8 220
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IBM

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH
PART VII, OPNAVINST 3750.6B

Aer-MA-612/95

31 JAN 1957

SEVENTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-211 AAR serial 9-56 concerning FJ-3M, BuNo 139241, accident occurring 22 Aug 1956, pilot EVERTS

From: Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

2. With reference to the first part of recommendation 5. of the basic report, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics considers that ample margin of safety is provided for in catapult operations of the FJ-3 type aircraft under normal launching conditions.

3. With reference to the first part of recommendation 6. of the basic report, the stall characteristics on cambered leading edge winged FJ-3 aircraft are being coordinated with North American Aviation and will be issued as a revision to the Flight Handbook.

F. W. Snyder

F. W. SNYDER
By direction

Copy to:
COMAIRPAC
COMFAIRHAWAII
COMCARDIV-7
CO, USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31)
COMCVG-21
CO, VF-211

COMMANDER AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, NORTH ISLAND
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO
FF4-1 A25
SERIAL NO.
80/ 19206

20 NOV 1956

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PART VII OPNAVINST 3750.6B

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-211 AAR ser 9-56 concerning FJ-3M BUNO 139241 accident occurring 22 August 1956, pilot EVERTS

From: Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (Aer-512)
(2) Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VF-211 AAR ser 9-56

Ref: (a) OPNAV INST 3750.6B

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by the first endorsement.

2. With regard to recommendation 5. of the Board, Catapult Launching Bulletin 6-27 has been revised, 5 September 1956, to require slightly higher wind over the deck (1 knot) and extends weight range to 24,000 pounds.

3. The attention of the second through fifth endorsers is invited to paragraph F.7., Part VIII of reference (a) which states a requirement for direct forwarding of AAR endorsements.

4. The following error in AAR form is noted:

a. IV - date submitted not included.

J. Sinkankas
J. SINKANKAS
By direction

Copy to:
NAVAVSAFCEN (2)(Airmail)
CINCPACFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMFAIRHAWAII
COMCARDIV-7
CO, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
CVG-21
CO, VF-211

A25

FF7-5/A25

Serial: 30/ 1557
19 OCT 1956

Special Handling Required in Accordance with Part VII OPNAVINST 3750.6B

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-211 AAR ser 9-56 concerning FJ-3M, 139241, accident occurring 22 August 1956, pilot EVERTS

From: Commander Fleet Air Hawaii
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commander Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
(2) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (Aer 512)
(3) Director, Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by the first endorsement.

G. E. CHASE
Chief of Staff
ACTING

Copy to:
COMCARDIV-7
CO, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
COMCARAIRGRU-21
CO, VF-211
DIRNAVAVSAFCEN
CINCPACFLT

[redacted] 25220

3

FB2-7:31:bi
A25
Ser: 310
10 OCT 1956

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-211 AAR serial 9-56 concerning FJ-3M, 139241 accident occurring 22 August 1956

From: Commander Carrier Division SEVEN
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air Hawaii
(2) Commander Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
(3) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (Aer-512)
(4) Director, Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by the first endorsement.

2. Special handling required in accordance with Part VII, OPNAV INST. 3750.6B

L. K. RICE

Copy to:
CO, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31)
VF-211
CAG-21
CINCPACFLT

4

CVA-31/A25
31/MCF:jhp
Ser: 3587
1 OCT 1956

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VF-211 AAR serial 9-56 concerning FJ-3M, 139241 accident occurring 22 AUG 1956

From: Commanding Officer, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division SEVEN
(2) Commander Fleet Air Hawaii
(3) Commander Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
(4) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (Aer-512)
(5) Director, Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by the first endorsement.

2. Although the catapult officer erred in the steam pressure settings, it is known that the aircraft had sufficient end speed to effect a satisfactory launch under existing wind conditions. Using a maximum aircraft weight of 19,970 lbs. and a steam pressure of 120 lbs., the launching chart shows an end speed of 84.5 knots. This particular catapult which has averaged 9 knots above the chart speeds, would have given the aircraft an end speed of 93.5 knots, or 2.5 knots less than was actually recorded by the Chronograph indicator and 5 knots less than recorded by the Daystrom indicator. Adding a wind of 32 knots, the minimum observed, would have produced an airspeed of 125.5 knots, and allowed a margin of 8.5 knots above the established stall speed of 117 knots for the FJ-3M in the above launching configuration. It should be noted that the above conditions are established utilizing a maximum figure for gross weight and minimum or least desirable figure for end speed, wind, and aircraft speed.

3. The practice of relieving the catapult officer during a launch has been prohibited.

4. Special handling required in accordance with Part VII, OPNAV INST. 3750.6B.

L. P. CARVER

Copy to:
VF-211
CAG-21
CINCPACFLT

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
FIGHTER SQUADRON TWO HUNDRED ELEVEN
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

28 September 1956

From: Senior Member, Aircraft Accident Investigation Board
To: Distribution List

Subj: Correction of AAR

Ref: (a) VF-211 AAR 9-56

1. Change line thirty-five (35), page five (5) to read "as the minimum air speed" vice end speed.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Distribution List:
CINCPACFLT
Aviation Safety Center
BUAER (Aer-512)
BAR Columbus
COMFAIRHAWAII
COMAIRPAC
NAMC, Phila, Pa.
Naval Liaison Officer
Directorate of Flight Safety Research
Norton AFB, San Bernandino, Calif.
CO, USS DON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)

FF12/CAG-21
A25
Ser: 133
SEP 14 1956

Special handling required in accordance
with Part VII, OPNAV INST. 3750.6B

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VF-211 AAR serial 9-56 concerning FJ-3M, 139241, accident occurring 22 August 1956

From: Commander Carrier Air Group TWENTY ONE
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
(2) Commander Carrier Division SEVEN
(3) Commander Fleet Air, Hawaii
(4) Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(5) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (Aer-512)
(6) Director, Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Readdressed and forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by the comments of the First Endorsement relative to the assignment of the primary accident factor.

E. M. Beauchamp
E. M. BEAUCHAMP

Copy to:
VF-211
CINCPACFLT

7

ORIGINAL

Special handling required in accordance
with Part VII, OPNAV INST. 3750.6B

FF12/VF211
A25
Ser: 620
8 September 1956

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VF-211 AAR serial 9-56 concerning FJ-3M, 139241, accident occurring 22 Aug 1956, pilot EVERTS

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron TWO HUNDRED ELEVEN
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-57)
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Air Group TWENTY-ONE
(2) Commanding Officer, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
(3) Commander Carrier Division SEVEN
(4) Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(5) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (Aer-512)
(6) Director, Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

2. It is noted in Section D, "Cause Factors," that the accident board listed carrier facilities as the primary accident factor. Pilot error is listed as a secondary factor. An error was made in not setting the proper catapult pressure for the gross weight of the aircraft. However, proper pilot technique would have enabled the pilot to fly off- even at the lower end speed. It is felt that the pilot did not recognize the soft catapult shot and inadvertently stalled the aircraft. The error of catapult personnel was a contributing factor, but the primary cause of the accident is felt to be pilot error.

3. Comments- Conclusions.

1,a: The error of the catapult launching officer is substantiated by the statements of the personnel concerned. The gross weight of the lost aircraft was confirmed, but the communication link failed.

1,b: Comments of conclusion 1,b are concurred with. This pilot was aware of the technique of raising a stalled swept wing by using opposite rudder. However, it is felt that the pilot did not recognize the soft catapult shot, and being relatively inexperienced, did not react properly to the emergency situation.

2. The introduction of a new aircraft to the fleet nearly always introduces problems as listed in this conclusion. Every effort should be made by the cognizant Bureaus to keep operational data abreast of the latest aircraft configuration. An official request had been made by this squadron, prior to deployment, for catapult launching data not included in Bulletin 6-27 of May 1956. No information was received.

4. Comments - Recommendations.

1: A proper system is in use by the catapult officer to determine aircraft catapult launching gross weights. However, the communication link failed in this instance, due to human error.

2: Pilots of this squadron have been instructed to indicate aircraft fuel weight to the catapult launching officer by proper hand signals.

3: Pilots of this squadron have been briefed and have demonstrated to themselves, in flight, the technique of raising a stalled swept wing with opposite rudder.

4: The comments of recommendation four concurred with. Catapult launching intervals nullify the requirement for turning immediately off the bow to clear the deck of jet wash.

5: Recommendation five is concurred with.

6: Recommendation six is concurred with.

5. This pilot had two prior accidents of a minor nature in the training command. LTJG EVERTS was an excellent pilot for his state of training. He was an aeronautical engineering graduate and had always demonstrated an outstanding motivation toward carrier aviation.

Paul E. Pugh

PAUL E. PUGH

Copy to:
COMFAIRJAPAN
COMFAIRHAWAII
COMAIRPAC
CINCPACFLT
BUAER (Aer-512)
BAR, Columbus
NAMC, Phila, Pa.
Naval Liaison Off, Norton AFB
NAVAVSAFECEN (2 via air mail)

9

ORIGINAL

Special handling required in accordance with Part VII, OPNAV INST 3750.6B

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (REV. 11-55)
PAGE 1

See Instructions for completion prior to filling out

ORIGINAL

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART I - GENERAL

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD CONVENED BY: Fighter Squadron TWO HUNDRED ELEVEN
2. DATE OF ACCIDENT: 22 Aug 1956 — TIME: 1818 W
3. AAR SERIAL NUMBER: 9-56
4. TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Op-57)
5. ENCLOSURES: (1) Cat Off; (2) Cat Off; (3) Plane Captain; (4) Line P.O.; (5) Eng. Off; (6) Witness; (7) Witness; (8) Witness; (9) Photo (10) MED OFFICERS REPORT
6. VIA: (1) CO, VF-211; (2) COMCARAIRGRU-21; (3) CO, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31); (4) COMCARDIV-7; (5) COMAIRPAC; (6) CHIEF BUAER (Aer 512); (LAST) DIRECTOR, U.S. NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
7. REPORTING CUSTODIAN (if different than item number 1): - - - - - - - - -
8. ACTIVITY OPERATING AIRCRAFT (if different than item 7): - - - - - - - - - - - -
9. KIND OF FLIGHT: 1A4
10. TIME OF DAY: [ ] DAWN [X] DAY [ ] DUSK [ ] NIGHT
11. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT: 200 ft. Stb Bow 21°17.2N 157° 29.4 W
12. ELEVATION ABOVE SEA LEVEL: 0 ft.
13. PLACE OF LAST TAKE-OFF: U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
14. CLEARED FROM USS BHR TO USS BHR
15. TYPE CLEARANCE: [ ] IFR [X] VFR [X] LOCAL [ ] OPERATIONAL [ ] AIRWAYS [ ] DIRECT [ ] OTHER (Specify)
16. TIME IN FLIGHT: 0-01
17. TYPE ACCIDENT: D-1 Spin take off
18. PHASE OF FLIGHT: Code 3

AIRCRAFT

19. MODEL: FJ-3M
20. SERIAL NUMBER: 139241
21. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT: [X] A. [ ] B. [ ] C. [ ] D.
22. DOLLAR COST: 384,000
23. AIRSPEED (Kts): 128
24. A/C WEIGHT: 19970
25. LIST MODEL, SER. NBR., REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (complete separate OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C): -

SECTION B - PERSONNEL INFORMATION

PILOT AND CO-PILOT

1. PERSONNEL	2. NAME (last, first and middle initial)	3. RANK/RATE	4. FILE/SERV. NO.	5. DESIGNATOR	6. DATE DESIGNATED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	AGE
PILOT (Person at controls at time of accident)	EVERTS, Ronald J.	LTJG	(b) (6)	1315	8 Jun 1955	(b) (6)	24
CO-PILOT							

8. PERSONNEL	9. OPERATIONAL FLIGHT TRAINER AVAILABLE?	USED?	10. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	11. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD
PILOT	[ ] YES [X] NO	[ ] YES [X] NO	VF-211	[X] STANDARD [ ] SPECIAL
CO-PILOT	[ ] YES [ ] NO	[ ] YES [ ] NO		[ ] STANDARD [ ] SPECIAL

12. PILOT, CO-PILOT, STUDENT EXPERIENCE

TOTAL PILOT HOURS

ITEM	PILOT	CO-PILOT	STUDENT
ALL MODELS	665.4	1.6	362.4
ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS	279.0	.6	0
ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS	55.4	0	0
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	277.1	0	0
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL, LAST 12 MONTHS	272.1	0	0
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL, LAST 3 MONTHS	54.5	0	0

ITEM	PILOT	CO-PILOT	STUDENT
CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	33/0	0	6/0
FCLP LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	107/20	0	126/0
INSTRUMENT HOURS, LAST 3 MONTHS	1.3	0	0
NIGHT HOURS, LAST 3 MONTHS	4.0	0	0
(jet accidents only) TOTAL JET PILOT HOURS	429.0	0	1
DATE LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	8-14-56	0	0
DURATION LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	0.7	0	0

13. ALL PERSONNEL

NAME (last, first and middle initial)	RANK/RATE	FILE/SERVICE NO.	ORG. TO WHICH ATTACHED	INJURY CODE	BILLET	POSITION
1. EVERTS, Ronald J.	LTJG	(b) (6)	VF-211	A	Pilot	Cockpit
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						

(if additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

SECTION C - WEATHER

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE OUTSIDE AIR	RUNWAY	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTINGS
3000 Brkn	12	000°/32	76.5°F		68°F	29.86

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, icing levels, state of sea, etc., if pertinent to accident)
Sea state slight 3 ft. waves at 2 Sec. Interval

SECTION D - CAUSE FACTORS (P = Primary factor; S = Secondary factor)

ITEM	P	S	ITEM	P	S	ITEM	P	S
PILOT ERROR		X	LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER ERROR			MATERIAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION		
CREW ERROR			OTHER PERSONNEL ERROR, Specify.....			MATERIAL INADEQUACY		
SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL ERROR			ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR			ROLLING AND PITCHING DECK/ROUGH SEAS		
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ERROR			AIRPORT OR CARRIER FACILITIES	X		UNDETERMINED		
SERVICING PERSONNEL ERROR			WEATHER			OTHER, Specify.....		

SECTION E - DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD DEPLOYED CARRIERS (Complete following Section on Pilot.)

1. DATE DEPLOYED	2. DAY - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	3. DAY - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS
16 Aug 1956	0	4.5/4
4. INSTRUMENT HRS. LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT	**5. NIGHT - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED**	**6. NIGHT - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS**
0	0	2.1/15

PART II - MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

SECTION A - AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE DATA

1. AIRCRAFT HISTORY

DATE OF MANUFACTURE	SERVICE TOUR	MONTHS IN THIS TOUR	TOTAL NO. OF OVERHAULS	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	TYPE CHECK LAST PERFORMED	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST CHECK	NO. OF DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
Accp. Date 15 Feb 56	1	5	0		212	3rd Int	13.8	14

2. ENGINE HISTORY

	ENGINE MODEL	SERIAL NO. OF ENGINE						
NO. 1								
NO. 2								
NO. 3								
NO. 4								

3. GENERAL

a. DID FIRE OCCUR: ☐ BEFORE ACCIDENT ☐ AFTER ACCIDENT ☒ DID NOT OCCUR

b. DID EXPLOSION OCCUR IN FLIGHT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

c. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ AMP FOR SERIAL

d. HAS DIR BEEN REQUESTED? ☐ YES ☒ NO

e. FAILED COMPONENTS INVOLVED

4. A/C MAINT. AND ENG. FACTORS

CHECK BELOW ITEMS PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT

a. ☐ AIRCRAFT DESIGN
b. ☐ AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT
c. ☐ MAINTENANCE
d. ☒ UNDETERMINED
e. ☐ TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
f. ☐ OTHER, Specify.....)
g. ☐ SURFACE FACILITIES
h. ☐ HUMAN ENGINEERING (e.g. cockpit configurations)

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5. MISCELLANEOUS DATA

a. ALTITUDE AT MALFUNCTION	b. AIR SPEED (kts)	c. OPERATING TEMPERATURE	d. WEIGHT OF AIRCRAFT	e. C.G. (% MAC)	f. KIND OF FUEL	g. FUEL PRESSURE
					JP-5	

h. EVIDENCE OF FUEL CONTAMINATION

i. CAUSE OF ENGINE FAILURE OR FLAMEOUT

j. FUEL CONTROL REGULATOR/CARBURETOR (List Stock and Ser. nos., give time since new or overhauled

k. EXTERNAL STORES ABOARD A/C

(If additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

PART II - MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA (Cont'd)

SECTION B - FACILITIES DATA

1. GENERAL (CHECK BASIC FACILITIES INVOLVED. DESCRIBE EFFECT ON ACCIDENT IN THE ANALYSIS SECTION)

a. [ ] CLEARANCE AUTHORITY	h. [ ] RUNWAY	o. [ ] EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR (Runway)
b. [ ] FLIGHT PLANNING INFORMATION SOURCE	i. [ ] WATER LANDING AREA	p. [ ] AIRCRAFT SERVICING, HANDLING AND DIRECTING (Field or Ship)
c. [ ] LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, etc)	j. [ ] APPROACH ZONE	q. [ ] CRASH AND RESCUE
d. [ ] TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER (Field or Ship)	k. [ ] END ZONE	r. [ ] SEARCH AND RESCUE
e. [ ] APPROACH AND ENROUTE AIDS TO NAVIGATION	l. [ ] SHOULDERS	s. [X] CATAPULT
f. [ ] RUNWAY WATCH	m. [ ] TAXIWAY	t. [ ] ARRESTING GEAR (Carrier)
g. [ ] LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER	n. [ ] PARKING AREA	u. [ ] BARRIER OR BARRICADE (Field or Ship)
v. [ ] OTHER (Specify)		v. [ ] FLIGHT DECK

2. SHIPS DATA

a. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: [X] CATAPULT [ ] ARRESTING GEAR

b. PRESSURE SETTINGS	c. WIND OVER DECK	d. RELATIVE HEADWIND	e. APPROACH SPEED (INDICATOR READING)
120	32 kts	0°	N/A

f. MARK NUMBER	g. MODEL NUMBER	h. LOCATION ON SHIP	i. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND CONFIGURATION USED
MK 11 Mod 1	C-11	Stbd Bow	NAF ACT P/N 314261-1 8'-11"

j. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

Catapult Launching Bulletin #6-27 7 May 56

k. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) a major aircraft accident involves arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Minor accidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable components need not be reported.

ENGAGED	DECK RUNOUT (FT.)	RAM TRAVEL (IN.)	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE: DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE: RATIO	CONSTANT RUN-OUT (WT. LBS.)	ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	COMMENTS (for cable failure specify number of landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER							
BARRIER							
BARRICADE							

PART	SECTION	ITEM	PART III REMARKS (continue on separate pages if necessary)
1	A	6	AAR VF-211 9-56 to be mailed direct 1 Naval Liaison Officer, Directorate of Flight Safety Research Norton AFB, San Bernardino, Calif. 1 CINCPACFLT 2 Aviation Safety Center 1 BUAER (Aer 512) 1 BAR Columbus 1 COMFAIRHAWAII 1 COMAIRPAC 1 NAMC, Phila, Pa. 1 COMFAIRJAPAN

12

ORIGINAL

PART IV - SIGNATURES (INDICATE DATE SUBMITTED TO C.O.)

(b) (6) [redacted]
UNIT BILLET

(b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6)
LT (MC) USN
(Flight Surgeon Member)

(b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6)
LT USN Operations Officer
(Member) (b) (6) [redacted]
UNIT BILLET

(b) (6) [redacted]
LTJG USNR
Ass't Avia Safety Officer
UNIT BILLET

The Account

Part V The Accident

Six FJ-3 aircraft were scheduled for a short landing refresher period in preparation for night landing qualifications. The schedule called for fuel in the internal tanks only.

LTJG EVERTS was scheduled to fly the number four (4) position. He was assigned FJ-3 139241, side no G-111. This aircraft had not previously flown on 22 August, and consequently had a full fuel load, including full external tanks, as was the case with G-113, also scheduled as the flight.

Due to spot position on the deck, G-111 was the fifth FJ-3 to be catapulted.

The launch proceded normally until G-111 reached the end of the catapult, stalled and crashed into the sea approximately 200 feet off the starboard bow.

Part VI Damage to Aircraft

The aircraft, FJ-3M 139241 was lost at sea. The aircraft struck the water in a nearly vertical bank, nose low. The aircraft was seen to break up and sink immediately.

Part VII The Investigation

Investigation reveals that the pilots were properly briefed, one hour prior to launch time, by CDR (b) (6) [redacted], CAG-21, who was the flight leader.

The flight was properly cleared through the ships air operations office.

All pilots were assigned aircraft prior to leaving the ready room and checked the aircraft yellow sheets, located there.

Pilots of G-111 and G-113 were informed by the ODO (squadron operations duty officer) of the fuel situation of their aircraft. The six pilots left the ready room to man planes twenty minutes prior to launch time. LTJG EVERTS made a visual check of the aircraft, also ascertaining that it was fully loaded.

In the mean time (b) (6) [redacted], AD1, the line petty officer informed the catapult officer (b) (6) [redacted] of the existing fuel loads. LT (b) [redacted] requested that (b) (6) [redacted] check again, which he did. The squadron executive officer, LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] observing the launch from the 07 deck level watched (b) (6) [redacted] open two fuel caps on each drop tank of G-111 to check the fuel. (b) (6) [redacted] again informed LT (b) (6) [redacted] that G-111 and G-113 had full internal and full drop tanks.

After LT (b) (6) [redacted] had launched the first FJ-3 and possibly the second one he was relieved by LT (b) (6) [redacted], the senior catapult officer. LT (b) [redacted] briefed LT (b) (6) [redacted] concerning the full fuel loads on G-111 and G-113. Because of the noise on the deck LT (b) (6) [redacted] asked LT (b) [redacted] to repeat the numbers

ORIGINAL

LT (b) (6) [redacted] continued the launch and checked, by use of hand signals, with each pilot for a fuel state. In each case he checked he got a full internal fuel weight. When G-111 came onto the catapult he did not check with LTJG EVERTS for a fuel state and launched him with the steam pressure required for a plane loaded only with internal fuel.

The aircraft was spotted dead center on the catapult. LTJG EVERTS was given the turn up signal, saluted the catapult officer and was launched.

Observers generally agree that at the bow G-111 nosed up (rotated ~~laterally~~ longitudinally) and then dropped the right wing immediately and abruptly. The aircraft continued to roll starboard reaching a roll past vertical and an altitude probably twenty five feet above the deck level. The ailerons were seen to react to the roll without effect (also indicated in the photograph) and the aircraft continued to turn starboard, showing a gradual recovery from the roll as it struck the water right wing tip and nose first.

The engine appeared to all observers to be functioning properly at full power, throughout the course of the catapult and even as the aircraft struck the water.

The aircraft broke up upon striking the water and sank immediately except for one drop tank and undistinguishable debris. Dye marker colored the sea, at the point of the crash. The pilot was not seen! The ship passed immediately port of the crash scene and it was visible to many observers.

An escort destroyer reached the crash scene in approximately 5 minutes and searched the area to no avail. The helicopter had just left its station less than five minutes prior to G-111 being launched, to search the scene of an F7U crash, off the port bow.

Logs maintained by the catapult crew indicate that at the time of the launch the wind was 32 Kts and G-111 had an end speed of 96 Kts, (98.5 Kts end speed indicated by the experimental Daystrom gear) for an airspeed of 128 Kts. An FJ-3 with wheels and flaps down and weighing 20,000 pounds, stalls at 117 Kts. Catapult launching data, indicates that for G-111 to have reached an end speed of 96 Kts, it could not have weighed more than 18,000 pounds when launched with only 120 pounds of steam pressure.

Catapult Launching Bulletin 6-27 dated 7 May 56 establishes 118 knots as the minimum ~~end~~ AIR speed for an FJ-3 with a gross weight of 20,000 pounds.

The flight handbook AN-01-60 JKC-1 dated 1 Oct 55 and revised 1 May 56 establishes 117 kts as stall speed, power on, for the same weight.

Part VIII The Analysis

The combination of a soft catapult shot, over-rotation, and incorrect pilot technique used to pick up a stalled swept wing appears to be the cause of this accident.

The catapult officer erred when he failed to substantiate the fuel load aboard G-111.

ORIGINAL

No doubt exists to the fact that G-111 was fully loaded with fuel, both internally and externally, at the moment of launch.

The fact that the catapult launching chart indicates an FJ-3M fully loaded requires 170 pounds of steam to reach an end speed of 102 knots, raises a question concerning the validity of the chronograph and Daystrom end speed indicators. With 32 knots of wind over the deck an FJ-3M weighing 20,000 pounds is generally launched with sufficient steam pressure to give it an end speed of 102 kts.

In accordance with the launching chart 120 pounds of steam would give an FJ-3M, grossing 20,000 pounds only 84.5 knots of end speed. This particular catapult, however, has averaged 9 knots greater end speed than the chart indicates. Assuming an end speed of 96 knots plus 32 knots of wind across the deck at 0 degrees deflection, the aircraft had 10 knots in excess of stall speed.

An abrupt rotation at the end of the catapult would dissipate some airspeed and increase the stall speed. Witnesses disagree slightly as to the degree of the rotation, but facts indicate that the aircraft did climb approximately 25 feet above the level of the flight deck.

During this climb, or perhaps even before the climb commenced, the starboard wind dropped to at least 60 degrees of bank and the aircraft turned to the right. As the nose began to drop and the aircraft commenced falling to the water, the starboard wing dropped farther, reaching a degree of bank slightly past the vertical. Before striking the water a recovery was in progress and at the moment of impact the angle of bank had been reduced to approximately 70 degrees.

During this entire period the ailerons were observed to be in a full left stick position. The board feels that the fully deflected starboard aileron, at the critical speed, caused more drag than lift and accentuated the stalled condition of the starboard wing. As the plane nosed down toward the water and gained airspeed the ailerons again became effective and commenced a recovery with too little altitude remaining.

A more positive recovery for a stalled starboard wing would have been the application of PORT rudder. This procedure increases the lift on the starboard wing by decreasing the sweep and works conversely on the port wing, thereby causing the wings to level with a minimum of drag.

However, in the immediacy of this situation it is a <u>normal reaction</u> for a pilot to correct with aileron, to lift a dropping wing.

There is no evidence to indicate any reason for the pilot to initiate rotation, at the end of the catapult except possibly to compensate for an impression that he was sinking, or infact, a sinking aircraft.

There is no question of engine failure or reduced power!

The crash was too severe for survival gear to be effective.

ORIGINAL

Part IX Conclusions and Recommendations.
As a result of the investigation it is concluded ~~that:~~

1. The primary and contributory causes of the accident were human error, in that:

a. The catapult officer failed to substantiate the correct fuel load of G-111 and subsequently requested too little steam pressure for the gross weight.

b. The pilot in over-rotating and attempting to pick up a stalled wing with aileron followed natural instinct and reacted in a manner which worsened his situation.

2. The catapult launching bulletin 6-27 dated 7 May 1956 allows no safety factor between minimum end speed and stall speed of an FJ-3M weighing 20,000 pounds.

The board recommends that:

1. The catapult officer utilize a fool proof system to establish aircraft gross weights when operating with varied configuarations in the same type aircraft.

2. Pilots always indicate by hand signal to the catapult officer, the weight of the fuel.

3. All pilots of swept wing aircraft demonstrate to themselves, at altitude, the advisability of utilizing rudder to pick up a stalled wing, in lieu of aileron.

4. In event of a soft catapult shot the pilot should beware of over-rotating the aircraft and should ease off altitude to gain airspeed and take advantage of "ground effect" close to the water.

5. The catapult launching bulletin 6-27 dated 7 May 1956 be revised to allow a wider margin of safety between stall speed and minimum end speed, also to include gross weight to 23,000 pounds.

6. The flight handbook AN-01-60 JKC-1 dated 1 Oct 55 and revised 1 May 56, be revised to more accurately describe the stall of a cambered leading edge winged FJ-3. Also that the same revision establish or advocate the proper pilot technique to be used under circumstances which confronted the subject pilot.

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

ENCL - 9

MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS AND GROUND ACCIDENTS

OPNAV FORM 3750-8 (REV. 2-54)
(Supersedes OPNAV Form-3750-7)

OPNAV REPORT-3750-

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. This report shall be filed in the event of an aircraft accident/incident which involves one or more of the following:

   Death — Ditching
   Injury, — Water Crash
   Bail-out or Ejection *(attempted or successful)*
   Wherever physiological or psychological factors are involved
   Aircraft Ground Accidents resulting in serious injury

2. Completion of the form shall be the responsibility of the flight surgeon
3. For type accident and damage code refer to OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6A.
4. This form shall be prepared in quadruplicate. One copy shall be turned over to the Aircraft Accident Board *(or the Survival and Intelligence Officer in the case of combat incidents)*, and the original shall be air mailed *(regular mail within 250 miles of Washington, D.C.)* direct to Chief of Naval Operations *(OP-57)* Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. within 4 working days following the accident. The third copy shall be mailed direct to Safety Equipment Branch, BUAER, Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. The fourth copy shall be forwarded direct via air mail *(regular mail within 250 miles of Norfolk, Va.)* to the U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Activity, Naval Air Station, Norfolk 11, Virginia. Where more than one aircraft is involved, separate forms must be completed for each aircraft wherein one or more of the requirements in paragraph 1, above are applicable. *(Additional copies may be prepared for use of squadron flight surgeons and other interested individuals)*

1. FROM *(Ship or station address)*	2. SERIAL NO.	3. ACCIDENT OCCURRED *(Geographic location)*	4. TIME *(Local)*	5. DATE
USS BON HOMME RICHARD CVA-31	F3-3	21 17.2N 157 29.4W	1818	8-22-56

6. PLANE COVERED BY THIS REPORT	MODEL	BU. NO.	NO. OCCUPANTS	UNIT OPERATING AIRCRAFT	TYPE ACCIDENT	DAMAGE
	FJ-3M		One	VF 211	Water crash	A

7. OTHER PLANE *(if involved)*	MODEL	BU. NO.	NO. OCCUPANTS	UNIT OPERATING AIRCRAFT	DAMAGE

8. NAME OF PILOT IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT *(Last, first, middle)*: EVERTS, Ronald Jack

UNIT PILOT ATTACHED TO: VF 211, CVG-21

9. FLIGHT SURGEONS CHECK LIST: [X] ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED [ ] SURVIVORS NARRATIVES [ ] PHOTOS AS NEEDED [ ] RECOMMENDATIONS [ ] COPIES FURNISHED

10. REPORT FILED BY: (b) (6) [redacted] LT., MC USN — SIGNATURE: (b) (6) [redacted] — DATE: 8-28-56

11. FORWARDED: (b) (6) [redacted] CDR., USN — USN USMC COMMANDING — (b) (6) [redacted] — DATE: 8-28-56

12. [X] AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT [ ] AIRCRAFT INCIDENT [ ] COMBAT INCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT

13. ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION

INCLUDE HERE A PARAGRAPH GIVING A BRIEF BUT FACTUAL ACCOUNT DESCRIBING THE ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. INCLUDE SUCH CAUSES AS KNOWN, ESTIMATES OF "G" FORCES, ANGLES OF IMPACT, SPEED ON IMPACT, ATTITUDE ON IMPACT, ETC. ATTACH PHOTOGRAPHS WHEN PERTINENT.

Refer to enclosed observers reports.

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14. PILOT FACTORS *(Check pertinent pilot factors listed below)*

	PILOT	CO-PILOT		PILOT	CO-PILOT
IN CONTROL AT TIME OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT	Yes		HYPOXIA SUSPECTED	No	
AMOUNT OF FLIGHT TIME IN LAST 24 HOURS	0-01		CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING SUSPECTED	No	
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS IN LAST 24 HOURS	One		FAULTY VISION	No	
NUMBER HOURS DUTY IN LAST 24 HOURS	16		AEROEMBOLISM	No	
HOURS SINCE LAST FULL MEAL	6		BLACKOUT, GREYOUT, REDOUT	No	
TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	0-01		VERTIGO	No	
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	665.4		NIGHT BLINDNESS	No	
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME IN MODEL	277.1		FATIGUE	No	
NUMBER PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS	2*		DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES	No	
DATE OF LAST ACCIDENT	31 May,55		UNFAMILIARITY IN TYPE AIRCRAFT	No	
NUMBER DAYS GROUNDED IN LAST MONTH	None		ANXIETY REACTION	No	
DATE LAST LOW PRESSURE INDOCTRINATION	Sept55		LAST CER *(date and score)*	416	
AMOUNT SLEEP IN LAST 24 HOURS	8		OTHER PERTINENT FACTORS IN ACCIDENT *(describe below)*		

15. COMMENTS ON ITEMS CHECKED UNDER ITEM 14 WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. WHERE APPLICABLE, COMMENT BELOW ON ANY OF THE ABOVE FACTORS AFFECTING CREW MEMBERS OR PASSENGERS

* Previous accidents in student training.

ORIGINAL

16. INCLUDE SURVIVORS NARRATIVES

ENCLOSURE 10 ORIGINAL AAR ONLY

OPNAV FORM-3750.8 (REV. 2-54)

SUMMARIES OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT, INJURIES AND CAUSE

DIRECTIONS

1. Use separate form for each person.
2. Under Injury Class, use following key:

Class "A" Fatal injury, is considered for reporting procedure as one that results in death prior to submission of the Aircraft Accident Report.
Class "B" Critical injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury which threatens to result in death either from injuries sustained in the accident or from complications thereof. Critical injuries resulting in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addressees.
Class "C" Serious injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury less than critical but definitely requiring five or more days hospitalization involving medical treatment but from which the individual will be expected to recover. Unsuspected critical conditions or complications erroneously listed in this category which result in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addressees.
Class "D" Minor injury is considered for reporting procedure as any injury less than serious.
Class "E" No injury.
Class "L" Unknown injury - lost and presumed drowned.
Class "M" Unknown injury - missing.

3. Under disposition, use following key:
"E" - Uninjured
"G" - grounded
"W" - treated and returned to duty
"X" - hospitalized
"Y" - remains recovered
"Z" - remains not recovered

1. NAME	2. FILE NO.	3. RANK/RATE	4. AGE	5. WEIGHT	6. HEIGHT
EVETS, Ronald Jack	(b) (6) redacted	LT(jg)	24	136	63"

7. DUTY ABOARD PLANE, ON DECK/GROUND	8. POSITION OCCUPIED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT	9. INJURY CLASS	10. DISPOSITION
Pilot	Cockpit	E	Z

11. SAFETY EQUIPMENT	MODEL/TYPE	AVAILABLE	USED	NOT USED	DAMAGED	LOST
SHOULDER HARNESS	NAF 1201-1259	Yes	Yes			
LAP BELT	Non automatic NAF1201-8	Yes	Yes			
INERTIA REEL	Inertia electric	Yes	Yes			
"G" SUIT	Z-3	Yes	Yes			X
HELMET	Z-2	Yes	Yes			X
OXYGEN MASK	A-13A	Yes	Yes			X
GOGGLES	None					X
SHOES (type)	Flight deck					X
FLIGHT SUIT, OTHER THAN "G" (type)	Summer	Yes	Yes			X
EXPOSURE SUIT (type)	None					X
OTHER (specify)						

WAS OXYGEN BEING USED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT	X YES	NO
PREOXYGENATION	YES	X NO
IF YES, OXYGEN SUPPLY PRESSURE PRIOR TO FLIGHT	1800 PSI	
AT TIME OF ACCIDENT	1800 PSI	
WAS OXYGEN EQUIPMENT PRE-FLIGHTED BY PILOT Presumed	X YES	NO

IF SHOULDER HARNESS USED	LOCKED	UNLOCKED	TIGHT	SLACK
	Presumed X		X	

X PRESSED FORWARD AGAINST HARNESS Presumed — PRESSED AGAINST SEAT BACK

ON IMPACT	SAFETY BELT	LOCKED	TIGHT	SLACK
		X presumed	X	

12. COMMENT ON EFFECTIVENESS (Entries of "No," "None," "as designed," etc., will not be accepted. If any equipment failed, describe failure and probable cause). Use additional sheet, if necessary.

IN CASE OF BURNS, FREEZING, OR FROSTBITE, LIST ALL CLOTHING WORN. USE ADDITIONAL SHEET, IF NECESSARY.

13. POST CRASH EXAMINATION

IF DEAD, LIST PRIMARY CAUSE (multiple extreme, so state)

INTERNAL INJURIES

AUTOPSY FINDINGS, IF PERFORMED

IF HOSPITALIZED, GIVE DIAGNOSIS

PLACE

NOT APPLICABLE

ESTIMATED LENGTH OF HOSPITALIZATION

LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION (as condition permits)

CARBON MONOXIDE-NAME COHb TEST-RESULTS

IF GROUNDED, REASON

ESTIMATED LENGTH OF GROUNDING

14. INJURIES

	DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	CARBONIZATION ENTIRE BODY
☐ BURNS											
☐ FROSTBITE	AREA	HEAD (ventral)	(dorsal)		TRUNK (ventral)	(dorsal)		EXTREMITIES (upper)	(lower)		

NOT APPLICABLE

UNCONSCIOUSNESS ☐ SHORT DURATION-LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (time)

HEAD INJURIES — CEREBRAL CONCUSSION ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL — MINOR FACIAL INJURIES — MAJOR FACIAL INJURIES

MINOR EYE INJURIES ☐ RIGHT EYE ☐ LEFT EYE — MAJOR EYE INJURIES ☐ RIGHT EYE ☐ LEFT EYE

TYPE / BONES	SKULL CRANIAL	SKULL FACIAL	VERTEBRAE (specify no.) CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX	SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM L	UPPER ARM R	LOWER ARM L	LOWER ARM R	HAND L	HAND R	UPPER LEG L	UPPER LEG R	LOWER LEG L	LOWER LEG R	FOOT L	FOOT R
SIMPLE FRACTURE																						
COMPOUND FRACTURE																						
COMMINUTED FRACTURE																						
DIS-LO-CA-TION		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE	
															HAND						FOOT	

NOT APPLICABLE

AMPUTATIONS - STATE PARTS

AREA OF INVOLVEMENT		LACERATIONS MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	ABRASIONS MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES (upper)										
EXTREMITIES (lower)										

NOT APPLICABLE

☐ DROWNED

SHOCK	EXPOSURE
☐ MILD	☐ MILD
☐ MODERATE	☐ MODERATE
☐ SEVERE	☐ SEVERE

15. CAUSE OF INJURIES (Give opinion as to cause of each injury indicated above. Give specific parts of aircraft involved. Entries of "No," "None," "Sustained on impact," or "Undetermined" with no amplification will not be accepted. Use additional sheet, if necessary.)

OPNAV FORM 3750-8 (REV. 2-54) PAGE

BAILOUT AND EJECTION REPORT

(Use separate form for each person)

UNIT	
DATE ACCIDENT	
MODEL	
BU. NO.	

NAME	FILE NO.	RANK

1. AT TIME OF EJECTION

		YES	NO
INDICATED AIR SPEED *(Knots)*	FEET IN STIRRUPS		
ALTITUDE ABOVE SEA LEVEL	SEAT BELT FASTENED		
ALTITUDE ABOVE TERRAIN	SHOULDER HARNESS LOCKED		
ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT	SHOULDER HARNESS TIGHT		
	DISCONNECT USED *(Give type)*		

NOT APPLICABLE

2. WERE "G" FORCES PRESENT ☐ YES ☐ NO — IF YES, STATE NATURE OF FORCE AND DIRECTION OF FORCE

3. LIST DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED IN EJECTION *(jettisoning canopy, positioning, ejecting, etc.)*

4. AFTER EJECTION

HOW LONG WAS FACE CURTAIN HELD AFTER EJECTION

DID SEAT TUMBLE AFTER LEAVING A/C ☐ YES ☐ NO *(If yes, describe)*

AUTOMATIC LAP BELT RELEASE USED ☐ YES ☐ NO TYPE

AUTOMATIC RIP CORD DEVICE USED ☐ YES ☐ NO TYPE

NOT APPLICABLE

TIME IN SEAT AFTER EJECTION *(Seconds)*

WERE ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN LEAVING SEAT ☐ YES ☐ NO *(If yes, describe)*

5. BAILOUT ONLY

INDICATED AIRSPEED *(Knots)*	
ALTITUDE ABOVE SEA LEVEL	
ALTITUDE ABOVE TERRAIN	
ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT	
BAILOUT OVER RIGHTSIDE	☐ YES ☐ NO
BAILOUT OVER LEFTSIDE	☐ YES ☐ NO
BAILOUT INVERTED	☐ YES ☐ NO

NOT APPLICABLE

6. BAILOUT AND EJECTIONS

WAS FREE FALL DELIBERATE	☐ YES ☐ NO
WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN AVAILABLE ☐ YES ☐ NO	USED ☐ YES ☐ NO TYPE
ALTITUDE RIP CORD PULLED	
ALTITUDE CHUTE OPENED	
BODY POSITION WHEN CHUTE OPENED	
TYPE PARACHUTE	SIZE CANOPY FEET
CHUTE HARNESS CINCHED TIGHT	☐ YES ☐ NO
CHUTE DAMAGE	

7. LIST ANY DIFFICULTIES IN PULLING RIP CORD OR CHUTE OPENING

8. DESCRIBE NATURE OF TERRAIN LANDED ON *(rocky, trees, water, etc.)*

NOT APPLICABLE

9. POSITION OF BODY ON LANDING

10. DIFFICULTIES IN REMOVING HARNESS AND SPILLING CHUTE *(windforce, knots, direction)*

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11. METHOD OF RESCUE *(List difficulties)*

12. LIST TRAINING INDIVIDUAL HAD FOR BAILOUT OR EJECTION

13. SAFETY EQUIPMENT	TYPE	USED	DAMAGED	LOST	DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE OR WHEN LOST
HELMET					
GOGGLES					
OXYGEN MASK					
CLOTHING					
GLOVES					
SHOES					

NOT APPLICABLE

14. OTHER SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT *(List all worn, effectiveness and damage)*

15. INCLUDE SURVIVORS NARRATIVE OF ENTIRE PROCEDURE *(Include comments on windblast, force of ejection, sensation, etc.)*

OPNAV FORM-3750-8 (REV. 2-54)

UNIT	VP 211
DATE ACCIDENT	Aug. 22, 1956
MODEL	
BU. NO.	PJ-M 13921

DITCHING AND WATER CRASH REPORT

☐ 1. CONTROLLED DITCHING ☒ 2. WATER CRASH

3. WEATHER — SEA: ☐ SLIGHT ☐ MODERATE ☐ ROUGH — WIND VELOCITY (Knots) 060/15 — (air temp. °F) 76F — (Water temp. °F) 81F

4. PROCEDURES

CANOPY: ☐ JETTISONED ☐ OPEN ☒ CLOSED

POWER: ☒ ON ☐ OFF

WHEELS: ☐ UP ☒ DOWN

FLAPS: ☐ UP ☐ PARTIAL ☒ FULL

DITCHED: ~~xxxxx~~ Crashed ☐ INTO WIND ☐ DOWN WIND ☒ CROSS WIND

5. IMPACT (Estimated)

ATTITUDE	ANGLE	SPEED (Knots indicated)	STOPPING DISTANCE (ft.)	NO. OF IMPACTS	TIME A/C FLOATED (Sec.)
70° Bank	30° nose low.	120	Unknown	One	0

6. EXIT

NAME	BILLET	UNDERWATER	PLACE OF EXIT	DIFFICULTIES
A.	PILOT	UNKNOWN		Denote below under A, B, C, and D
B. EVERTS, Ronald Jack				
C.				
D.				

A

B

C

D

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7. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

	SHOES TYPE	SHOES DAMAGED	GLOVES TYPE	GLOVES DAMAGED	LIFE VEST TYPE	LIFE VEST DAMAGED	EXPOSURE SUIT TYPE	EXPOSURE SUIT DAMAGED	RAFT TYPE	RAFT DAMAGED	USED TO ATTRACT ATTENTION: DYE	FLARES	FLASHLIGHT	MIRROR	GUN	RADIO
A																
B	Flight deck B3A				Mark II		None		PK-2			NOT APPLICABLE				
C							used									
D	Unknown		Unknown		Unknown		Unknown		Unknown							

8. LIST CAUSE OF DAMAGE, IF ANY, TO SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT (include photo of damage) (use additional sheet, if necessary)

9. LIST ANY DEFICIENCIES OR FAILURES IN USE OF SURVIVAL GEAR (use additional sheet, if necessary)

10. TIME IN RAFT | TIME IN WATER | METHOD OF RESCUE

11. LIST EQUIPMENT DROPPED TO SURVIVORS; STATE IF USED EFFECTIVELY (use additional sheet, if necessary)

12. LIFT ALL ITEMS IN SURVIVAL KIT WHICH WERE USED - EFFECTIVENESS (List those needed items which failed or were lost - Recommendations) (Use additional sheet, if necessary)

13. Neither pilots body nor equipment were sighted nor recovered following crash.