5-15
NB

Code 36
File: A 2 5 (8)
8431
12 JUN 1957

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on Aircraft Accident Report Serial No. 1-57 w/ CO, NAS, Key West, Fla. FIRST ENDORSEMENT Ser: 1009 of 22 May 1957 and CDR., NPG, Dahlgren, Va. SECOND ENDORSEMENT of 6 June 1957

From: Commandant, Potomac River Naval Command
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center, Norfolk, Va.

Subj: OPNAV Form 3750.1 Aircraft Accident Report S2F-1 BuNo 136555 occurring on 5 May 1957

1. Forwarded.

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
NAS, Key West, Fla. (End. 3 only)
CDR, NPG, Dahlgren, Va. " " "

1

6 JUN 1957

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on Aircraft Accident Report Serial [illegible]

From: Commander, Naval Proving Ground
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Potomac River Naval Command
(2) U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center, [illegible]

Subj: OPNAV Form 3750.1 Aircraft Accident [illegible]
BuNo 136555 occurring on 5 May 1957

1. Forwarded concurring in the recommendations [illegible] of the Aircraft Accident Board and the first endorsement. [illegible] the facts presented, the accident is considered [illegible] excusable and apparently a result of over-confidence [illegible] gence.

2. LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] enlisted in the Navy in 1941 and [illegible] continuous active flying duty since 1946 at which time he was designated Aviation Pilot. He received his commission as [illegible] in May of 1946. In January of 1950 he reverted back to AD1/CP by choice in order to maintain flying status and was recommissioned LTJG in July of 1955. He has over 2700 hours flight time involving one barrier crash aboard ship approximately ten years ago.

LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] had been considered to be an excellent and a most conscientious naval aviator. His preflight planning and navigation as previously observed had been thorough, exact, and in accordance with standard procedures.

(b) (6)
[redacted]

G. H. WALES

2

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
KEY WEST, FLORIDA

Code 14
Serial: 1009

MAY 22 1957

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Aircraft Accident Report Serial No. 1-57

From: Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-57).
Via: (1) Commander, Naval Proving Ground, Dahlgren, Virginia
(2) Potomac River Naval Command
(3) U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center, Norfolk

Subj: OPNAV FORM 3750-1, Aircraft Accident Report, S2F-1 BuNo. 136555 occurring on 5 May 1957

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendations and conclusions of the Aircraft Accident Board.

2. It is considered that this accident was inexcusable.

R. O. Greene
R. O. GREENE

3

ORIGINAL

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (REV. 11-55)
PAGE 1

See instructions for completion prior to filling out

OPNAV REPORT 3750

PART 1 - GENERAL

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD CONVENED BY: NAS Key West, Florida
2. DATE OF ACCIDENT: 5-5-57 TIME: 1555
3. NAR SERIAL NO.: 1-57.
4. TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Op-57)
5. ENCLOSURES: (1) Pilots Statement
   (2) Crewmans Statement
   (3) Plot of Assumed Track
   (4) Medical Officers Report (OPNAV375
   (5) Weather Report
   (6) Flight Plan
   (7)
   (8)
   (9)
6. VIA: (1) C.O. NAS Key West, Florida
   (2) Commander NPG, Dahlgren, Va.
   (3) Potomac River Naval Command
   (4) Naval Aviation Safety Center, Norva
   (5)
   (6)
   (LAST) DIRECTOR, U.S. NAV. AV. SAFETY CENTER
7. REPORTING CUSTODIAN (if different than item number 1): NPG, Dahlgren, Va.
8. ACTIVITY OPERATING AIRCRAFT (if different than item 7): Same
9. KIND OF FLT.: IRI
10. TIME OF DAY: ☐ DAWN ☒ DAY ☐ DUSK ☐ NIGHT
11. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT: LAT 25-10 N 77-08 W
12. ELEV. ABOVE SEA LEVEL: 0
13. PLACE OF LAST TAKE-OFF: Broward International Airport, Fla.
14. CLEARED: FROM Broward County TO NAS Key West
15. TYPE CLEARANCE: ☐ IFR ☒ VFR ☐ LOCAL ☐ OPERATIONAL ☒ AIRWAYS ☐ DIRECT ☐ OTHER (Specify)

AIRCRAFT

16. TIME IN FLT.: 2+00
17. TYPE ACCIDENT: B-7
18. PHASE OF FLIGHT: 8
19. MODEL: S2F-1
20. SERIAL NO.: 136555
21. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT: ☒ A. ☐ B. ☐ C. ☐ D.
22. DOL. COST: $781,000
23. AIRSPEED (Kts): 80
24. A/C WT.: 19,500
25. LIST MODEL, SER. NRS, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (complete separate OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C): NONE

PILOT AND CO-PILOT

PERSONNEL	2. NAME (last, first and middle initial)	3. RANK RATE	4. FILE SERV. NO.	5. DESIG-NATOR	6. DATE DESIG-NATED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	AGE
PILOT (PERSON AT CONTROLS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT)	(b) (6) [redacted]	LTJG	(b) (6) [redacted]	1312	4/15/46	(b) (6) [redacted]	35
CO-PILOT	NONE						

8. PERSONNEL	9. OPERATIONAL FLT. TRAINER AVAILABLE?	USED?	10. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	11. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD
PILOT	☐ YES ☒ NO	☐ YES ☒ NO	NPG, Dahlgren, Va.	☐ STANDARD ☒ SPECIAL
CO-PILOT	☐ YES ☐ NO	☐ YES ☐ NO		☐ STANDARD ☐ SPECIAL

SECTION B - PERSONNEL INFORMATION

12. PILOT, CO-PILOT, STUDENT EXP.

TOTAL PILOT HOURS

ITEM	PILOT	CO-PILOT	STUDENT	ITEM	PILOT	CO-PILOT	STUDENT
ALL MODELS	2747			GV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT			
ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MOS.	190			FCLP LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT			
ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MOS.	26			INSTRUMENT HOURS, LAST 3 MONTHS	7		
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	51			NIGHT HOURS, LAST 3 MOS.	7		
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL, LAST 12 MONTHS	44			(Jet accidents only) TOTAL JET PILOT HOURS			
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL, LAST 3 MONTHS	32.2			DATE LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	4/30		
				DURATION LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	2+00		

4

13. ALL OTHER PERSONNEL INVOLVED

	NAME (last, first and middle initial)	RANK RATE	FILE SERVICE NO.	ORG. TO WHICH ATTACHED	INJURY CODE	BILLET	POSITION
1.	(b) (6) [redacted]	LTJG	(b) (6) [redacted]	NPG Dahlgren	E	Pilot	Left
2.		AD-3		NPG Dahlgren	E	Plane Capt	Rigl
3.							
4.							
5.							

ORIGINAL

(If additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (REV. 11-55)

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV REPORT 3750

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE	OUTSIDE AIR	RUNWAY	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTINGS
3000	5 Mi	080° 5 knts					

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, icing levels, state of sea, etc., if pertinent to accident)

Slight waves - Sea state estimated at 1

ITEM	P	S	ITEM	P	S	ITEM	P
PILOT ERROR	X		LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER ERROR			MATERIAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION	
CREW ERROR			OTHER PERSONNEL ERROR, Specify			MATERIAL INADEQUACY	
SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL ERROR			ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR			ROLLING AND PITCHING DECK/ROUGH SEAS	
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ERROR			AIRPORT OR CARRIER FACILITIES			UNDETERMINED	
SERVICING PERSONNEL ERROR			WEATHER			OTHER, Specify	

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD DEPLOYED CARRIERS (Complete following Section on Pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED	2. DAY-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	3. DAY-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS
4. INSTRUMENT HRS. LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT	5. NIGHT-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	6. NIGHT-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS

PART II – MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

1. AIRCRAFT HISTORY	DATE OF MANUFACTURE	SERVICE TOUR	MONTHS IN THIS TOUR	TOTAL NO. OF OVERHAULS	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	TYPE CHECK LAST PERFORMED	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST CHECK	NO. OF DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
		ENGINE MODEL	SERIAL NO. OF ENGINE						
2. ENGINE HISTORY NO. 1									
NO. 2									
NO. 3									
NO. 4									

a. DID FIRE OCCUR: ☐ BEFORE ACCIDENT ☐ AFTER ACCIDENT ☒ DID NOT OCCUR

b. DID EXPLOSION OCCUR IN FLIGHT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

C. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ AMP FOR SERIAL

D. HAS DIR BEEN REQUESTED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

E. FAILED COMPONENTS INVOLVED NONE

CHECK BELOW ITEMS PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT

a. ☐ AIRCRAFT DESIGN

b. ☐ AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT

c. ☐ MAINTENANCE

d. ☐ UNDETERMINED

e. ☐ TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION

f. ☐ OTHER, Specify

g. ☐ SURFACE FACILITIES

h. ☐ HUMAN ENGINEERING (e.g. cockpit configuration)

5

A. ALTITUDE AT MALFUNCTION	B. AIR SPEED (kts)	C. OPERATING TEMPERATURE	D. WEIGHT OF AIRCRAFT	E. C.G. (% MAC)	F. KIND OF FUEL	G. FUEL PRESSURE

H. EVIDENCE OF FUEL CONTAMINATION

I. CAUSE OF ENGINE FAILURE OR FLAMEOUT

J. FUEL CONTROL REGULATOR/CARBURETOR (List Stock and Ser. nos.; give time since new or overhauled)

K. EXTERNAL STORES ABOARD A/C

(If additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

ORIGINAL

SECTION A – AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE DATA

1. AIRCRAFT HISTORY 2. ENGINE HISTORY 3. GENERAL 4. AIRCRAFT AND ENG. FACTORS 5. AIRCRAFT ENGINE DATA

PART II – MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA (Cont'd)

SECTION B – FACILITIES DATA

1. GEN. (CK. BASIC FACILITIES INVOLVED, DESCRIBE EFFECT ON ACCIDENT IN THE ANALYSIS SECTION)

a. ☐ CLEARANCE AUTHORITY
b. ☐ FLIGHT PLANNING INFORMATION SOURCE
c. ☐ LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, etc.)
d. ☐ TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER (Field or Ship)
e. ☐ APPROACH AND ENROUTE AIDS TO NAVIGATION
f. ☐ RUNWAY WATCH
g. ☐ LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER
w. ☐ OTHER, Specify _____
h. ☐ RUNWAY
i. ☐ WATER LANDING AREA
j. ☐ APPROACH ZONE
k. ☐ END ZONE
l. ☐ SHOULDERS
m. ☐ TAXIWAY
n. ☐ PARKING AREA
o. ☐ EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR (Runway)
p. ☐ AIRCRAFT SERVICING, HANDLING & DIRECTING (Field or S
q. ☐ CRASH AND RESCUE
r. ☐ SEARCH AND RESCUE
s. ☐ CATAPULT
t. ☐ ARRESTING GEAR (Carrier)
u. ☐ BARRIER OR BARRICADE (Field or Ship)
v. ☐ FLIGHT DECK

2. SHIPS DATA

a. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR | B. PRESSURE SETTINGS | C. WIND OVER DECK | D. RELATIVE HEADWIND | E. APPROACH SPEED (SP READING)

F. MARK NUMBER | G. MODEL NO. | H. LOCATION ON SHIP | I. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND CONFIGURATION U

J. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

K. THIS PORTION SHALL BE COMPLETED WHENEVER (1) A MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES ARRESTING GEA BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT, OR (2) AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES MALFUNCTIONING OF ARRES ING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT. MINOR ACCIDENTS OR ROUTINE DAMAGE TO CABLES, WEL INGS AND OTHER EXPENDABLE COMPONENTS NEED NOT BE REPORTED.

ENGAGED	DECK RUNOUT (FT.)	RAM TRAVEL (IN.)	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	COMMENTS (for cable failure specify number of landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER							
BARRIER							
BARRICADE							

PART	SECTION	ITEM	PART III – REMARKS (continue on separate pages if necessary)

6

ORIGINAL

(b) (6)

[redacted]

THE ACCOUNT

Part V, The Accident.

At approximately 1230 R, 5 May 1957, pilot LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] USN, while at Broward County Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, filed a VFR flight plan by telephone with Flight sevice. His intended route was Airways V-3 from Fort Lauderdale to Key West, Florida. He took off at 1257 in an S2F Tracker BuNo 136555 with an estimated two hours of fuel aboard for a planned 45 minutes enroute. Immediately after take off the pilot turned southward towards Miami VCR. At 1310 after having turned westward to avoid rain showers he passed Miami VCR and called his position to Miami Radio. Therafter he turned southeasterly to a heading which he later believed to be 108 but which the crewman believed to be 138. However the latter appears to have been a temporary heading taken by the pilot later in the flight. The pilot appears to have read the distance figure of 108 shown on the Miami Key West leg of V3 airways and mistaken it for the heading. After flying out bound on a course apparently close to 108 (see chart, encl. (3) for reconstruction of flight route), for not more than 30 and not less than ten minutes he realized that he should be on course 226. He turned to this heading and then corrected 20 degrees to the right to bring himself back on the radial outbound from Miami VCR. He actually figured to hold 244°. When he had flown 45 minutes, plus or minus, he expected to see Key West. Not finding Key West he turned to the left hoping to cross the keys. He then turned back to 045 as the approximate reciprocal of the heading on which he had flown previously (244) and still thinking that he was north of the Keys or possibly beyond Key West he hoped to return towards Miami. Shortly thereafter, he was able to tune in on Perrine LF range and still believing himself over the Bay of Florida, supposed that he was in the southwest quadrant. On heading 045 he intercepted a leg which appeared to him to be the southwest leg. He then turned northerly to check the edge of the beam and ran out of it. On turning back to 045 he found that he had to hold 060 to 065 in order to remain in the beam. From the chart it appears that in fact he was far out on the east leg of Perrine radio Range and was flying out bound. While on this course he passed over a small island which the chart reveals to be Holmes Cay or Little Harbor Cay in the Bahamas. This confirmed his belief that he was north of the Keys however and led him to continue to expect sighting the Everglades or the Overseas highway. Just as another island, the southern tip of Great Abaco Island appeared his fuel ran out. Both engines quit within seconds of each other. He landed straight ahead without power at 1555. The aircraft struck once in a full stall condition. There was onemore jolt, or bounce and solid water come over the canopy for a few seconds. The plane nosed in and then came back to a flat attitude. The pilot and crewman got out

ORIGINAL

Part V, The Accident. (Cont)

immediately and opened life rafts, then climbed into them. A few seconds after the process was completed the aircraft sank in a slightly nose down attitude. On the first impact there was a tearing sound which the crewman interprets as the flaps hitting the water. There was however no observable structural damage.

Part VI, Damage to Aircraft.

There was no observable damage to the aircraft on actual Landing. However the loss sustained by submergence and abandonment is $781,000.00.

Part VII, The Investigation.

The investigation of the accident revealed the following facts:

1. LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] has been designated a naval aviator on continuous active duty since April 1946.

2. He has flown fifty hours in type in the last three months.

3. He was on duty with the Naval Proving Ground, Dahlgren, Virginia for one year and six months. During the last three weeks he has been flying with a detachment from Broward County International Airport.

4. It appears that he has had one previous accident: a night barrier engagement 10 years ago.

5. He has instructed instruments in the training command and at Moffet Field for a total of approximately five years.

6. He has made one previous flight to Key West a week before the day of the accident.

7. His planning was hurried and incomplete. Headings were not determined prior to take off nor was a map of the area consulted or even observed.

8. There were many thunderstorms in the area but the weather was described as VFR. Electrical storm radio interference was considerable. No winds sufficiently strong to have any bearing on the accident were reported.

9. The pilot intentionally completely depended on the RFC Charts after becoming airborne.

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ORIGINAL

Part VII, The Investigation. (Con't)

10. He depended on one navigational aid solely, until becoming concerned about his position.

11. Both Pilot and crewman were apparently confused as to headings flown and times on each heading. Both gave contradictory statements during the interrogation.

General Summary:

On the afternoon of 5 May 1957 an S2F Tracker, BuNo 136555 piloted by LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] was enroute from Fort Lauderdale to Key West on VFR Flight Plan, via V3 Airways. The aircraft took off with an estimated two hours of fuel on board for a forty-five minute flight. The pilot made a routine time-off report to Miami radio and then a position report over Miami VOR. He was not heard from again. Search and rescue procedure was inaugurated when the aircraft was overdue. Search continued into the night without success. On Monday 6 May 1957 search aircraft were sent out at first light. By seven o'clock a message was received from the SS Vanessa enroute through the Bahamas to Houston, Texas that the downed aviators had been picked up. A NAS Key West UF-1 was landed alongside the Vanessa in the mid morning and the pilot and crewman were taken aboard and returned to Key West. The AAR board commenced investigation immediately by gathering all SAR messages and Compiling records from CAA and Flight Service sources. Although the pilot and crewman were not physically hurt it was neccessary for them to be sent to the Dispensary for observation. The Medical Officer member of the Board commenced his own observations immediately as required for his separate report. The crewman was held over night in the dispensary but the pilot was allowed to go ashore to stay with relatives in the city of Key West. A delayed emotional reaction set in during the night and he was returned to the Dispensary where hewas retained until the morning, 7 May 1957. He was placed under sedation and was not made available to the board until that afternoon for interview. At the time of the first interview on Tuesday afternoon the pilot was still in an obvious condition of emotional stress but he was able to reconstruct the flight and reviewed the possible courses taken by his aircraft from take off untill fuel exhaustion occurred. His statement was written before the verbal discussion and interview with the board. As he commenced his verbal narrative he corrected various statements after having been given access to charts and the RadFac Chart handbooks He stated at first that after reporting in at Miami he flew a heading of 108. He persisted in this statement until it was suggested that he must have meant 180. Then after having been shown a chart and the RFC he stated that the board misunderstood him, that he must have flown 244°, a corrected heading from the course of 226 which he wanted to fly.

ORIGINAL

General Summary: (Con't)

The crewman remembers that after passing Miami a heading of 138 showed on a compass dial but he does'nt remember for how long. The pilot after reviewing his flight in substance as he had written about it then recollected that the position of the course needle on the OMNI dial could only have been that for 108 out of Miami, he was convinced at last that that was the heading he flew. On reviewing the RadFac charts he feels that he misread the mileage value shown on the airways and interpreted it without question as the heading to fly to Key West. He had not looked at a map or chart in the aircraft prior to the time when he realized that he was in trouble. It appears from his statement and from interview that he did not plan his flight nor did he look at any charts or navigational aids before taking off.

On Wednesday 8 May 1957 both pilot and crewman were recalled to review statements and possible plots of the courses of the aircraft. The crewman was more specifically interviewed and enlarged his written statement after the verbal interview. The board has little more than the two statements of the occupants of the aircraft on which to reconstruct the path taken by the aircraft. However, by using the geographic information contained, coupled with the known point of ditching a reconstruction has been made which fits most aspects of the description.

Part VIII, The analysis.

It appears that the pilot neglected his flight planning. In his verbal amplification of his statement enclosed he discussed the difficulty in getting telephone contact for weather and enroute briefing. He was under pressure to get his aircraft to Key West. He had previously flown the route from Fort Lauderdale to Key West under "blue sky" conditions and felt no need to plan his flight in advance.

He knew the frequency of the Miami VOR range by memory and therefore did no checking in any of his publications. He homed directly to Miami. On leaving Miami where he had vectored around thundershowers which he had not expected or anticipated in such density, he hurriedly scanned his RadFac charts and misread the mileage(108 mile) from Miami to Key West as the course to make good. This he set on his VOR receiver as the radial to fly.

It appears that on crossing Bay Biscayne on a heading of 108 he presumed he had alreadystarted to cross the Keys and the Bay of Florida. He indicated that he thought he was passing the section of the Keys along which runs the Overseas Highway.

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ORIGINAL

Part VIII, The Analysis (Con't)

Some few minutes later he realized that he was on the wrong radial and turned to 226°. Knowing that he should correct to the right he took up and eighteen degree cut to the right to a heading of 244°. By this time the flag had come up on the ILS head indicator, or was probably wavering. He attempted to tune Key West on VOR while continuing on 244°. When his estimated time enroute had expired and he found himself still over water he thought that he was either North of Key West or beyond it. He therefore turned left thinking he would cross the keys for a visual orientation. In a few more minutes he realized he must orientate by radio and he changed course to 045°

He could read no VOR stations. He then tried to use his radio compass which he did not trust. He states that he endeavored to use the LF receiver also. He identified Perrine LF Radio and could hear both indentification signals and an N signal. He believed himself close to the center of the beam because he could hear the identification signals with nearly equal strength. He believed he was on the southwest course of Perrine and so he checked by turning north. He believed he had turned out of the leg and so he returned then to 045°. It is apparent that he was crossing at this time the EAST leg of Perrine many miles out. With such a broad beam at this distance from station he found that by correcting to 050 or 065 that he could remain on the beam. He could then hear only the identification signals through heavy static. He crossed a small island and believed them to be islets in the Florida Keys close to the mainland. The island was probably Holmes Cay and Little Harbor Cay in the Bhamas. Approximately 30 miles and ten minutes later both engines quit near the southern tip of Great Abaco Island and the aircraft was ditched with no injury to occupants but with a total loss.

Personnel Error.

1. The pilot did not do any flight planning.

2. He did not use the publications available to him in his navigation kit.

3. He misread his information in the RadFac charts.

4. He was not familiar with the area in which he was to fly.

5. He did not know any heading he was going to fly before he entered the aircraft, he was expecting merely to "home in".

6. When the pilot realized he was on heading 108° he did not know how long he had been on it and therefore had little knowledge of his position when he first turned to 244°.

ORIGINAL

Personnel Error. (Con't)

7. He had attempted to tune no other equipment such as LF or Radio Compass to any other station prior to realizing he was lost.

8. He did not wear his survival equipment in the aircraft, nor require his crewmember to.

9. He did not do anything about making sure of his position until he had flown his total estimated time enroute.

Safety Equipment in Use.

1. There were no hard-hats in the aircraft.

2. The pilot and crewman did not wear their survival equipment while flying. Maewests were put on only a few minutes before ditching.

3. Pilot and crewman were wearing Maewests and were firmly strapped into their seats on impact. Immediately after ditching they exited the aircraft by the overhead escape hatches, carrying parachutes with attached life rafts by hand.

4. On disembarking they attempted to inflate rafts while in the water. The crewman's lanyard pulled loose and he was unable at first to find the CO-2 Bottle. Both men were able to inflate their life rafts however, and climbed into them. The sea was calm and they were able to retain their parachutes in the rafts with them. They did not tie themselves together at first. The crewmanstartedto swim for shore towing the rafts but was advised not to by the pilot. He got back into his raft just in time to observe a large shark pass under him. The crewman opened his shark repellant bag and dropped it into the water where it floated away.

5. The pilot fashioned a paddle from his parachute seat and brought the two rafts together. Both men were afraid to use their hands because sharks were nudging the bottoms of their rafts.

6. A ship passed by before nightfall but did not notice the men in spite of the fact that a flare was used. In the early morning hours of darkness another ship passed close aboard and the pilot fired three tracers from his 38 pistol. The crewman fired one red hight flare and then commenced signalling SOS with his flashlight. It was stated that the Captain of the ship was in reality attracted by the SOS signal rather than by the flare and the tracers which he had tentatively evaluated as fishing boats at work and was about to ignore and pass by.

ORIGINAL

Safety Equipment in Use. (Con't)

7. Both men were wearing flight suits.

8. They ate no K-rations. Squalls provided a mixture of salt and fresh water in the bottoms of the rafts, such was drunk with no ill effects.

Part L, Conclusions and recommendations.

1. Pilot error is the primary cause of the accident.

2. The pilot was disoriented and failed to admit it or be aware of it until too late.

3. He failed to prepare himself for his flight.

4. While in flight prior to becoming aware or admitting he was lost he failed to follow proper navigational technique.

5. The pilot did not use proper lost plane procedure.

6. The proper requirements for wearing of survival gear were not followed.

7. The aircraft is a total loss by reason of submergence in salt water in depth beyond recovery.

ORIGINAL

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That all pilots preplan flights carefully and use all navigational and radio aids and facilities available to insure that the flight is developing as planned.

2. That all pilots be cautioned frequently to guard against over confidence leading to disregard of basic flight planning procedures.

3. That authorization for both VFR and IFR cross country flight be granted on the clearance form only after a complete flight plan-log has been presented to the clearance authority.

4. That the Aircraft safety program endeavor to place more emphasis on confessions of experienced pilots in order to generate less reticence by inexperienced pilots in admitting mistakes, and particularly in requesting aid when lost.

5. That consideration be given to a means by which more information may be disseminated internationally to mariners concerning the survival equipment used by U. S. airman. (In this case the flares and tracers were misinterpreted.)

6. A separate page for the Key West area be added to the VaFac Chart in place of the insert on page 137, such to include Miami and Fort Meyers or the area to the north as far as room will allow.

ORIGINAL

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)



ENCLOSURE (3)
WARNING AREA
WARNING AREA
WARNING AREA
WARNING
GRAND BAHAMA ISLAND
GREAT ABACO ISLAND
DITCH
PICKED UP BY SHIP
ANDROS
ISLAND
MN
NN
NM
MM
ML
NL
MK
NK
LN
LM
LK
KN
KM
KL
KK
JN
JM
JL
JK

MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS AND GROUND ACCIDENTS

OPNAV FORM 3750/4 (REV. 3-54)
CONSOLIDATED OPNAV FORM 3750-2(1)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-4

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. This report shall be filed in the event of an aircraft accident/incident which involves one or more of the following:
   Death — Ditching
   Injury — Water Crash
   Bailout or Ejection (Attempted or successful)
   Whenever physiological or psychological factors are involved
   Aircraft Ground Accidents resulting in serious injury
2. Completion of the form shall be the responsibility of the flight surgeon.
3. For type accident and damage code refer to OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6A.
4. This form shall be prepared in quadruplicate. One copy shall be turned over to the Aircraft Accident Board for the Survival and Intelligence Officer in the case of combat incidents; and the original shall be airmailed (regular mail within 250 miles of Washington, D.C.) direct to Chief of Naval Operations (OP-13) Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. within 4 working days following the accident. The third copy shall be mailed direct to Safety Equipment Branch, BUAER, Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. The fourth copy shall be forwarded direct via air mail (regular mail within 250 miles of Norfolk, Va.) to the Naval Aviation Safety Activity, Naval Air Station, Norfolk 11, Virginia. Where more than one aircraft is involved, separate forms must be completed for each aircraft wherein one or more of the requirements in paragraph 1. above are applicable. (Additional copies may be prepared for use of squadron flight surgeons and other interested individuals.)

1. FROM (Ship or station address)	2. SERIAL NO.	3. INCIDENT OCCURRED (Geographic location)	4. TIME (local)	5. DATE
NAS, KEY WEST, FLORIDA	5-57	ABOCO ISLAND, BAHAMAS	1550	5-5-57

6. PLANE COVERED BY THIS REPORT	MODEL	BU NO.	NO. OCCUPANTS	UNIT OPERATING AIRCRAFT	TYPE ACCIDENT	TYPE
	S2F-1G	136555	TWO (2)	NFG DAHLGREN, VIRGINIA	B7	A
7. OTHER PLANE (If involved)						

8. NAME OF PILOT ON CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT (last, first, middle): (b) (6) [redacted]

UNIT PILOT ATTACHED TO: NFG DAHLGREN, VA.

MINIMUM CHECK LIST				
	X FORM COMPLETED	X SUBMIT NARRATIVES	PHOTOS AS REQUIRED	X RECOMMENDATIONS	X FLIGHT SHEET

10. REPORT FILED BY: (b) (6) [redacted] USN — R — (b) (6) [redacted] — DATE 5-8-57

R. O. GREENE CAPTAIN — MC — R. O. Greene — DATE 5-8-57

11. X AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT ☐ AIRCRAFT INCIDENT ☐ COMBAT INCIDENT ☐ GROUND ACCIDENT

13. ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION

INCLUDE HERE A PARAGRAPH GIVING A BRIEF BUT FACTUAL ACCOUNT DESCRIBING THE ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. INCLUDE SUCH CAUSES AS KNOWN. ESTIMATES OF "G" FORCES, ANGLES OF IMPACT, SPEED ON IMPACT, ATTITUDE ON IMPACT, ETC. ATTACH PHOTOGRAPHS WHEN PERTINENT.

Flying east at 3000ft. in vicinity of Aboco, Bahamas, fuel starvation occurred and a controlled power-off, full flap ditching was performed. Touch down was into about 5 knots of wind in a mild sea state, at 100 knots. Stopping distance 50 to 100 feet. Impact was moderate, comparing to that of a arrested landing. Seat belts and shoulder straps were tight, no helmets were worn. Overhead hatches were closed at impact. The pilot and crewman left through overhead hatches wearing life vests. The parachutes and seat packs were then pulled out and rafts inflated without difficulty. Rescued 12 hours later by tanker.

14. PILOT FACTORS (Check pertinent pilot factors listed below)

	PILOT	CO-PILOT		PILOT	CO-PILOT
IN CONTROL AT TIME OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT	X	NONE	HYPOXIA SUSPECTED	NO	NONE
AMOUNT OF FLIGHT TIME IN LAST 24 HOURS	3hrs		CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING SUSPECTED	NO	
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS IN LAST 24 HOURS	1		FAULTY VISION	NO	
NUMBER HOURS DUTY IN LAST 24 HOURS	3		AEROEMBOLISM	NO	
HOURS SINCE LAST FULL MEAL	3		BLACKOUT, GREYOUT, REDOUT	NO	
TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	3hrs		VERTIGO	NO	
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	EST. 2900 hr		NIGHT BLINDNESS	NO	
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME IN MODEL	EST. 150 hr		FATIGUE	NO	
NUMBER PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS	1		DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES	NO	
DATE OF LAST ACCIDENT	1947		UNFAMILIARITY IN TYPE AIRCRAFT	NO	
NUMBER DAYS GROUNDED IN LAST MONTH	0		ANXIETY REACTION	NO	
DATE LAST LOX PRESSURE INDOCTRINATION	5-17-56		LAST CEN (date and score) 12-56	+ 16	
AMOUNT SLEEP IN LAST 24 HOURS	8hrs		OTHER PERTINENT FACTORS IN ACCIDENT (describe below)		

15. COMMENTS ON ITEMS CHECKED UNDER ITEM 14 WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. WHERE APPLICABLE, COMMENT BELOW ON ANY OF THE ABOVE FACTORS AFFECTING OTHER MEMBERS OR PASSENGERS.

Pilot apparently began preparation for ditching when fuel warning light came on. According to statements, the ditching was accomplished in an orderly, efficient manner.

I do not feel that there was any pre-existing physical or emotional factor of importance.

SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ENCLOSURE (4)

NAVAL 3750-6 (REV. 2-54)

SUMMARIES OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT, INJURIES AND CAUSE

DIRECTIONS

1. Use separate form for each person.
2. Under Injury Class, use following key:

Class "A" Fatal injury is considered for reporting procedure as one that results in death prior to submission of the Aircraft Accident Report.
Class "B" Critical injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury which threatens to result in death either from injuries sustained in the accident or from complications thereof; Critical injuries resulting in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addressees.
Class "C" Serious injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury less than critical but definitely requiring five or more days hospitalization involving medical treatment but from which the individual will be expected to recover. Unexpected critical conditions or complications arising from injuries listed in this category which result in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addressees.
Class "D" Minor injury is considered for reporting procedure as any injury less than serious.
Class "E" No injury.
Class "F" Unknown injury - loss and presumed drowned.
Class "G" Unknown injury - missing.

3. Under disposition, use following key:
"G" - Uninjured
"H" - grounded
"I" - treated and returned to duty
"J" - hospitalized.
"K" - remains recovered
"L" - remains not recovered

1. NAME	2. FILE NO	3. RANK/RATE	4. AGE	5. WEIGHT	6. HEIGHT
(b) (6) [redacted]	(b) (6) [redacted]	LT JG	36	175	5'9"

7. DUTY ABOARD PLANE, ON DECK, GROUND: PILOT

8. POSITION OCCUPIED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: PORT SEAT — D — U

11. SAFETY EQUIPMENT	MODEL/TYPE	AVAILABLE	USED	NOT USED	DAMAGED	LOST
SHOULDER HARNESS	R-37-[illegible]-302-302	X	X			
LAP BELT	R-37-[illegible]278325	X	X			
INERTIA REEL		X	X			
"G" SUIT				X		
HELMET				X		
OXYGEN MASK				X		
GOGGLES				X		
SHOES (type)	LOW CUT	X	X			
FLIGHT SUIT, OTHER THAN "G" (type)	SUMMER	X	X			
EXPOSURE SUIT (type)				X		
OTHER (specify)	GLOVES B-3A	X	X			

WAS OXYGEN BEING USED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT				X
PREOXYGENATION				X
TESTS OXYGEN SUPPLY				
AT TIME OF ACCIDENT				
WAS OXYGEN EQUIPMENT PRE-FLIGHTED BY PILOT				
IF SHOULDER HARNESS USED	X		X	
FROZEN FORWARD		X		
AGAINST HARNESS				
IN SAFETY INSERT IMPACT	X		X	

10. COMMENT ON EFFECTIVENESS (Entries of "No," "None," "as designed," etc., will not be accepted. If equipment failed describe failure and method to repair. Use additional sheet if necessary.) Safety equipment prevented injury from impact of ditching

(b) (6) [redacted]

OPNAV FORM-3750-8 (REV. 3-54)

SUMMARIES OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT, INJURIES AND CAUSE

DIRECTIONS

1. Use separate form for each person.
2. Under Injury Class, use following key:

Class "A" Fatal injury, is considered for reporting procedure as one that results in death prior to submission of the Aircraft Accident Report.
Class "B" Critical injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury which threatens to result in death either from injuries sustained in the accident or from complications thereof. Critical injuries resulting in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addressees.
Class "C" Serious injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury less than critical but definitely requiring five or more days hospitalization involving medical treatment but from which the individual will be expected to recover. Unexpected critical conditions or complications arising

listed in this category which result in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addressees.
Class "D" Minor injury is considered for reporting procedure as any injury less than serious.
Class "E" No injury
Class "F" Unknown injury - lost and presumed dismissed
Class "G" Unknown injury - missing
Injury disposition, use following key:
"C" - Outjactured
"G" - grounded
"W" - treated and returned to duty
"H" - hospitalized
"R" - remains recovered
"I" - remains not recovered

1. NAME	2. FILE NO.	3. RANK/RATE	4. AGE	5. WEIGHT	6. HEIGHT
(b) (6) [redacted]	(b) (6) [redacted]	AD3	27	170	6'

7. [illegible] 8. POSITION OCCUPIED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT

Plane Captain - Observer Co-Pilot Seat D W

11. SAFETY EQUIPMENT	MODEL/TYPE	AVAILABLE	USED	NOT USED	DAMAGED	LOST
SHOULDER HARNESS	R-37-MAF-502-302	X	X			
LAP BELT	R-37-S278325	X	X			
INERTIA REEL		X	X			
"G" SUIT				X		
HELMET				X		
OXYGEN MASK				X		
GOGGLES				X		
SHOES (type)	Street	X	X			
FLIGHT SUIT, OTHER THAN "G" (type)	Sunger	X	X			
EXPOSURE SUIT (type)				X		
OTHER (specify)				X		

	D	W
WAS OXYGEN BEING USED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT?		X
PREOXYGENATION		
IF YES, OXYGEN SUPPLY PRESSURE PRE-FLIGHTED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT?		
WAS OXYGEN EQUIPMENT PRE-FLIGHTED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT?		
IF SHOULDER HARNESS USED	X	X
PRESSED FORWARD AGAINST HARNESS	X	

(b) (6) [redacted]

FORM 3750-8 (REV. 2-54)

UNIT: NPG DAHLGREN, VA.
DATE ACCIDENT: 5-5-57
MODEL: S2F-1G
NO. 136-555

DITCHING AND WATER CRASH REPORT

[X] 1. CONTROLLED DITCHING [ ] 2. WATER CRASH

3. WEATHER: SEA [X] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] ROUGH | WIND VELOCITY (Knots) APPROX. 5 | Air temp. °F 80 | Water temp. °F 70-80 (APPROX.)

4. PROCEDURES

CANOPY: [ ] JETTISONED [ ] OPEN [X] CLOSED OVERHEAD HATCHES

POWER: [ ] ON [X] OFF
WHEELS: [X] UP [ ] DOWN
FLAPS: [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL [X] FULL

DITCHED: [X] INTO WIND [ ] DOWN WIND [ ] CROSS WIND

5. IMPACT (Estimated)

ATTITUDE	ANGLE	SPEED (Knots Estimated)	STOPPING DISTANCE (Ft.)	NO. OF IMPACTS	[illegible]
LEVEL FLIGHT	3 pt.	100	50-100	2	50

6. EXIT

NAME	BILLET	UNDERWATER	PLACE OF EXIT	DIFFICULTY
(b) (6) [redacted] TJG	PILOT		OVERHEAD HATCH	[illegible]
AD3	CREWMAN		OVERHEAD HATCH	[illegible]

After impact pilot opened port overhead hatch, climbed through, wearing Mae West only, then holding parachute strap. Then he pulled out parachute, life raft and survival kit. Tossed these in water, jumped in, and inflated raft.

After impact the crewman also opened starboard overhead hatch and climbed through holding loose parachute strap. Once clear, he pulled parachute and seat pack clear of hatch. Life raft extracted and opened in water without difficulty.

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7. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

	SHOES TYPE	SHOES DAMAGED	GLOVES TYPE	GLOVES DAMAGED	LIFE VEST TYPE	LIFE VEST DAMAGED	EXPOSURE SUIT TYPE	EXPOSURE SUIT DAMAGED	RAFT TYPE	RAFT DAMAGED	USED TO ATTRACT ATTENTION: DYE	FLARES	FLASHLIGHT	MIRROR	GUN	RADIO
A	Street	NO	B-3A	NO	MK2	NO	NO		PK-2	NO		X			X	
B	Street	NO	B-3A	NO	MK2	NO	NO		PK-2	NO		X	X			
C																
D																

8. LIST CAUSE OF DAMAGE, IF ANY, TO SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT (include photo of damage) (see additional sheet, if necessary) No damage to gear aside from soaking, except liferafts which were left aboard rescue ship.

9. LIST ANY DIFFICULTIES OR FAILURES IN USE OF SURVIVAL GEAR (see additional sheet, if necessary)

See Enclosure (4)

10. TIME IN RAFT: Approx. 12 hours | TIME IN WATER: None | METHOD OF RESCUE: Ships long boat

11. LIST EQUIPMENT DROPPED TO SURVIVORS; STATE IF USED EFFECTIVELY (use additional sheet, if necessary)

None

12. LIST ALL ITEMS OF SURVIVAL KIT WHICH WERE USED - EFFECTIVENESS (List those needed items which failed or were lost - Recommendations) (Use additional sheet, if necessary)

See Enclosure (4)

13. IMPROVE SURVIVORS NARRATIVES: See Enclosures (1) & (2)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
KEY WEST, FLORIDA

ENCLOSURE (3)

RECOMMENDATIONS OF INVESTIGATING FLIGHT SURGEON: SZP-1G ACCIDENT

After interviewing the survivors it is felt that the ditching and subsequent escape were performed in an orderly and capable manner. Their use of the life rafts and survival gear showed good indoctrination and clear thinking in general.

I feel that both men were lucky to have escaped head injury, since neither wore his helmet, and the force at impact was sufficient to throw the pilot's head set against the windshield. Leaving their parachute harness open certainly facilitated their escape through the overhead hatches, and no difficulty was encountered getting the survival gear out of the aircraft.

During their 12 hour period in the life rafts, although constant bailing was necessary during a squall, the rafts performed well. The value of the shark chaser seems equivocal. The pilots inability to assemble his radar reflector is understandable, considering the darkness and rough seas during the night. It is also worth mention that the pilot used his 38 caliber pistol with [illegible] in signaling the rescuing ship. [illegible] (b) (6) [redacted] ary effectively

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ENCLOSURE (4)

MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS AND GROUND ACCIDENTS

(b) (6)

[redacted]

Page (4)
Item 9
A. Pilots flash light failed when used at time of rescue. Light worked well the next day when re-examined.

B. Straps connecting the two life rafts were broken during squall. The rafts were tied about six inches apart. When the rafts were again tied about two feet apart, the straps remained intact.

C. Pilot was unable to assemble radar reflector. Last check-out was five years ago.

Page (4)
Item 12
NIGHT FLARES: were effective in signaling ship one mile away in moderate sea with no moon-light.
DAY FLARES: Not effective in signaling ship two miles away in rain squall. Pilot states that flare "smoked well".
HAND LIGHT: Crewmans light used to send SOS signals to rescueing ship. Pilots hand light failed. (later ashore, it worked properly).
RADAR ANTENNA: Could not be assembled in raft. Pilot had previously assembled one in the classroom about five years ago.
SHARK CHASER: Was effective in that sharks would not swim through the dye, although they surrounded the dye and investigated it. Sharks remained with the raft through the entire 12 hrs. Rations and drinking water were not used before rescue.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
A. Both survivors felt they would have been greatly aided by short paddles. Paddles were improvised from aluminum pans in the seat packs, but were of little use.
B. Extra flash light batteries would have enabled pilot to use his hand light.
C. The crewman threw his shark chaser in water without opening packet. This might be prevented by instructions written on side of packet.
D. Both survivors felt that the riding qualities of raft in heavy weather was excellent, but would have liked a little more room.
E. The pilot used a 38 caliber pistol with tracer bullets which he felt was more effective than the flares in signaling ship.

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ORIGINAL

WEA PBI - EYW ON
5 MAY AFTERNOON

1. SURFACE HOURLY AIRWAYS OBS (SA)

05/1228E

PBI 35 ⊕/⊕15 118/85/66 ↑ ↑ 8/987

MIA M39 ⊕/⊕10 122/82/75 ↑8/988/
RB00E40 PIREPS TOPS OVT MIA 1P0 MSL
VOR RADIALS 298 AND 226 DEGS UNUSABLE
ACCT RUFNS

EYW 20 ⊕/⊕12 130/80/73 ↑ ↑ 12/990

05/1328E

PBI S3 E25 ⊕/⊕15 108/82/70 ↑ 12/984/
814 1207 66

MIA M21 ⊕/⊕ 7RW 122/82/74 ↑8/988/
RB49 TWRG CU AND RWT E MOVG E
VOR RADIALS 298 AND 226 DEGS UNUSABLE
ACCT RUFNS

EYW 20 ⊕/⊕12 128/80/73 ↑ ↑11/989/500 1107 70

05/1428E

PBI E25 ⊕/⊕15 105/85/71 ↑ 7/983/ PIREPS
(AND TWRG)
25 40 N PBI 1410E AT ↑ ⊕↑ 574 ⊕0
40 MSL CONVE

MIA M31 ⊕/⊕10 115/83/73 ↑ ↑12/986/TWRG
CU NE VOR RADIALS 298 AND 226 DEGS

ENCLOSURE (5)

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ORIGINAL

UNUSABLE ACCT RUFNS RE 05

EYW 20 ⊕/⊕ 12 126/81/73 ↑ 11/989

05/1528E

PBI S4 10 ⊕ 20 ⊕ E 30 ⊕/⊕ 15 098/80/67 ↑ 16/981/

LTGIC WNW CB ALL QUADS

MIA M35 ⊕/⊕ 10 108/84/76 ↑ 12/984/CB DSNT

E VOR RADIALS 298 AND 226 DEGS

UNUSABLE ACCT RUFNS

EYW 20 ⊕/⊕ 12 120/81/73 ↑ 11/987/TWRG CB

DSNT S

05/1628E

PBI S7 6 ⊕ 12 ⊕ E 30 ⊕ 100 ⊕ 10 TRW 105/74/66

↓ 15/983/ TB47 T MUD E T W PRTMP

4/1535E/38/ 502 1978

MIA M32 ⊕/⊕ 10 108/83/74 → 13/984/614

1207 VOR RADIALS 298 AND 226

EYW 20 ⊕/⊕ 12 120/80/74 ↑ 11/987

MIAMI WEA BUR ISSUED SPECIAL BULLETIN AT [illegible]

2MM SPL [illegible] RADAR V OF MIA LN SLD STG

40/125 360/20 WIDTH UNK MOVG SE 18 KTS LN [illegible]

WK 360/20 275/50 WIDTH UNK BRKN WK TO INTENSE

170/150 100 DIAM

ORIGINAL

FORT MYERS ISSUED SPECIAL BULLETIN AT 05/1650E
FMY. AT 05/1650E RDO STN WNOR NAPLES ADZ
SUR TSTM STRUCK AREA RDO TWR AND SEVERAL
TWRS SCOWN [illegible] AND NEAR TIDAL WAVE STRUCK
AREA TIME UNK

UNOFFICIAL CONVERSATION BY [illegible] WEB BUR PERSON
AND RDO STN [illegible] NAPLES [illegible] INDICATED
1 TIME NOT [illegible] KNOWN
2 STORM CAME FROM WEST TO EAST
3 VERY DARK, HEAVY CLOUDS
4 LASTED ABOUT 10 MIN AT RDO STN
5 PERSON [illegible] WIND [illegible] 70 [illegible] HIGHER [illegible]
6 [illegible] LIGHTNING [illegible]

[illegible] AVERAGE [illegible] AREA

	05/1650E (1 [illegible])	05/[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	260/40	[illegible]
500 MB (1000 FT)	240/50 60	[illegible]
[illegible] (3000 FT)	[illegible]/60	

ORIGINAL



(SIGNATURE OF PILOT)

EXISTING	DESTINATION EYW 20 ⊕/⊕ 12 ↓K13	TIME OF OBS 1030C	FORECAST	DESTINATION (ETA) 20 ⊕ 250 ⊕ 12 ↓K15
	ALTERNATE	TIME OF OBS		ALTERNATE (ETE)

HOURS FORECAST	MIN CSG 20 AT [illegible]	MAX CLD TOPS 300 FT MSL	THUNDERSTORMS IC SEVERE	TURBC T	HAIL T
	MIN VIS FLT LVL 7 RW	DUST OR HAZE	SMOKE —	RAIN RW	FOG
	MIN FILL LVL 110 FT MSL	ICING —	FRZ PCPN —	SNOW —	DRIFTING VOL AFTER
	WINDS 10 270 15			SIGNATURE WY	

FLIGHT CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION

SUBMITTED TO	TIME	BY	SIGNATURE OF CLEARING AUTHORITY
INSTRUCTIONS AND APPROVAL TRANS. TO TOWER OR PILOT BY		ACTUAL T. O. TIME	
STATION ARRIVED AT	TIME	NAME	GRADE OR POSITION

DD FORM 1 MAY 54 175 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED.

ORIGINAL