AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
IDENTIFICATION
NO.

704 05 101

RECORDS CODE SHEET
SNC 4535 (Rev. 7-55)

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

GENERAL (Card No. 1)

Bureau Number	138917	16-21
Reporting Custodian	298	22-24
Type Duty	J	25
Major Command	1	26
Aircraft Damage	A	27
Aircraft Injury	A	28
Time of Day	2	29
Carrier Hull Number	—	30
First Accident type	36	31-32
First Accident phase	48	33-35
Second Accident type		36-37
Second Accident phase		38-40
Type of Operation	3	41-42
Contributing Cause Fact	Z	43-47
Pilot Factor, First		48-49
Pilot Factor, Second		50-51
Pilot Factor, Third		52-53
First other Personnel Factor		54-55
Second other Personnel Factor		56-57
Primary Major Material Factor		58
Secondary Major Material Factor		59
Design		60
Facilities	D	61
Special Data & Cond.	GJ ~~LN~~	62-65
Special Data & Cond. ~~Type of Incident~~	~~—~~	66
Primary Cause	Z	67
1st Posit. of Pri. Causal Factor		68
1st Possible Cause & Causal Factor	3T	69-71
2nd Possible Cause & Causal Factor	1 5	72-74
No Personnel Card ("R")	Q	80

SUPPLEMENTARY (Card No. 2)

Weather		16-21
Kind of Flight	1A1	22-24
Relative Wind - Direction		25
Relative Wind - Velocity		26
Special Attention		27
Clearance	1	28
Maneuver prior to Occurrence		29
Number of other Aircraft		30
Primary Causal Factor		31-32
Altitude of Occurrence or Emergency	18Ø	33-35
Environmental Factors	9AF	38-40
Non-Navy Injury ("R")		42
Number of "A" or "U" Injury	Ø4	43-44
Number of "B" Injury		46-47
Number of "C" Injury		48-49
Number of "D" Injury		50-51
Number of "E" Injury		52-53
Number of "F" Injury		54-55
Number of "G" Injury		56-57
Location	A7CALIF	63-68

ACCIDENT DAMAGE: A (9)

ACCIDENT INJURY: A (10)

FISCAL YEAR: 7 (15)

Don't Count		Enemy Action		Other Aircraft		
I. D. NO.	7 (1) YR	Ø4 (2-3) MO	Ø5 (4-5) DAY	1 (6) TYP	Ø1 (7-8) SEQ	
				-A3B (11-15) Model		

Model Code: Ø1 (76-77)

PERSONNEL STATISTICS (Card No. 3)

File Number → (b) (6) [redacted]

Name	16	17	18	19	20	21	Rank Rate	Br Service	Age	Yrs Experience	Status	Position	Inj to Ind	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Trainer Utilization	Instr. Card	Total Time All Models	All Models 3 Months	All Series This Model	All Ser Mod 3 Months	CV Landings	Instrument Hours	Nite Hours	Total Time Jet or Helo
03 PARKS		R		E			3	1	G	A	A	1	A	1	2	Ø9	3	28	Ø2	Ø2	Ø2	3	Ø6	Ø4	Ø7
04 KING		D		E			3	1	H	A	Y	2	A	1	4	—	3	42	Ø9	83	Ø4	A	18	Ø5	99

File Number → (b) (6) [redacted]

IBM: PERSONNEL CODED ON REVERSE SIDE

CODED ___ REVIEWED ___ LOGGED BB PUNCHED ___ VERIFIED ___

CODE SHEET REVIEWED BY CLASS DESK ANALYST ___ (Initials) ___ (Date)

CLOSED
03 JUL 1967
25 MAR 1968

07-14-67

Parks Ser 396

I.D. Number	GCI	MODEL	FY	Model Code
7Ø4Ø51Ø1	ØØ	-A3B	7	Ø1

TA	TM	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	INJ	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq of Ind.
16	17	18 19 20 21 22 23	24 25 26 27 28 29	30 31 32 33 34 35	36 37 38 39 40 41	42 43 44 45 46 47	48 49 50 51 52 53	54 55 56 57 58 59	60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67	68	69 70	71 72	73 74
A	F	H 6	J 1	A 1	E C	S 7	S 1	S 2	S 3	A	1 2		Ø 1

CARD 65

TA	TM									INJ	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq of Ind.
16	17	18 19 20 21 22 23	24 25 26 27 28 29	30 31 32 33 34 35	36 37 38 39 40 41	42 43 44 45 46 47	48 49 50 51 52 53	54 55 56 57 58 59	60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67	68	69 70	71 72	73 74
A	F	P 5	Q 5	D C	E 2	N 2	L 7	O 1	A 6	A	2 2		Ø 1

CARD 65A

TA	TM									INJ	No. of Cds	CZ	Seq of Ind.
16	17	18 19 20 21 22 23	24 25 26 27 28 29	30 31 32 33 34 35	36 37 38 39 40 41	42 43 44 45 46 47	48 49 50 51 52 53	54 55 56 57 58 59	60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67	68	69 70	71 72	73 74

CARD 65B

TYPE AIRCRAFT	TYPE MISHAP	TOP. AT SCENE	EGRESS	EJT. INFO	Egress Prob. Prior	Egress Prob. During	Egress Prob. After	TYPE SEAT	FIRING METHOD	SEAT POS.	A/C ATTIT.	EJT. ALT.	AIR-SPEED	WEIGHT	CHUTE OP. ALT.	IN CRASH AREA	Time in WATER	Time in RAFT					VERTEBRAL	FRACTURES	EJT. FAT. CAUSE	INJURY	COMBAT ZONE	Seq of IND
16	17	18	19	20	21	22 23 24	25 26 27	28	29 30 31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38 39 40	41 42 43	44	45 46 47	48 49	50 51 52 53	54 55	56 57 58 59	60 61	62 63	64 65 66 67	68 69	70	71	72 73 74
A	F		D	Z																							A		Ø 1

CARD 66

25 SEP 1967

SND 4535 (Rev. 1/65) (Back)

OTHER INJURED PERSONNEL

(Modified Card No. 3)

	C.C. 79 - 80	FILE NUMBER						NAME									Rank or Rate	E.R. Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Inj. to Ind.	Abandon A/C
		16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	35	37	40	42	45	47	49
05		(b) (6) [redacted]						M	I	L	L	E	R		C		V	E	1	—	—	X	3	A	1
06								R	E	A	D	E	R		J		M	3	1	D	—	Q	4	A	1
07																									
08																									
09																									
10																									
11																									
12																									
13																									
14																									
15																									
16																									
17																									
18																									
19																									
19																									
19																									
19																									
19																									
19																									

IBM. Place an "X" overpunch in CC80 if these cards are coded.

Parks Sec 3B

I. D. Number	GCI	MODEL	FY	MODEL CODE
70405101	00	-A3B	7	01

TYPE A/C	TYPE MIS	WIND VEL	WAVE HEIGHT	WAVE INTERVAL	VISIBILITY	AIR TEMP	WATER TEMP		ALERT FACTOR	LOC. SITE	SURV. LEFT	LOC. SURV.	SURV. FAC.	FATALS (NO RESCUE)		TRG. DATE	TRG. DATE	TRG. FACTOR		NO E/R	INJURY	C ZONE	SEQ OF IND.
16	17	18 19	20	21	22	23 24	25 26	27 28 29	30 31 32	33	34 35	36 37	38 39	40 41 42	43 44 45 46 47	48 49	50 51	52 53 54	55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68	69	70	71 72	73 74
A	F	14			422				NOF	H	E			AHA		EE	EP			2	A		01

CARD 67

TIME OF DAY: MISHAP	DEPART	LOCATE	ACC/ABAN.	LOC. DUTY RES. VEH.	RESCUE VEHICLE MODEL AND TYPE	NO TO BE RESCUED	NO RESCUED	BACK UP RES. VEH.	WATER TEMP	AIR TEMP	SEA COND	WEATHER	WIND VEL	RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED	TRG OF RES. TEAMS	COM. TECH AND EQUIP	RETRV. TECH AND EQUIP	RES TEAM WORK	TYPE AIRCRAFT	TYPE MISHAP	TOPOGRAPHY	DISTANCE	TIME MIS. TO ALERT	ALERT PROB.	METHOD OF ALERT	TIME DEPART	DEP DELAY	INJURY	C ZONE	SEQ OF IND
16	17	18	19	20 21	22 23 24	25 26	27 28	29	30	31 32	33	34 35	36 37	38 39	40	41 42	43	44 45 46 47	48 49	50 51	52 53	54 55	56 57	58 59	60 61	62 63	64 65 66	67 68	69	70	71 72	73 74

CARD 68

TIME ALERT TO LOC.	PROB IN RTE.	FAIL TO REACH	REASON	TIME LOC TO RCH.	LOCATOR MEANS	LOC PROB	SURV. SIG. PROB.	TYPE A/C	TYPE MIS	RESCUE PROBLEMS	RESCUE PROBLEMS	RESCUE PROBLEMS	RESCUE PROBLEMS	SURVIVOR PROBLEMS	SURV. COND	SURV. COND	TIME RCH. TO ACC.	TOT. TIME	RES. REC.	SEQ OF IND
16 17	18 19	20	21	22 23	24 25 26	27 28	29	30 31 32	33	34 35	36 37 38 39	40 41	42 43 44 45 46 47	48 49	50 51	52 53	54 55	56 57 58 59	60 61 62 63	64 65 66 67 68	69 70	71 72	73 74

CARD 69

Kerg Ser 396

I.D. Number	GCI	MODEL	FY	Model Code
7ϕ4ϕ51ϕ1	ϕϕ	-A3B	7	ϕ1

CARD 65

TA	TM	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	INJ	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq of Ind.
A	F	H6	J1	A1	S7	S1	S2	S3	P5	A1	12		ϕ2

CARD 65A

TA	TM									INJ	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq of Ind.
		Q5	DC	E2	N2	L7	O1	A6		A2	22		ϕ2

CARD 65B

TYPE AIRCRAFT	TYPE MISHAP	TOP. AT SCENE	EGRESS EJT. INFO	Egress Prob. Prior	Egress Prob. During	Egress Prob. After	TYPE SEAT	FIRING METHOD	SEAT POS.	A/C ATTIT.	EJT. ALT.	AIR-SPEED	WEIGHT	CHUTE OP. ALT.	IN CRASH AREA	Time in Water	Time in Raft	VERTEBRAL FRACTURES	EJT. FAT. CAUSE	INJURY	COMBAT ZONE	Seq of Ind
AF		D	Z																	A		ϕ2

CARD 66

I. D. Number	GCI	MODEL	FY	MODEL CODE
7Ø4Ø51Ø1	ØØ	-A3B	7	Ø1

TYPE A/C	TYPE MIS	WIND VEL	WAVE HEIGHT	WAVE INTERVAL	VISIBILITY	AIR TEMP	WATER TEMP		ALERT FACTOR	LOC. SITE	SURV. LEFT	LOC. SURV.	SURV. FAC.	FATALS (NO RESCUE)	TRG. DATE	TRG. DATE	TRG. FACTOR	NO E/R	INJURY	C ZONE	SEQ OF IND
16	17 18 19	20	21	22	23 24	25 26	27 28	29	30 31 32	33	34	35 36 37	38 39	40 41 42	43 44 45 46 47	48 49 50 51	52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68	69	70	71	72 73 74
A	F 1 4			1	2 2			1	N O F H		E			A H A		I B B R		2	A		Ø2

CARD 67

TIME OF DAY: MISHAP	DEPART	LOCATE	ACC/ABAN.	LOC. DUTY RES. VEH.	RESCUE VEHICLE MODEL AND TYPE	NO TO BE RESCUED	NO RESCUED	BACK UP RES. VEH.	WATER TEMP	AIR TEMP	SEA COND	WEATHER	WIND VEL	RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED	TRG OF RES. TEAMS	COM. TECH AND EQUIP	RETRV. TECH AND EQUIP	RES TEAM WORK	TYPE AIRCRAFT	TYPE MISHAP	TOPOGRAPHY	DISTANCE	TIME MIS. TO ALERT	ALERT PROB.	METHOD OF ALERT	TIME DEPART	DEP DELAY	INJURY	C ZONE	SEQ OF IND
16	17	18	19	20 21	22 23 24	25 26	27 28	29	30	31 32	33	34	35 36 37	38 39	40	41 42	43 44 45 46 47	48 49	50 51	52 53	54 55	56	57 58	59	60 61	62 63	64 65 66	67 68	69	70	71	72 73 74

CARD 68

TIME ALERT TO LOC.	PROB IN RTE.	FAIL TO REACH	REASON	TIME LOC TO RCH.	LOCATOR MEANS	LOC PROB	SURV. SIG. PROB.	TYPE A/C	TYPE MIS	RESCUE PROBLEMS	RESCUE PROBLEMS	RESCUE PROBLEMS	RESCUE PROBLEMS	SURVIVOR PROBLEMS	SURV. COND	SURV. COND	TIME RCH. TO ACC.	TOT. TIME	RES. REC.	SEQ OF IND
16 17	18 19	20	21	22 23	24 25 26	27 28	29	30	31 32 33	34	35 36 37	38 39 40	41 42 43 44 45 46 47	48 49 50 51	52 53	54 55 56 57 58	59 60 61 62 63	64	65 66 67	68 69 70	71 72 73 74

CARD 69

I.D. Number	GCI	Model	FY	Model Code
70405101	00	-A3B	7	01

TA	TM	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	IN J	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq. of Ind.
A	F	A6	J1	A1	E C	S7	S1	S2	S3	A	13		03

CARD 65

TA	TM									IN J	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq. of Ind.
A	F	P5	G5	D C	E2	N2	A7	O1	A6	A	23		03

CARD 65A

TA	TM									IN J	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq. of Ind.
A	F	A5	R5							A	33		03

CARD 65B

Type Aircraft	Type Mishap	Tor at Bogue	Egress	Ejt Info	Egress Prob. Prior	Egress Prob. During	Egress Prob. After	Type Seat	Firing Method	Seat Pos	A/C Attit	Ejt Alt	Air-speed	Weight	Chute or Alt	In Crash Area	Time in Water	Time in Raft	Vertebral	Fractures	Ejt Fat Cause	Injury	Combat Zone	Seq. of Ind.
A	F	D	3																			A		03

CARD 66

Miller Ser 396

I. D. Number	GCI	MODEL	FY	MODEL CODE
7ϕ4ϕ51ϕ1	ϕϕ	-A3B	7	ϕ1

16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74
TYPE A/C	TYPE MIS	WIND VEL		WAVE HEIGHT	WAVE INTERVAL	VISIBILITY	AIR TEMP	WATER TEMP					ALERT FACTOR			LOC. SITE	SURV. LEFT	LOC. SURV.		SURV. FAC.			FATALS (NO RESCUE)								TRG. DATE		TRG. DATE		TRG. FACTOR																	NO EXR	INJURY	CNOME	SEQ OF IND.		
A	F	1	4			1	2	2						N	O	F	H		E					A	H	A						E	P	P	P																	2	A			ϕ	3

CARD 67

16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74
TIME OF DAY MISHAP	TIME OF DAY DEPART	TIME OF DAY LOCATE	TIME OF DAY ACC/ABAN.	LOC. DUTY RES. VEH.					RESCUE VEHICLE MODEL AND TYPE					NO TO BE RESCUED	NO RESCUED	BACK UP RES. VEH.		WATER TEMP	AIR TEMP	SEA COND			WEATHER	WIND VEL			RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED				TRG OF RES. TEAMS		COM. TECH AND EQUIP		RETRV. TECH AND EQUIP		RES TEAM WORK		TYPE AIRCRAFT	TYPE MISHAP	TOPOGRAPHY	DISTANCE	TIME MIS. TO ALERT		ALERT PROB.		METHOD OF ALERT		TIME DEPART	DEP DELAY		INJURY	CNOME	SEQ OF IND		
6																																																										

CARD 68

16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74
TIME ALERT TO LOC.	PROB IN RTE.	FAIL TO REACH	REASON	TIME LOC. TO RCH.					LOCATOR MEANS					LOC. PROB.				SURV. SIG. PROB.		TYPE A/C	TYPE MIS.	RESCUE PROBLEMS					RESCUE PROBLEMS					RESCUE PROBLEMS					RESCUE PROBLEMS					SURVIVOR PROBLEMS					SURV. COND	SURV. COND	TIME RCH. TO ACC.				TOT. TIME		RES. REQ.	SEQ OF IND	

CARD 69

Reader Ser 396

I.D. Number	GCI	MODEL	FY	Model Code
7Ø4Ø51Ø1	ØØ	-A3B	7	Ø1

TA	TM	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	INJ	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq of Ind.
16	17	18 19 20 21 22 23	24 25 26 27 28 29	30 31 32 33 34 35	36 37 38 39 40 41	42 43 44 45 46 47	48 49 50 51 52 53	54 55 56 57 58 59	60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67	68	69 70	71 72	73 74
A	F	H 6	J 1	A 1	E C	S 7	S 1	S 2	S 3	A	1 2		Ø 4

CARD 65

TA	TM									INJ	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq of Ind.
16	17	18 19 20 21 22 23	24 25 26 27 28 29	30 31 32 33 34 35	36 37 38 39 40 41	42 43 44 45 46 47	48 49 50 51 52 53	54 55 56 57 58 59	60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67	68	69 70	71 72	73 74
A	F	P 5	Q 5	D C	E 2	N 2	L 7	O 1	A 6	A	2 2		Ø 4

CARD 65A

TA	TM									INJ	No. of Cds	CZ	Seq of Ind.
16	17	18 19 20 21 22 23	24 25 26 27 28 29	30 31 32 33 34 35	36 37 38 39 40 41	42 43 44 45 46 47	48 49 50 51 52 53	54 55 56 57 58 59	60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67	68	69 70	71 72	73 74

CARD 65B

TYPE AIRCRAFT	TYPE MISHAP	TOP. AT SCENE	EGRESS	EJT. INFO	Egress Prob. PRIOR	Egress Prob. DURING	Egress Prob. AFTER	TYPE SEAT	FIRING METHOD	SEAT POS.	A/C ATTIT.	EJT. ALT.	AIR-SPEED	WEIGHT	CHUTE OP. ALT.	IN CRASH AREA	Time in WATER	Time in RAFT	VERTEBRAL FRACTURES	EJT. FAT. CAUSE	INJURY	COMBAT ZONE	Seq of IND
16 17	18	19	20	21	22 23	24 25 26 27	28 29	30 31	32 33	34 35	36 37	38 39	40 41	42 43	44	45 46	47	48 49	50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67	68 69	70	71 72	73 74
A	F	D	Z																		A		Ø 4

CARD 66

Reed Lev 296

I. D. Number	GCI	MODEL	FY	MODEL CODE
TØ4Ø51Ø1	ØØ	-A38	7	Ø1

TYPE A/C	TYPE MIS	WIND VEL	WAVE HEIGHT	WAVE INTERVAL	VISIBILITY	AIR TEMP	WATER TEMP		ALERT FACTOR	LOC. SITE	SURV. LEFT	LOC. SURV.	SURV. FAC.	FATALS (NO RESCUE)	TRG. DATE	TRG. DATE	TRG. FACTOR	NO E/R	INJURY	C ZONE	SEQ OF IND
16	17	18 19	20	21	22	23 24	25 26	27 28 29	30 31 32	33	34	35 36 37	38 39	40 41 42	43 44 45 46 47	48 49	50 51	52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68	69	70	71 72	73 74
A	F	1 4			1	2 2			N O F	H		E		A H A		A I	A P		2	A		Ø4

CARD 67

TIME OF DAY: MISHAP	DEPART	LOCATE	ACC/ABAN.	LOC. DUTY RES. VEH.	RESCUE VEHICLE MODEL AND TYPE	NO TO BE RESCUED	NO RESCUED	BACK UP RES. VEH.	WATER TEMP	AIR TEMP	SEA COND	WEATHER	WIND VEL	RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED	TRG OF RES. TEAMS	COM. TECH AND EQUIP	RETRV. TECH AND EQUIP	RES TEAM WORK	TYPE AIRCRAFT	TYPE MISHAP	TOPOGRAPHY	DISTANCE	TIME MIS. TO ALERT	ALERT PROB.	METHOD OF ALERT	TIME DEPART	DEP DELAY	INJURY	C ZONE	SEQ OF IND
16	17	18	19	20 21	22 23 24	25 26	27 28	29	30	31 32	33	34 35	36 37	38 39	40	41 42	43	49 45 46 47	48 49	50 51	52 53	54 55	56	57 58	59	60 61	62 63	64 65 66	67 68	69 70	71 72	73 74

CARD 68

TIME ALERT TO LOC.	PROB IN RTE.	FAIL TO REACH	REASON	TIME LOC TO RCH.	LOCATOR MEANS	LOC PROB	SURV. SIG. PROB.	TYPE A/C	TYPE MIS	RESCUE PROBLEMS	RESCUE PROBLEMS	RESCUE PROBLEMS	RESCUE PROBLEMS	SURVIVOR PROBLEMS	SURV. COND	SURV. COND	TIME RCH. TO ACC.	TOT. TIME	RES. REC.	SEQ OF IND
16 17	18 19	20	21	22 23	24 25 26 27	28 29	30 31 32 33	34	35	36 37 38 39	40 41	42 43 44 45 46 47	48 49 50 51 52 53	54 55 56 57 58 59	60 61 62 63	64	65 66 67	68 69 70	71 72	73 74

CARD 69

REQUEST FOR CODE SHEET CHANGES

8.24.67
(Date)

From: M&M Dept.
To: (1) Coder (b) (6) [redacted]
(2) M&M
(3) Log Clerk 8/29 (b) (6) [redacted]
(4) IBM
(5) File Clerk 30 AUG

Return to: Open File
Closed File
Master Coder
Other

Ident. No. 70405101 Model 133 BUNO 135917 Model Code 01

Card #1 - Chg. col. ____ to ____ Chg. col. ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____ " " ____ to ____

Card #2 - Chg. col. ____ to ____ Chg. col. ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____ " " ____ to ____

Card # ____ Name ____ Chg. col. ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____

Card # ____ Name ____ Chg. col. ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____

USE THIS SECTION FOR CHANGES TO CARDS 31 THROUGH 59 AND CARDS 20 THROUGH 29.

Card # ____ Chg. col. ____ to ____ Card # ____ Chg. col. ____ to ____
" " ____ " " ____ to ____ " " ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ " " ____ to ____ " " ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ " " ____ to ____ " " ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ " " ____ to ____ " " ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ " " ____ to ____ " " ____ " " ____ to ____

☑ Card #(s) 45 IBM, SEE CHANGES TO NARRATIVE BRIEF.
ORIGINATOR, USE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHANGES TO BRIEF.

NOTE: (1) A separate change sheet will be used for each A/C involved.
(2) Change sheet will be stapled to code sheet.

(b) (6) [redacted]
Originator's Signature

☐ Change to 5 x 8 card required.

NOTE TO ORIGINATOR OF CHANGE: If change to narrative brief is required, use the below provided space to reflect the change. Give the whole card text which represents the line of print out containing the area of change. The coders will make the final change to the master code sheet.

Card No.	Narrative
45	Correct spelling of "VALUE"
	(See code sheet change of 7-17-67)

REQUEST FOR CODE SHEET CHANGES

From: N-N (b) (6) [redacted] 7/21 AMA

7-17-67
(Date)

To: (1) Coder
(2) M&M 17-1967
(3) Log Clerk (b) (6) [redacted] 1967
(4) IBM
(5) File Clerk

Return to: Open File
Closed File
Master Coder
Other

Ident. No. 70-05101 Model A 3 S BUNO 138917 Model Code 01

Card #1 - Chg. col. ____ to ____ Chg. col. ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____ " " ____ to ____

Card #2 - Chg. col. ____ to ____ Chg. col. ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____ " " ____ to ____

Card # ____ Name ____ Chg. col. ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____
____ to ____
____ to ____

Card # ____ Name ____ Chg. col. ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____
" " ____ to ____

USE THIS SECTION FOR CHANGES TO CARDS 31 THROUGH 59 AND CARDS 20 THROUGH 29.

Card # 33 Chg. col. 33-37 to T 9999 Card # ____ Chg. col. ____ to ____
" " 33 " " 17-21 to U 9999 " " ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ " " ____ to ____ " " ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ " " ____ to ____ " " ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ " " ____ to ____ " " ____ " " ____ to ____
" " ____ " " ____ to ____ " " ____ " " ____ to ____

☑ Card #(s) 44 — IBM. SEE CHANGES TO NARRATIVE BRIEF.
ORIGINATOR, USE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHANGES TO BRIEF.

NOTE: (1) A separate change sheet will be used for each A/C involved.
(2) Change sheet will be stapled to code sheet.

Originator's Signature

☐ Change to 5 x 8 card required.

NOTE TO ORIGINATOR OF CHANGE: If change to narrative brief is required, use the below provided space to reflect the change. Give the whole card text which represents the line of print out containing the area of change. The coders will make the final change to the master code sheet.

Card No.	Narrative
44 -	CONTINUED
	TION. [redacted] ENGINEERING ANALYSIS
	OF COMPONENTS RECOVERED DID NOT REVEAL
	MALFUNCTION OF SIGNIFICANT VALUE IN
	DETERMINATION OF CAUSE.

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD
OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: RECORDS DEPT. Chg in green 3/19/68 AHA

DATE 19 MARCH 1968

TO: (1) CODING SECT.
(2) REC. CONT. BRANCH
(3) ADPE DIV. 19 MAR 1968
(4) REC. CONT. BRANCH

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq. No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen. Data Sect. of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq. No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq. No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.									AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYPE REPT	LOG NUMBER			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	Ø	4	Ø	5	1	Ø	1	Ø	1

PARKS A 38 138917

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL., OF FLD. START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS				PERSON SEQ. NUMBER		FIELD LENGTH		DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)										TAPE REC DIV. NO.	TRANS. CODE
				12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29		
✓ 1	SPEC DATA & CONDIT	Ø6	67	Ø	3	2	2	Ø	Ø	Ø	3	D											
				30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47		
✓ 2	2ND POSS CAUSAL	Ø6	43	Ø	2	9	8	Ø	Ø	Ø	1	1											
				48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	77
✓ 3	"	Ø6	48	Ø	3	Ø	3	Ø	Ø	Ø	2	2	5T										

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV. may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6) [redacted]

ORIGINATORS SIGNATURE

3-18-68

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CODE SHEET (Narrative brief on reverse)

5ND 4621 (Rev. 11/65)

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CARD NUMBER 33		CARD COL.
PRIMARY INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT		16-21
SECONDARY INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT	9999	24-29
POSSIBLE INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT	T ~~Ø1Ø3~~	32-37
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS		40-42
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS		44-46
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS		48-50
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS		52-54
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS		56-58
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS		61-63
FIRST MAINT FLT SPEC COMPONENT		65-68
CARD NUMBER	3 3	79-80

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CARD NUMBER 34		CARD COL.
PRIMARY INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT:		
MFG P/N		16-31
TOTAL HOURS		34-37
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY		39
NUMBER OF OVERHAULS		41
HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL		43-46
AIRCRAFT TOUR		48
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT HOURS SINCE ACCEPTANCE 37 48.9	W	50
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST INSPECTION	2 4 6	53-55
DAYS SINCE LAST AIRCRAFT INSPECTION	7 9	57-58
TYPE LAST AIRCRAFT INSPECTION	C	61
MONTHS SINCE PAR/OVERHAUL	6	67-68
CARD NUMBER	3 4	79-80

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CARD NUMBER 35		CARD COL.
POSSIBLE OR SECONDARY INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT:		
MFG P/N		16-31
TOTAL HOURS		34-37
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY		39
NUMBER OF OVERHAULS		41
HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL		43-46
POWER PLANT MODEL NUMBER	J57P1Ø	49-56
POWER PLANT SERIAL NUMBER	P6Ø7625	58-64
DIR	2	68
CARD NUMBER	3 5	79-80

CAUSE FACTORS Z

COMPONENT NO. 1

COMPONENT NO. 2

DESIGN

POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTORS 3

COMPONENT T

DESIGN

ACCIDENT DAMAGE A (9)

ACCIDENT INJURY A (10)

Don't Count		Enemy Action		Other Aircraft		
I.D. NO.	YR	MO	DAY	TYP	SEQ	
	7	Ø4	Ø5	1	Ø1	

	A	3	B	
	11	12	13	14	15

Model

SPECIAL ATTN: ("X")

Model Code Ø1 (76 77)

03 JUL 1967

FOR IBM

COORDINATOR	M&M CODING RECORD			PUNCHED	VERIFIED
DIVISION OFFICER	DATE CODED	CODED BY	LOGGED	PUNCHED	VERIFIED

FOR M&M FILING ONLY

MODEL	BUNO	DATE	REPORT NUMBER / CUSTODIAN / IDENT. NUMBER

	CARD NO. 79	80	
ACFT ON AUTHORIZED	3	6	
CROSS COUNTRY INST & CHECK FLT. RADAR CONTACT LOST,	3	7	
RADIO CONTACT LOST, WITH ACFT OVER MOUNTAINOUS TER-	3	8	
RAIN. WITNESS SAW & HEARD ACFT CRASH IN DEEP SNOW &	3	9	
HEAVY DRIFTS. FLT PATH OF ACFT SHOWED TREES OF VARI-	4	0	
OUS SIZE SHEARED ← AT DIFFERENT HEIGHTS. SALVAGE &	4	1	
INVES WILL CONTINUE AFTER SNOW MELTS. PRIMARY CAUSE	4	2	
~~UNDET, POSSIBLE PORT ENG FAILURE &/OR PLT DISORIENTA-~~	~~4~~	~~3~~	
~~TION. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF COMPONENTS RECOVERED~~	~~4~~	~~4~~	
~~DID NOT REVEAL MALFUNCTION OF SIGNIFICANT VALUE IN~~	~~4~~	~~5~~	
~~DETERMINATION OF CAUSE.~~	~~4~~	~~6~~	
UNDET- POSS MAT FAILURE/MAL UNDET COMP PORT ENG. POSS	~~4~~	~~7~~	43
PE- EMERG OR UNUSUAL SITUATION DEVELOPED WHICH PLACED	~~4~~	~~8~~	44
PLT BEYOND LIMITS OF HIS EXPER LEVEL. ENGINEERING A-	~~4~~	~~9~~	45
NALYSIS OF COMPONENTS RECOVERED DID NOT REVEAL MAL OF	~~5~~	~~0~~	46
SIGNIFICANT VALUE IN DETERMINATION OF CAUSE.	~~5~~	~~1~~	47
	5	2	
	5	3	
	5	4	
	5	5	
	5	6	
	5	7	
	5	8	
	5	9	

SND 4621 (Rev. 11/65)(Back)

DISPATCH CARD
A/C ACCIDENTS ONLY
(REV 4-65)

CODED 26 DATE 4-7
LOGGED [illegible] DATE 4-7
PUNCHED PRB DATE 11 APR 66.

SUBJECT	DON'T COUNT	ENEMY ACTION	OTHER AIRCRAFT	CARD COLUMNS
IDENTIFICATION	7	0 4 0	5 1 0	1-8
ACCIDENT DAMAGE			A	9
ACCIDENT INJURY			U	10
MODEL AIRCRAFT			– A 3 B	11-13
BUREAU NUMBER		1	3 8 9 1 7	16-21
REPORTING CUSTODIAN			2 9 8	22-24
TYPE DUTY			5	25
MAJOR COMMAND			1	26
AIRCRAFT DAMAGE			A	27
AIRCRAFT INJURY			U	28
TIME OF DAY			2	29
CARRIER HULL NO.				30
FIRST ACCIDENT TYPE			B 6	31-32
FIRST PHASE OF OPERATION			4 1	33-35
TYPE OF OPERATION			3	41-42
CONTRIBUTING CAUSE FACTORS			2	43-44
NUMBER "A" OR "L" OR "U" INJURIES			0 4	48-49
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS				62-65
PRIMARY CAUSE			2	67
DISPATCH CARD				74
FISCAL YEAR			7	75
MODEL CODE			0 1	76-77

IBM NOTE: Keypunch a "12" overpunch in card column 8 to denote other aircraft.

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

11/hs
Ser 325
25 March 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

From: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron ONE TWO THREE

Subj: VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A concerning A-3B BuNo 138917 accident occurring 5 April 1967, pilot PARKS

1. The subject report and all endorsements thereon have been reviewed. Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center concurs with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. The cause of this accident has been recorded at the NAVAVNSAFECEN as UNDETERMINED with MATERIAL FAILURE (undetermined component of engine) and PILOT (emergency or unusual situation developed which placed pilot beyond limits of his experience level) as probable contributing factors.

W. CARMAN
By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 404) (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
COMRCVW-12
NAVPLANTREPO LONG BEACH

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

Code 62/Pn
20 June 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NAVAVNSAFECEN INVESTIGATION 54-67

Ref: (a) NAVAIRREWORKFAC NORIS 282356Z April 1967
(b) NAVAIRREWORKFAC Alameda 191918Z April 1967
(c) NAVAIRREWORKFAC Alameda 270102Z April 1967
(d) NAVAIRREWORKFAC NORIS 220118Z April 1967
(e) NAVAIRREWORKFAC Norfolk 042204Z May 1967

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The Accident. A-3B, BUNO 138917, assigned to HEAVY ATTACK SQUADRON ONE TWO THREE (VAH-123) and piloted by LCDR Richard Earl PARKS, USN, (b) (6) 1310, crashed (ALFA) on a snow covered mountain at the 7000-foot level, at 1432(U), 5 April 1967, eight miles southeast of Alturas, California. The four occupants of the aircraft sustained fatal injuries in the crash. The crash site was in a U. S. Forest Preserve, and property damage was limited to broken trees.

b. Synopsis of Flight. The aircraft was enroute from NAS Miramar to NAS Whidbey Island on an instrument flight plan at Flight Level (FL) 180. Flight Level 220 had been requested, but was not available. The weather in the area was cumulus buildups with tops at FL 200. The assigned altitude, therefore, placed the aircraft in the clouds for at least some of the time. Moderate to occasionally severe turbulence was reported in the buildups. The aircraft was directed to change frequencies for hand-off from Oakland Center to Seattle Center, but no contact was made with Seattle Center. Radar contact was lost in the vicinity of Alturas, California, and search was initiated. The crash site was located by Forest Rangers.

2. INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

a. History

(1) Pilot. LCDR PARKS had 2821 total flight hours. He was a student replacement pilot in VAH-123 and had 25 hours in the A-3. The flight had been scheduled as an instrument check as a part of the syllabus training. He had 3.6 hours of instrument flight in the A-3 prior to departure from NAS

Whidbey Island the previous day. His previous experience was primarily in A-1H aircraft. His jet experience consisted of 72 hours. He held a special instrument rating and was considered well qualified for this flight.

(2) Instructor Pilot. LCDR Donald Edwin KING, USN, (b) (6) /1310, had 4209 total flight hours of which 1786 hours were in jet aircraft and 833 hours in the A-3.

(3) Plane Captain. Carl Virgil MILLER, ADJ3, USN, (b) (6) was a well qualified crewman with about 1100 hours in the A-3. He was probably in the fourth seat as it is the procedure for the plane captain to secure the hatch prior to taxiing.

(4) Passenger. LCDR James Merritt READER, USN, (b) (6) /1310, was a passenger enroute to NAS Whidbey Island for duty. His log books were aboard the aircraft and were not recovered. He was probably in the third crew position.

(5) Aircraft. BUNO 138917 was accepted on 28 December 1956 and had accumulated 3749 total hours. The sixth PAR was completed in October 1966 and 440 hours were subsequently flown. A calendar ODD inspection was completed on 19 January 1967 and 246 hours were since flown.

(6) Engines

(a) J57-P-10, serial number P607625, had accumulated 2435 hours since acceptance. The fourth overhaul was completed on 9 July 1966 at NAS North Island and the engine had since operated 440 hours. A calendar ODD inspection was completed on 19 January 1967 and the engine had since operated 246 hours. J57 Engine Bulletin 535-A1 was reported by reference (a) to have been incorporated in February 1964 and verified during the last overhaul. This engine was installed on the port side.

(b) J57-P-10, serial number 632289, had accumulated 2076 hours since acceptance. The third overhaul was completed on 11 July 1966 at NAS North Island and the engine had since operated 440 hours. A calendar ODD inspection was completed on 19 January 1967 and the engine had since operated 246 hours. J57 Engine Bulletin 535-A1 was reported by reference (a) to have been incorporated in September 1965 and verified during the last overhaul. The engine was installed on the starboard side.

(7) Weather. The nearest weather reporting station was Klamath Falls, Oregon. At 1400 (U) the reported weather was 3000-foot ceiling with

light snow showers, temperature 40 degrees F, dewpoint 25 degrees F, with lowering ceilings. Cumulus buildups were to FL 200. The aeronautical weather at Alturas, California, nearby the crash site is unknown; however, persons on the ground recall the clouds to be well below the mountain peaks with occasional snow.

b. Field Investigation. The field investigation was hampered by a four-foot accumulation of snow. The location of parts was not practicable beyond the immediate impact area. The physical removal of heavy components required prodigious effort; and, upon removal of the engines, further salvage operations were postponed until the snow melted. Certain smaller engine accessories and airframe components were located and carried out by hand. Parts removed from the mountain were flown to the designated overhaul points for failure analysis.

c. Failure Analysis

(1) The airframe components were examined by NAVAIRREWORKFAC Alameda and the report of the analysis is reference (b) and amplified by reference (c). Pertinent findings of these analyses are:

(a) Both air turbine motors (ATM) were turning at impact.

(b) Aileron boost and surface control hydraulic pump, P/N AA 65319R6, showed no evidence of seizure.

(c) The remote attitude indicator (VGI) had the sphere distorted such that it appeared the impact attitude of the aircraft was vertical and tail down. While no correlation is suggested, it should be noted that a typical unit with power removed would assume the orientation observed in the damaged unit.

(d) One DC generator had indications of stationary axial impact. No evidence of rotation at impact was found on the armature.

(e) Wing fuel boost pump was running at impact.

(f) The emergency escape chute had not been fired. One recovered cartridge was tested and it fired within voltage and current limits.

(2) The engines and accessories were examined by NAVAIRREWORKFAC North Island, and the report of the priority disassembly inspection (PDIR)

is reference (d). The port engine was concluded to be stopped or at low RPM at impact. The starboard engine was rotating at impact. No indication of malfunction was found in the engine accessories. The engines were incomplete as recovered. The first, second, third, fifteenth stages of the port engine compressor were missing; with the fourth and sixteenth stages unattached. The first five spacers from the N1 compressor were missing. The first and second stages of the starboard engine were missing; with the third, fourth, and sixteenth stages unattached. The first, second, and fourth spacers from the N1 compressor were missing.

d. Other Investigation and Analysis

(1) NORAD radar was tracking BUNO 138917 along his route of flight. The computer readout indicated a ground speed of 443 knots and a steady track of 340°, along J-5 airway. At 1431.9(U) the readout suddenly changed to 396 knots and 327° track. Very shortly thereafter the radar return disappeared. The geographic plot of the point of lost radar contact by NORAD was 5 to 7 miles further along the track than the Seattle Center radar (located at Klamath Falls). The variation could be an indication of an electrical power loss causing the IFF to become inoperative and cause the center radar contact loss prior to the loss of the radar return by the NORAD radar. The speed loss and the course deviation were duplicated by a pilot of VAH-123 by an intentional sudden power reduction on one engine. The maneuver also resulted in a severe yaw which caused considerable control problems from which the pilot was able to recover under the existing VFR conditions.

(2) The combination of left course deviation observed by NORAD radar and the stopped or low RPM condition of the port engine led to concern about the possibility of failure or seizure of the port engine. During the course of the investigation, another mishap occurred in a VAH-10 aircraft, in the Caribbean area, which was operationally similar to the hypothesis formulated in this accident. This second mishap did not result in a crash. Two crewmen had bailed out while the aircraft was out of control. Upon reaching a low altitude the pilot successfully regained control and landed the aircraft. The starboard engine was found to have suffered severe damage in the compressor area and had extensive damage to the engine pod nose cowl. A PDIR was performed at NAVAIRREWORKFAC, Norfolk. Reference (e) is the report of this investigation and cites the cause of the engine failure to have been the use of the old type second stage compressor rotor two-rail spacer, P/N 206973, rather than the currently required three-rail spacer, P/N 366490. The engine log book indicated that J57 Engine Bulletin 535-A1 (new spacer) had been incorporated. As noted in 2c(2) above, this spacer has not been recovered from the crash site.

3. CONCLUSIONS

a. The cause of this accident is undetermined.

b. The possible cause is a loss of flight control due to severe yaw brought about by a failure of the port engine. An electrical power failure and temporary loss of hydraulic systems may have resulted from a pilot reaction to reduce power on the remaining starboard engine, causing the ATM's to fall below operating RPM. Such conditions in an instrument flight situation would render the aircraft uncontrollable due to the tumbled VGI, asymmetrical thrust, and limited hydraulic flight control. If, as in the VAH-10 mishap, the engine failure also caused compressor case and nose cowl damage, an undetermined but severe amount of asymmetrical drag would be experienced causing further control difficulty.

4. RECOMMENDATION. None, pending further salvage efforts which are planned when snow conditions permit.

Distribution:
List A
CNO (Op-05F)

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE OUT" LETTER ON ORIGINAL REVIEW

NOTE: 1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DEPT:

THE BOARDS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARE BASED ON MEAGER FACTUAL INFORMATION AND MUCH CONJECTURE. THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT WILL REMAIN UNDETERMINED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MAY BE GLEANED FROM FURTHER INVESTIGATION, AS ADDITIONAL COMPONENTS MAY BE RECOVERED

CAS 221C 221

INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPT:

The NAVAIRSYSCOM is having a study conducted to determine the feaseability of installing the YANKEE extraction system in the A3 type aircraft.

H.W.P/433

Concur with conclusions & recommendations of AAR & endorsers. AS/42.

INITIAL/CODE

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to Correction to		Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1			/
DIR			/
Misc. Items for Action or Correction			
To Code	From Code/Date	~~AOA - if you want to sent WX as a Cause change Under to 3, mat U & then you can add WX~~	
	/		/
	/		/
	/		/
	/		/
	/		/
	/		/
	/		/
	/		/

(b) (6) [redacted]

Endorsements Reviewed and Acton Completed on All Phases of this Report.

UNIT VAH 123

MODEL A3B

BUNO 138917

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER DEPT	ROUTING	CODE/INIT
	M&M		7-19-67	O	/	/	/
	AERO MED	7-31-67	8-18-67	D	[illegible]	AWT / 5	/

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS

REMARKS

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NASC 14 FEB 1968 (10 working days)

EXTENSIONS

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER DEPT	ROUTING
A&R					/	/

NASC ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT
1	R&S	3-18-68	3-19-68	[illegible]
2	M&M		3-15	O
3	ADMIN			

AWT 3/19/68

ROUTING AFTER CLOSE OUT

DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER DEPT	ROUTING
AERO MED				/ /	/

NOTES
1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder
2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch
3. Any Department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

AIR-4041:WEH

25 JAN 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A concerning A-3B BuNo. 138917 accident occurring 5 April 1967, pilot PARKS

From: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Forwarded.

2. The A-3 YANKEE Extraction Tests have been basically completed by the contractor. It has been determined that the installation of the YANKEE Extraction system in the A-3 aircraft is technically feasible. Final determination on the requirement, priority and funding for the installation of the YANKEE Extraction system in the A-3 aircraft will be made by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(b) (6) [redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMREADATKCARAIRWING 12
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
NAVPLANTREPO LONG BEACH
CO HATRON 123

1. Reporting Activity: NARF-316-SW NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA (500)	2. Report No. 927	3. Date of Dis. 16 Nov 67	4. Assembly Nomenclature and Part No. P/N 5380824-549 Horizontal stabilizer actuator	Engine
5. Assembly (Model)	6. Assembly (Serial)	7. Assembly MFR 88277	8. Date Removed	9. Removed From (Eng Mod) / 10. Removed From (Eng Ser)
11. Total Hrs Since Last Ord. Unknown	12. Hrs Since Last Ord. Unknown	13. Date Last Ord.	14. Last Overhaul Activity	15. No. Prev. Dis. / 16. Aircraft (Model) A-3B / 17. Aircraft (Bureau) 138917
18. Operating Activity VAH-123	19. Tur-Ser. Ser. (Tur-Ser)	20. Reason for Removal and Code Accident/incident damage 4B		

21. Findings: O [X] No Discrepancy; B [ ] Basic (Mfg/Design) Discrepancy; N [ ] Non-Basic (Maint/Oper) Discrepancy; F [ ] Foreign Object Damage

22. Primary Part Failure (Part No.) | Cond | Cond

23. Description of Findings (Include name and part no. of primary part failure)

Ref: (a) VAH-123 msg 252314Z Oct 1967
(b) NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA DIR 854 of 18 Jul 1967

a. A remaining part of the horizontal stabilizer actuator was recovered as reported by reference (a). This part was received for DIR as a continuation of reference (b), which reported the actuator was jammed by crash impact in approximately the neutral position.

b. Only the lower mounting portion comprising the housing assembly P/N 5380909-501 was received. The transmitter, AC motor assembly P/N XA30525 and DC motor assembly P/N 5949 were torn away by crash impact and missing.

c. Disassembly disclosed no discrepancies other than those caused by crash impact.

24. Discrepant Parts (Part No.) | Cond

25. Pertinent Bulletins, Changes, etc. Incorporated

Number	Yes	No

PRIORITY

26. [X] Priority DIR | Requested by: NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC msg 310110Z Oct 67. | Reference: Control No. 3282-67. | 27. Ones Fix | Applicable / Incorporated

28. Signature: (b) (6) [redacted] | 29. Title: WEAPONS SYSTEMS ENGR DIV HEAD | 30. Date: 30 November 1967

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT NAVWEPS FORM 4730/2 (11-61) REPORT SYMBOL NUWEPS 4730-2

27. CONCLUSIONS: There is no evidence to indicate this portion of the actuator was not operating satisfactorily prior to crash impact.

28. RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

DISTRIBUTION:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR-4113) (AIR-4541)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
NAVAVNSAFECEN NORVA
NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC PHILA
VAH-123
NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
NAVAIREWORKFAC QUONPT
NAVAIREWORKFAC JAX

704051 - -

3750
Ser 80/ 3[illegible]

8 JUN 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A concerning A-3B BuNo 138917 accident occurring 5 April 1967, pilot PARKS

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command

Subj: VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6E

1. Readdressed and forwarded for NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ comments concerning the recommendation contained in Part X concerning installation of the YANKEE Extraction system in A-3B aircraft.

2. The conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements, are concurred with.

3. The first endorsement does not show complete copy to distribution. By copy of this endorsement, the Commanding Officer, VAH-123 is requested to ensure complete copy to distribution in accordance with subparagraph 4(h) of reference (a).

(b) (6)
[redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMBEADATKCARAIRWING 12
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
NAVPIANTREPO LBEACH
CO HATRON 123

Code 015-ee
3750
Ser: 678

2 JUN 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 AAR Ser 1-67 of 5 April 1967, A-3B BUNO 138917, Pilot PARKS

From: Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded. Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey concurs in the comments and recommendations of the Board as modified by the first two endorsements, except as noted below.

(b) (5)

[redacted]

3. Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey concurs in the need of an extraction system for A-3 crew members. The number of possible saves for Whidbey based aircraft are correctly stated in the second endorsement. These do not include combat losses.

4. Plans for further investigation at the crash site are being made. It is estimated that the snow will have receded enough by 1 July to permit access to the area.

J. A. JAAP

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
CONNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMRCVW-12
NAVPLANTREP LBEACH
HATRON ONE TWO THREE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

COMRCVW-12:bd
3750
Ser 80/ 230
23 MAY 1967

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 ser 1-67 of 5 April 1967, A3B BUNO 138917
Pilot PARKS

From: Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board as modified by the remarks of the first endorser and with the following comments:

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

[redacted]

3. It is further noted that section A.19. of the Aircraft Accident Report Form 3750-1 should be changed to reflect altitude 7200 feet above mean sea level and zero feet above terrain.

R. E. Gallatin
R. E. GALLATIN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Copy to:
CO, VAH-123
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS

VAH-123/JPS-dwc
3750
Ser 00/
12 MAY 1967

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 ser 1-67 of 5 April 1967 A3B BUNO 138917 Pilot PARKS

From: Commanding Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron One Two Three
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing Twelve
(2) Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey
(3) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board with the following exceptions:

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

[redacted]

(b) (5)

[redacted]

d. Concur.

e. Concur. All possible efforts will be made to recover further wreckage and ascertain additional facts concerning the accident. Any new developments will be forwarded when available.

(b) (5)

[redacted]

3. An examination of LCDR PARKS flight log shows that he had not been involved in a previous pilot caused accident.

4. The last COMNAVAIRPAC Accident Prevention Survey was completed on 30 March 1967

J. P. SUNDBERG

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

From: Commanding Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron ONE TWO THREE

To: Commander, U S Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Supplementary Accident Data concerning VAH-123 AAR serial 1-67A, A3B BUNO 138917 occurring 5 April 1967, Pilot PARKS, Instructor Pilot KING
submission of

Ref: (a) NASC ltr ser: 50/B155 of 19 APR 1967

Encl: (1) Supplementary Accident Data Form for subject accident pages 1 through 5 & 1-3
(2) Reproduction of subject pilot's log covering month of accident and two (2) preceding calendar months and co-pilot's.
~~(3) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~(4) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

1. As requested by reference (a), the enclosures are forwarded.

J. P. SUNDBERG

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SUPPLEMENTARY ACCIDENT DATA

In addition to answering the following questions, enclose a duplicate of the pilot's log covering the month in which the accident occurred as well as the preceding two calendar months.

1. Date of mishap: year 1967 month April day 5
2. Aircraft model A-3B
3. Bureau Number of aircraft 133917
4. Reporting custodian VAH-123
5. Pilot file number (b) (6) [redacted]
6. Branch of service: Marine ____ Navy X
7. Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing (RCVW) trained? Yes ____ No X
   UNDERGOING RCVW TRAINING WHEN ACCIDENT OCCURRED.
   If Yes, date completed / /
   RCVW Squadron VAH-123
8. Percentage of training completed if in a formal training status 25%
9. Length of time (mo.) in present squadron 4 mo
10. Pilot currently qualified in following aircraft (model and series)
    A3B TF9J ____ ____ ____

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AVIATORS FLIGHT LOG BOOK
LCDR PARKS

DAY	MODEL	SERIAL NUMBER	KIND OF FLIGHT CODE	TOTAL PILOT TIME	FIRST PILOT	CO-PILOT	INST TIME DAY	INST TIME NIGHT	NIGHT VFR TIME	OTHER LAND OR SEA	STD INST APPR COMPLETED	REMARKS
3-1-67	A-3B	138959	1A1	1.2		1.2	0.2 A					F-1
3-9-67	A-3B	138932	1A1	2.5	1.8	0.7					1 T A	F-1
3-11-67	A-3B	142251	1A1	2.1	2.1		0.5 A			8	1TA,3GA	F-2
3-13-67	A-3B	138932	1A1	2.5	2.5		0.7 A			6	1TA,1RA, 2GA	F-3
3-18-67	A-3B	138921	1A1	2.3	2.3		0.4 A			8	5JGA,1JGA	F-4
3-21-67	A-3B	142634	1A1	1.7	1.7		0.5 A			10	1TA,2GA	F-5X
3-24-67	A-3B	138906	1A1	2.4	2.4		0.3 A			8	3GA,1RA	F-6
3-27-67	A-3B	142251	1A2	2.0	2.0					6	1TA,3GA	F-7
-29-67	A-3B	138917	3A1	2.1	2.1				2.1	6	1TA,2GA	F-9
3-30-67	A-3B	138917	1A1	2.7	2.7		0.5 A			2	1TA,1RA, 1GA	F-8
3-30-67	A-3B	138917	3A1	1.4	1.4		0.5 A		1.4	4	1RA,4GA	F-10
4-3-67	A-3B	138917	1A2	2.2	2.2			2.0S		1	1RA,1TA, 2GA	I-1
TOTAL				25.1								

11. a. Specify training time (hrs.) with reference to date of mishap as follows:

	WST		OFT		CPT		LINK
	This model	All other models	This model	All other models	This model	All other models	
Previous 12 months			9	UNK			
Previous 6 months			9	UNK			
Previous 3 months			9	Ø			
Previous 1 month			9	Ø			

If training time in this model during previous three months was less than 3 hours in Weapons Systems Trainer (WST), Operational Flight Trainer (OFT), or Cockpit Training (CPT), indicate reason by checking appropriate spaces in part b.

b.

	WST	OFT	CPT	LINK
(1) Pilot deployed				
(2) Trainer not in area (station)			X	
(3) Down for maintenance				
(4) Not available due to trainer schedule				
(5) Lack of trainer personnel				
(6) Not available due to pilot's schedule				
(7) Other reasons (specify):				

Co-Pilot Form

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 1750.6 SERIES

SUPPLEMENTARY ACCIDENT DATA

In addition to answering the following questions, enclose a duplicate of the co-pilot's log covering the month in which the accident occurred as well as the preceding two calendar months.

1. Date of mishap: year 1961 month APRIL day 25
2. Aircraft model A-3B
3. Bureau Number of aircraft 138917
4. Reporting custodian VAH-123
5. ~~XXX~~ Co-pilot file number (b) (6) [redacted]
6. Branch of service: Marine ____ Navy X
7. Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing (RCVW) trained? Yes X No ____

   If Yes, date completed 8 AUG 61

   RCVW Squadron VAH-123
8. Percentage of training completed if in a formal training status ____
9. Length of time (mo.) in present squadron 16 MO
10. ~~XXX~~ Co-pilot currently qualified in following aircraft (model and series)

    A-3B A-6A ____ ____ ____

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AVIATORS FLIGHT LOG BOOK
LCDR KING

DAY	MODEL	SERIAL NUMBER	KING OF FLIGHT CODE	TOTAL PILOT TIME	FIRST PILOT	CO-PILOT	INST TIME DAY	INST TIME NIGHT	NIGHT VFR TIME	OTHER LAND OR SEA	STD INST APPR COM-PLETED	REMARKS
2-3-67	A-6A	152621	1A1	2.5	2.5		1.0 A	1.0 S		1	1JRA	BNAV-2
2-6-67	A-6A	152616	1A1	2.6	2.6		0.1 A	1.0 S		1	1JRS	
2-6-67	TA-3B	144856	1A1	4.1	4.1		1.4 A	3.0 S		1	1JRA	RN-3
2-9-67	A-6A	152616	1A1	2.3	2.3		1.0 A	1.0 S		1	1JRA	
2-14-67	A-6A	152616	1A1	2.5	2.5					1		
2-17-67	A-3B	138944	1R2	2.6	2.6					1	1JTS	NKX
2-23-67	A-3B	142364	3A4	3.8		3.8			3.8			
2-27-67	TA-3B	144867	1A1	2.0	2.0		0.5 A			1		RN-2
3-6-67	A-3B	142634	1A1	1.5		1.5						
3-7-67	A-6A	152617	1A1	2.1	2.1					1	1AS	
3-9-67	A-6A	152622	1A1	5.0	2.5	2.5	0.5 A	1.0 S		1	1GA	NWW MIRAMAR
3-10-67	A-3B	142844	1A1	1.4		1.4	1.5 A	0.5 S		4	2GA,2TA	
3-13-67	A-3B	142634	1A1	1.9		1.9						
3-15-67	A-6A	152901	1A7	2.0	2.0		0.5			1		
3-14-67	A-6A	152613	1A7	2.6	2.6		0.5 A	1.0 S		1	1RS	BWPS ING

AVIATORS FLIGHT LOG BOOK
LCDR KING
(CONT)

DAY	MODEL	SERIAL NUMBER	KING OF FLIGHT CODE	TOTAL PILOT TIME	FIRST PILOT	CO-PILOT	INST TIME DAY	INST TIME NIGHT	NIGHT VFR TIME	OTHER LAND OR SEA	STD INST APPR COMPLETED	REMARKS
3-22-67	A-3B	138906	3A4	0.4		0.4						COA-64
3-22-67	A-3B	138921	1A1	2.5	2.5		0.7 A	1.0 S		1	1RA	NKX
3-16-67	A-3B	142634	1A1	3.0		3.0	1.0 A					NKX
3-27-67	A-3B	138917	1A2	1.9	0.4	1.5				2		
3-29-67	A-6A	152615	1A1	2.5	2.5		0.1			1		BNAV-4
4-1-67	A-6A	152900	1A7	2.3	2.3		0.1 A			1		NWW NWW
4-3-67	A-6A	152623	1A7	2.2	2.2					1		BDM
4-4-67	A-6A	152623	1A1	2.7	1.5	1.2	0.2			3	1GA	PFAM-1
TOTAL				56.4								

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Co-Pilot Form

11. a. Specify training time (hrs.) with reference to date of mishap as follows:

	WST		OFT		CPT		LINK
	This model	All other models	This model	All other models	This model	All other models	
Previous 12 months							
Previous 6 months							
Previous 3 months							
Previous 1 month							

If training time in this model during previous three months was less than 3 hours in Weapons Systems Trainer (WST), Operational Flight Trainer (OFT), or Cockpit Training (CPT), indicate reason by checking appropriate spaces in part b.

b.

	WST	OFT	CPT	LINK
(1) Pilot deployed				
(2) Trainer not in area (station)				
(3) Down for maintenance				
(4) Not available due to trainer schedule				
(5) Lack of trainer personnel				
(6) Not available due to pilot's schedule		X		
(7) Other reasons (specify):				

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

12. [redacted] ____

13. Commanding Officer's rating of co-pilot's ability: Superior X

Average ____ Below Average ____

14. [redacted]

a. [redacted] ____

b. [redacted] ____

15. [redacted]

a. [redacted] ____

b. [redacted] ____

c. [redacted] ____

16. [redacted] ____

17. [redacted] ____

18. [redacted] ____

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

12. If flight was a maintenance test flight, was pilot designated by Commanding Officer as qualified maintenance test pilot? Yes ___ No ___

13. Commanding Officer's rating of pilot's ability: Superior ___

Average X Below Average ___

14. Length of time (mo.) Commanding Officer

a. Has been aboard 3mo

b. Has been in command of this squadron 3mo

15. Estimate of total time (hrs.) involved in accident investigation by:

a. Accident board members 788

b. Wreckage recovery and salvage 710

c. Supporting Personnel 1220

16. Best estimate of operation and maintenance funds expended for investigation and salvage (e.g. civilian salaries, O&R cost, equipment rental, etc.) $ 23.00

Attach itemized breakdown.

GASOLINE — 12.50
BLACK IRON PIPE - 10.50
$23.00

17. Did funding cause a delay in wreckage recovery? Yes ___ No X

If Yes, how long? ___ (days)

18. Was equipment for wreckage recovery adequate? Yes X No ___

If No, list deficiencies.

WRECKAGE RECOVERY LIMITED BY WEATHER AND DENSE SNOW COVER. LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND SMALL BUSINESS FIRMS PROVIDED MUCH ASSISTANCE AT NO COST.

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

19. Number of accident board members 4

20. Specify number of accident board members who have attended the following schools :

a. Safety Officer's School, USC 0

b. Safety Officer's School, Monterey 0

c. Safety Center 5-day ASO School 1

d. Monterey Baccalaureate Curriculum Safety Course 0

e. SEE BELOW

f. None of the above ____

21. Specify by checking if the:

	Manufacturer's Technical Reps			Manufacturer's Engineers		
	Requested	were Available	Utilized	Requested	were Available	Utilized
Airframe		X	X		X	X
Engine		X	X		X	X
Other						

22. Was pre-accident plan adequate? Yes X No ____

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INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE WAS PROVIDED BY
AVIATION SAFETY CENTER REPRESENTATIVE
COM FAIRWHIDBEY AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER
VAH-123 A-6 AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER
ALL GRADUATES OF SAFETY OFFICERS SCHOOL, USC.

23. Did previous training adequately prepare the accident board for its duties?

Yes X No ___

(If answer to questions 22 or 23 is No, please make comments).

COMMENTS:

24. Has the command submitted any previous recommendation that included factors similar to those associated with this mishap? Yes X No ___

COMMENTS:

THIS COMMAND HAS MADE MANY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOME EJECTION SEAT ESCAPE CAPABILITY AND CONTINUES TO DO SO. THE NEED FOR AN O ESCAPE SYSTEM IS RE-EMPHASIZED BY THIS MISHAP.

1. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	2. REPORT NO.	3. DATE OF D/I	4. ASSEMBLY NOMENCLATURE AND PART NO.	ENGINE
NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS	31	5-9-67		X

5. ASSEMBLY (Model)	6. ASSEMBLY (Serial)	7. ASSEMBLY MFR	8. DATE REMOVED	9. REMOVED FROM (Eng Mod)	10. REMOVED FROM (Eng Ser)
J57-P10	P607625 & P632289	77445	4-5-67	-----	-----

11. TOTAL HRS SINCE NEW	12. HRS SINCE LAST O/H	13. DATE LAST O/H	14. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	15. NO. PREV O/H'S	16. AIRCRAFT (Model)	17. AIRCRAFT (BUNO)
See Page 2	See Page 2		NAS NORIS	See Page 2	A3B	138917

18. OPERATING ACTIVITY	19. FUR-EFR-AAR-1/FH/GA	20. REASON FOR REMOVAL AND CODE
VAH-123	AAR-1-67A	Aircraft Accident 4B

21. FINDINGS: O [X] NO DISCREPANCY; B [ ] BASIC (MFG/DESIGN) DISCREPANCY; N [ ] NON-BASIC (MAINT/OPER) DISCREPANCY; F [ ] FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE

22. PRIMARY PART FAILURE (Part No.) | COND | ZONE

23. DISCREPANT PARTS (Part No.) | COND

28. DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS (Include name and part no. of primary part failure) See attached sheets.

Distribution:

NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR-4113/53613/4012/504)
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
NAVAVNSAFECEN NORVA
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMNAVAIRLANT
NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
COMREADATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
HATRON ONE TWO THREE
NAVPLANTREPO L. BEACH
NAVPLANTREPO E. HARTFORD
NAVAIREWORKFAC NORVA
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT

Local Dist:
1000
400
6000
PWA Representative

AAR
060300Z Apr

24. PERTINENT BULLETINS, CHANGES, ETC. INCORPORATED

NUMBER	YES	NO
E.B. 535-A1	X	

27. CONCLUSIONS

See attached sheets.

34. RECOMMENDATIONS

See attached sheets.

29. [X] PRIORITY DIR | REQUESTED BY: NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC Control No. | REFERENCE: 3282-67 131804Z Apr '67

25. GREB 114 | APPLICABLE | INCORPORATED

(b) (6) [redacted]

31. TITLE: Weapons Engineering Department Supt.

32. DATE: 5/12/67

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT NAVWEPS FORM 4730/2 (11-61) REPORT SYMBOL BUWEPS 4730-2

332
SHB:lvb

NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS PRIORITY DIR NO. 31

NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC 131804Z April 1967 Control No. 3282-67 requested a failure analysis on J57-P10 engines, Serial Nos. P607625 and P632289, removed from A3B aircraft BUNO 138917, due to an aircraft accident. NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS 220118Z and 282356Z April 1967 refer.

26. Description of Findings:

Supplemental Data to Form 4730/2

Engine Serial No. P607625

11. Total hours since new - 2864.5

12. Hours since last overhaul - 439.7

13. Date last overhaul - 18 July 1966

15. No.of previous overhauls - (4)

Engine Serial No. P632289

11. Total hours since new - 2076.1

12. Hours since last overhaul - 439.7

13. Date last overhaul - 19 July 1966

15. No. of previous overhauls - (3)

a. Visual inspection revealed that both engines had suffered major impact-type damage. Engine rotating components were found severed into five sections, as shown in enclosure (1).

b. Examination of damaged parts from L/H engine S/N P607625, i.e., N_1 and N_2 compressors, as shown in enclosures (2) and (3), respectively, revealed that the compressor blades were relatively straight and negligible rotor rotation was in evidence, indicating that engine speed was low RPM or rotors stopped at impact.

(1) Examination of the third and second stage turbine discs, as shown in enclosure (4), substantiates further that rotor speed of engine S/N P607625, was low RPM or stopped at impact, as indicated by the blade tip bending and absence of rotational rub marks.

(2) A review of the N_1 and N_2 compressors and discs of engine S/N P607625, revealed that Nos. 1, 2, and 3 discs were missing; No. 4 disc was found unattached; No. 5 disc was missing; Nos. 6 through 14 discs were found assembled together; No. 15 disc was missing and No. 16 disc was found unattached.

704051

332
SHB:lvb

NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS PRIORITY DIR NO. 31

c. Examination of damaged compressor parts of R/H engine S/N P632289, indicated rotor rotation at impact. Engine speed was probably in the idle RPM range, as disclosed by the anti-rotation right-angle bending and clipped off N_1 and N_2 compressor blades shown in enclosure (5).

d. The No. 1 main bearings were missing from both engines. All other main bearings of both engines were examined and found to have operated satisfactorily prior to suffering impact damage.

e. Those parts of engine, S/N P607625 and P632289 affected by E.B. 535-A1 were not received; therefore, inspection could not verify physical incorporation of this bulletin.

f. Research of history data indicates:

(1) Engine S/N P607625 - NORIS shops engine assembly records indicate J57 E.B. 535-Amendment 1 incorporation was certified 9 July 1966; NAVWEPS Form 13090/40 indicates incorporation of J57 E.B. 535 Amendment 1 by NORIS on 3 February 1964 and certification of incorporation by NORIS on 9 July 1966.

(2) Engine S/N P632289 - NORIS shops engine assembly records indicate J57 E.B. 535 Amendment 1 incorporation was certified 11 July 1966; NAVWEPS Form 13090/40 indicates incorporation of J57 E.B. 535 Amendment 1 by NORIS on 25 September 1965 and certification of incorporation by NORIS on 11 July 1966.

g. Accessories:

(1) The pressurizing and dump valve removed from engine S/N P607625 was disassembled and examined without testing, because of impact damage; no indication of malfunction was found.

(2) The upper body group of one unidentified fuel control was received. These parts were examined; no indication of malfunction was found.

27. Conclusions:

a. Engine S/N P607625 was stopped or at low RPM at impact. Engine S/N P632289 was rotating at impact, probably in the idle RPM range.

b. Examination and analysis of engine components as received revealed no indications of malfunction.

28. Recommendations: None.

Encl: (1) NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS Photo No. LAA-34898
(2) " " " " " -34897
(3) " " " " " -34895
(4) " " " " " -34899
(5) " " " " " -34896





ENCL (5)

NNNNZCZCNASC729CSLA038
RTTU JAW RUWJMUA5959 2002204-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 192204Z JUL 67
FM NAVACREWORKFAC NORIS
TO ZEN1/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN1/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREDATKCRARIWING ONE TWO
RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCEN
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO L BEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD
BT
UNCLAS
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ PASS TO AIR-4113/504/53613
A3B BUNO 138917 A/C ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A. YOUR 280121Z JUN 67
1. REF A CONTROL NO. 3282-67 REQ AN ENGINEERING ANALYSIS ON MAIN FUEL CONTROL, P/N 507650-L16, S/N 20112, REMOVED FROM ONE ENGINE OF SUBJ

729/67

Cog M+M Records

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA5959 UNCLAS
A/C.
2. INVESTIGATION REVEALED:
A. FUEL CONTROL SUFFERED MAJOR IMPACT DAMAGE.
B. CONTROL MECHANISMS (CONTROL SHAFT, LINKAGE, BRACKET, AND LEVER ASSY, ETC.) WERE MISSING.
C. FUEL STRAINERS WERE CLEAN.
D. PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE - CLOSED POSITION (NORMAL). NO DISCREPANCIES.
E. FLYWEIGHT GOVERNOR ASSY - NO DISCREPANCIES.
F. CYLINDER CAM SPEED SENSOR - NO DISCREPANCIES.
3. CONCLUDE: DETERMINATION OF FUEL CONTROL OPERABILITY OR MALFUNCTION PRIOR TO IMPACT NOT FEASIBLE DUE TO MUTILATED CONDITON OF PARTS.
4. THIS IS A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS PRIORITY DIR NO. 31 OF 12 MAY 1967.
BT

JUL
192204Z

A3B 138917

704051--

1. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	2. REPORT NO.	3. DATE OF D/I	4. ASSEMBLY NOMENCLATURE AND PART NO.	ENGINE
NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA (300)	854	12 Jul 67	Horizontal stabilizer actuator P/N 5380824-549	

5. ASSEMBLY (Model)	6. ASSEMBLY (Serial)	7. ASSEMBLY NFR	8. DATE FLMOVED	9. REMOVED FROM (Eng Mod)	10. REMOVED FROM (Eng Ser)
		88277			

11. TOTAL HRS SINCE NEW	12. HRS SINCE LAST O/H	13. DATE LAST O/H	14. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	15. NO. PREV O/H'S	16. AIRCRAFT (Model)	17. AIRCRAFT (BUNO)
Unknown	Unknown				A-3B	138917

18. OPERATING ACTIVITY	19. FUR-EFR, SAR, I/FH/GA	20. REASON FOR REMOVAL AND CODE
HATRON-123		Accident/Incident Damage 4B

21. FINDINGS: [O] NO DISCREPANCY [B] BASIC (MFG/DESIGN) DISCREPANCY [N] NON-BASIC (MAINT/OPER) DISCREPANCY [F] FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE

22. PRIMARY PART FAILURE (Part No.) | COND. | ZONE

23. DISCREPANT PARTS (Part No.) | COND.

26. DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS (Include name and part no. of primary part failure)

Only the top mounting portion of the actuator was received at this Facility. It consisted of a fractured ball screw assembly and a damaged ball nut P/N 5660-2. These parts were jammed in position by crash impact. This position corresponded with the approximately neutral position or zero degree trim of the actuator.

24. PERTINENT BULLETINS, CHANGES, ETC. INCORPORATED

NUMBER	YES	NO

27. CONCLUSIONS

Actuator was in approximately neutral position or zero degree trim during impact.

28. RECOMMENDATIONS

None.

25. OPER 114 | APPLICABLE | INCORPORATED

29. [ ] PRIORITY DIR. REQUESTED BY: NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC 280121Z Jun 67. REFERENCE: Control 3282-67.

30. SIGNATURE: (b) (6) [redacted]

31. TITLE: WEAPONS SYSTEMS ENGR DIV HEAD

32. DATE: 18 July 1967

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT NAVWEPS FORM 4730/2 (11-61) REPORT SYMBOL BUWEPS 4730-2

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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPOR[redacted]
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRE[redacted] accordance with
Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART 1 GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY: CO, HATRON-123	2. SERIAL NO: 1-67A	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP: 051431U APR	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT: A-3B	5. BUREAU NUMBER: 138917
6. TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center		9. LOCATION OF MISHAP: 41-17 N/120-16 W		10. DAMAGE: AFA
7. VIA: Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing Twelve Commander Fleet Air Whidbey Commander Naval Air Force Pacific	8.	11. TIME OF DAY: AFTERNOON	12. TIME IN FLIGHT: 1 + 15	13. FLIGHT CODE: 1A1
		14. CLEARED FROM: NAS MIRAMAR TO: NAS WHIDBEY		
		15. TYPE CLEARANCE: IFR	16. AIRSPEED: 450 E	17. A/C WEIGHT: 56,000 (EST)

18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP: AIRCRAFT COLLISION WITH GROUND

19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP: S L 7,200 TERRAIN 7,200

20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL	X	17. WEATHER
X	2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		19. DESIGN GSE/EQUIPMENT
	4. PILOT OTHER (Specify)		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
	5. CREW		13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN, TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK, ROUGH SEAS
	6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)	X	22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)	X	23. UNDETERMINED
	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)		16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)		24. OTHER (Specify)

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2. RANK/GR	3. SERVICE NO	4. DESIGNATOR	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7. YEARS EXP. NAVA	8. PILOT	9. POSITION	10. NAVAL OFFICER
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap) PARKS, Richard E.	LCDR	(b) (6)	1310	USN	35	11 YRS	FRP	PILOT	A
CO-PILOT (identify & submit separate page 1) KING, Donald E.	LCDR	[redacted]	1310	USN	36	14 YRS	INST PILOT	B/N	A

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS		2821	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	362 / 109
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		153	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	0 / 0
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		25	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	4 / 2
				IN MODEL	4 / 2
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	25	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	4 /
	OFT/OPT	9 / NA		IN MODEL	4 /
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	25	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap)		72
	OFT/OPT	9 / NA			
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	25	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	4 April 1967
	OFT/OPT	9 / NA		DURATION	3
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK		NONE	24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		SPEC

OTHER PERS

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. RANK	27. SERIAL NO	28. DESIGNATOR OF MUSTER	29. FILE/SERVICE NO	30. UNIT	31. INJURY	32. PILOT	33. POSITION
MILLER, Carl V. Jr.		ADJ3	USN	(b) (6) [redacted]		FATAL	P/C	COCKPIT
READER, James M.	XX	LCDR	USN	[redacted]	VF-126	FATAL	PAX	COCKPIT

OP-23F

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev 3-[illegible]) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with Part 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION [illegible]6, effective edition*

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART 1 GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY	2. SERIAL NO	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT	5. BUREAU NUMBER
CO, HATION-123	1-67A	051431U APR	A-3B	138917

6. TO Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center

7. VIA	8.	11. TIME OF DAY	12. TIME IN FLIGHT	13. FLIGHT CODE

14. CLEARED FROM TO

15. TYPE CLEARANCE	16. AIRSPEED	17. A/C WEIGHT

18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP

19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP S.L. TERRAIN

20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED *(Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)*

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

FACTOR	FACTOR	FACTOR
1 PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT	9 SERVICING PERSONNEL	17 WEATHER
2 PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES	10 LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER	18 DESIGN AIRCRAFT
3 PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM	11 OTHER PERSONNEL *(Specify)*	19 DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
4 PILOT OTHER *(Specify)*	12 ADMINISTRATIVE	20 DESIGN OTHER *(Specify)*
5 CREW	13 FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN, TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK	21 ROLLING/PITCHING DECK, ROUGH SEAS
6 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL	14 FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (OCA, OCA, ILS, MIRROR)	22 MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
7 MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL	15 FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR *(Ship or field)*	23 UNDETERMINED
8 SUPERVISORY OTHER *(Specify)*	16 FACILITIES OTHER *(Specify)*	24 OTHER *(Specify)*

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2. RANK	3. SERVICE NO	4. DESIG NATOR	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7. YEARS FLIGHT TIME	8. BILLET	9. POSITION	10. FLIGHT CODE
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap)									
CO-PILOT (Identify & submit separate page 3) KING, Donald E.	LCDR	(b) (6)	1310	USN	36	14 YRS	INST PILOT	R/N	A

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA — PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		TOTAL
11 ALL MODELS		4209	17 CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	XXX	180 /
				IN MODEL	UNK / UNK
12 ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		413	18 FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	74 / 112
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
13 ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		92	19 INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	8 / 10
				IN MODEL	4 / 5
14 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	833	20 NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	5 /
	OFT/CPT	UNK / UNK		IN MODEL	5 /
15 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	182	21 TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (If jet mishap)		1786
	OFT/CPT	0 / 0			
16 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	43	22 LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	4 April 1967
	OFT/CPT	0 / 0		DURATION	3
23 DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK		8/14/64 QUAL	24 TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		SPEC

OTHER PERS

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. RANK	27. SERVICE NO	28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	29. FULL SERVICE NO	30. UNIT	31. NAVY	32. BILLET	33. POSITION

OP-4257

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 2

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OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL, AND FACILITIES DATA

A. A/C HISTORY

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST PAR OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
28 Dec 56	3748.9	6	6	439.7	NAS ALAMEDA	CAL. ODD	246.3	79

B. ENGINE HISTORY

	1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR REQUESTED	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)	J-57 P-10	P607 625	2434.7	4	YES	439.7	NAS NORIS	CAL. ODD	246.3	79
(2)	J-57 P-10	P632 289	2076.1	3	YES	439.7	NAS NORIS	CAL. ODD	246.3	79
(3)										
(4)										

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

	1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OVERHAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR REQUESTED	8. SER. NO. FUR/AMPEUR
(1)	ATM 78P-247	352040-0-4	1746.2	2	543.6	NAS ALAMEDA	YES	
(2)	ATM PX-44-175	352030-0-2	1883.9	5	453.7	NAS ALAMEDA	YES	
(3)								
(4)								

D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS

1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED	
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURES

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE
	18,000'	360K EST	UNK	UNK	LEVEL FLT	UNK	LEVEL

8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT	10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL	14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS
UNK	☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED				☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL	

INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS
UNK	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/BMEP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE

INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. AMPFUR SERIAL NUMBER
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP VAH-123 110345Z — Info NASC on DIR request. See para. 38 OPNAVINST 3750.6E
3. OTHER
4.

OP-05F

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REP[redacted] SPECIAL [redacted]NDLING REQUI[redacted] in accordance with

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Re[redacted]63) Page 3 Para 86, [redacted]NAV INSTRUCTI[redacted]3750.6, effective edition

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR	2. PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH END SPEED
6. [illegible] NUMBER	7. WHEEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION OF SHIP	9. LAUNCHING [illegible] AND BRIDLE ARRESTER	
10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR [illegible]				

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves an arresting gear barrier and/or [illegible] equipment or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or damaged equipment, including [illegible] or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

G. SHIPBOARD

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (PSI)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (use side or back)

1. DATE DEPLOYED (CONUS)	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
5. INST. HOURS/LANDINGS (FOR DEPLOYMENT) ACTUAL/A.H.O.R.F.T.	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY / OUTSIDE AIR	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING

7. OTHER WEATHER OBSERVATIONS (winds aloft, icing level, cloud, [illegible] as appropriate)

See weather enclosure.

PART II ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS
			Time extension granted by CNAP 2022262 APR 67

2. COPY DISTRIBUTION

20C NAVINDEFDEV DIRECT DAMP

10C SUWEPS DIRECT DAMP

1CC COMNAVAIRPac

1CC COMFAIRWHIDBEY

1CC COMFCVW-12

1CC PLANT REPO

LONG BEACH

COST DAMAGE TO	3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	4. PRIVATE PROPERTY	5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CNO
	Various trees of unknown value	NONE	5 MAY 1967

PART IV SIGNATURES

[redacted] (b) (6)	OPERATIONS OFFICER UNIT BILLET	[redacted] (b) (6) AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER UNIT BILLET
[redacted] (b) (6)	FLIGHT SURGEON	[redacted] (b) (6) MATERIAL OFFICER UNIT BILLET

* When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

OP-03P

V THE ACCIDENT

On 5 April A3B BUNO 138917, NJ309, departed NAS Miramar at 1316 local for NAS Whidbey Island via Bakersfield, J-5 Seattle direct NAS Whidbey at flight level 220, airspeed 450 knots TAS. The flight progressed normally, deviating from filed flight level to 180. At 1428 approximately 95 nautical miles SSE of Lakeview VORTAC Oakland Center advised 138917 to contact Seattle Center on frequency 306.3 MCS. This transmission was acknowledged with no statement of difficulty. At 1430 the aircraft reported at flight level 180 to Seattle Center but did not acknowledge when subsequently requested to SQUAWK IDENT. At 1431 Seattle Center observed the aircraft make an abrupt left deviation from flight track and disappear from radar at 41 - 27N, 120 - 15W.

Agencies concerned were alerted at this time and at 1630 search and rescue attempts were initiated by Air Rescue Center at Hamilton AFB. At approximately 1430 a witness 8½ miles from the scene heard an explosion and observed smoke. He subsequently notified the MODOC county sheriff in Alturas, California. Search and rescue aircraft maintained a vigil over the scene throughout the remainder of the day and all during the night. Search efforts were hampered by dense cloud cover and restricted visibility in snow showers. The following morning, 6 April 1967, the MODOC county sheriff in a light civil aircraft visually spotted the wreckage at 41° - 17'N, 120° - 16'W. The wreckage was located on the western side of the Warner Mountain range at 7400' level amidst a forested area with snow depths approximately 4 - 6 feet (see enclosure 2). Coincidentally, a ground party of two U. S. Forest Rangers assigned to the Modoc National Forest reached the scene via snow tractor and established that there were no survivors at the wreckage site. A navy flight surgeon, dropped by helo later during the day, verified that there were no survivors at the crash scene. On 8 April the navy aircraft accident investigative team from VAH-123 established that all four occupants had remained with the aircraft and further search efforts terminated. Rescue report, OPNAV form 3750-13 is contained as enclosure (3).

VI DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

The aircraft sustained ALFA damage as a result of impacting a thickly forested area in a 35° nose down, upright attitude. Explosion occured following impact with several massive trees and wreckage was strewn over an area approximately 2000' X 500' against a rising 40° slope in a conical expanding pattern. Complete examination of the wreckage was not possible due to heavy snow cover and fallen trees in the initial impact area. Prior to impact the aircraft had severed numerous trees as it approached the ground. The area upslope showed patchy areas of residual ground fire of short duration. Fragments of nose radome and port outer wing panel were located along the flight path 350 feet prior to the impact area. Fragmentation of the aircraft was severe and no components were found intact. Engines were located up slope from the impact center, the port engine broken into 2 major sections and the starboard into 3 sections. All recovered engine sections and accessory components that could give evidence of inflight operation were salvaged and shipped for DIR.

Portions of both ATM's and accessories were located close to the left side of the impact area. Scroll and nozzle guide vanes from both ATM's were found. Stators to both AC generators, a DC generator housing, a DC armature, pressurization turbine, and wing fuel pump were located in the same vicinity. An ATM turbine and an internal section of hydraulic pump were found approximately 300' upslope. These parts were submitted for DIR.

A number of cockpit instruments were recovered. The TACAN DME gauge, VGI, standby gyro, angle of attack and turn & bank were found and submitted for DIR. A portion of fiber glass curtain approximately 1½' X 2½' was recovered and found charred though its location was in an upslope area devoid of other ground fire indications. One of the two escape chute actuating cylinders, found nearly intact, was submitted for DIR.

See enclosure (4) for a general wreckage diagram. This diagram does not indicate all wreckage found but is submitted to permit a better understanding of the crash site. A great number of components of interest to the investigators were not recovered due to thick snow cover (4 to 6' in depth) and continued snow flurries which daily recovered the site.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

VII THE INVESTIGATION

A. Flight Investigation

On 4 April 1967 the aircraft had flown to NAS Miramar for the dual purpose of conducting an instrument training flight for LCDR PARKS and providing transportation for LCDR KING and LCDR (b) (6) for attendance at a 0800 5 April COMACVW-12 conference. LCDR KING served as flight instructor for the flight to Miramar. The landing at Miramar was exceptionally hard as noted in LCDR (b) (6) statement (enclosure (5)). (b) (5) [redacted] (b) (5) [redacted] No repairs were conducted on the aircraft.

The following day 5 April 1967 the aircraft was scheduled for a 1300 departure from Miramar to Whidbey Island. The flight was properly constituted as an instrument training flight with LCDR PARKS as replacement pilot in the pilots seat, the instructor pilot LCDR KING occupying the bombardiers seat, ADJ3 MILLER as plane captain and LCDR READER as passenger. It is not known which seat positions LCDR READER or ADJ3 MILLER occupied.

The flight was properly filed (see enclosure (6)) and departed NAS Miramar at 1316 via direct Bakersfield, J-5 Seattle direct Whidbey Island with FL 220 assigned. In the Los Angeles Center area of control the aircraft was descended to FL 180 for reasons unknown. A study of the complete flight tape transcripts does not reveal any reason for descent to lower altitude.

Flight thru the Oakland area was uneventful till after passing the Reno 155/78 radial. At 1419 numerous calls were made by Oakland Center with no acknowledgement. From then until last contact at 1431 radio communications were intermittent. See enclosure (7) for a transcript of communications during this period. At 1431 Seattle Center observed on radar the aircraft deviate from flight track in a sharp left turn and disappear from contact at 41 - 27N, 120 - 15W.

NORAD radar maintained a plot on the aircraft till losing contact at 1431.9. A plot of their computerized track (see enclosure (2)) shows a left deviation from track commencing at 1429.4 with increased left turn aggravation occuring at 1431.5. The last reliable fix was at 1431.9. During the period of left track deviation the ground speed slowed from 463 KTS to 396 KTS. The portion of final track from 1431.5 to 1431.9 records a change of ground speed from 443 KTS to 396 KTS. Last contact from the NORAD plot occured at 41 - 20N, 120 - 13W.

The actual crash location was sighted by a witness 8½ miles from the scene (see enclosure (8)) who heard an explosion and saw smoke. His subsequent report via telephone to the county sheriff in Alturas, California was instrumental towards visual spotting of the wreckage the following day. The correct crash location was established as 41 - 17N, 120 - 16W.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

B. Site Investigation

The crash occurred in a moderately forested area in approximately 4 feet of snow with higher drifts. Trees of varying trunk size from 6 inches to 2 feet in diameter were severed and or fallen both prior to ground contact and following. Others were canted at varying degrees from vertical from the impact point forward along the path of the crash. Elevation of the impact point was approximately 7200 feet with wreckage strewn over a 500' X 2000' area against a rising 40° slope to 7400'. Site photos are contained as enclosure (9).

Examination of the site and severed trees along the flight path indicates that the aircraft initially encountered the top of a tree in a nose low, slight right wing down condition heading 205° magnetic. Continued tree contact for approximately 400 feet at a 35° dive angle caused the aircraft to impact the ground in a slight left wing down condition. Explosion occurred upon contact with the trees. The identification and positioning of the wreckage confirmed that the aircraft had been in an upright attitude with some degree of left wing down condition at impact. At or near the impact point no indications of ground fire existed. However, upslope 300' to 900' slightly burned patchy areas were evident indicating residual ground fire of short duration.

Major sections of both engines were located. The port engine sections were to the left of the crash path. All sections were severely damaged with some discs and the majority of compressor and turbine blades missing. Very little engine case remained attached to the main bodies. Shafts showed little evidence of torsional failure. A number of Z bent compressor & turbine blades were found, some remaining on the engine, others located from digging efforts. No large compressor blades from the port N-1 compressor were located. Major pieces of fuel control, fuel heater and oil filter were found near the left side of the impact point. All port engine components and accessories that could be found were shipped to NAS North Island for DIR. Enclosure (10) containes photographs of engine sections.

The starboard engine was found in three sections. The compressor and burner sections were partially surrounded by engine casing while the turbine section was devoid of external cover. Again, the majority of blades were missing from the engine, however, numerous blades were recovered along the starboard side of the flight path. Shafts showed some evidence of torsional failure. No engine accessories to the starboard engine were found. All components located were sent to NAS North Island for DIR. Starboard front engine sections, speedrings or oil coolers were not located.

It could not be definitely established that the airframe was intact at the time of the impact. Portions of the upper vertical stabilizer, rudder assembly, horizontal stabilizer, port aileron counter weights and outer wing panel skin were identifiable. Wing, horizontal stabilizer, and elevator extremities were not located. The recovery of small

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

fragments conditionally identified as outer wing panels, elevators and ailerons tends to imply a completeness. However, evidence recovered is insufficient to state irrefutably an intact airframe.

Portions of both air turbine motors and accessories were recovered and inspected for evidence of rotation or inflight operation. Both ATM shrouds and an ATM turbine wheel were intact and some slight degree of rotation was evident on all units. See enclosure (11) for photographs of all airframe accessory components. The pressurization cooling turbine and exhaust vanes showed some indications of turning at impact. Both AC generator stators, one DC generator stator, one DC generator armature, and portions of a hydraulic pump were examined and showed little or no evidence of rotation. All components were shipped to NAS Alameda for DIR.

An AC wing fuel transfer pump was recovered and submitted for DIR. A nearly intact escape chute firing cylinder was recovered and submitted for DIR.

Pilot cockpit instruments recovered included the VGI, standby gyro horizon, TACAN (ID-310), oil temperature gauge, angle of attack, and turn and bank indicator. The VGI indicated the aircraft to be in an inverted nose high attitude. This is a like position a VGI assumes when power is lost from the instrument. The standby gyro horizon face was obliterated and nothing could be determined from this instrument. The TACAN DME (ID-310) showed a milage indication at 76 NM, however, the OFF bar was missing. The oil temperature gauge indicated 150° on the starboard engine but no reading was possible on the port since the needle was missing. The angle of attack face had an OFF flag indication implying no power to the instrument. The turn & bank instrument reading indicated a slightly less than a half standard rate right turn. All instruments were submitted for DIR.

All wreckage was closely examined for signs of inflight fire. An unidentified piece of impregnated fiberglass cloth approximately 1½' X 2½' in size bore some evidence of possible fire and overheating prior to impact. It was found in an area of no surrounding ground burn indications. All other wreckage was examined for evidence of burning or overheating inflight. The fiberglass material was submitted for DIR.

There was no indication of any survival equipment having been utilized. All parachutes were located in the crash site and remained attached to torso harness KOCH fittings. All survival equipment suffered severe crash damage. Limited evidence indicated that some seat belts and shoulder harnesses were still fastened.

Dense snow cover severely hampered the recovery of additional pertinent wreckage. Daily snow flurries frequently covered previous days efforts and restricted movement by helicopter. Access by ground means via truck, snow tractor and snowshoes was limited by the carrying capacity of the snow tractor and the excessive traveling time required. (6 hour round-trip)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

C. Aircraft History

A3B BUNO 138917 was accepted by the Navy from Douglas Aircraft Co. on 28 December 1956. Subject aircraft was in the seventh (7) month of service period number seven (7) with the last progressive aircraft rework being completed at NAS Alameda on 16 September 1966. Wing damage was received during a carrier landing on 5 May 1959. Repair of the outboard wing panel, wing tip and starboard engine nacelle was effected by O & R Alameda. Due to corrosion, the aircraft was restricted from loft bombing in Oct 1962 with subsequent replacement of upper left and right hand wing skins. Grindouts in lower wing skins were within allowable tolerence and repairs were completed by NAS Alameda on 21 June 1963. On 14 Aug 1963 the aircraft received class "C" damage as a result of a port engine failure and partial engine disintegration. Numerous holes were patched in the fuselage and the upper vertical stabilizer and rudder assembly. The center wing slat, L/H main landing gear door, L/H pylon and nacelle, fuel dump and outlet assembly were replaced by an O & R Field team.

The above history is from the aircraft log book. The following history was obtained from the contractor and is included without amplification:

a. 9 Jan 1960 tail hook and shank failure.

b. 13 Feb 1960 wheels up landing due to hydraulic failure, Echo damage.

c. 4 Sep 1960 Delta damage to nose section from taxi accident.

d. Oct 1960 5" crack in keel repaired.

Both engines were installed during PAR at NAS Alameda in September 1966. Since installation, the accumulated time had been 439.7 hours. Total time since acceptance by the Navy was 2864.5 hours on the port engine, and 2076.1 hours on the starboard engine. Total time since overhaul was 439.7 hours on the port engine, and 439.7 hours on the starboard engine.

Routine maintenance was performed with no unusual incidents recorded on the engines during this operating period.

Total accumulated flight time since acceptance was 3748.9 hours. Total flight time since last PAR was 438.6 hours. Twelve (12) weeks and six (6) days had elapsed since the last "ODD" aircraft inspection was performed.

A complete review of the log book indicates all applicable directives that were required to make the aircraft operational had been performed. The following "F" code technical directives had not been completed.

AFC 303 - Wing Tank Pressurization Vent

AFC 380 - Radome Boot

AFC 382 - High Frequency Antenna

AFC 388 - Flex Waveguide

AFC 395 - Periscope Cover Switch

AFC 404 - MLG Wheel Bearing

AFB 77 - Flap Hinge Fitting

AFB 88A - Fuel Filter Installation

The following Aircraft Service Changes and Airframe Changes were not incorperated by higher level maintenance activities.

28	Receiver Probe & New Lox
228	Baird Atomic Sextant
336	MOD ARC-27 ANT Cable
363	Tail Cone Removal/Blank off inlet scoop
376	ATM Ejector Duct Assy Replacement
377	Bleed air System (Bleed Air Pylons Shutoff)
390	Flap Hinge Fittings Change
395	Periscope
405	Wing Slat Track (Reinforcement)

A review of the last ten "B" sections to the OPNAV form 3760-2 was not possible since there documents accompanied the aircraft. Therefore the Maintenance Officer's statement (enclosure (12)) contains a listing of work orders from the maintenance control register for the period 22 March to 4 April. Oil consumption rates were checked and found to be normal on both engines.

D. DIR Investigation

The engine DIR was accomplished by the Naval Air Rework Facility, North Island. Their message report is contained in enclosure (13). As stated both engines received major impact damage.

A study of the port engine indicated low or no RPM on impact. Subsequent telephone conversation revealed that in addition to the missing number one (1) main bearing, the first three (3) stages of the N-1 compressor section were also absent. No evidence was discovered to establish an engine malfunction.

The starboard engine was rotating at impact and investigation revealed no evidence of malfunction. As with the port, the starboard engine number one (1) main bearing was missing.

Naval Air Rework Facility, NAS Alameda conducted the investigation on the ATM components, airframe accessories and cockpit instruments. Their message report is contained in enclosure (13).

The following evidence was established:

1. Both air turbine motors were turning at impact.
2. Screw failure on an AC generator indicated unit rotating on impact.
3. One DC generator bearing damage indicated stationary axial impact.
4. Pressurization turbine turning at impact.
5. Wing fuel AC boost pump running at impact.
6. Aileron and surface control hydraulic pump had no evidence of seizure.
7. Escape chute cylinder had not been fired.
8. The TACAN DME (ID-310) indicator reading at 76NM is probably reliable within plus three, minus four miles.
9. Angle-of-attack indicator face read OFF, no angle-of-attack reading possible.
10. Burned fiberglass material identified as a portion of fuel tank liner surrounding the aft or forward fuselage fuel cell. Marks and burn pattern could not be established as having occured inflight.

All other materials shipped for DIR yielded no pertinent facts unknown to the accident board.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

E. Crew Factors

The crew was properly prepared for the return flight from NAS Miramar to NAS Whidbey. There is no evidence of adverse physical or psychological factors effecting crew performance.

LCDR PARKS a replacement pilot on an instrument training flight had demonstrated slightly above average ability in the A3B. Initial jet aircraft experience had been acquired in VF-126 just prior to reporting to VAH-123. In VF-126 he amassed a total of 55 hours in the TF-9J demonstrating above average ability in the jet transition phase and average proficiency in the instrument phase. He had met all requirements for flight in the A3B. Ditching and bail out drill had been completed on 10 February 1967. A resume of LCDR PARK's past five years of flight experience is contained in enclosure (14).

LCDR KING, the instructor pilot with 4200 total flight hours had compiled a total of 833 hours in the A3B. He held a current SPECIAL instrument rating and was considered qualified for flight operations in the A3B. It should be noted that LCDR KING maintained a dual aircraft qualification in the A6A. As senior squadron LSO it was necessary that this dual qualification be maintained. A resume of LCDR KING's past five years flight experience is contained in enclosure (14).

ADJ3 MILLER, was a designated A3B plane captain with over 1100 hours in the aircraft. He was considered qualified for flight operations in the A3B.

LCDR READER, a passenger, with orders to VAH-123 for A6A training was not qualified in the A3B. Information on LCDR READER's past flight experience is not available. It is assumed that he had been properly briefed on emergency escape procedures from the aircraft, however no formal ditching and bailout drills were given.

F. Weather Investigation

Enclosure (15) is an analysis of weather conditions in the area of the crash. The weather is interpolated from reporting stations nearest to the site and is considered an expert estimate of prevailing weather at 1430 5 April 1967.

Capt. (b) (6) [redacted] USAF, on 5 April in a F-101 from Kingsley AFB was vectored to the scene by Seattle Center for a communications search at the time of the mishap. His statement, enclosure (16), is in basic agreement with the weather estimate.

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VII THE ANALYSIS

A. Flight Analysis

The return flight to NAS Whidbey Island was planned for and originally flown at FL 220. The flight was descended to FL 180 shortly after initial level-off, probably because of conflicting traffic.

Flight progress was normal until the aircraft experienced intermittent UHF radio difficulties approximately 25 minutes prior to the crash. It should be noted that this particular area on J-5, between Lakeview and Reno, has in the past been an area of poor communications in many A-3B aircraft. Voice communications that were completed between 1406 and 1430 were normal and indicated no difficulty.

Three minutes before impact the aircraft commenced left turn deviation. The turn began at 1429.4 with the aircraft heading 352°, 463 KTS ground speed. From then until 1431.5 left turn increased to 339° and ground speed decreased to 443 GS. From 1431.5 to 1431.9, left turn rate increased drastically from 339° to 327°. Ground speed reading during this time interval dropped sharply from 443 to 396 GS. Actual altitude is not known.

The position of last reliable radar contact was three miles from the impact point.

The aircraft initially contacted numerous trees at a 35° dive angle in a slight right wing down, upright attitude. Tree contact caused the aircraft to roll to a slight left wing down condition at ground impact. Final aircraft heading was 205° magnetic.

The only witness, Mr. (b) (6) stated (b) (5) [redacted] (b) (5) [redacted] Eagle Peak elevation is 9883' while the crash site is at the 7400' elevation. Somewhere between these altitudes the aircraft reached VFR conditions. Since the aircraft crashed in a nearly wings level condition it is possible that the pilot had some degree of control over the aircraft and was attempting to recover from a steep dive.

B. Material Failure/Malfunction

The following evidence supports inflight port engine failure:

(1) DIR investigation revealed little or no rotation on impact.

(2) The flight track deviated to the left.

(3) Ground speed slowed from 463 KTS to 396 KTS.

The following additional facts further substantiate port engine failure and infer catastrophic disintegration inflight. A review of past catastrophic failures in the A3B revealed several cases

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where control of the aircraft was momentarily lost or marginal. IFR conditions would aggravate this problem. The first three stages and number one main bearing of the N-1 compressor section were not found in the wreckage. No large N-1 compressor blades were located as belonging to the port engine. Oil coolers, fairings or speed rings were not recovered. A secured engine would have been windmilling at a much higher rotational speed than was indicated in the DIR. DIR on recovered engine sections found no cause for engine stoppage.

The starboard engine was running at impact at low or IDLE RPM. No evidence was found contrary to the belief that it was functioning normally.

Analysis of ATM's and accessories indicate operating conditions. A variance exists between the DIR message report that the ATM's were running at impact and that a DC generator indicated only impact damage. Since the DC generator is spline shafted directly to the ATM gear train it is not likely that an ATM can be rotating without rotation on the DC generator. A sheared generator shaft or broken gear train would be the only circumstances that would allow such an event. Since generator shafts have a designed shear strength, a failure from a sheared shaft remains a possibility. In any event, the seizure or stoppage would not adversely effect the operation of the other DC generator or the battery.

A study of cockpit instruments indicates a probable number one AC generator power loss of unknown duration prior to impact.

The TACAN (ID-310) DME indicator showed a fixed range at 76NM. DIR results stated this reading possible within plus three minus four miles. When AC power is taken from the instrument the mileage indication stops and records the last mileage received. A loss of LOCK ON is manifested by continually spinning counters. Had power from the number one AC been available, the aircraft would have LOST LOCK ON when below the line of sight to Lakeview and the DME counters would have revolved to some number indication of 0 to 199. To have lost LOCK ON and revolved to a 76NM reading at impact seems remote. A measure of TACAN distance from Lakeview VORTAC to the impact point is 72 nautical miles.

The remote attitude indicator (VGI) was located and examination of the face indicated an inverted nose up wing down attitude. This is the position the VGI assumes with power removed from the aircraft. Again it appears remote that the VGI would move to this position at impact had their been AC power applied.

These individual indications are inconclusive separately but collectively provide a strong argument to support loss of number one AC generator power.

For the number two generator, a DIR of the wing fuel transfer pump established that it was running at impact. Since there is no evidence to contradict number two AC generator power availability it

must be assumed that the standby gyro horizon was functioning as well.

The above conditions can be caused by insufficient bleed air supply to the ATM's.

Examination of ATM scrolls showed both sets of nozzle guide vanes to be in a nearly closed position. This is the position the guide vanes will assume when the ATM governor attempts to maintain designed ATM speed from insufficient bleed air. Normally, at single engine 70 percent RPM on the ground under static minimum load conditions, sufficient bleed air is available to operate both ATM's with associated hydraulic pumps and generators. Application of additional loads to the hydraulic pumps such as operation of speed brakes, cycling of surface controls or electrical demands on the generators, (such as AC trim actuation), will burden the ATM's to sufficient extent to cause a loss of AC power from both under frequency and under voltage conditions. This can occur to both generators. However, normally the number one AC generator, which carries the greatest electrical load, will fail in advance of number two since more bleed air is required to maintain ATM speed. Unless an increased quantity of bleed air is supplied, the generator will operate under low RPM with continued under frequency and under voltage output. The majority of AC electrical systems are frequency sensitive and require a steady state 400 ± 20 CPS for proper operation. Both TACAN and VGI instruments are considered frequency sensitive and unreliable below an estimated 360 CPS.

A reduced bleed air supply in an aircraft operating under single engine conditions can be derived in three ways. A faulty flapper check valve, ruptured bleed air duct or single engine operation at reduced RPM will deny sufficient bleed air to operate at the ATM's governed speed.

In the event of engine failure the flapper check valves, located near the wing roots at bleed air duct coupling joints, are designed to prevent the escape of bleed air through the failed engine. Squadron aircraft are started on starboard engines on odd calendar days and port engine on even number days. This action provides a check on the operation of the valve. No past discrepancies were reported and it is assumed that valve operation was satisfactory.

That a ruptured bleed air duct could have caused a reduced air supply is a consideration. All past known catastrophic engine failures that disentegrated in flight and shed parts into the airframe caused damage to the airframe aft of the engine disintegration point. A section of bleed air ducting is aft of a lateral plane measured from the forward N-1 compressor stage. This ducting is located in the wing and on the engine side of the flapper check valve. At engine failure this line would be isolated by the closing of the flapper check valve. From the check valve inboard to the fuselage, and subsequent, all ducting common to both engines is very near to or forward of the lateral plane. Approximately 18 inches of ducting common to both engines is vulnerable to shrapnel damage. This section could have been punctured or severed by flying shrapnel. A study of

past engine failures indicates this probability remote but not impossible.

The third likely cause of bleed air reduction is reduced power to the starboard engine. Idle RPM on both engines is considered sufficient to operate ATM's at designed speed with no load. From past A3B experience, AC generators have dropped off the line under dual engine IDLE conditions when hydraulic loads or heavy electrical loads were placed on the ATM's. Single engine low power, at or near the IDLE range, is considered insufficient to sustain the ATM's in normal operation. Though bleed air is available to drive the ATM's, they will operate at reduced RPM's with the generators at under frequency, under voltage output. Following the starboard engine DIR report, a phone call to O & R North Island established that the starboard engine was operating in the IDLE range at impact.

Evidence of inflight fire is inconclusive. All wreckage recovered was examined for indications of inflight fire. One piece of fiberglass material was found and its manner of fold and burned areas suggested the possibility of having occured inflight. DIR analysis of the material determined it to be fuel cell tank liner used as external covering around the forward and aft main fuel cells. Since the material also bears indications of ground fire, though recovered in an area devoid of noticeable ground fire activity, the evidence is controversial. It should be noted that a sizable number of wreckage items became entangled in tree branches and subsequently fell to the ground in the days following the accident. Conceivably, burning could have taken place in the upper tree branches. In any event, no other indications of inflight fire were found. Without further support, evidence of inflight fire is inconclusive.

A review of the aircraft history contains no revelant information as possible contributory factors to the accident. Existing records indicate that J-57 Engine Bulletin 535 had been incorporated in the port engine. Verification from engine examination was not possible since front stages of the port N-1 compressor section were not recovered.

C. Weather Analysis

The weather at FL 180 was IFR with patchy intermittent VFR conditions. With decreasing altitude, VFR conditions became more predominant. A PIREP reported turbulence as occasionally light with no icing reported. Surface conditions in the area appear to have been broken conditions between 9880' MSL and 7500' MSL with visibility reduced in areas of snow flurries.

D. Survival Equipment Analysis

Examination of all evidence indicates there was no use of any escape systems or equipment. No personal survival equipment was utilized.

The emergency escape chute cylinder was recovered and submitted for DIR. Examination revealed only impact damage. The impulse car-

tridge was removed and test fired within voltage and current requirements. A minimum of 6 volts is required to fire the cartridge. This voltage is available on the 28V DC battery bus. This bus is active at all times regardless of any cockpit switch position. Therefore it seems certain that no attempt was made to vacate the aircraft.

E. Pilot/Personnel Factor Analysis

Strong evidence supports starboard engine operation at low RPM. This condition was most probably a result of pilot response. Nothing provides evidence to suggest the starboard engine low power to be a result of material malfunction.

Available evidence indicates no attempt to abandon the aircraft. The emergency escape door was not fired. The decision to delay bailout was most probably based on the erroneous conclusion that the aircraft altitude of 18,000 feet permitted sufficient time to attempt recovery from an unusual attitude prior to passing 10,000 feet. Once the aircraft passed 10,000 feet in a steep dive only seconds remained prior to impact. Even if the aircraft was in VFR conditions at that time it would have been obvious to the crew that they were too low to bail out.

F. NATOPS Factors

The A-3 NATOPS Manual, Section I, page 72N, contains the following CAUTION note:

"During single engine flight do not throttle the engine to IDLE as the engine bleed air is not sufficient to operate the ATM units".

Other than the evidence that the starboard engine was operating at IDLE, there is no indication that the NATOPS Manual was not being compiled with or that NATOPS requirements or procedures were a factor in the accident.

A recommendation to include further CAUTION warnings concerning the above note in the A-3B Pocket Checklist and the Emergency Section of the A-3B NATOPS Manual has been submitted in accordance with OPNAV INST 3510.9B.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

VIII CONCLUSIONS

The cause of the accident is determined to be inflight port engine failure. The cause of the engine failure is undetermined. The most probable cause of engine failure is inflight disintegration of the primary N-1 compressor stages or malfunction of number one main bearing. It is felt that the failure may have been catastrophic involving explosion in flight causing some degree of control loss to the aircraft. Evidence of bleed air duct rupture was not found and therefore not considered. Evidence of inflight fire is inconclusive.

The following additional factors severely aggravated the mishap.

The weather is considered a prime factor to the accident. It is felt that the aircraft may have been initially out of control in IFR conditions. Recovery on a single engine by an inexperienced A3B pilot under IFR conditions would be extremely difficult. The instructor pilot in the right-hand seat could not fully analyze and respond with proper voice instruction rapidly enough to prevent the development of aggravated aircraft performance.

It is further suggested that the crew was occasionally VFR. Perhaps enough to suggest that better VFR weather could be encountered immediately below FL 180. This expectation of improved VFR conditions and partial regaining of control may have led to intentional continued descent to lower altitude. That such action was contemplated may account for the apparent lack of attempt to bail out.

All available evidence has shown no mechanical reason for the starboard engine to have been operating in the IDLE range. This appears to have been a pilot action either to descend voluntarily or to reduce excessive airspeed built up during an uncontrolled descent. Had the descent been completely uncontrolled, some evidence would be manifest that preparations had been made to BAILOUT. The following events would result in a power reduction on the starboard engine:

1. Port engine disintegration.
2. Aircraft yaw to left.
3. Some degree of control loss.
4. Nose down condition aggravated by loss of port engine thrust.
5. Possible expectation of VFR weather at lower altitude.
6. No awareness of actual terrain clearance.
7. Pilot response, throttle RETARD.

The action of retarding a single engine to the IDLE range will cause a loss of AC generator power to below that required to maintain

the AC cockpit instruments on the line. Initially, at electrical power loss, the number one AC generator fails. If the pilot responds to the situation by securing the number one generator in order to effect a BUS TIE, thereby transferring the electrical load to the number two AC generator, then the number two AC generator will assume all electrical load and subsequently fail in the same manner. With only limited bleed air available, the AC generators may intermittently reach operating frequency. However, this possibility is remote unless more bleed air is forced to the ATM's by engine power application.

It is considered a strong probability that loss of AC electrical power occurred during the pilot's attempts to regain positive control of the aircraft.

The board's conclusions are based on limited evidence and findings are, in part, circumstantial. All evidence supports the findings. No evidence is to the contrary. Due to the inaccessibility of the crash site and dense snow cover a great deal of wreckage was not found that could establish further proof or modify the board's conclusions. As snow cover recedes in warmer weather, additional wreckage will be exposed that may provide further information.

IX Recommendations

1. The need for an early decision to abandon the aircraft in uncontrolled flight conditions must again be reemphasized to all flight crew personnel.

2. Enroute High and Low Altitude Flight Information Charts should be revised to include a graphic presentation of topographical features, particularly in mountainous terrain areas.

3. The installation of the YANKEE Extraction system in A-3B aircraft should proceed on a priority basis.

4. Include additional explanation and warning concerning the single engine power setting requirements to sustain complete ATM operation in the A-3B Pocket Checklist and the Emergency Section of the A-3B NATOPS Manual. A routine change has been proposed in accordance with OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3510.9B.

5. With improving weather and greater accessibility to the crash site further wreckage recovery should establish additional evidence pertinent to the investigation. It is recommended that further investigation be conducted and new evidence, as received, be disseminated to all concerned.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

VAH-123 SERIAL 1-67A 5 APRIL 1967

A3B 138917 PILOT PARKS

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

ENCLOSURES

ENCL	TITLE
1	Medical Officers Report (original only)
2	Maps of Flight Track, Crash Location
3	Rescue Report, OPNAV 3750-13 (original only)
4	Wreckage Diagram
5	LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] Statement
6	Copy of Flight Plan
7	FAA Flight Transcript
8	Mr. (b) (6) [redacted] Statement
9	Wreckage Site Photographs
10	Engine Photographs
11	Airframe Component Photographs
12	Maintenance Officers Statement
13	DIR Message Reports
14	Pilot/Co-pilot Flight Time Resumé
15	Weather Analysis
16	Capt. (b) (6) [redacted] Statement

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750

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B. CAPT. (b) (6) [redacted], USAF
C. MR. (b) (6) [redacted]
D. WEATHER ANALYSIS(LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] USN)
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MEDICAL OFFICER

(b) (6)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

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ENCLOSURE (IX)


GB1
GB2
GB3
GB
GA
Alturas
GA1
GA2
GA3
GA4
GA5
LAKEVIEW
332°/72 NM
SQUAW PEAK
SURPRISE VALLEY
WARNER MOUNTAINS
2231.9|327|396
2257.5|339|443
2231.2|340|443
EAGLE PEAK
9883
COLE PEAK
2230.8|342|446
EMERSON PEAK
2230.4|345|454
MODOC NATIONAL FOREST
MODOC COUNTY
LASSEN COUNTY
2230.1|349|459
HAT MOUNTAIN
REDROCK MOUNTAIN
2229.7|350|460
2229.4|352|463
2229.0|352|462
2228.7|351|464
TIME/HDG/AIRSPEED
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E
Enclosure (2)

RESCUE REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-13 (3-63) IIA 0107-401-7230

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST P3750.6E
INSTRUCTIONS: SEE REVERSE

OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL 3750-14

1. FROM COMMANDING OFFICER, HEAVY ATTACK 3 [illegible]-123		2. DATE OF MISHAP 5 April 1967	2A. DATE OF RESCUE NONE
3. LOCATION AND DUTIES OF RESCUE VEHICLE A1°20 120° 15 SEARCH FOR MISSING AIRCREW		4. RESCUE VEHICLE (Type/model) SEE PARA 12.	
5. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL 100 EST	5A. IN RESCUE VEHICLE OR ON RESCUE TEAM 20 EST	5B. TO BE RESCUED 0	5C. RESCUED 0
		6. RESCUE BACK UP MEANS FOREST SERVICE SNOW CAT	

7. TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Local Date Time Group)

7A. Alert Received	Method 051431U SEATTLE CENTER LOST RADAR CONTACT
7B. Vehicle Departed	Distance to Scene 051559U 250 NM.
7C. Arrived on Scene	Search Required COMMENCE 051730U AIRBORNE SEARCH FOR POSS SURVIVORS
7D. Located Survivor	Method of Locating 060330U WRECKAGE SIGHTED BY LIGHT AIRCRAFT, CONFIRMED BY A-6.
7E. Began Retrieval	What Was Sighted First 060800U FOREST SERVICE "SNOW CAT" DIRECTED TO SITE BY RADIO FROM A-6.
7F. Ended Retrieval	Subsequently 081644U RESCUE ATTEMPT CLOSED
7G. Survivor(s) Disembarked	Location (If different from Item 3)

8. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RESCUE SITE

8A. WATER TEMPERATURE	AIR TEMPERATURE	WIND VELOCITY
DNA °F	15° - 30 °F	15 - 25 KTS.

8B. SEA STATE/WAVE HEIGHT/FREQUENCY, TERRAIN DESCRIPTION

MOUNTAINOUS CRASH SITE ELEVATION 7000 - 7500 FEET MSL, HEAVILY TIMBERED.

8. EQUIPMENTS ACTUALLY USED DURING RESCUE

FOREST SERVICE "SNOW CAT".

10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final outcome of rescue attempt, i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATING, RETRIEVING, POST-RETRIEVAL)

AIRBORNE SEARCH HAMPERED BY LOW CLOUDS, SNOW AND RAIN. SURFACE SEARCH MOVEMENT RESTRICTED DUE TO DEEP AND DRIFTING SNOW.

11. PERSONNEL REQUIRING RESCUE NAME-LAST FIRST INITIAL	GIVE REASON FOR RESCUE	FACTORS COMPLICATING RESCUE ATTEMPT Physical condition, ignorance of equipment, sea state, etc.
NONE		

Certified to be true
(b) (6) [redacted]
LCDR USN

12. REMARKS: (Training of rescue team or crew, communication equipments/technique, retrieval equipments/techniques, rescue vehicle)

(1) THERE WERE NO SURVIVORS OF THIS CRASH.
(2) ALL SEARCH AND RESCUE ACTIVITIES WERE DIRECTED BY WESTERN AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY CENTER, HAMILTON AFB.
(3) PARA 4. SEARCH AND RESCUE VEHICLES: (1) USAF C-130; (2) USAF HU-16; (1) USN HU-16; (1) USAF H-19; (2) USN CH-34; (2) USN A-6; (1) USN P-3.
(4) A CONSTANT AIRBORNE SEARCH WAS MAINTAINED UNTIL IDENTIFICATION OF MISSING AIRCREW WAS CONFIRMED.

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: Narratives of search, location and retrieving—Survivor's statements

14. NAME AND TITLE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL (b) (6) [redacted], ASST AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER	SIGNATURE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL
15. NAME AND TITLE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL J. P. SUNDBERG, COMMANDING OFFICER	SIGNATURE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL

OP-05V



Enclosure (4)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6B

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

MILITARY FLIGHT PLAN

AIRCRAFT UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT/HOME STATION	AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO.
[redacted]	135917

TYPE OF FLIGHT PLAN	RADIO CALL	AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION TO CODE	ESTIMATED TRUE AIRSPEED	DEPARTURE TIME (Z) PROPOSED	ACTUAL
☐ IFR ☐ DVFR ☐ VFR ☐ FVFR	NJ 309	A3			2116Z

INITIAL CRUISING ALTITUDE	POINT OF DEPARTURE	STANDARD INSTRUMENT DEPARTURE NAME AND NUMBER	TO
FL 220	NAS MIRAMAR	SAN PEDRO	

IFR	VFR	ROUTE OF FLIGHT	TO	ETE
X		3E/9		
		ZLAT		
		OVER DUE		

REMARKS

VFR DEPARTURE WEST
280° Radial NKX TACAN
AFTER TAKE-OFF

RANK/HONOR CODE	PSGR/CARGO CODE
—	

HOURS FUEL ON BOARD	DIST TO DESTN	ALTERNATE AIR FIELD	ETE TO ALTN	NOTAMS	DD FORM 365F (Wt. and Bal.)	WEATHER	REQUEST CLEARANCE AFTER
3+30	[illegible]	McChord AFB	0+10	✓			—

INST RATING	SIGNATURE OF PILOT IN COMMAND	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING AUTHORITY	DATE
SPEC	[signature]	W. W. JONES Captain U. S. Navy	4-5-67

CREW/PASSENGER LIST — ☐ Attached ☐ See Passenger Manifest

DUTY	NAME AND INITIALS	GRADE	SERVICE NO.	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION
PILOT IN COMMAND	PARKS, R.E.	LCDR	(b) (6) [redacted]	USN [illegible]
	KING, D.E.	LCDR		" "
	MILLER, C.V. Jr.	ADJ3		" "
	READER, J.M.	LCDR.		" "
			Certified to be true	
			(b) (6) [redacted]	
			LCDR USN	Enclosure (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

DD FORM 1 JUL 66 175 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM WILL BE USED UNTIL STOCK IS EXHAUSTED.

W106-500-5352

FLIGHT WEATHER BRIEFING

AIRCRAFT NO. 58-217 | BRIEFING NO. 8-810 | DATE 27-5-67

I. TAKEOFF DATA

SUNRISE TIME | PRESSURE ALT. | TEMP. DEVIATION | VAPOR PRESSURE | SPECIFIC HUMIDITY | DENSITY ALTITUDE

FLIGHT RISKS

REMARKS

IFR/NKW/ETD 2115Z/ETE 2+16/ 31°54'A 2+41 W.

II. ENROUTE DATA

FLIGHT LEVEL 25000 | TEMPERATURE | WINDS KK-RAID 245-50 RAID-LAX 230-25 SAX-[illegible] RAD-A

CLOUDS AT FLIGHT LEVEL: ☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ IN AND OUT

VISIBILITY AT FLIGHT LEVEL: ☐ HAZE ☐ DUST ☐ SMOKE ☐ PRECIPITATION

MINIMUM CRUISING TURBULENCE: 1800 E.W 35000' EAST | MINIMUM CLOUD TOPS: 25,000' 35000' | MINIMUM CRUISING LEVEL: 2500'

THUNDERSTORMS	TURBULENCE	PRECIPITATION	ICING
☐ NONE	☐ NONE	☐ NONE	☐ NONE
☐ FEW	☐ CAT	☐ RAIN	☐ CLEAR
☐ SCATTERED	☐ TURB	☐ SNOW/ICE	☐ RIME
☐ NUMEROUS	☐ LGT	☐ FREEZING	☐ MIXED
☐ MAT	☐ MOD	☐ HAIL	☐ FZR
	☐ SVR		☐ FZR CLOUDS

III. TERMINAL DATA

DESTINATION (Primary): NKW 18 @ 40 @ 70 @ 7 110/05 - 29.93

FORECAST: 180 35 @ 7 VAIC @ 29.97 2330 TO 0130 Z

ALTERNATE (Primary): PCM 30 @ 1/2 @ 30 310/03 29.81

FORECAST: 300 8 VAR/05 29.84 2330 TO 0140 Z

IV. COMMENTS/REMARKS

Certified to be true

(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR USN

Enclosure (6)

(b) (6) [redacted]

TOTO TIME 2145Z | EXTENDED TO

V. TELEVISION/TELEPHONE BRIEFING RECORD

BRIEFING FACILITY

SPECIAL HANDLING BRIEFING IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6

TAPE NO. | START | STOP | PHONE CHARGE

DD FORM 175-1 (REV. 1-65)

TRANSCRIPTION OF ARTC CONTROLLER EVENTS 1406 to 1436 5 APRIL 67

TIME	CALLER	EVENT
1406.30	NJ309	"RENO 155°/78NM FL 180"
1419	OAKLAND CTR	Attempted 4 calls to NJ309 with no contact.
1427	OAKLAND CTR	Oakland Center advised Seattle Center that NJ309 was 10NM south of 41 - 00N. Seattle acknowledged radar contact.
1428.0	OAKLAND CTR	"NJ309 this Oakland over."
	NJ309	"Oakland 309, loud & clear."
	OAKLAND CTR	"NJ309, contact Seattle Center 306.3, over."
	NJ309	"309, roger 306.3"
1428.46	UNKNOWN	"GARBLED _ _ _FL 180"
1430.06	NJ309	"Seattle Center, NJ309 FL 180"
1430.20	SEATTLE CTR	"NJ309, roger, FL 180, sqwak IDENT"
1430.58	SEATTLE CTR	"NJ309, Seattle Center, over."
1432	SEATTLE CTR	"NJ309, Seattle Center, over."
1436		Seattle Center requests Lakeview to call NJ309 on UHF guard channel.

The times and events listed above are correct. Oral transmission are copied from abbreviated material and subject to variance, however, contents and purpose of transmission is specific.

Certified to be true

(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR USN

Enclosure (7)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

(b) (5), (b) (6)

PROJECTED FLIGHT PATH TO IMPACT POINT



9 FLIGHT PATH

9 - FLIGHT PATH

AIRCRAFT ENTRY ANGLE INTO IMPACT AREA



9-4 WRECKAGE SITE

ENGINE PHOTOGRAPHS

VAH-123 SERIAL 1-67A 5 APRIL 1967 A-3B BUNO 138917 PILOT PARKS

ENCLOSURE (10) VIEWS SHOWING DAMAGE TO BOTH ENGINES

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6E





TACAN ID-310 VGI TURN + BANK

11-1 COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS

ATM - 50 - 1 MARKS INDICATING ROTATION



11-2 #2 ATM SCROLL

BURNED FIBERGLASS MATERIAL SHOWING NUMEROUS INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE INFLIGHT BURNING



Maintenance Officers Statement

A3B BUNO 138917 had accumulated 438.6 hours in 7 months of its current period. The last Calendar ODD Inspection was completed on 16 January 1967, and 246.3 hours had been flown since the completion of that inspection. Review of the last ten "B" sections of the OPNAV Form 3760-2 is not possible due to the loss of these flight records in the accident. The below tabulation listing discrepancies and corrective action taken or currently outstanding was extracted from the maintenance control master register. Both engines had normal oil consumption during this operating period.

Table of Aircraft Maintenance History Extracted from VAH-123 Maintenance Control Register for A3B BUNO 138917

DATE	JCN	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
22 MAR 67	470	HYD LEAK NLG DOOR	INSPECTED - NO EVIDENCE
22 MAR 67	471	HYD LEAK TAIL SKAG	INSPECTED - NO EVIDENCE
22 MAR 67	472	HYD LEAK PORT WING	INSPECTED - NO EVIDENCE.
22 MAR 67	475	HYD LEAK PORT MLG ACT	RESEALED PORT MLG ACT CYL
22 MAR 67	479	2 SMALL UTIL HYD STRAINERS #1 ADU CPT LEAKING	INSPECTED UTIL HYD FILTER FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF LEAK
22 MAR 67	515	HYD LEAK WING FOLD AREA	INSPECTED - NO EVIDENCE
22 MAR 67	556	WASH A/C	WASHED
23 MAR 67	755	STBD FIRE WRNG LITE ON ALL TIMES	REMOVED AND RE-INSTALLED STBD ENGINE. FOUND C/P IN PYLON SHORTED, REPAIR SAME. FOUND TEST SWITCH BAD, REPLACED. FOUND 3 ELEMENTS BAD AND 2 FLEXION CONNECTORS REPLACED. MEGGED & TESTED X'S GOOD.
25 MAR 67	929	HYD LEAK ON HYD FILTER IN #1 ADU CPT	TIGHTENED FILTER, TURNED X'ED GOOD
26 MAR 67	943	PORT ENG LATE TO START (18-2070) SUSPECT BAD IGNITER	CHANGED BOTH IGNITERS TURNED UP, X'ED GOOD
(27 MAR 67 & 3 APR 67)	074 917	OUTBOARD PORT BLEED VALVE LOWER RIVET SHEERED	REPLACED BROKEN SEAL RING AND POPPED RIVET

Enclosure (12)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

DATE	JCN	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
29 MAR 67	278	2 WET STARTS PRIOR TO SUCCESSFUL LITE OFF STBD ENG	CHECK IGNITION SWITCH FOR CORRECT ADJ. CYCLED IGNITION TIMER THRU 4 TIMES. RUN FOR 30 SEC EACH TIME. TURNED UP 2 TIMES, NO MALFUNCTION, X GOOD
29 MAR 67	315	#1 ADU LOOSE	TIGHTENED TOP MOUNT BOLT AND RE-SAFETIED
30 MAR 67	399	NOSE GEAR ALT CYL LEAKING SLIGHTLY	T/U NO LEAKAGE FROM RUNNING NOSE GEAR THRU 7 OR 8 TIMES
30 MAR 67	510	CHECK RUN DOWN TIME ON PORT ENG, CLOCK MAY BE OFF	REPAIRED SHORTED C/P ON PORT TACH GEN. ALSO XED TACH IND AND GEN. BY SUBSTITUTION RUN DOWN TIME 44 SEC WITH A/C PARTS AND NEW PARTS.
31 MAR 67	684	ADU OIL LEAK BY PORT BRAKE HINGE	CHANGED #1 ADU GOVERNOR T. U. AND X'ED FOR LEAKS AND PROPER OPERATION, X'S OK
31 MAR 67	685	HORIZ STBD ACT OIL LEAK	SERVICED ACT FOUND NO LEAKS, X'S GOOD
31 MAR 67	707	SEVERAL SOFT SPOTS IN RADOME	
2 APR 67	771	STBD FIRE WARN LITE ON	DRIED OUT SHORT PIGTAILS SYSTEM X'S GOOD
3 APR 67	810	FIRE WARN LITE STBD ENG NO IND OF FIRE OR OVER TEMP ON VIS INSP TURNED ENG FOR ABOUT 7-8 MIN ELECT X FOR LOOSE OR WET CONNECTORS. LIGHT REMAINS ON.	FLEX LEAD BAD. REPLACED 4 FLEX LEADS. X'S GOOD
3 APR 67	914	#1 ADU AC FREQ 380 #2 ADU AC FREQ 410 AT IDLE	RESET FREQ'S IN #1 & #2 ADU'S
(3 APR 67 & 4 APR 67)	916	ADU OIL LEAK	CHANGED #2 AC GEN GARLOC SEALS AND OIL PURGE GASKET
4 APR 67	953	REMOVED & REPLACED AC GEN	REMOVED & REPLACED #2 GEN X'S GOOD ON TURN

(b) (6) [redacted] (6) (b) (6)

LCDR [redacted] USN
2 Maint. Officer

Enclosure (12)

Certified to be true

(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR USN

Enclosure (13)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

Certified to be true

(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR USN

Enclosure (13)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

[illegible] CONTROL HYDRAULIC PUMP P/N [illegible]
[illegible] SUBASSEMBLY PARTS SHOWED NO HEAT
[illegible] SEIZURE.
[illegible] DALANCE BUNGEE ASSEMBLY P/N [illegible]
[illegible] CASE SO THAT COMPRESSION LOAD TEST NOT
[illegible] ON CAP MISSING. NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND ON

[illegible] GAGE HAD DUAL INDICATORS. THE LEFT-HAND
[illegible] SHIELD AND REMOVAL OF SHIELD REVEALED
[illegible] HAD BEEN DISENGAGED SO THAT NOTHING
[illegible] ABOUT POINTER IMPACT POSITION. RIGHT-HAND
[illegible] ITS POSITION INDICATED READING OF 158 DEGREES,
[illegible] POSITION IS AGAINST UPPER LIMIT STOP AND
[illegible] CERTAIN. NO SIGNIFICANT MARKS OBSERVED UNDER
[illegible]
[illegible] WAS RECOVERED FROM THE ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INDICATOR.
[illegible] INDICATED OFF. ANGLE-OF-ATTACK SETTING WAS 25.5
[illegible] SO NO DETERMINATION OF ANGLE-OF-ATTACK
[illegible] COULD BE MADE.
[illegible] THE DIAL TYPE OF FUEL FLOW INDICATOR AVAILABLE. THE POINTER

[illegible]
[illegible] NO DETERMINATION OF IMPACT INDICATION POSSIBLE.
[illegible] EXAMINATION REVEALED NOTHING.
[illegible] THE [illegible] ATTITUDE INDICATOR (VGI) HAD SPHERE DISTORTED SUCH THAT
[illegible] THAT THE IMPACT ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT WAS VERTICAL AND TAIL
[illegible] NO CONSTRUCTION IS SUGGESTED, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT A
[illegible] REMOVED WOULD ASSUME THE ORIENTATION OBSERVED
[illegible] THE DAMAGED UNIT.
[illegible] THE [illegible] INDICATOR SHOWED AN INDICATION OF [illegible] MILES
[illegible] HOWEVER ATTEMPTS TO VERIFY THIS INDICATION BY MEASURING
THE RESISTANCE SETTING OF THE RESOLVER POTENTIOMETERS WAS NOT POSSIBLE
BECAUSE POTENTIOMETERS WERE BROKEN INSIDE. IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME
THAT THE FIRST TWO DIGITS OF THE INDICATION ARE CORRECT, HOWEVER, THE
UNITS DIGIT MAY BE IN ERROR BY PLUS THREE, MINUS FOUR.
[illegible] MODE OF FASTENING SCREW FAILURE BETWEEN TWO ROTOR PARTS OF ONE
[illegible] GENERATOR, INDICATES UNIT ROTATING AT MOMENT OF IMPACT.
[illegible] BRINELLING ON RACE WAYS OF DC GENERATOR BEARINGS WAS CONCENTRATED
ON A SMALL AREA INDICATING STATIONARY AXIAL IMPACT, WITH GENERATOR
NOT ROTATING. THERE WERE NO MARKS ON ARMATURE INDICATING ROTATION
AT IMPACT.
[illegible] THE RIGHT-INCH-LONG BLEED AIR DUCT SEGMENT WITH COUPLING RECEIVED

[illegible] UNCLES
INDICATED ONLY IMPACT DAMAGE.
14. WING FUEL BOOST PUMP WAS RUNNING AT IMPACT.
15. ESCAPE CHUTE CYLINDER INDICATED ONLY IMPACT DAMAGE. CYLINDER
HAD NOT BEEN FIRED.
BT

Enclosure (13)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

B033/27
ZCTFA701
RTTUI JAW RUWMHVA3132 1170103-UUUU--RUWMFTA
ZNR UUUUU
R 270102Z APR 67
FM NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
TO RUWJMUA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
INFO RUWMFTA/NATRON ONE TWO THREE
RUWJMUA/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOM
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN NORVA
RUEOHRA/NATSF PHILA
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
ZEN/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUWJAPA/COMREADAIRCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWJNDA/NPRO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NPRO EAST HARTFORD
BT
UNCLAS
A-3B BUNO 138917 FAILURE ANALYSIS
A. YOUR 131804Z APR 67 (NOTAL)
B. MY 191918Z APR 67
C. FONECON LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] VAH-123 AND MR. (b) (6) [redacted] THIS FACILITY
1. REF A REQUESTED FAILURE ANALYSIS CONTROL NUMBER 3282-67 OF SELECTED AIRCRAFT PARTS. REF B WAS A PARTIAL REPORT. THIS REPORT COVERS REMAINING ITEMS.
2. SECOND DC GENERATOR RECEIVED WITH ROTOR MISSING. UNABLE DETERMINE IF ROTOR TURNING AT IMPACT.

Apr 27 05 03:57

"INTERNAL ROUTING CORRECT AND TAKE FOR C VICE SUP.

PAGE 2 RUWMHVA3132 UNCLAS
3. EMERGENCY ESCAPE CHUTE IMPULSE CARTRIDGE EX-82-0 WITH INKED DATE 10-28-67 WAS TESTED AND FIRED WITHIN VOLTAGE AND CURRENT LIMITS.
4. REF C REQUESTED THAT FOLLOWING THREE ADDITIONAL ITEMS BE INCLUDED IN REPORT:
   A. ATM SHROUD SHOWED DEFINITE INDICATIONS THAT AIR TURBINE MOTORS WERE TURNING AT IMPACT.
   B. SUPPORT ASSEMBLY, CONTROL COLUMN AFT 4272754, BEARING AN202KP478, AND RETAINER NAS669-387 SHOWED ONLY IMPACT DAMAGE.
   C. PIECE OF BURNT WOVEN MATERIAL WAS IDENTIFIED AS FIBERGLAS CLOTH IMPREGNATED WITH POLYESTER RESIN BINDER AND NYLON WOVEN FABRIC. THIS WAS DETERMINED TO BE PART OF A FUEL CELL TANK LINER. TEMPERATURE OF BURNING ESTIMATED BETWEEN 500 AND 600 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AS EVIDENCED BY CHARRED REMAINS OF NYLON AND TOTALLY BURNT POLYESTER RESIN BINDER.
5. THIS COMPLETES NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA ACTION ON CONTROL 3282-67.
BT

Certified to be true
(b) (6) [redacted]
LCDR USN

CFW C/S ADMIN OPS OPCON AMO SUP COM SDO
| | | | | C | | |

VAH-123.....AT.....Z WU/DL

Enclosure (13)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

RESUME OF PILOT EXPERIENCE PAST FIVE YEARS

LCDR R. E. PARKS (b) (6) [redacted] /1310

COMMAND ATTACHED	PERIOD ASSIGNED	MODEL AIRCRAFT	FLIGHT HOURS	CV LNDGS DAY/NIGHT	TYPE
US NAVAL POST GRAD SCHOOL	APR 1962 MAY 1963	TC-45J T-28	113	NONE	PROFICIENCY
VA-42	JULY 1963 DEC 1963	A-1H	144	16/8	OPERATIONAL
VA-176	DEC 1963 JAN 1966	A-1H	848	177/79	OPERATIONAL
USS LEXINGTON	JAN 1966 OCT 1966	C-1A	104	NONE	PROFICIENCY
VF-126	NOV 1966 DEC 1966	TF-9J	46	NONE	OPERATIONAL
VAH-123	DEC 1966 APR 1967	A3B	25	NONE	OPERATIONAL

Certified to be true

(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR USN

Enclosure (14)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

RESUME OF PILOT EXPERIENCE PAST FIVE YEARS

LCDR D. E. KING (b) (6) /1310

COMMAND ATTACHED	PERIOD ASSIGNED	MODEL AIRCRAFT	FLIGHT HOURS	CV LNDGS DAY/NIGHT	TYPE
VAH-10	APRIL 1962 JUNE 1963	A3B	261	160*	OPERATIONAL
US NAVAL POST GRAD SCHOOL	JULY 1963 DEC 1964	T2A	150	NONE	PROFICIENCY
BUPERS	JAN 1965 OCT 1965	T1A	61	NONE	PROFICIENCY
VAH-123	NOV 1965 APR 1967	A3B/A6A	530	14/6	OPERATIONAL

*ONLY ONE LOG BOOK AVAILABLE

Certified to be true

(b) (6)

LCDR USN

Enclosure (14)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

From: Officer in Charge, Naval Weather Service Environmental Detachment, Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, Washington
To: Aviation Safety Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron ONE TWO THREE

Subj: Summary of weather at and near site of A3B aircraft crash in Northern California mountains on 5 April 1967

1. The following is a summary of available weather observations as well as estimates and opinions of the weather that most likely occurred at points where no observations were available:

GENERAL SYNOPTIC SITUATION: During the afternoon of 5 April 1967 an upper-air closed low pressure cell was centered just off the Northern Oregon coast. This low was nearly stationary. The circulation around this upper-level low extended far enough to the South and East so as to overlie all of Oregon, Nevada, and California. Although no definite fronts appeared on the surface chart at this time at or near the area of interest, rather widespread unsettled, unstable surface and low level weather conditions did prevail over most of Western Nevada, Northern California, and Southern Oregon.

SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS: Interpolation based on actual upper wind observations taken at 051800Z and 060000Z indicate that the 18,000-feet wind between Reno and Lakeview should have been from 240 degrees true at 35 to 40 knots. Reno, at 2200Z and 2300Z, reported only one layer of clouds. These clouds, based at 3400 feet above the ground, probably had tops no higher than 7000 or 8000 feet. However, on both of these observations Reno carried the remark, "ROTOR CLOUDS OVER VALLEY". Rotor clouds are normally associated with mountain wave conditions or other extremely turbulent conditions. Mountain waves and rotor clouds are usually observed over or on the lee side of mountainous terrain. Although Reno did not estimate a height of these rotor clouds, they might well have been between 14,000 and 24,000 feet. It is probable that considerable turbulence existed in and near these clouds.

Continuing Northward from Reno toward Lakeview an increase in low and middle clouds should have been encountered. This is an opinion based on rather sparse data since there aren't many weather observation stations on or near the route from Reno to Lakeview. A review of the weather reported by the stations in Northern California and Southern Oregon during the time in question reveals that most of the peaks and ridges higher than 5000 feet above sea level were probably obscured by low clouds and snow showers. Tops of all low and middle clouds were most likely 13,000 to 14,000 feet. A higher broken to overcast relatively dense cirrus cloud layer with bases about 26,000 feet and tops about 32,000 feet was observed over most of Northern California and Southern Oregon.

Enclosure (15)

REPORTED OBSERVATIONS:

LKV	2043Z	EST 1500 OVC, 15 MI, LIGHT SNOW, TEMP 35, DP 28, WIND 200/7
LKV	2345Z	3000 SCTD EST 5000 BKN HI OVC CIRRUS, 30 MI, TEMP 48, DP 19, WIND 180/10
LMT	2200Z	3000 SCTD EST 5000 BKN 12,000 BKN HI OVC CIRRUS, 10 MI, LIGHT SNOW SHOWERS, TEMP 40, DP 25, WIND 190/6, VISIBILITY LOWER SW-NW AND N, SNOW SHOWERS OCCASIONALLY VERY LIGHT
LMT	2300Z	2800 SCTD EST 5000 BKN 12,000 BKN HI OVC CIRRUS, 10 MI, TEMP 38, DP 26, WIND 280/13, CEILING RAGGED, SNOW SHOWERS OF UNKNOWN INTENSITY N AND E-SE
SIY	2116Z	1500 SCTD MEASURED 2500 BKN 4500 OVC, 15 MI, LIGHT RAIN SHOWERS, WIND 260/15G20
SIY	2200Z	2000 SCTD EST 3500 BKN 5000 OVC, 15 MI, LIGHT RAIN SHOWERS, TEMP 42, DP 32, WIND 200/15G20, CEILING RAGGED, LIGHT RAIN SHOWERS OCCASIONALLY VERY LIGHT
SIY	2300Z	3000 SCTD EST 4500 BKN 8000 OVC, 20 MI, TEMP 40, DP 33, WIND 190/10G17, SNOW SHOWERS OF UNKNOWN INTENSITY NE
MHS	2200Z	1500 SCTD EST 3000 OVC, 4 MI, LIGHT RAIN AND SNOW SHOWERS, TEMP 36, DP 34, WIND 130/13, RAIN BEGAN 2110Z
MHS	2300Z	INDEFINITE 1000 OBSCURED, ½ MI, MODERATE SNOW SHOWERS, TEMP 35, DP 34, WIND 140/8, RAIN ENDED 2245Z, MODERATE SNOW SHOWERS OCCASIONALLY LIGHT
BNY	2020Z	500 SCTD EST 1500 BKN 10,000 OVC, 15 MI, LIGHT RAIN, WIND 250/10, LOWER CLOUDS W-SW, PASS OBSCURED
RNO	2200Z	EST 3400 BKN, 25 MI, TEMP 47, DP 22, WIND 190/18, ROTOR CLOUDS OVER VALLEY, SNOW SHOWERS OF UNKNOWN INTENSITY NE-SE, CLOUDS TOPPING SIERRA NEVADAS
RNO	2300Z	EST 3400 BKN, 25 MI, TEMP 47, DP 22, WIND 200/13, ROTOR CLOUDS OVER VALLEY, CLOUDS TOPPING SIERRA NEVADAS

LKV - LAKEVIEW, ELEVATION 4764 FT ABOVE SEA LEVEL
LMT - KLAMATH FALLS, ELEVATION 4084 FT ABOVE SEA LEVEL
SIY - MONTAGUE, CALIF, ELEVATION 2651 FT ABOVE SEA LEVEL
MHS - MOUNT SHASTA, ELEVATION 3587 FEET ABOVE SEA LEVEL
BNY - BURNEY, CALIF, ELEVATION 3100 FEET ABOVE SEA LEVEL
RNO - RENO, ELEVATION 4400 FEET ABOVE SEA LEVEL

(b) (6)
[redacted]
Lieutenant Commander, USN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

(b) (5), (b) (6)

[redacted]

Enclosure (16)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

NNNNNZCNASC489CZCSLB983
PTTUZYUW RUWMFTA0042 2982314-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P 252314Z OCT 67
FM HATRON ONE TWO THREE
TO ~~RUEDBRB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ~~
RUWJMUA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
INFO RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
ZEN/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWMHVA/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
RUWMHVA/CARAEWRON THIRTEEN
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
BT
UNCLAS
PRIORITY INVESTIGATION
A. BWFRRPACINST 4730.8A
B. NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC 280121Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)
C. NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA (300) DIR REPORT 654 (NOTAL)
1. A3B 138917

PAGE TWO RUWMFTA0042 UNCLAS
2. NA
3. HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ACTUATOR S/R UNKNOWN
4. S/N RQ1680-739-5067-ADGA P/N 5380-824-549
5. DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO.
6. UNKNOWN
7. THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF REF B. FURTHER SEARCH RECOVERED REMAINING PART OF TRIM ACTUATOR. OTHER PART OF TRIM ACTUATOR REPORTED ON IN REF C.
8. REQUEST DIR IAW REF A.
BT

#989/67

COG M+M

OCT
252314Z

VAH 123 4-5-67 Parks

NNNNZCZCNASC729CSLA038
RTTU JAW RUWJMUA5959 200220A-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 192204Z JUL 67
FM NAVACREWORKFAC NORIS
TO ZEN1/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN1/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUWMFIA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREDATKCRARIWING ONE TWO
RUWMFIA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCEN
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO L BEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD
BT
UNCLAS
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ PASS TO AIR-4113/504/53613
A3B BUNO 138917 A/C ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A. YOUR 280121Z JUN 67
1. REF A CONTROL NO. 3282-67 REQ AN ENGINEERING ANALYSIS ON MAIN FUEL CONTROL, P/N 507650-L16, S/N 20112, REMOVED FROM ONE ENGINE OF SUBJ

7/29/67

Cog Mgm Records

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA5959 UNCLAS
A/C.
2. INVESTIGATION REVEALED:
A. FUEL CONTROL SUFFERED MAJOR IMPACT DAMAGE.
B. CONTROL MECHANISMS (CONTROL SHAFT, LINKAGE, BRACKET, AND LEVER ASSY, ETC.) WERE MISSING.
C. FUEL STRAINERS WERE CLEAN.
D. PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE - CLOSED POSITION (NORMAL). NO DISCREPANCIES.
E. FLYWEIGHT GOVERNOR ASSY - NO DISCREPANCIES.
F. CYLINDER CAM SPEED SENSOR - NO DISCREPANCIES.
3. CONCLUDE: DETERMINATION OF FUEL CONTROL OPERABILITY OR MALFUNCTION PRIOR TO IMPACT NOT FEASIBLE DUE TO MUTILATED CONDITON OF PARTS.
4. THIS IS A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS PRIORITY DIR NO. 31 OF 12 MAY 1967.
BT

JUL 1922042

VAH-123

Petterson

4-5-67
Clark

NNNNZCZCNASC233LB850
RTTE JAW RUWJMUA8621 1790121-EEEE--RUCILSA.
ZNY EEEEE
R 280121Z JUN 67
FM NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
TO RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
ZEN1/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN1/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREDATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO L BEACH (DOUGLAS ACFT CO, INC)
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD (PRATT AND WHITNEY ACFT DIV, UNITED
ACFT CORP CONN)
BT
UNCLAS E F T O
A3B BUNO 138917 ACFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A. HATRON-123 240233Z JUN 67
B. HATRON-123 110345Z APR 67
1. HATRON-123: REQ FWD REF A FUEL CONTROL, S/N 20112, TO NAVAIREWORKFAC
NORIS CUSTOMER SERVICE CODE 523.2, AND HORIZONTAL TRIM ACTUATOR,

233/07

AAR

Cog RECORDS

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA8621 UNCLAS E F T O
P/N DG5380824-549, TO NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA CUSTOMER SERVICE CODE
524.1. REF B REFERS. MARK CONTAINERS AND DOCUMENTS FOR PRIORITY
DIR IAW REF C. ADCON SHIPPING MODE AND TCH OR B/L NRS. REFER
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC CONTROL NR 3282-67.
2. NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS: REQ CONDUCT ENGRG ANAL SUBJ FUEL CONTROL,
S/N 20112, P/N 507650L-16, IAW REF C. ADCON RESULTS. REFER ABOVE
CONTROL NR ALL FUTURE RELATED CORRES.
3. NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA: REQ CONDUCT ENGRG ANAL SUBJ HORIZONTAL
TRIM ACTUATOR, P/N DG5380824-549, IAW REF C. ADCON RESULTS. REFER
ABOVE CONTROL NR ALL FUTURE RELATED CORRES.
BT

Gwe
280121Z

NNNN,1;-:64CZCSLA450
RITU JAW RUWJMUA1396 11M2356-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 282356Z APR 67
FM NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
TO RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE-TWO THREE
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN1/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
ZEN1/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC PHILA
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD
RUCILSA/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORVA
RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
BT
UNCLAS
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ PASS TO AIR-4113/53613
A3B BUNO 138917 A/C ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A. TELCON LT. (b) (6) VAH-123 (b) (6) NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS ON

#564/67

CG: M&M

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA1396 UNCLAS
27 APR 67
B. MY 220118Z APR 67 NOTAL
1. REF A REQ CONFIRM INCORP OF J57 ENG BULL NO. 535 AMEND - 1 IN J57-P10 ENGS S/N'S P607625 AND P632289 INSTALLED IN SUBJ A/C AT TIME OF ACCIDENT. REF B IS PRELIMINARY PRI DIR ON NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC CONTROL NO. 3282-67.
2. HISTORY:
A. ENG. S/N P607625; NORIS SHOPS ENG. ASSY RECORD INDICATES J57 E.B. 535-A1 INCORP. CERTIFIED 7-9-66; NEW FORM 13090/40 INDICATES INCORP E.B. 535-A1 2-3-64 AND CERTIFIED 7-9-66.
B. S/N P632289; NORIS SHOPS ENG. ASSY RECORD INDICATES J57 E.B. 535-A1 INCORP. CERTIFIED 7-11-66; NW FORM 13090/40 INDICATES INCORP E.B. 535-A1 9-25-65 AND CERTIFIED 7-11-66.
3. PORTIONS OF THE ENGINES AFFECTED BY E.B. 535-A1 WERE NOT RECEIVED: THEREFORE INSPECTION COULD NOT VERIFY PHYSICAL INCORP. OF BULLETIN.
BT

A3B 138917

APR 282356Z

NNNNZCZCNASC225CZCSLR099
RTTU JAW RUWMHVA3132 1170:05-UUUU--RUCILSA. 225/67
ZNR UUUUU
R 270102Z APR 67
FM NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
TO RUWJMUA/NAVAIRSYSCOMRECAC
INFO RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE-TWO THREE
RUWJMUA/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOM
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN NORVA
RUEGHRA/NATSF PHILA
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
ZEN/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWJNDA/NPRO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NPRO EAST HARTFORD
BT
UNCLAS
A-3B BUNO 138917 FAILURE ANALYSIS
A. YOUR 131804Z APR 67 (NOTAL)
B. MY 191918Z APR 67
C. FONECON LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] VAH-123 AND MR. (b) (6) [redacted] THIS FACILITY
1. REF A REQUESTED FAILURE ANALYSIS CONTROL NUMBER 3282-67 OF SELECTED AIRCRAFT PARTS. REF B WAS A PARTIAL REPORT. THIS REPORT COVERS REMAINING ITEMS.
2. SECOND DC GENERATOR RECEIVED WITH ROTOR MISSING. UNABLE DETERMINE IF ROTOR TURNING AT IMPACT.

Cog: M&M

VA 1 123
A 6 1 138917
H 2-6 77
1-6 7 A

PAGE 2 RUWMHVA3132 UNCLAS
3. EMERGENCY ESCAPE CHUTE IMPULSE CARTRIDGE EX-82-0 WITH INKED DATE 10-28-67 WAS TESTED AND FIRED WITHIN VOLTAGE AND CURRENT LIMITS.
4. REF C REQUESTED THAT FOLLOWING THREE ADDITIONAL ITEMS BE INCLUDED IN REPORT:
   A. ATM SHROUD SHOWED DEFINITE INDICATIONS THAT AIR TURBINE MOTORS WERE TURNING AT IMPACT.
   B. SUPPORT ASSEMBLY, CONTROL VOLUME AFT 4272754, BEARING AN202KP47B, AND RETAINER [illegible]-387 SHOWED ONLY IMPACT DAMAGE.
   C. PIECE OF BURNT WOVEN MATERIAL WAS IDENTIFIED AS FIBERGLAS CLOTH IMPREGNATED WITH POLYESTER RESIN BINDER AND NYLON WOVEN FABRIC. THIS WAS DETERMINED TO BE PART OF A FUEL CELL TANK LINER. TEMPERATURE OF BURNING ESTIMATED BETWEEN 500 AND 600 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AS EVIDENCED BY CHARRED REMAINS OF NYLON AND TOTALLY BURNT POLYESTER RESIN BINDER.
5. THIS COMPLETES NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA ACTION ON CONTROL 3282-67.
BT

APR 67
270102Z

NNNNMZCNASC 337CZCSLA 425
RTTU JAW RUWJMUA6188 1120118-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 220118Z APR 67
FM NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
TO ZEN1/NAVAIRSXSCOMREPAC
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
ZEN1/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSFAFECEN NORVA
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD
BT
UNCLAS
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ PASS TO AIR-4113/53613
A3B BUNO 138917 A/C ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A. YOUR 131800Z APR 67
1. REF A CONTROL NO 3282-67 REQ FAILURE ANALYSIS ON J57-P10 ENGINES S/N'S P607625 AND P632289 REMOVED FROM SUBJ A/C.
2. AS RECEIVED BOTH ENGINES REVEALED MAJOR IMPACT DAMAGE.

837/67

COG: M&M

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA6188 UNCLAS
A. INVESTIGATION INDICATED ENG S/N P607625 WAS STOPPED OR LOW RPM AT IMPACT. ENG S/N P632289 WAS ROTATING AT IMPACT.
B. NO. 1 MAIN BEARING BOTH ENGINES NOT RECEIVED. ALL OTHER MAIN BEARINGS BOTH ENGINES FOUND IN SATISFACTORY CONDITION EXCEPT FOR IMPACT DAMAGE.
3. CONCLUDE INVESTIGATION OF ENGINE COMPONENTS AS RECEIVED REVEALED NO INDICATIONS OF MALFUNCTION.
4. INVESTIGATION CONTINUING.
5. FORMAL PRI DIR TO BE SUBMITTED APPROX 5 MAY 1967.
BT

APR 220118Z

NNNNZCZCNASC669973
RTTU JAW RUWJMUA5708 1102226-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 202226Z APR 67
FM COMNAVAIRPAC
TO RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
INFO RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
BT
UNCLAS
A3B BUNO 138917 AAR
A. YOUR 200318Z APR 67
1. EXTENSION GRANTED AS REQ REF A.
BT

669/67

Coy: Records

CER
2022267

NNNNMZCNASC581
RTTU JAW RUWMFTA0043 1100318-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 200318Z APR 67
FM HATRON ONE TWO THREE
TO RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
ZEN/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
BT
UNCLAS
A3B BUNO 138917 AAR
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6E
1. REQ 10 WORKING DAY EXTENSION SUBJ RPT.
BT

#521/67
OOA RECORDS

APR
2003182

ZNR UUUUU
R 191918Z APR 67
FM NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
TO RUWJMUA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
INFO RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
RUWJMUA/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOM
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC PHILA
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN NORVA
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO EAST HARTFORD
ZEN/COMFAIRALAMEDA
BT
UNCLAS
A-3B BUNO 138917 FAILURE ANALYSIS
A. YOUR 131804Z APR 67 (NOTAL)
B. HATRON ONE TWO THREE 110345Z APR 67 (NOTAL)
1. NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA TAKES REF A FOR ACTION.
2. REF A REQUESTED FAILURE ANALYSIS CONTROL NO. 3282-67 OF SELECTED AIRCRAFT PARTS FROM ACCIDENT REPORTED REF B. THIS IS A PARTIAL REPORT. REMAINING ITEMS WILL BE REPORTED WHEN ANALYSIS COMPLETED.
3. BOTH AIR TURBINE MOTORS WERE TURNING AT IMPACT. PRESSURIZATION TURBINE WAS TURNING AT IMPACT.

#546/67

COG/MHM

PAGE TWO RUWMHVA2572 UNCLAS
4. AILERON BOOST AND SURFACE CONTROL HYDRAULIC PUMP P/N A465319R6 BROKEN FROM IMPACT. ROTATING GROUP SUBASSEMBLY PARTS SHOWED NO HEAT DISCOLORATION OR EVIDENCE OF SEIZURE.
5. COCKPIT CONTROL BOBWEIGHT BALANCE BUNGEE ASSEMBLY P/N 4554463 HAD ONE-EIGHTH INCH DEEP DENT ON CASE SO THAT COMPRESSION LOAD TEST NOT POSSIBLE. SAFETY WIRING ON CAP MISSING. NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND ON INTERNAL PARTS.
6. THE PORT OIL TEMPERATURE GAGE HAD DUAL INDICATORS. THE LEFT-HAND POINTER WAS CRUMPLED BENEATH SHIELD AND REMOVAL OF SHIELD REVEALED THAT ENTIRE POINTER MOVEMENT HAD BEEN DISENGAGED SO THAT NOTHING POSITIVE COULD BE DETERMINED ABOUT POINTER IMPACT POSITION. RIGHT-HAND POINTER WAS INTACT AND ITS POSITION INDICATED READING OF 150 DEGREES, HOWEVER, NOTE THAT THIS POSITION IS AGAINST UPPER LIMIT STOP AND VALIDITY OF READING NOT CERTAIN. NO SIGNIFICANT MARKS OBSERVED UNDER BLACK LIGHT.
7. ONLY THE DIAL FACE WAS RECOVERED FROM THE ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INDICATOR. ELECTRICAL POWER FLAG INDICATED OFF. ANGLE-OF-ATTACK SETTING WAS 23.5 UNITS. POINTER WAS MISSING SO NO DETERMINATION OF ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INDICATION COULD BE MADE.
8. ONLY THE DIAL FACE OF FUEL FLOW INDICATOR AVAILABLE. THE POINTER WAS MISSING SO THAT NO DETERMINATION OF IMPACT INDICATION POSSIBLE. BLACK LIGHT EXAMINATION REVEALED NOTHING.
9. THE REMOTE ATTITUDE INDICATOR (VGI) HAD SPHERE DISTORTED SUCH THAT IT APPEARED THAT THE IMPACT ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT WAS VERTICAL AND TAIL DOWN. WHILE NO CORRELATION IS SUGGESTED, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT A TYPICAL UNIT WITH POWER REMOVED WOULD ASSUME THE ORIENTATION OBSERVED IN THE DAMAGED UNIT.
10. THE ID-310/ARN TACAN INDICATOR SHOWED AN INDICATION OF 076 MILES WHEN RECEIVED HOWEVER ATTEMPTS TO VERIFY THIS INDICATION BY MEASURING THE RESISTANCE SETTING OF THE RESOLVER POTENTIOMETERS WAS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE POTENTIOMETERS WERE BROKEN INSIDE. IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE FIRST TWO DIGITS OF THE INDICATION ARE CORRECT, HOWEVER, THE UNITS DIGIT MAY BE IN ERROR BY PLUS THREE, MINUS FOUR.
11. MODE OF FASTENING SCREW FAILURE BETWEEN TWO ROTOR PARTS OF ONE AC GENERATOR, INDICATES UNIT ROTATING AT MOMENT OF IMPACT.
12. BRINELLING ON RACE WAYS OF DC GENERATOR BEARINGS WAS CONCENTRATED ON A SMALL AREA INDICATING STATIONARY AXIAL IMPACT, WITH GENERATOR NOT ROTATING. THERE WERE NO MARKS ON ARMATURE INDICATING ROTATION AT IMPACT.
13. THE EIGHT-INCH-LONG BLEED AIR DUCT SEGMENT WITH COUPLING RECEIVED INDICATED ONLY IMPACT DAMAGE.
14. WING FUEL BOOST PUMP WAS RUNNING AT IMPACT.
15. ESCAPE CHUTE CYLINDER INDICATED ONLY IMPACT DAMAGE. CYLINDER HAD NOT BEEN FIRED.
BT

APR 19 1967

NNNNZCZCNASC923SLB077
RTTU JAW RUWJMUA8884 1031804-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 131804Z APR 67
FM NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
TO RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
ZEN1/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN1/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LONG BEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD
BT
UNCLAS
A-3B BUNO 138917 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A. HATRON 123 110345Z APR 67 PASEP
B. COMNAVAIRPAC/BWFRRPAC INST 4730.8A
1. HATRON 123: REQ FWD REF A ENGINES TO NAVAIREWORKFAC
NORIS AND SELECTED AIRCRAFT PARTS TO NAVAIREWROKFAC ALAMEDA.

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA8884 UNCLAS
MARK CONTAINERS AND DOCUMENTS FOR PRIORITY DIR IAW REF B.
ADCON SHIPPING MODE AND DOCUMENT NRS. REFER NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
CONTROL NR 3282-67.
2. NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS: REQ CONDUCT FAILURE ANALYSIS
SUBJ ENGINES S/NS P607625 AND P632289 IAW REF B. ADCON
RESULTS. ABOVE CONTROL NR ASGD.
3. NAVAIREWROKFAC ALAMEDA: REQ CONDUCT FAILURE ANALYSIS
REF A SELECTED AIRCRAFT PARTS IAW REF B. ADCON RESULTS.
ABOVE CONTROL NR ASGD.
BT

923/67

Cog. M+M
A.I

OK
131804Z

NNNNZCZCNASC536CZCSLB093
PTTU JAW RUWMFTA0043 1010342-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 110342Z APR 67
FM HATRON ONE TWO THREE
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUWMMEA/COMTWELVE
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARIARWING TWELVE
RUEOPDA/DIR AFIP
RUCIJFA/BUPERS
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO HARTFORD
RUEDBHB/CHNAVMAT
BT
UNCLAS ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT NR 3NOF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6E

PAGE TWO RUWMFTA0043 UNCLAS ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
B. 060300Z PASEP
C. 062340Z PASEP
D. 090234Z PASEP
1. PARA 1 THRU 6 AND 9 THRU 11 REMAIN THE SAME
2. PARA 7, PORT ENGINE FAILURE AND/OR DUAL ATM FAILURE SUSPECTED CAUSE FACTOR
3. PARA 8. YES
4. PARA 12, ENGINES (J-57; P-10; SN P-607625 AND SN P-632289) ATM'S WITH ACCESSORIES; FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS, FORWARDED FOR DIR.
BT

536)67

SUPP AAR

APR 110342Z

A3

VAH-123

NNNNZCZCNASC542LQ
PTTU JAW RUWMFTA0046 1010345-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P 110345Z APR 67
FM HATRON ONE TWO THREE
TO RUWJMUA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
INFO RUWJMUA/COMNAVEIRPAC
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUCILSA/NAVAVWSAFECEN
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD
ZEN/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWJMUA/NAS NORIS
RUWMHVA/NAS ALAMEDA
BT
UNCLAS
PRIORITY INVESTIGATION
A. BWFRRPAC 4730.8A
B. OPNAVINST P3750.6E
C. BUWEPINST 4700.2A
D. TELECON NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC WHIDBEY IS.
BQM A-3B 138917

542/67

Cog: M&M

PAGE TWO RUWMFTA0046 UNCLAS
2. J57P10 S/R P607625
J57P10 S/R P632289
3. 2 FUEL PUMPS
2 FUEL CONTROLS
2 BLEED VALVE GOV
1 ATM ROTOR AND EXHAUST DUCT
1 D/C GEN
1 A/C GEN COIL
COCKPIT INST: TACAN, VGI, STBY GYRO
4. OMITTED
5. OMITTED
6. OMITTED
7. ACFT ENROUTE FROM NAS MIRAMAR TO NAS WHIDBEY IS. FL 180. 1 PLUS 15 AFTER TAKEOFF CENTER CONTROLLER OBSERVED ON RADAR LEFT DEVIATION FROM COURSE FOLLOWED BY LOST CONTACT. WRECKAGE DISCOVERED NEXT DAY. NO SURVIVORS. SUSPECT CATASTROPHIC PORT ENG. FAILURE AND/OR DUAL ATM FAILURE.
8. REQUEST PRIORITY INVESTIGATION IAW BWFRRPACINST 4730.8A AND OPNAVINST P3750.6E
BT

APR
110345Z

NNNNECNASC419SLB738
PTTU JAW RUWMFTA0010 0990234-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 090234Z A PR 67
FM HATRON ONE TWO THREE
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUWMMEA/COMTWELVE
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
RUEDPDA/DIR AFIP
RUCIJFA/BUPERS
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDBHB/CHNAVMAT
BT
UNCLAS
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT NR 2 OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6E

419/67

AAR

PAGE TWO RUWMFTA0010 UNCLAS
B. MY 060300Z APR 67 (PASEP)
C. MY 062340Z APR 67 (PASEP)
1. PARA 1 THRU 9 AND 11 REMAIN THE SAME
2. PARA 10 BAILOUT ATTEMPT UNDETERMINED
3. PARA 12, PILOT RICHARD EARL PARKS, LCDR, (b) (6) [redacted] USN, 1310, ACTIVE, FATAL; DONALD EDWIN KING, LCDR, (b) (6) [redacted], USN, 1310, ACTIVE, FATAL, INSTRUCTOR PILOT; CARL VIRGIL MILLER JR., ADJ3, (b) (6) [redacted], USN, ACTIVE, FATAL, PLANE CAPTAIN; JAMES MERRITT READER, LCDR, (b) (6) [redacted], USN, 1310, ACTIVE, FATAL, PAX; AAR BOARD AT SCENE
BT

APR
090234Z

A3B 138917 VAH-123 1-67A 4-5-67

NNNNTSCNASC144CZCSLA421
PTTU JAW RUWMFTA0095 0962340-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 062340Z APR 67
FM HAIRON ONE TWO THREE
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUWMMEA/COMTWELVE
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWJKDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDBNB/CHNAVMAT
RUEDPDA/DIR AFIP
BT
UNCLAS ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6E
B. 060300Z APR 67 NOTAL
I. A3B, 138917, VAH-123, 1-67A, PARKS.

144/67

SUPP

AAR

PAGE TWO RUWMFTA0095 UNCLAS
2. NAS MIRAMAR TO NAS WHIDBEY IS, IFR, 1 PLUS 15.
3. ALFA.
4. ACFT COLLISION WITH GROUND.
5. PILOTS FILED J-5 FROM NAS MIRAMAR TO NAS WHIDBEY, IFR, FLT LEVEL 180. COMMUNICATIONS WERE GOOD UNTIL OAKLAND CENTER CLEARED ACFT TO SWITCH TO SEATTLE CENTER. NO RADIO CONTACT WAS MADE WITH SEATTLE CENTER. AT 1431U, SEATTLE CENTER LOST RADAR CONTACT. NORAD ALSO LOST RADAR CONTACT AT 1432U. NORAD REPORTED THE ACFT CHANGED GROUND SPEED FROM 443 KTS AT 1431U TO 396 KTS AT 1432U, AND CHANGED TRACK FROM 340 DEGREES M TO 327 DEGREES M DURING THE SAME TIME. ALT. WAS REPORTED AS 16,750 FT. NO DISTRESS TRANSMISSIONS WERE RECEIVED.
6. 1400U KLAMATH FALLS WX. 3000 FT. CEILING WITH LCT SNOW SHOWERS, TEMP 40 DEGREES F, DEW PT. 25 DEGREES F, WITH CEILINGS LOWERING. CUMULUS BUILDUPS WERE TO FL 200.
7. UNKNOWN.
8. UNKNOWN.
9. UNKNOWN.
10. BAILOUT UNKNOWN. NO KNOWN SURVIVORS AT THIS TIME.
11. NONE.

PAGE THREE RUWMFTA0095 UNCLAS
12. WRECKAGE FOUND THIS A.M. ON THE 107R/80 MI. OF KLAMATH FALLS VORTAC AT 6500 FT. LEVEL OF MOUNTAINS. SAR OF AREA CONTINUING. NEGATIVE RESULTS. AAR BOARD ENROUTE TO CRASH SCENE. STATUS OF INJURIES OF FATALITIES UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. SUPPLEMENTARY MSG NR 2 TO FOLLOW.
BT

APR

0623402

A3B 138917 VAH-123 1-67A 4-5-67

MESSAGE DRAFT
SND 4462 (Rev 2/58)

DATE: 6 APR 1967

CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

DRAFTED BY: CAPT J.B. LEONARD — J.B. Leonard

DEPT.

RELEASED: J.B. Leonard

ACTION
VAH-123
COM TWELVE
COM THIRTEEN

V	REFERENCE	V
	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
X	[illegible]	X
	[illegible]	
	Op [illegible] mod.	
	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	

INFO
CNO
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIR WHIDBEY
NAS WHIDBEY
COMREADEACKCARAIRWING-12
NAVAIRSYSREPAC

TEXT

UNCLAS E F T O

A3B BUNO 138917 ACCIDENT

1. LCDR [redacted], (b) (6)/1310, USN, CLRD TOP SECRET WILL INVESTIGATE SUBJECT ACCIDENT. INVESTIGATOR CURRENTLY AT ALAMEDA AND WILL ARRANGE EARLIST TRANSPORTATION.

2. INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN OPNAVINST P3750.6E PAGE 19, PARA 30.B, AND PAGE 25, PARA 39A (PRESERVATION OF WRECKAGE) APPLY.

REFERENCE MESSAGE: A3B 138917 VAH-123 4-5-67

TRANSMIT BY RADIO —	CLASS OF REF.	CWO	TO COMM. OFFICE	DATE/TIME GROUP
				062233Z

NNNNZCZCNASCR /CZCSLA052
PTTE JAW RUWM A0024 0960300-EEEE--RUCILSA.
ZNY EEEEE
P P 060300Z A 67
FM HATRON ONE WO THREE
TO RUENAAA/CIN
RUWJMUA/COMNA IRPAC
RUWJMUA/NAVAI YSCOMREPAC
RUCILSA/NAVAV AFECEN
INFO RUEDBHB/ VAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUWMMEA/COMTW VE
ZEN/COMFAIRWH BEY
RUWJAPA/COMRE AIKCANAIRWING TWELVE
RUHLHL/CINCPA LT
RUWJNDA/NAVPL TREPO DOUGLAS LBEACH
RUEDBHB/CHNAV T
RUWMMHA/COMTH TEEN
BT
UNCLAS E F T ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
PRELIMINARY M SAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 50.6F
1. 5 APR, 143 , DAY
2. A3B, 138917 VAH-123, AIR 1-67

AAR

PAGE TWO RUWM A0024 UNCLAS E F T O
3. 151 DEG/64 AKEVIEW VORTAC
4. PILOT RICH D EARL PARKE, LCDR, (b) (6), USN, 1310, ACTIVE, UNIFORM.
5. DONALD EDW KING, LCDR, (b) (6), USN, 1310, ACTIVE, UNIFORM, INSTRUCTOR PIL T.
CARL VIRGIL M LER JR., AD.3, (b) (6), USN, ACTIVE, UNIFORM, PLANE CAPTAIN
JAMES MERRITT EADER, LCDR, (b) (6), USN, 1310, ACTIVE, UNIFORM, PAX.
6. UNKNOWN
7. INSTRUMENT RAINING FLIGHT
8. UNKNOWN
9. ACFT ENROU FROM NAS MIRAMAR TO NAS WHIDBEY IS. FL 180.
1 PLUS 15 AFT TAKE OFF CENTER CONTROLLER OBSERVED ON RADAR LEFT DEVIATION FRO COURSE FOLLOWED BY LOST CONTACT. RADIO CONTACT HAD NEVER BEE ESTABLISHED.
10. ESTIMATED EA IN AREA OF LOST CONTACT, COMULUS BUILDUPS TO FL 200 TURBULENC MODERATE OCCASIONALLY SEVERE. SURFACE WEA 15-2000 OVERCAST, RAI AND SNOW SHOWERS, VIS RESTRICTED IN SHOWERS.
11. UNKNOWN

PAGE THREE RUW FTA0024 UNCLAS E F T O
12. UNKNOWN
13. UNKNOWN
14. UNKNOWN
15. SEARCH EFFORTS HAMPERED BY WEA IN AREA. SEARCH ACFT ON STATION.
16. J. P. SUNDBERG, CDR, COMMANDING OFFICER, HATRON ONE TWO THREE, 257-2460.
BT

A3B 138917 VAH-123 1-67 4-5-67

AAR