) radar and Miramar Tower.

2. Cancellation: The Letter of Agreement between FAA Miramar RATCC and NAS Miramar, subject: Release of Aircraft to Military Gound Controlled Approach (GCA) and Tower at NAS Miramar, dated July 12, 1965, is cancelled on the following effective date.

3. Effective Date: March 1, 1966

4. Scope: These procedures are applicable to military aircraft arriving and departing NAS Miramar. These procedures may be utilized for civil aircraft provided the pilot specifically requests a GCA approach.

5. Responsibility:

a. FAA Miramar RATCC shall:

(1) Furnish GCA with the necessary flight data at least five minutes prior to the aircraft's estimated time of arrival at handoff point.

(2) Furnish Miramar Tower with appropriate flight data on aircraft executing non-radar approach when GCA is out of service, and coordinate as necessary.

b. Miramar GCA shall:

(1) Be responsible for maintaining radar separation between all aircraft released to GCA control in accordance with AT P 7110.1B.

(2) Advise FAA whenever they are unable to provide radar service set forth in the terms of this agreement. This shall include advising FAA when single or multiple approach capability exists.

(3) Obtain approval from FAA for any deviation more than one mile either side of final approach course.

(4) Unless GCA is out of service, coordinate all approaches with Miramar Tower.

(5) Instruct aircraft executing IFR low approaches to maintain 1,600 when MLP special VFR operations are in progress. (see paragraph 8)

(6) Advise FAA immediately when an aircraft misses approach, radio or radar contact is lost with an aircraft or if an approach is

abandoned. For aircraft planning an IFR departure after an approach, GCA shall advise FAA when the aircraft is nine, six and three miles from end of runway.

6. Procedures:

a. FAA Miramar RATCC shall furnish by posting on Form FAA 566B/566.D the following flight data for GCA:

(1) Aircraft identification.

(2) Type.

(3) Present position.

(4) Type of approach.

(5) Frequency for final approach.

b. Transfer of control:

(1) Transfer of radar control of arriving aircraft shall be accomplished between nine and six miles from end of Runway 24 and between seven and five miles from end of Runway 6. FAA shall, on final frequency and after vectoring an arriving aircraft to a position between these points, broadcast the following to the pilot: Position from runway, heading and altitude. If radar contact is established by GCA with reference to the position given above, GCA shall broadcast the following to the pilot on final frequency: (Ident) radar contact (number) miles from touchdown/runway.

(2) Transfer of control for low altitude TACAN approach shall be accomplished when the aircraft crosses the Miramar TACAN 055 radial.

(3) When FAA radar is inoperative, transfer of control to GCA shall be accomplished at the Miramar TACAN 060 radial 10 mile DME fix. The pilot shall be instructed to report at this fix.

(4) GCA shall issue the following lost communication procedures to aircraft as soon as practical after radar identification:

(a) Runway 24.

1. TACAN equipped aircraft - execute TACAN approach.

2. Non-TACAN equipped aircraft - proceed to Seawolf Intersection at 1,500.

3. Civil aircraft - proceed to Redfin Intersection via heading 280 at 1,500.

(b) Runway 6.

1. Military aircraft - climb immediately to 7,500 on Miramar 075 radial (or 075 bearing from Miramar Radio Beacon), cross 4 mile fix at 2,000, cross 35 mile fix at 7,500.

c. Number of aircraft to be released to military control:

(1) A maximum of four aircraft or formations executing approaches may be released to GCA at one time.

(2) ADC fighter aircraft that are being recovered in accordance with annexes to the Authorization for Interceptor Operations may be released as specified in the authorization.

d. Missed approaches and loss of radar:

(1) Aircraft executing GCA approaches shall be assigned the approved primary or alternate missed approach procedures as specified by FAA Miramar RATCC.

(2) Aircraft executing TACAN approaches with GCA monitor shall be instructed to execute the published primary or alternate missed approach as specified by FAA Miramar RATCC.

7. Departures:

a. Miramar Tower may issue the following clearances without prior coordination with FAA Miramar RATCC. Miramar Tower shall advise FAA Miramar RATCC of the clearance issued.

(1) Local departure.

(a) "ATC clears (Ident) to Woodson, maintain 7,000, Woodson Three departure."

(b) "ATC clears (Ident) to Seawolf, Seawolf Four departure."

(2) Departures on stereotype flight plans:

(a) "ATC clears (ident) as filed via (coded designation)."

b. Miramar Tower shall obtain a release for all IFR departures from FAA Miramar RATCC. The Tower may then clear these IFR departures for takeoff until IFR arriving aircraft are three miles from runway or apply separation in accordance with AT P 7110.1B, paragraph 225.3. FAA Miramar RATCC may require additional separation when a possibility of a missed approach exists or the aircraft on final is planning an IFR departure after completion of approach.

8. Special VFR Operations within the NAS Miramar Control Zone:

a. Mirror Landing Practice may be conducted at NAS Miramar when weather is below basic VFR minima in accordance with the following:

(1) Minimum ceiling 600 feet, minimum visibility two miles.

(2) These aircraft shall be continuously visible to Miramar Tower.

(3) All pilots shall maintain radio contact with Miramar Tower.

(4) The Tower shall receive approval from FAA Miramar RATCC prior to beginning these Special VFR operations and shall advise when they are terminated.

(5) NAS Miramar shall instruct pilots conducting these Special VFR Operations to remain north of the City of San Diego water tank on U. S. Highway 395 and not above 1,100 feet MSL.

/s/ (b) (6) [redacted]
(b) (6) [redacted]
Chief, Miramar RATCC

/s/ W. W. Jones
CAPT W. W. JONES, USN
Commanding Officer
U. S. Naval Air Station, Miramar

3750
80/ 8253
NOV 4 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 AAR ser 3-69A concerning F-8C
BuNo 147001 accident occurring 12 Aug 1968, pilot OHNEMUS

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center

Subj: VF-124 AAR ser 3-69A

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements.

2. COMNAVAIRPAC has recorded the cause of this accident as undetermined.

(b) (6)
[redacted]
(b) (6)
By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMREDATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
CO FITRON ONE TWO FOUR
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS

CENTER
NAVAL
RECEIVED

ORIGINAL

80
3750
Ser 1073
16 OCT 1968

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 serial 3-69A concerning F8C BuNo 147001, accident occurring 12 August 1968, pilot OHNEMUS

From: Commander Fleet Air Miramar
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VF-124 Aircraft Accident Report serial 3-69A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, and the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements.

2. This command highly endorses recommendation 2 of the basic report and paragraph 3 of the first endorsement.

3. In view of the fact that basic radar training is accomplished in the T-39 aircraft and, therefore, reduced individual night flight hours, it is recommended that VF-124 consider revising their syllabus to include two day and two night instrument flights vice three day and one night instrument flight.

(b) (6)
[redacted]
Acting

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMRCVW 12
FITRON 124
NAS MIRAMAR
CNO (OP 534)
DIR ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

AS
Ser 1002

4 OCT 1968

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 serial 3-69A concerning F8C BuNo 147001, accident occurring 12 August 1968, Pilot OHNEMUS

From: Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, MIRAMAR
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air, MIRAMAR
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VF-124 Aircraft Accident Report serial 3-69A

Ref: (b) COMFAIRMIRAMAR THIRD END ser 1014 of 26 Sep 1968
(c) Letter of Agreement between FAA MIRAMAR RATCC and NAS MIRAMAR effective date 1 Mar 1966 (copy attached)

1. Forwarded.

2. Reference (b) requested comment on paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Investigation and Analysis section of VF-124 AAR serial 3-69A. The following information is submitted:

a. Although MIRAMAR RATCC is a joint FAA/Navy operation, the functions and responsibilities of FAA and the Navy are divided and specific. Reference (c) contains detailed procedures for transferring control jurisdiction. Approach and Departure Control at MIRAMAR are FAA functions and are defined "San Diego Approach Control" and "San Diego Departure Control" respectively.

b. The GCA Coordinator receives all MIRAMAR radar controlled arrivals from San Diego Approach Control and assigns the GCA Final Controller. The arrival of NJ-457 appeared normal in all respects and the Coordinator, quite properly, accepted the information from the Approach Controller's flight strip, assigned the aircraft to a GCA Final Controller and programmed via light signals a "Jet-low approach with IFR departure" to the Control Tower and Final Controller.

c. NJ-457 made a routine GCA approach and at three miles, due to other landing traffic, was waved-off by the Control Tower. The wave-off procedure, at this point, is considered normal in that a programmed low approach is not normally given priority over landing traffic. Shortly after wave-off, the Tower operator observed a Jet GCA wave-off (NJ-457) which appeared to be climbing into overhead VFR break traffic and immediately issued "traffic information" via the GCA final control frequency transfer system. The transfer system is specifically designed to allow the Tower Controller to utilize the GCA Final Control frequency within 90 seconds after completion of GCA transmissions. This feature has proven extremely valuable in the past and it is considered that it was properly used in this instance.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

AS
Ser 1002
4 OCT 1968

Subj: VF-124 Aircraft Accident Report serial 3-69A

3. In conclusion, it is considered that the procedures used by MIRAMAR Navy GCA and Tower controllers preceding this accident were correct. Control and jurisdiction of the FAA are beyond the purview of this Command; however, copies of the Accident Report and this endorsement have been made available to the Chief MIRAMAR RATCC for his consideration and action as he deems appropriate.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E)
COMSAFECEN (2)
COMRCVW-12
FITRON 124
NAVPLANTREPO Dallas
Director Armed Forces Institute of Pathology
CNO (OP-534)
COMNAVAIRPAC

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

80
3750
Ser 1014
26 SEP 1968

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 serial 3-69A concerning F8C BuNo 147001, accident occurring 12 August 1968, pilot OHNEMUS

From: Commander Fleet Air Miramar
To: Commander Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Miramar
(2) Commander Fleet Air Miramar
(3) Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VF-124 Aircraft Accident Report serial 3-69A; forwarding of

1. In view of the contents of paragraphs 1 and 4 of the investigation and analysis, this report is readdressed and forwarded to NAS Miramar for comments prior to endorsement by this command.

2. By copy of this endorsement, Commanding Officer, FITRON 124 is requested to forward a copy of this report to Commanding Officer, NAS Miramar.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E)
COMNAVSAFECEN (2)
COMRCVW-12
FITRON 124
NAVPLANTREPO Dallas
Director Armed Forces Institute of Pathology
CNO (OP-534)
COMNAVAIRPAC

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

COMRCVW-12:sn
3750
Ser 80/ 603
17 SEP 1968

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 AAR serial 3-69A, F8C BuNo 147001 accident occurring 12 August 1968, Pilot OHNEMUS

From: Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air, Miramar
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VF-124 Aircraft Accident Report serial 3-69A

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6F

1. Forwarded, concurring with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, and the remarks of the first endorser.

2. The Director, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology has been added to the distribution of this report in accordance with reference (a).

(b) (6)
[redacted]

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E)
COMNAVSAFECEN (2)
CNO (OP-534)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
NAVPLANTREPO, DALLAS
CO, FITRON ONE TWO FOUR
DIRECTOR ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

VF-124/20:jsk
3570
Ser 757
9 September 1968

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 serial 3-69A concerning F8C BUNO 147001 occurring 12 August 1968, pilot OHNERUS

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron 124 (VF-124)
Naval Air Station, Miramar, California 92145
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing 12
(2) Commander Fleet Air Miramar
(3) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VF-124 Aircraft Accident Report Serial 3-69A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the comments, conclusions and recommendations of the board.

(b) (6) [redacted]

3. It has long been recognized that night all-weather carrier aviation is the most demanding form of flying. The problems of the F8 operating from a small carrier increases the demands placed upon F-8 pilots. This type of flying requires good sound instrument pilots with no less than average ability. LTJG OHNERUS was ordered to VF-124 as a Fleet Replacement Pilot which would have automatically placed him in this demanding environment upon satisfactory completion of the syllabus. (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) (b) (6) [redacted] LTJG OHNERUS had been involved in no previous accidents.

4. This commands last Aviation Safety Survey was conducted on 26 April 1968.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Copy to:
CNO (OP-534)
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVSAFECEN
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
COMRCVW-12
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition*

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART 1 GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY	2. SERIAL NO.	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT	5. BUREAU NUMBER
VF-124	3469A	122138T AUG 68	F8C	147001

6.	9. LOCATION OF MISHAP	10. DAMAGE
TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center	351° M 6.5 nm NKX TACAN	ALFA

7. VIA:	8.	11. TIME OF DAY	12. TIME IN FLIGHT	13. FLIGHT CODE
CO, VF-124 COMRCVW-12 COMFAIRMIRAMAR COMNAVAIRPAC		NIGHT	1+32	3A6

14. CLEARED FROM: NKX TO: NKX

15. TYPE CLEARANCE	16. AIRSPEED	17. A/C WEIGHT
VFR	EST 350 KTS	EST 20500

18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP: Contact with ground extreme nose down attitude - no ejection

19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP: S.L. 500 TERRAIN ZERO

20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED *(Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)*: NONE

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL		17. WEATHER
	2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11. OTHER PERSONNEL *(Specify)*		19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4. PILOT OTHER *(Specify)*		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER *(Specify)*
	5. CREW		13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
	6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)		22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR *(Ship or field)*	X	23. UNDETERMINED
	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER *(Specify)*		16. FACILITIES OTHER *(Specify)*		24. OTHER *(Specify)*

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2. RANK/RATE	3. FILE/SERVICE NO.	4. DESIG-NATOR	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7. YEARS EXP. DWA	8. PILAT	9. POSITION	10. SEQUENCE CODE
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap)									
OHNEMUS, R. S.	LTJG	(b) (6)	1310	USN	25	10½ mo.	PILOT	COCKPIT	ALFA
CO-PILOT (identify & submit separate page 1)									

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS		379.1	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	10/0
				IN MODEL	0/0
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		157.1	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	0/0
				IN MODEL	0/0
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		61.6	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	0.8/4.5
				IN MODEL	0.8/4.5
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	59.0	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	5.2/
	OFT/CPT	7.5/4.5		IN MODEL	5.2/
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	59.0	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap) HELOS (if helo mishap)		353
	OFT/CPT	7.5/4.5			
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	59.0	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	10 AUG 68
	OFT/CPT	7.5/4.5		DURATION	0.9
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK	Fleet Replacement Pilot		24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD	Standard	Standard

OTHER PERS

26. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. DWA	27. RANK/RATE	28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	29. FILE/SERVICE NO.	30. UNIT	31. WARRY	32. BILLET	33. POSITION

F-OSF

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 2

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL, AND FACILITIES DATA

A. A/C HISTORY

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST/PAR OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK

B. ENGINE HISTORY

1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)									
(2)	NA								
(3)									
(4)									

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OV-HAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. FUR/AMPFUR
(1)							
(2) NA							
(3)							
(4)							

D. MISHAPS & GROUND ACCIDENTS

1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED	
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE
NA				

E. FLIGHT FAILURES

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE
8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT ☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED		10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL ☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL	14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS
INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS NA			16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS			

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/BMEP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE
INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS			26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS			

F. OTHER FAILURES

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. AMPFUR SERIAL NUMBER _____
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP _____ Info NASC vs. DIR request. See para. 38 OPNAVINST 3750.6E
3. OTHER
4. NA

CSF

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED In accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

G. SHIPS DATA

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR	2. PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH/END SPEED

6. MARK NUMBER	7. MODEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION OF SHIP	9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDLE ARRESTER

10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT			NA				
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDING LAST 30 DAYS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED NA	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY / OUTSIDE AIR	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
NONE	15 Miles	Calm	63	58	29.96

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, icing level, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate)

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS	2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
			NA	2CC NAVAVNSAFECN DIRECT (AAR)
				NAVAIRSYSCOMHDQ
				COMNAVAIRPAC
				COMFAIRMIRAMAR
				COMRCVW-12
				NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS

COST DAMAGE TO:	3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	4. PRIVATE PROPERTY	5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO
	NONE	30ft. of wire fence	30 August 1968

SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

1. SIGNATURE (b) (6) [redacted] UNIT BILLET

2. NAME (b) (6) [redacted] CDR, USN, SAFETY OFF. UNIT BILLET

3. FULL NAME (b) (6) [redacted] USN E. W. OFFICER UNIT BILLET

* When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

OP-OSF

PART V-THE ACCIDENT

After briefing for a live sidewinder missile training flight to be conducted on the Point Mugu Missile Range, LTJG OHNEMUS launched in F8C BUNO 147001, Modex NJ457, at 2005T, 12 August 1968. The flight progressed as briefed and LTJG OHNEMUS returned to the NAS Miramar area. The pilot requested a random radar and GCA to NAS Miramar. The weather in the Miramar area was 1000 ft. scattered 15 miles visibility. Enclosure (1). The approach was normal until three miles from touch down, when a wave-off was given to NJ457 due to conflicting traffic. A VFR clearance over the field at 1500 feet, to be followed by a standard instrument departure (Woodson Four Departure) was acknowledged by the pilot. LTJG OHNEMUS reported to departure control that he was commencing a Woodson Departure. Less than one minute later, the aircraft crashed six miles north of NAS Miramar. NAS Miramar crash equipment was dispatched to the scene at 2148. Aircraft Fire/Rescue Report Enclosure 2.

PART VI-DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT

The aircraft contacted rocky terrain, nose first, left wing down, near vertical, slightly inverted. The speed of the aircraft at impact was estimated to be 300 to 400 knots. A violent explosion occurred upon impact and the aircraft sustained Alfa damage. Enclosure (3). Parts of the aircraft were scattered in a northerly direction to a distance of one half mile from initial impact. Enclosure (4).

PART VII-INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

The investigation of the accident revealed no concrete cause factor. Intensive investigation was made into the following areas:

1. Sequence of events: The missile firing flight proceeded as briefed up to the time that LTJG OHNEMUS contacted San Diego Approach Control for a random radar approach to NAS Miramar. Flight leaders statement Enclsoure (5).
Playback of tape recordings from San Diego Approach Control, GCA final controller, NAS Miramar tower, and San Diego Departure Control, together with controller statements and interviews, disclosed the events.

LTJG OHNEMUS requested a random radar and GCA to NAS Miramar. However, the approach controller marked the flight strip for NJ457 for a low approach into the GCA box pattern. All subsequent handling of NJ457 therefore was carried out with this intention. During the approach, the pilot reported that the distance measuring equipment (DME) portion of his TACAN was inoperative, however this information was not recorded on the flight strip. Approach Controller statement is Enclosure (6). A normal approach and GCA was executed. Three miles from touch down, NJ457 was waved off because of conflicting traffic. The pilot was given instructions to maintain 1500 feet over the field and when past the TACAN cleared to Woodson at 5000 feet via a Woodson Four Departure. Final Controller statement Enclosure (7). The Woodson Four Departure is a TACAN departure requiring DME to perform. The pilot had reported his DME to be inoperative, yet he accepted the clearance. Because he had not asked for a GCA box pattern, this was LTJG OHNEMUS' first

indication that he was not going to make a full stop landing and that he was going to make a standard instrument departure.

As the aircraft crossed the field, the tower transmitted on GCA approach frequency, without identification, "Jet aircraft on GCA wave-off maintain 1500 feet, traffic breaking overhead". Tower Controller statement Enclosure (8).

Approximately one minute and ten seconds later, the pilot transmitted that he was executing a Woodson departure. This transmission was not acknowledged by departure control. Approximately forty-five seconds later, at a time when the aircraft was about to, or had already crashed at a point six miles north of NAS Miramar, San Diego Departure Control made the transmission, "NJ457 call field boundary." After another twenty five seconds, departure control called NJ457 for a radio check, followed by another attempted radio check on guard frequency. No radar or radio contact was established by Departure Control. Departure Controller statement Enclosure (9).

A credible witness (an F8 pilot who lives near the departure pattern and crash scene) reported hearing and seeing an aircraft with the engine running, in level flight, lights on, at an estimated speed of 300-350 knots. The witness watched the aircraft until a hill interrupted his view. A few seconds later, an explosion was heard and a red glow was seen on the horizon. When the aircraft that he had observed failed to emerge from behind the hill, the witness called NAS Miramar to inquire if an accident had occured. Enclosure (10).

2. Pilot factors: During the forty eight hours prior to the accident, LTJG OHNEMUS received normal rest and nourishment. MOR Enclosure (11). In reviewing LTJG OHNEMUS' past flight training and flight performance, the following facts were revealed:

a. He graduated from the advanced training command with a flight grade standard score of 45 (50 is 50 percentile). In basic instruments he was in the 50 percentile, and in instrument navigation he was in the lower 15 percentile of training command graduates.

b. After reporting to VF-124, his performance in the TA4F instrument training program was average.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

d. LTJG OHNEMUS' further F8 training in VF-124 consisted of mostly day VFR

tactics and weapons flights in which his performance was well above average. He had two night flights totalling 3.7 hours in the F8 prior to the accident, the last being 16 July, 1968. He had accumulated a total of 8.3 actual and simulated instrument hours in the F8. His last flight involving instrument flight prior to the accident was 0.2 hours actual time on 27 July 1968.

3. Material condition of the aircraft: Review of the aircraft log books and yellow sheets indicated that the aircraft was in sound material condition prior to this flight. The pilot reported that the DME portion of his TACAN had failed prior to his radar approach to NAS Miramar. No other discrepancies were reported by the pilot. VF-124 Maintenance Officer's Statement as to history of the aircraft is enclosure (12).

To determine the operating condition of the aircraft systems prior to the crash, the following investigation was performed:

a. Engine:

Engine wreckage showed heavy counter-rotational swirl on compressor and turbine blades, indicating high RPM at impact. Enclosure (13). A witness, a current F8 pilot, saw the aircraft and heard the engine at high RPM a few seconds prior to the crash. Enclosure (10).

b. Controls:

All recovered power control packages revealed only impact damage. No malfunctions were indicated. A witness saw the aircraft in level flight a few seconds prior to impact. Enclosure (10).

c. Electrical:

A witness saw lights on the aircraft just prior to impact. The pilot made a radio transmission about 45 seconds prior to impact. The main generator was recovered and indicated rotation at impact. The emergency ram air power package alternator field was recovered. Armature marks on the field core showed impact damage only, with no indication of rotation. The total cockpit area was disintegrated. No instruments were recovered.

4. Facilities: The pilot requested a random radar approach with a GCA to NAS Miramar. However, the approach controller marked the flight strip for a GCA box pattern after low approach to NAS Miramar. The pilot reported the DME portion of his TACAN to be inoperative. This information was not recorded on the flight strip. Consequently, NJ457 was programmed for a Woodson Departure (Requiring DME to execute) into the GCA box pattern. At three miles from touchdown, NJ457 was waved-off and cleared at 1500 feet over the field past the TACAN station, then to Woodson via a Woodson Four Departure, to maintain 5,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged and accepted this clearance although he had no operating DME equipment. As the aircraft flew over the field, NAS Tower transmitted over GCA frequency, "Jet aircraft on GCA wave-off maintain 1500 feet, aircraft breaking overhead." The Tower Controller did not identify himself on this transmission, which was the last radio transmission and instruction issued to NJ457 prior to the crash. The pilot transmitted that he was on a Woodson Departure about 35 seconds prior to the crash. This transmission was not acknowledged. Departure control transmitted to NJ457 to call western field boundary 45 seconds after the pilot had called on a Woodson Departure. At this time the aircraft was well past the field boundary and was about to or had already crashed six miles north of the field.

5. NATOPS is not a factor in this accident.

PART VIII-CONCLUSIONS

The board concludes that:

1. The cause of the accident is undetermined.

2. All information available indicates that the aircraft was in sound material condition with the exception of the DME portion of the TACAN.

3. Although the board has no indications of attitude gyro failure being involved in this accident, it must be considered a possibility. The F8, unlike other carrier aircraft, has no standy gyro system for the pilot to rely upon.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

5. NJ457 was observed to be in level flight at about 1500 feet well past the point at which an aircraft would normally commence a climb to assigned altitude on a Woodson Departure. The pilot may have failed to climb if he were unsure of the departure procedures and looking for the departure plate while maintaining the last assigned altitude heard on departure control frequency, which was, "Jet aircraft on GCA wave-off maintain 1500 feet, aircraft breaking overhead".

6. Though discrepancies in control procedures were noted in the tape recording of the sequence of events, the board feels that these discrepancies were not a cause factor in this accident. Since the flight was being conducted in VFR conditions entirely, the pilot had the option to cancel IFR at any time and proceed VFR to a landing. Therefore, the pilot erred if he accepted a clearance that he was not prepared to perform, or not capable of performing because of his faulty DME. Discrepancies in control procedures that were noted have been discussed with supervisory authorities at NAS Miramar Tower and Miramar RATTC.

7. For the following reasons, the most probable cause of this accident was pilot error resulting in disorientation and loss of control of the aircraft.

a. The pilot's attention was most likely distracted from flying the aircraft if he was unsure of the departure procedures and was looking for the departure plate.

b. The aircraft was last observed heading in the general direction of Black Mountain at an altitude at or slightly below the obstruction light. The pilot could have suddenly become aware that he was headed toward a

lighted object and maneuvered abruptly in an attempt to avoid the obstruction, resulting in a loss of control of the aircraft.

PART IX-RECOMMENDATIONS

The board recommends that:

1. Pilots be continuously reminded not to accept IFR clearances if they are not prepared to perform them, and that proper instrument scan and/or VFR lookout be maintained at all times, especially when operating at low altitudes during rapidly changing conditions.

2. Only aviators with average to above average instrument performance be ordered to training in high performance all weather aircraft.

3. A standby attitude gyro, ICP721 be funded and incorporated in all F8 aircraft without further delay.

INDEX OF ENCLOSURES

VF-124 AAR Serial 3-69A, 12 August 1968, F8C, BUNO 147001, Pilot OHNEMUS.

Enclosures:

1. Weather report
2. Aircraft Fire/Rescue Report (original only)
3. Picture of crash site (close up)
4. Picture of crash site (entire area)
5. Flight Leader statement
6. Approach Controller statements
7. Final Controller statement
8. Tower Controller statement
9. Departure Controller statement
10. Witness statement
11. Medical Officer Report
12. Maintenance Officer statement
13. Picture of engine

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

WEATHER REPORT
AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY OR ON-STATION FIRE
11ND-NAS-MIR-(OPS)-3140/1 (REV. 2-64)

EMERGENCY DATA

CRASH ALARM SOUNDED AT 2047 PST | STATION FIRE ALARM SOUNDED AT N.A. PST | DATE 12 AUG. 1968

AIRCRAFT/PILOT

- [ ] A/C DEFERRED EMERGENCY
- [x] A/C ACTUAL CRASH
- [x] A/C CRASH DAMAGE
- [x] PILOT INJURY
- [x] A/C ACTUAL EMERGENCY
- [ ] A/C LANDED SAFELY
- [x] A/C FIRE

WEATHER DATA

WEATHER OBSERVATION MADE AT 2047 PST DATE 12 AUG 1968

SURFACE WIND DIR CALM DEG(T) VELOCITY 0 KTS MAX. DIR N.A. VEL NA KTS

BAROMETER STATION PRESSURE 29.450 INS. ALTIMETER 29.96 INS. MSL 1013.7 MBS

TEMPERATURE AIR 63 °F DEW POINT 58 °F RELATIVE HUMIDITY 84 %

SKY COVER (Give type, amount and height of each layer present)

- [ ] CLEAR SKIES
- [x] CLOUDS PRESENT

TYPE OF CLOUDS ST TENTHS 2 HEIGHT OF LAYER 1000 FT
TYPE OF CLOUDS Ci TENTHS 1 HEIGHT OF LAYER / FT
TYPE OF CLOUDS TENTHS HEIGHT OF LAYER FT

VISIBILITY PREVAILING 15 MILES LEAST VISIBILITY N.A. MILES DIR N.A.

TREND: [x] NO CHANGE [ ] INCREASING [ ] DECREASING [ ] CHANGING SLOWLY [ ] CHANGING RAPIDLY

RESTRICTIONS TO VISIBILITY (Check appropriate element if present at time)

- [ ] FOG
- [ ] GROUND FOG
- [ ] SMOKE
- [ ] HAZE
- [ ] RAIN
- [ ] SHOWERS
- [ ] DRIZZLE
- [x] NO RESTRICTIONS TO VISIBILITY

REMARKS (Any pertinent weather not covered by the above)

(b) (6) [redacted] 963 | (b) (6) [redacted] AG1

DISTRIBUTION	AIRCRAFT/PILOT DATA
Original: Weather Service File	A/C TYPE F-8
If pilot injury or A/C damage occurs	PILOT (Name)
3 Copies - Code AO (For C.O. of squadron to which Pilot and A/C are attached)	BUNO 147001 RANK/RATE
1 Copy - Code AO (Operations Officer)	UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED N.A.
1 Copy - Crash House/Fire Chief	SQUADRON VF-124

AIRCRAFT FIRE/RESCUE REPORT
NAVWEPS FORM 11135/1 (8-60)

NO TRANSMITTAL LETTER REQUIRED

REPORT SYMBOL BUWEPS 11135-1

STATION AND LOCATION	DATE OF REPORT	AFRR NO.
Naval Air Station MIRAMAR, California 92145	12 August 1968	2.69
	DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT: 12 August 1968 2148 hours	ON STATION / OFF STATION X
REPORTING CUSTODIAN	MODEL AIRCRAFT INVOLVED: F-8-C (VF-124)	BUREAU NO.

TO: Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons (SEEQ) AIR 4232

VIA — MILITARY COMMAND: Commander, Fleet Air MIRAMAR

SIGNATURE

EXACT LOCATION OF INCIDENT: Approx. 6 miles on a 360 degree heading from NAS MIRAMAR (Near Black Mountain Pumping Station)

TYPE OF INCIDENT						FIRE INVOLVED	
TAKE-OFF		LINE OR LOADING		FUELING		YES	
LANDING		PARKED		MAINTENANCE		NO	
TAXIING		DEFUELING		INFLIGHT	X	IMPACT IGNITION	X
OTHER (Specify)						DELAYED IGNITION	

ESTIMATED CAUSE: Aircraft was in box pattern controlled by San Diego Approach on final leg. Cause unknown.

CONDITIONS AT TIME OF INCIDENT

GENERAL WEATHER PICTURE		
Stratus 1000 feet Scattered	WIND DIRECTION	Calm
	WIND VELOCITY (mph)	0
	TEMPERATURE (°F)	63

NATURE OF TERRAIN AT AND IN APPROACH TO INCIDENT: Rough brush and rock on mountain foothill.

LIQUID FUEL QUANTITY

ESTIMATED ON BOARD BEFORE INCIDENT (lbs)	
ESTIMATED ON BOARD AFTER INCIDENT (lbs)	NONE
ESTIMATED SPILL AREA (Size in feet)	

OTHER FUELS: Bruch cover and aircraft materials.

PERSONNEL RESCUE

NO. PERSONNEL ON BOARD AIRCRAFT	1
NO. PERSONNEL SURVIVED	0
NO. PERSONNEL ESCAPED UNAIDED	0
NO. PERSONNEL RESCUED	0

DESCRIBE RESCUE METHODS USED: N. A.

FIRE FIGHTING

FIRST METHOD OF ALARM USED						TIME RECORD	
TWO-WAY RADIO		EMERGENCY INTER-COM.		EMERGENCY PHONE	X	TIME ALARM RECEIVED	2148
OTHER METHOD (State)						TIME EQUIPMENT ARRIVED	2210

STATION EQUIPMENT

EACH EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE AT INCIDENT		NO. PERSONNEL MANNING EQUIPMENT		QUANTITY EXTINGUISHING AGENTS USED	
TYPE	NO. LOADS USED	MIL.	CIV.	FOAM (gals. conc. used)	OTHER TYPES AND QUANTITIES
MB-1	0	1	2	None	Water 600 gal.
MB-5	0	0	4	None	None
CBS	0	0	1	None	Water 800 Gal.
1 P/U	0	0	1	N. A.	N. A.
MG-33	0	1	1	N. A.	N. A.

STATION EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE

TYPE	DEFICIENCY	NO. OF DAYS	EXPLAIN DELAYS TO REPAIR
MB-1	Rehab	69	
MB-5	Transmission	55	Parts procurement

FULL DESCRIPTION OF FIREFIGHTING OR PROTECTION AT INCIDENT

2148: Control tower reported a possible crash north of MIRAMAR. Above listed equipment reported. Route to crash scene was approximately eight miles on small dirt road.

2210: First truck arrived on the scene. Six separate areas of brush and aircraft debris involved in fire. Debris was scattered over an area of approximately 1500 feet. California Division of Forestry truck and crew was on scene having arrived approximately 10 minutes earlier.

2220: Two additional California Division of Forestry trucks and crews arrived on scene.

2245: Fire controlled using water only. Hot spots were overhauled and personnel assisted Medical Department searching area for remains. Brush fire pumper remaining on the scene and continually using water to wet down dense brush undercover.

2320: MB-1 secured to station.

2400: MB-5 secured to station.

0230: 8/13/68 All equipment except brush truck secured. One California Division of Forestry pumper remaining on scene.

0845: 8/13/68 California Division of Forestry bulldozer unit arrived on scene. Fire area perimeter "cold trailed".

1320: All fire equipment secured.

DESCRIPTION OF DIFFICULTIES IN FIRE CONTROL AND EXTINGUISHMENT DUE TO UNUSUAL CONDITIONS OR EQUIPMENT AND/OR AGENT INADEQUACIES

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN EQUIPMENT AND/OR PROCEDURES TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY

MONETARY LOSSES (*Estimated*)

PERCENT DAMAGE BY IMPACT	PERCENT DAMAGE BY FIRE	LOSS TO SURROUNDING PROPERTY
100%		None

DATE	PREPARED BY (Name and title)	SIGNATURE
8/19/68	(b) (6) [redacted] Fire Chief	

DATE	STATION COMMANDING OFFICER	SIGNATURE
8/19/68	(b) (6) [redacted] LCDR USN By direction	

DIAGRAM OF INCIDENT SHOWING WIND, DIRECTION, APPROACH OF EQUIPMENT, POSITION OF AIRCRAFT, DISTANCES, ETC.
(Maps and photographs should be included, if significant)

Photo attached of all overall scene.





PICTURE OF CRASH SITE (CLOSE UP)
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ENCLOSURE (3)

PICTURE OF CRASH SITE (ENTIRE AREA)
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
ENCLOSURE (4)

Statement of LT (b) (6) [redacted] USN, (b) (6) [redacted] concerning VF-124 AAR Serial 3-69A, 12 August 1968, F8C, BUNO 147001, pilot OHNEMUS.

On 12 August 1968, at 1831, I briefed LTJG OHNEMUS and other members of a missile firing training flight scheduled on the Pacific Missile Range.

LTJG OHNEMUS reported the DME portion of his TACAN inoperative shortly after take-off, however rendezvous went without incident and the missile firing portion of the flight was completed as briefed.

LTJG OHNEMUS was detached to return to NAS Miramar for a random radar approach with a GCA as briefed. During my landing approach I heard NJ457 being called on guard frequency. During landing rollout, I saw a large fire to the north of the field.

(b) (6) [redacted]

LT USN

Enclosure (5)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
RADAR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, MIRAMAR
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92145

The following is a report concerning the accident to aircraft NJ457 approximately 5 miles north of NAS Miramar on August 12, 1968, at approximately 130438 GMT.

My name is (b) (6) [redacted] My address is (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] I am employed as an Air Traffic Control Specialist by the Federal Aviation Administration at the Miramar Radar Air Traffic Control Center, Miramar Naval Air Station, San Diego, California. During the period 122150 GMT to 130600 GMT, August 12, 1968, I was on duty in the Miramar Radar Air Traffic Control Center. I was working Position AR-1/AR-1A from 130351 GMT to 130553 GMT.

At 0430 GMT, I assumed radar control of NJ457 from the AC-1 controller who had radar identified the aircraft by using my radar scope. At that time, the aircraft was 19 miles east of Miramar, and on a heading of 240 degrees with an assigned frequency of 310.8 Mhz. I continued the radar vector and descended the aircraft in a normal manner to 9 miles from Miramar. When Miramar PAR advised NJ457 that he had radar contact, I then released the aircraft and radio frequency to Miramar PAR. I had no further contact with this aircraft.

The operational configuration of the UPA-35 indicator #590 which I was using was as follows, utilizing clock code: MTI gain setting 3, NORMAL gain setting off, SECRA gain setting 4, the display was off-centered 10 miles west and 10 miles south, RANGE was 30 miles with 5 mile range marks.

(b) (6) [redacted]

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Enclosure (6)

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
RADAR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, MIRAMAR
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92145

The following is a report concerning the accident to aircraft NJ457 approximately 5 miles north of NAS Miramar on August 12, 1968 at approximately 130438 GMT.

My name is (b) (6) [redacted] My address is (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] I am employed as an Air Traffic Control Specialist by the Federal Aviation Administration at the Miramar Radar Air Traffic Control Center, Miramar Naval Air Station, San Diego, California. During the period 122240 GMT to 130700 GMT August 12, 1968, I was on duty in the Miramar Radar Air Traffic Control Center. I was working position AC-1/DC-1 from 130236 GMT to 130659 GMT.

At 0418 GMT, NJ457, an F8, called me on 281.8 MHz. I advised him to stand by. At approximately 0419 GMT, I called NJ457 and advised him to go ahead with his message. NJ457 advised that he was on the Miramar TACAN 290 radial estimated at 25 miles and requested a random radar vector to NAS Miramar. I advised NJ457 to depart the Miramar Radio Beacon not below 8,000 feet on a heading of 030 degrees and to report over the Radio Beacon. I advised NJ457 to contact approach control on 310.8 MHz. NJ457 advised that he was approaching the radio beacon. I then advised him to report 7 miles northeast of Miramar. NJ457 then advised that he had no DME. I requested NJ457 to squawk code 0400 and to "IDENT", and asked his estimated distance from Miramar. NJ457 reported about a half mile and I advised him to continue northeastbound. I asked NJ457 to squawk standby and then to squawk code 0400, turned him left to 360 degrees, and advised him to maintain VFR conditions. I than advised NJ457 that I had radar contact and issued some observed traffic to him. NJ457 advised that he was heading 360 degrees. I turned NJ457 right to heading 050 degrees and asked his altitude. NJ457 reported 7,000 feet and I advised him to maintain 8,000 feet and to turn right, heading 150 degrees. I continued to vector the aircraft inbound and handed him off to the AR-1 controller. I had no further contact with this flight.

(b) (6) [redacted]

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Enclosure (6)

Statement of (b) (6) [redacted], AC1, (b) (6) [redacted] USN, Final Controller, concerning VF-124 AAR Serial 3-69A, F8C, BUNO 147001, pilot OHNEMUS.

Radar contact was established at 9 miles on final with NJ457 who was programmed for a low approach to a Woodson departure. The approach progressed normally to 3 miles at which point a wave-off was ordered by the Tower. NJ457 was instructed to give way to the right, fly the parallel taxiway, maintain 1500, after passing the tacan, cleared to Woodson; maintain 5000 via Woodson 4 departure, contact departure control this frequency. NJ457 was observed to give way to the right as instructed and proceed toward the airport. The Tower was on the transfer with traffic information as I switched to another frequency for the next approach.

The approach and wave-off appeared normal in all respects and was terminated at 2136T.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Enclosure (7)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] USN, Control Tower Watch Stander, concerning VF-124 AAR Serial 3-69A, F8C, BUNO 147001, pilot OHNEMUS.

I was on Local Control Position at the time of the below occurance:

NE107, AN F4 in the Landing Pattern, reported a fire 3 to 4 miles North of Miramar, approximately concurrent with a report of the same information from GERTIE 41. NJ151, F4 was requested to leave FCLP Pattern and check on the fire, and this aircraft reported apparent brush fire at the location. At this time San Diego Departure Control was heard attempting contact with NJ457 on UHF Guard Frequency, and after this attempt notified Tower they had no contact with the aircraft. I notified San Diego Coast Guard of a possible crash at the above position, alerted the ODO of this possibility and received the ODO's permission to sound the crash phone, relaying the information that NJ457, F8, VF-124 has possibly crashed at the fire scene. Time of sounding the crash phone was 2147T, approximately 10 minutes after first fire reports. Approximately 5 minutes later the fire, which had been visible from the Tower from the time of first reports, was no longer observed by me. An emergency vehicle subsequently reported from the site that the aircraft was an F8, BUNO 147001, which checked as NJ457 MODEX, in Tower Squadron files.

At about 2135 a jet being waved-off from GCA appeared to be climbing above the prescribed 1500 ft. altitude over the field. As I had breaking traffic overhead at 2000 ft, I cautioned the GCA wave-off traffic to maintain 1500 ft. After this aircraft passed the Tower and was no longer a traffic factor, I returned my attention to the other aircraft in the pattern. ~~The jet on GCA wave-off proved to be NJ457.~~

(b) (6) [redacted]

Enclosure (8)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
RADAR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, MIRAMAR
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92145

The following is a report concerning the accident to aircraft NJ457 approximately 5 miles north of NAS Miramar on August 12, 1968 at approximately 130438 GMT.

My name is (b) (6) [redacted] My address is (b) (6) [redacted] California. I am employed as an Air Controlman 1/C by the U. S. Navy at Miramar NAS, but assigned to the Federal Aviation Administration, Radar Air Traffic Control Center, at NAS Miramar, San Diego, California. During the period 122145 GMT to 130600 GMT, August 12, 1968, I was on duty in the Miramar Radar Air Traffic Control Center. I was working Position DR-1 from 130040 GMT to 130450 GMT.

At approximately 0435 GMT, I was advised that NJ457 had been waved off by the NAS Miramar Tower and had been assigned a Woodson #4 Departure to 5,000 feet and was on frequency 310.8 MHz. I was unable to establish either radio or radar contact with NJ457. At approximately 0437 GMT, I observed an aircraft squawking code 0400 on downwind leg to Miramar. I checked with Miramar Tower for the identification of this aircraft, thinking that possibly NJ457 had turned downwind. Miramar Tower advised that it was not NJ457. I continued to call NJ457 on 310.8 MHz and 243.0 MHz. AH216, an F8, who was on a Woodson #4 Departure, heard my calls and advised that when he was about 3 to 4 miles east of Miramar on final approach he had observed a fireball and had just passed over a fire patch. He made a circle to check the fire, but was unable to determine anything definite about the fire at that time.

The operational configuration of the UPA-35 indicator #592 which I was using was as follows, utilizing clock code: MTI gain setting 3, NORMAL gain setting 5, SECRA gain setting 5, the display was off-centered 8 miles south, RANGE was 25 miles with 5 mile range marks.

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Enclosure (9)

Statement of LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] USNR, (b) (6) [redacted] concerning VF-124 AAR Serial 3-69A, 12 August 1968, F8C, BUNO 147001, pilot OHNEMUS.

On the night of 12 August 1968, at approximately 2140, I was standing in my yard at (b) (6) [redacted] which is about four miles north of NAS Miramar.

I heard an aircraft coming from the direction of Miramar and I turned to see it. (b) (5) [redacted] (b) (5) [redacted] There is a large hill to the west of my home and a ridge running north and south into the hill. I could see the aircraft's anti-collision light, appearing to be low on the ridge line. Shortly after the aircraft dissappeared behind the hill, there was a sudden stop of the engine noise, immediately followed by what I thought sounded like a car door slamming, and a faint sky glow coming from over the hill just beyond where the aircraft had dissappeared from view. I went inside and called the operations desk at NAS Miramar and asked them if they had any trouble up around my area. They told me there was a possible aircraft down in my area.

I am a naval aviator with a total of approximately five hundred hours.

Total jet time of 350 hours and total of 200 F8 hours.

(b) (6) [redacted]

LTJG USNR

Enclosure (10)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

D FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON D. C. 20305

REPORT OF POST-MORTEM BIOCHEMICAL FINDINGS ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT FATALITY

IDENTIFICATION

OHNEMUS, ROMAN STEWART 25/68 (b) (6) [redacted]
LTJG USN 708517
USNH SAN DIEGO CALIF
22 AUG 68 A68-388 AP FROZEN ?
RUSH

TO
Chief, Laboratory Service
US Naval Hospital
San Diego, California 92134

cc CO, USNASC, Norfolk, Va. 23511
CNO OP-05F, Wash., D. C. 20360

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA: AIRCRAFT TYPE: AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER:

8-12-68
F 8 C 147001

2. TOXICOLOGY:

A. CARBON MONOXIDE

BLOOD OR TISSUE CONCENTRATION EXPRESSED AS CARBOXYHEMOGLOBIN SATURATION IS . . . . . Muscle - none found %

TEST NOT PERFORMED (SEE REMARKS BELOW) . . . . . [ ]

CARBOXYHEMOGLOBIN SATURATIONS OF 10% OR ABOVE ARE CONSIDERED ELEVATED VALUES.

B. LACTIC ACID

THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM LACTIC ACID CONCENTRATION IS . . . . . MGM%

TEST NOT PERFORMED (SEE REMARKS) . . . . . [*]

VALUES OVER 200 MGM% ARE CONSIDERED TO BE INDICATIVE OF CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM HYPOXIA. THIS MAY BE DUE TO ONE OF SEVERAL CAUSES: (1) HIGH ALTITUDE EXPOSURE TO LOW OXYGEN TENSION; (2) REDUCED OXYGEN SUPPLY; (3) PROLONGED SHOCK; (4) TRAUMATIC INJURIES WHICH IMPAIR ADEQUATE OXYGENATION AND/OR CIRCULATION OF BLOOD TO THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM.

NON ELEVATED VALUES DO NOT RULE OUT HYPOXIA AS A CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT

C. ALCOHOL

ETHYL ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION IS . . . . . Muscle - none found MGM%

TEST NOT PERFORMED (SEE REMARKS) . . . . . [ ]

D. DRUGS

DETERMINATION FOR DRUGS OR POISONS WILL BE DONE ON REQUEST FROM THE SUBMITTING FACILITY.

E. REMARKS

*No central nervous system tissue submitted.

NOTE: FROZEN TISSUE WILL BE HELD FOR TWENTY (20) DAYS. IF SPECIAL STUDIES OR FURTHER INFORMATION ARE DESIRED, SUBMIT REQUEST BY MOST EXPEDIENT MEANS. CONSULTATION SERVICE FROM THE AEROSPACE BRANCH, AFIP, IS AVAILABLE ON 24 HOUR BASIS. CALL WASHINGTON, D. C., RANDOLPH 3-1388 OR RANDOLPH 3-1000, EXTENSION 33.

3. EXAMINATION AND REPORT BY:
Col. (b) (6) [redacted] MC, USA

4. DATE OF REPORT:
4 September 1968

5. ~~MODERATOR~~:
FOR THE DIRECTOR:
(b) (6) [redacted]
Captain, MC, USN

6. SIGNATURE
(b) (6) [redacted]

AFIP FORM 64 (1 OCT 66)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PART I

OPNAV FORM 3750-6 (REV. 3-63) — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.* — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity)	2. MOR NUMBER	3. LEAVE BLANK
Fighter Squadron ONE TWENTY FOUR, NAS MIRAMAR, CALIF. 92145	3-69A	

4. TYPE OF MISHAP	5. TIME & ZONE	6. DATE	7. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
[X] ACCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT [ ] INCIDENT	2138 T	12 AUG 68	6 mi N. of NAS MIRAMAR

8. MODEL A/C	9. BUNO	10. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	11. DAMAGE CODE	12. UNIT OPERATING A/C
F-8C	147001	One	ALPHA	VF-124

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED NAME (Last, first and middle initial)	14. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	15. RANK/RATE	16. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT ABOARD A/C	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT AT MISHAP	18. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL	19. PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED FOR FLIGHT	20. BRANCH OF SERVICE	21. INJURY CODE	22. DISPOSITION
A. OHNEMUS, Roman Stuart	VF-124	LTJG	(b) (6) [redacted]	Pilot		7 Feb 1968	Yes SG I	USN	A	A
B.										
C.										
D.										

23. CLARIFICATION OF ITEMS 13-22 WHEN NECESSARY

-

24. MODEL-OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	25. BUNO	26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	27. UNIT OPERATING A/C	28. DAMAGE CODE	29. MOR NO.
-	-	-	-	-	-

30. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP *(Use additional 8 x 10½ sheets if required)*

(SEE ADDENDUM "A")

31. PRIMARY CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

Undetermined . . . most likely: Pilot disorientation.

32. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

Demonstrated marginal instrument performance throughout training.

33. POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

Attitude gyroscope failure.

34. HAVE ALL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD? IF NO, EXPLAIN. YES [X] NO [ ]

35. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST

[X] ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED [ ] DRAWINGS SKETCHES, PHOTOS [ ] SURVIVORS NARRATIVES [ ] WITNESS STATEMENTS [ ] CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS [X] REQUIRED COPIES FURNISHED

36. REPORT FILED BY (Name & signature of medical officer)	DATE	37. FORWARDED (Name & signature of appointing authority)	DATE
(b) (6) [redacted] LT MC USNR [redacted]	20 AUGUST 1968	(b) (6) [redacted]	9 SEP 1968

OP-05F — ☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—685974

Enclosure (7)

(ADDENDUM "A")

PAGE 1 - SECTION A - #30

NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP

LTJG OHNEMUS departed Naval Air Station, Miramar, at 2005 on 12 August 1968, for a regularly scheduled syllabus night missile-firing flight. Weather was V.F.R. and the sole aircraft discrepancy was an inoperative D.M.E. (distance measuring equipment) unit on the TACAN.

On the basis of the information available to him at the time of his return toward Naval Air Station, Miramar, the flight had been entirely unremarkable. He requested from San Diego Approach Control a random radar approach and a ground-controlled final approach.

Three miles from touchdown Miramar tower instructed LTJG OHNEMUS to execute a waveoff because of conflicting aircraft traffic in the area. At that time he was further advised to accept a "Woodson-Four" departure and to enter the "box" pattern climbing to 5,000 feet after departure. This instruction was accepted without question, despite the fact that a properly functioning D.M.E. is required for this instrument departure and that weather continued V.F.R. so that an instrument departure was unnecessary.

While passing above Naval Air Station, Miramar, the tower advised LTJG OHNEMUS to hold altitude at 1500 feet because of aircraft breaking overhead. No transmission was received from the aircraft as is accepted practice as it crossed the western boundary of the field. Next transmission was heard over one minute later, at which time LTJG OHNEMUS was heard to say "On a Woodson." At this time he must have been three to four miles North of the field and two to three miles from the crash site and was observed from the ground by an off-duty Crusader (F-8) pilot who was in the general area and who reports the plane to have been in straight and level flight at about 300 knots about 1,000 feet above the terrain. (See statement filed as part of accompanying Aircraft Accident Report).

Approximately twenty seconds after LTJG OHNEMUS' last transmission ("On a Woodson"), Departure Control came up to ask whether he had cleared western field boundary. There was no answer to this transmission; at about the same time the aircraft crashed in a 90-degree left wing down attitude in rolling terrain at 500 ft. altitude M.S.L. (essentially identical to Naval Air Station, Miramar) out of view of the Aviator on the ground.

MOR. NO. 3-69A BUNO 147001 MODEL A/C F-8C
NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: OHNEMUS, Roman Stuart IDENT: (b) (6) [redacted]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PART

OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (REV. 3-63) — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. — *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.* — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION B - FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OR RELATING TO MISHAP BY PHASE OF MISHAP *(List in order in accordance with Section B of inst.)*

PHASE CODE: A - ACCIDENT; E - ESCAPE/EGRESS; S - SURVIVAL; R - RESCUE

FACTOR WEIGHT: M - MAJOR; C - CONTRIBUTING; Q - QUESTIONABLE OR POSSIBLE

1. FACTORS	2. PHASE OF MISHAP (See code at right) A	E	S	R	REMARKS
Pilot Disorientation	M				
Accepting instrument clearance incompatible with aircraft equipment	C				
Generally sub-standard instrument background	C				
Possible aircraft "stall" if pilot suddenly and strongly reacted to obstruction light ahead on Black Mountain.	Q				
Possible attitude gyroscope failure	Q				This is thought to be unlikely; pure speculation.

SECTION C AIR CREW DATA

1. FLIGHT TIME LAST 30 DAYS *(All models)*	34.6
2. FLIGHT TIME LAST 24 HOURS *(All models)*	1.5
3. NO. FLIGHTS LAST 24 HOURS *(Include present flight)*	1
4. TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	1.5
5. TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ALL MODELS	381.1

FLIGHT TIME THIS MODEL	6. TOTAL	7. LAST 30	8. 60 DAYS	9. 90 DAYS
	59.0	33.1	54.6	59.0

10. NO. GROUNDINGS PAST YEAR	None
11. NO. DAYS GROUNDED PAST YEAR	None
12. DATES AND TYPES OF PRIOR MISHAPS	None
13. NO. HRS. IN A DUTY STATUS LAST 24 HRS.	5.0
14. DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF MISHAP	Forward

15. LOCATION AT TIME OF MISHAP

Seated in cockpit

SECTION D ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (Compare with health record)



AGE	25	
HEIGHT	N.A.	IN.
WEIGHT	N.A.	LB.
A. SITTING HEIGHT	N.A.	IN.
B. TRUNK HEIGHT	N.A.	IN.
C. FUNCTIONAL REACH	N.A.	IN.
D. BUTTOCK - KNEE	N.A.	IN.
E. LEG LENGTH	N.A.	IN.
F. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID)	N.A.	IN.

Specimen recovered not adequate for estimation of these data.

16. LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS

SPECIMEN		TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	1.	No specimen		TISSUE: (CNS)	No specimen	
	2.			MUSCLE	A.F.I.P. Studies not yet avail.	
	3.			VISCERA	No specimen	
URINE		No specimen		OTHER:		
G.I. CONTENT		No specimen		MARROW	A.F.I.P. Studies not yet avail.	

17. X-RAY RESULTS

No specimen

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
3-69A	F-8C	147001	(b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

OHNEMUS, Roman Stuart

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—713561

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PART 3

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-88 (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.*

SECTION E

INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE A PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION
TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL
IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP

TIME

(SEE ADDENDUM "B")

TIME

ACCIDENT PHASE

ESCAPE PHASE

SURVIVAL PHASE

TIME OF RESCUE

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
3-69A	F-8C	147001	(b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

OHNEMUS, Roman Stuart

OP-05F

S/N 0107-731-8200

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1966-235-393

(ADDENDUM "B")

PAGE 3 - SECTION E

INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

Details of LTJG OHNEMUS' activities during the two days preceding his accident are not available. He shared an apartment with LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] also attached to Fighter Squadron 124, who reports that they were together on a detachment in Yuma, Arizona until the afternoon of 10 August 68 when LTJG OHNEMUS returned alone to their apartment. LTJG (b) [redacted] joined him there on the morning of 12 August 68 and cannot relate the events of the intervening 36 hours.

On the morning of 12 August 68 both men attended two one-hour lectures at VF-124, after which LTJG OHNEMUS went with his fiancee to look at wedding rings in downtown San Diego. LTJG (b) [redacted] returned to their apartment for a few moments late in the afternoon to find LTJG OHNEMUS napping. He did not see him again.

In general, LTJG OHNEMUS is described by LTJG (b) [redacted] as happy and well-adjusted, a man who carefully assured himself of sufficient food and rest, and one who had no grave problems before him at this time. He was to have been married in November. His fiancee is described as a mature, somewhat older divorcee with a five-year-old son, all of whom were very happy with the prospects of this relationship; they saw each other regularly but did not keep late hours.

LTJG OHNEMUS was taking no medications and never used alcohol at a time when it might affect his flying.

In general, there appears to be nothing in LTJG OHNEMUS' way of life or in the activities of the 48 hours preceding his accident which might in any way have predisposed to its occurrence.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4

OPNAV FORM 3750-6C (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions. OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION F — PATHOLOGICAL DATA *(Refer to Section F of instructions.)*

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION: A / A

2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS: (b) (6) [redacted]

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ NO ☐ YES DURATION: (See "F-1")

4. DROWNED: ☐

5. ASPHYXIATED: ☐

6. SHOCK (See "F-1"): ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

7. EXPOSURE (See "F-1"): ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: Variable, minimal

9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: (See "F-1")

10. PLACE OF HOSPITALIZATION: (See "F-1")

11. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE REASON: ☐ NO ☐ YES (See "F-1")

12. DURATION *(See instruction)*: (See "F-1")

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: (b) (6) [redacted]

14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH: [redacted]

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: ☐ PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT ☒ PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT * ☐ MEDICAL OFFICER

16. (See ADDENDUM "C") (PAGES #1 #2 #3) ☒ PROTOCOL ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED P3065" USED? ☒ YES ☐ NO

18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON: —

19.

INJURIES	PHASE SUSTAINED A	E	S	R	CAUSE AND MECHANISM *(If unknown, theorize)*
"Multiple Injuries"	X				(See "F-13" above)

20. REMARKS: (b) (6) [redacted]

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
3-69A	F-8C	147001	(b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: OHNEMUS, Roman Stuart

OF-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964-713067

Revised August 1954
Bureau of the Budget
Circular A-32 (Rev.)

(ADDENDUM "C") (PAGE #1)

CLINICAL RECORD	AUTOPSY PROTOCOL

DATE AND HOUR DIED	A. M. / P. M.	DATE AND HOUR AUTOPSY PERFORMED	A. M. / P. M.	CHECK ONE: FULL AUTOPSY	HEAD ONLY	TRUNK ONLY
8/12/68 2147		8/13/68 1600				

PROSECTOR: (b) (6) [redacted]
(b) (6) [redacted] CDR MC USN

ASSISTANT: MR. (b) (6) [redacted]

CLINICAL DIAGNOSES (Including operations)

Aircraft accident

PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSES (GROSS)

CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple injuries

Systemic diagnoses : None available. Only small fragments of tissue were submitted for autopsy.

APPROVED—SIGNATURE
(b) (6) [redacted] CAPT MC USN (b) (6) [redacted] db

MILITARY ORGANIZATION (When required)	AGE	SEX	RACE	IDENTIFICATION NO.	AUTOPSY NO.
	25	M	C		A68-328

PATIENT'S IDENTIFICATION (For typed or written entries give: Name—last, first, middle; grade; date; hospital or medical facility)

OHNEMUS, Roman Stewart LTJG USN (b) (6) [redacted]

NHSD, CALIF.
A68-328

REGISTER NO.	WARD NO.
DOA	DOA

AUTOPSY PROTOCOL
Standard Form 503
503-104

AUTOPSY REPORT
A68-326
GROSS, page 1

OHNEMUS, Roman Stewart
LTJG USN

CLINICAL SUMMARY

This individual was involved in an aircraft accident 4 miles north of NAS Miramar, California, and the remains were submitted to this hospital by VF-124, NAS Miramar.

AUTOPSY REPORT
A68-328
GROSS, page 2

OHNEMUS, Roman Stewart
LTJG USN

GROSS DESCRIPTION

(b) (6) [redacted]
identification tags: OHNEMUS, Roman Stewart, LTJG USN.

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]
CDR MC USN
db

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 4A OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION F *(Continued)* SURFACE INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING AND SHADING AFFECTED AREAS
ALL LACERATIONS, ABRASIONS, CONTUSIONS, PUNCTURE WOUNDS, SPRAINS AND BURNS

RECORD ALL INJURIES NO MATTER HOW TRIVIAL, WHETHER PATIENT LIVED OR DIED



DETAILS OF SKULL FRACTURES AND BRAIN INJURY. DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY.
1. ALL FRACTURES, BY TYPE *(Simple, depressed, or indirect, etc.)* 2. SITES OF BRAIN LESIONS, IF ANY. 3. DISLOCATIONS OF MANDIBLE.



MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
3-69A	F-8C	147001	(b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

OHNEMUS, Roman Stuart

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—713396

SECTION F (Continued) SKELETAL INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING
ALL FRACTURES BY TYPE (Simple, compound, comminuted, etc.) AND DISLOCATIONS INDICATING DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT.

See Injury/Disposition
Code: "A/A"



DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY: 1. ALL FRACTURES OF SPINAL COLUMN (Simple, compressed, etc.)
2. DISLOCATION AND DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT. 3. SITES OF CORD DAMAGE, IF ANY.

DETAILS OF SPINAL INJURIES

See Injury/Disposition
Code: "A/A"

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
3-69A	F-8C	147001	(b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

OHNEMUS, Roman Stuart

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—713336

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8F (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for Instructions*

SECTION G — ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION G OF INSTRUCTION: PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP S-SURVIVAL E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. REQUIRED	4. AVAILABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10½ plain paper if needed.)
MK F-5A Seat	All current directives complied with	Y	Y	Y	N	-	
MBEU 5019PA 'chute	"	Y	Y	Y	N	-	
MK 3-C Life preserver	"	Y	Y	N	N	-	
L-R 1 Raft	"	Y	Y	N	N	-	
M-A 2 Torso Harness	"	Y	Y	Y	[illegible]	-	
O_2 MiniReg	"	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
APH-5 Helmet	None	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
Standard Navy Anti-"G" Suit	None	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	

SECTION H — NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

From careful examination of the crash site, there appeared no reason to believe that LTJG OHNEMUS made any attempt to exit the aircraft before impact. Personnel equipment and body fragments were scattered in approximately the same distribution as aircraft wreckage; the "scissors" yoke from the firing mechanism of the ejection seat was one of the few aircraft parts found intact and the central bolt was still in place, (b) (5) [redacted]

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
3-69A	F-8C	147001	(b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

OHNEMUS, Roman Stuart

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—712968

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C CCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACC IT — PAGE 6 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-6G (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION I DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

☐ WATER ☒ LAND ☐ OTHER

2. TYPE OF EGRESS available . . . none attempted.

☒ EJECTION ☐ BAILOUT ☐ UNDERWATER ☐ NORMAL ☐ OTHER *(State type)*

S	E		REMARKS
	X	3. NOT ATTEMPTED	
		4. ATTEMPTED	
		5. ACCOMPLISHED	
		6. THRU CANOPY	
YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
	?	7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	(See Narrative, Section "H")
		8. DURING EGRESS	(Does not apply)
		9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	(Does not apply)

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED: Martin Baker F5-A

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT (not fired) ☐ PRIMARY ☐ SECONDARY ☐ OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION: (None)

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION (none/unknown) ☐ UP ☐ DOWN ☐ FORWARD ☐ AFT ☐ OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT: (no ejection)

15. AIRSPEED: about 300 knots

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET) ABOVE SEA LEVEL 500 ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY Zero

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING: (none)

18. WEIGHT: about 150 lbs.

19. TIME IN WATER: (Does not apply)

20. TIME IN RAFT: (Does not apply)

21. WIND VELOCITY: about 5-10 knots

22. WAVE HEIGHT: (does not apply)

23. WAVE INTERVAL: (Does not apply)

24. AIR TEMPERATURE: about 72°F.

25. WATER TEMPERATURE: (Does not apply)

26. VISIBILITY: unlimited/V.F.R.

27. ALERTING FACTORS
Failure to respond to radio calls.
Fire visible from N.A.S. Miramar.

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE
Visual sighting of fire.

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR
(None)

30. (Does not apply)

31. (Does not apply)

32. (Does not apply)

33. (Does not apply)

34. (Does not apply)

35. (Does not apply)

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE? *(If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue)*

☐ NO ☐ YES (Does not apply)

SECTION J TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC 15 FEBRUARY 68 EJECTION TOWER 15 FEBRUARY 68 EJECTION SEAT 15 FEBRUARY 68 SURVIVAL 31 MAY 67

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? *(If yes, explain)*

☒ NO ☐ YES

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
3-69A	F-8C	147001	(b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

OHNEMUS, Roman Stuart

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—712966

Statement of the (b) (6) [redacted] concerning VF-124 AAR Serial 3-694, 12 August 1968, F8C BUNO 147001, pilot OMMENUS

F8C BUNO 147001 was accepted by the Navy on 12 April 1960. A total of 1661.5 flight hours had accumulated since acceptance. The aircraft completed the fifth PAR on 11 August 1966. The aircraft subsequently was transferred to VF-124 until 8 September 1966 when it was transferred to VF-24 accumulating 92.0 hours through December 1966. The aircraft sustained extensive damage in December 1966 as recorded in VF-24 AAR 4-66A and was subsequently transferred to NAVAIRREWORKFAC NORIS remaining there until 9 October 1967. It was transferred to LTV Dallas for hardpoint (installation of AFC 497) and then back to VF-24 on 30 NOV 1967 where it accumulated 81.9 hours before before being transferred to VF-124 on 21 March 1968. Since completion of VF-124 acceptance inspection on 23 March 1968, the aircraft flew 156.3 hours. While the aircraft was at NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS it completed an inspection equivalent to calendar major on 4 October 1967. The aircraft completed first calendar inspection on 20 May 1968. The engine was installed by VF-124 on 6 May 1968 with 268.5 hours since last overhaul and subsequently flew 123.3 hours. The engine completed first calendar inspection on 20 May 1968.

A review of previous discrepancy cards shows no indication of malfunctions that could have been a contributing factor to the aircraft accident, and the aircraft was considered ready in all respects for flight.

A review of the aircraft log books revealed that all pertinent technical directives had been complied with.

Preliminary investigation by the VF-124 Maintenance Department did not reveal any apparent cause for the aircraft accident.

(b) (6) [redacted]

CDR USN

Enclosure (12)

PICTURE OF ENGINE
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
ENCLOSURE (13)

Make

ZNR UUUUU
P 130809Z AUG 68

FM FITRON ONE TWO FOUR
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCEN
INFO RUEBBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUEBJFA/JAG
RUWJMEA/COMELEVEN
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
ZEN/COMFAIRMIRAMAR
RUEBJFA/BUPERS
RUEBNVA/CGFMFLANT
RUKHFMA/CGFMFPAC
RUWTATB/NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO EAST HARTFORD
RUEBBHB/CHNAVMAT
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
ZEN/COMREADATKCARARWING TWELVE
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEDGCA/CNARESTRA
RUEBPDA/DIRAFIP
BT
UNCLAS ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

437 A/cr

AAR

PAGE TWO RUWJAPA0001 UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NAVY PRELIMINARY REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6F
1. 12 AUGUST 1968, 2147(T) NIGHT
2. APPROX 360 DEGREES 4NM NORTH NAS MIRAMAR
3. F8C BUNO 147001
4. VF-124 ARR 3-69A
5. ALFA
6. OHNEMUS, ROMAN STUART, LTJG, (b) (6) USN, 1310, ACTIVE, ALFA, TOT FLT HRS 374, TOT HRS F8 52, TOT HRS LAST 90 DAYS 51. PILOT DID NOT EJECT.
7. NA
8. NA
9. 3A6 NIGHT AIR TO AIR LIVE MISSILE SHOOT ONE PLUS THIRTY-TWO, VFR, LOCAL, NAS MIRAMAR.
10. RE-ENTRY.
11. AFTER GCA WAVEOFF TO A DOWNWIND BOX PATTERN FOR SECOND GCA, DEPARTURE CONTROL LOST CONTACT WITH 147001. AIRCRAFT CRASHED APPROX. 360 DEGREES 4NM NORTH NAS MIRAMAR.
12. ONE THOUSAND SCATTERED, HIGH SCATTERED FIFTEEN MI VIS. TEMP

PAGE THREE RUWJAPA0031 UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
63DEGREES F, DEW POINT 58 DEGREES F, WIND CALM.
13. UNK.
14. UNK.
15. NONE
16. WRECKAGE ACCESSIBLE.
17. (b) (6) LCDR, ASST SAFETY OFFICER, AUTOVON (b) (6)
(b) (6)
BT

Any
130809Z

80812102

F8C 147001 VF-124 3-69A 8-12-68