AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
IDENTIFICATION
NO.

811 02 102

R&DP-20-1(1/68)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: Sgw REVIEWED: Dy LOGGED: els PUNCHED: P VERIFIED: R **13 MAR 1969**

CARD 1

RECORD IDENTIFICATION: Date – Col. Yr. (01–02)	Mo. (03–04)	Day (05–06)	Type Report (07)	Log Line Number (08–09)	Aircraft Number (10–11)	Source (12)	Don't Count (13)	Enemy Action (14)	Aircraft Model: Mission Modif. (15–16)	Basic Mission (17)	Design Number (18–20)	Series Symbol (21)	Model Code (22–23)	AIRCRAFT BUREAU NUMBER (24–29)	Repotting Custodian (30–32)	Type Duty (33–35)	Major Command (36)	Time of Mishap: CONDITION (37)	LOCAL TIME (38–41)
68	11	Ø2	1	Ø2	Ø1	1				F	ØØ8	J	17	15Ø85Ø	132	321	1	2	1217

Acdt. Dmg. (42)	Acft. Dmg. (43)	Acdt. Inj. (44)	Acft. Inj. (45)	Hull Number (46–48)	Kind of Flight (49–51)	Clearance (52)	Location: NAME CODE (53–59)	Bearing From (60–61)	Dist. From (62)	FAC. RWAY DESCRIP.: Distance (63)	Area (64)	Runway Heading (65–66)	Length (67)	WAS DUTY RWY USED? (68)	FAC. SHIP DESCRIP.: Ship Type (69)	Ship Course (70–71)	Ship Speed (72–73)	LOC'N: Initial Contact (74)	Final Rest (75)	(76)	Trans. Code (77)	Card Number (78–80)
A	A	A	A		1A6	2	A5MIRMR	Ø6	P												A	Ø1Ø

CARD 2

RELATIVE WIND: Direction (12–13)	Velocity (14–15)	Density Altitude (16–18)	Alt. of Emergency: Above Terrain (19–21)	Pressure Altitude (22–24)	Acft. Gross Weight (25–28)	(29–30)	Fiscal Year (31–32)	Fleets and Maws. (33–34)	(35–49)
					ØØ24		69		

(50–52)	PROPERTY DAMAGE COST: Gov't. (53–55)	Non Gov't. (56–58)	Total Occupants This Acft. (59–60)	Aircraft Injury Summary: TOTAL INJURIES "A" "U" "L" – Navy (61–62)	Non Navy (63–64)	"A" Injuries – Navy (65–66)	Non Navy (67–68)	"U" Injuries – Navy (69–70)	Non Navy (71–72)	"L" Injuries – Navy (73–74)	Non Navy (75–76)	Trans. Code (77)	Card Number (78–80)
	ØØØ	ØØØ	Ø1	Ø1		Ø1						A	Ø2Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 11

8110202

R&DP-20-2(1/68)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: bgp REVIEWED: ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 3

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Aircraft Injury Summary (cont'd)																								
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		"B" Injuries		"C" Injuries		"D" Injuries		"E" Injuries		"F" Injuries		"G" Injuries		Total Injuries		No. Occupants All Acft. Involved		
Cal. Yr.	Mo.		Day								Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
6	8	1	1	0	2	1	0	2	0	1																									0	1			0	0	1

ESCAPE SYS. DATA																																											
Sys.	Comp-onent	Spec. Data															Component Separated From Aircraft		Pri Acdt. Type		Pri Phase of Operation		1st Acdt. Type		1st Phase of Operation		2nd Acdt. Type		2nd Phase of Operation		Trans. Code	Card No.		
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																			D	3	4	4	7	D	3	4	4	7	B	1	A	2		A	1	3	1

CARD 4

	3rd Acdt. Type		3rd Phase of Operation				Type Operations		Contributing Causes							Pilot Error Causal Fac.						Pilot Factor After Fact			Other Personnel Causal Factor						Other Pers. Factor After Fact		Inv. Mat. Comp. 1st Causal Factor					
																First			Second			Third			First			Second			Third			Cross Ref.	Compo-nent		Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
							3		1	1						X	W							1													

Involved Mat. Comp. (cont'd.)											Material Fact After Fact				Acft. Design Comp. Causal Factor				DESIGN C.F.				
2nd Causal Factor						3rd Causal Factor																	
Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Cross Ref.	Compo-nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Special Equipment	Pilot Equipment	Trans. Code	Card No.		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																											A	0	4	0

SHEET 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 2 OF 11

81102102

R&DP-20-3(1/68)

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: lgw REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 6

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Weather Causal Factor						Facility Causal Factor	Facility Fact. After Fact		Environ. Factor									Cause + Factor Primary							Cause + Factor 1st Possible						
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number																			Misc							Misc.						
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day																								Wx					Fact		Wx					Fact	
																												Pers					Factor		Pers					Factor	
																												Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
6	8	1	1	0	2	1	0	2	0	1																		1					X	W								

Cause + Factor 2nd Possible							Cause + Factor 3rd Possible							Cause + Factor 4th Possible							Special Attention	Special Data and Conditions												Trans. Code	Card Number		
Misc							Misc							Misc																							
Wx						Fact	Wx						Fact	Wx						Fact																	
Pers						Factor	Pers						Factor	Pers						Factor																	
Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.																		
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																						G	M											A	0	6	0

CARD 8

								Material Special Data																																			
								First				Second				Third				Fourth				Fifth				Money Prior To Occur.	OPERATOR INCAPACITATED C.F.												
								Code				Code				Code				Code				Code																			
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

																												Multi-Occurrences		Multi-Maintenance Problems			Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												0	8	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 2 OF 11

8 1 1 0 2 1 0 2

R&DP-20-4(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: *[initials]* REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 9

Field	Columns	Entry
RECORD IDENTIFICATION — Date — Cal. Yr.	01–02	68
RECORD IDENTIFICATION — Date — Mo.	03–04	11
RECORD IDENTIFICATION — Date — Day	05–06	Ø2
RECORD IDENTIFICATION — Type Report	07	1
RECORD IDENTIFICATION — Log Line Number	08–09	Ø2
RECORD IDENTIFICATION — Aircraft Number	10–11	Ø1
1st Flight After Maint.	12	
D.I.R.	13	
Aircraft Data — Tour	14	
Aircraft Data — Hours Since Acceptance	15–18	1337
Aircraft Data — Since Last Insp. — Type	19	A
Aircraft Data — Since Last Insp. — Hours	20–22	
Aircraft Data — Since Last Insp. — Days	23–24	68
Aircraft Data — Since Last Par/O'Haul — Activity	25	
Aircraft Data — Since Last Par/O'Haul — Hours	26–29	123
Aircraft Data — Since Last Par/O'Haul — Months	30–31	Ø2
Power Plant Model Number	32–39	
Power Plant Serial Number	40–46	
	47–49	
Primary Involved Material Component — Manufacturers Part Number	50–65	
Primary Involved Material Component — Total Hours	66–69	
Primary Involved Material Component — Since Last Par/O'Haul — Activity	70	
Primary Involved Material Component — Since Last Par/O'Haul — Number	71	
Primary Involved Material Component — Since Last Par/O'Haul — Hours	72–75	
	76	
Trans. Code	77	A
Card Number	78–80	Ø9Ø

CARD 10

Field	Columns	Entry
Pri. Inv. Mat. Comp. (cont'd) — Since Last Check Perf. — Type	12	
Pri. Inv. Mat. Comp. (cont'd) — Since Last Check Perf. — Hours	13–15	
Pri. Inv. Mat. Comp. (cont'd) — Since Last Check Perf. — Days	16–17	
Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component — Manufacturers Part Number	18–33	
Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component — Total Hours	34–37	
Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component — Since Last Par/O'Haul — Activity	38	
Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component — Since Last Par/O'Haul — Number	39	
Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component — Since Last Par/O'Haul — Hours	40–43	
Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component — Since Last Check Perf. — Type	44	
Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component — Since Last Check Perf. — Hours	45–47	
Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component — Since Last Check Perf. — Days	48–49	
	50–76	
Trans. Code	77	
Card Number	78–80	1ØØ

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 4 OF 11

8110 2102

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: *[initials]* REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 11

RECORD IDENTIFICATION										
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	8	1	1	Ø	2	1	Ø	2	Ø	1

Controlling LSO's Carrier Pass Description

Start							Middle							In-Close							Ramp						
Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39

CLCPD (cont'd) TOUCH-DOWN								Trans. Code	Card Number		
Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position					
40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47–76	77	78	79	80
									1	1	Ø

CARD 12

12–49

	File or Serial Number (Pilot)	Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Trans. Code	Card Number		
50–61	62–68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
	(b) (6) [redacted]	5	2	6	Ø	E	1	A	1	A	1	2	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 5 OF 11

811102102

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 13

RECORD IDENTIFICATION																																															
Date																																															
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report		Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Pilot Factor Inv.		Service Tour		Instrument Card		Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 6 Months		Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 12 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 6 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 12 Months		Time All Models Total		Time All Models Last 3 Months		Time This Model Total		Time This Model Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Number of → Total		Number of → Day		Number of → Nite		Number of → Total Day This Model	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41							
6	8	1	1	0	2	1	8	2	0	1	1		2			0	7					0	3	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	6	0	3	2	9	0	0										

Carrier Landings																																															
Total Nite This Model		This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days														File or Serial Number (Co-Pilot)								Rank/Rate		Br. of Service		Age		Yrs. D.N.A.		Status		Position		Inj. to Indiv.		Abandon A/C		Pilot Factor Involved		Service Tour		Instr. Card		Trans. Code		Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80									
																																			A	1	3	∅									

CARD 14

Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 6 Months		Emerg. Syst. Train. Last 12 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 6 Months		Instrument Trainer Last 12 Months		Time All Models Total		Time All Models Last 3 Months		Time This Model Total		Time This Model Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Number of Carrier Landings Total		Number of Carrier Landings Day		Number of Carrier Landings Nite		Number of Carrier Landings Total Day This Model		Number of Carrier Landings Total Nite This Model		Number of Carrier Landings This Model Day Last 30 Days		Number of Carrier Landings This Model Nite Last 30 Days											
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49										

					File or Serial Number (Instr. Plt. in Other A/C)							Rank/Rate		Br. of Service		Age		Yrs. D.N.A.		Status		Position		Inj. to Indiv.		Abandon A/C		Pilot Factor Involved		Service Tour		Instr. Card						Trans. Code		Card Number							
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80																	
					(b) (6) [redacted]											H																																

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 6 OF 11

8110210102

R&DP-20-8(1/68)

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Emerg. Syst. Train.				Instrument Trainer				Time All Models				Time This Model										Number of Carrier →						
Date																																							
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Last 6 Months		Last 12 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Total		Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model		Total Nite This Model	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	8	1	1	0	2	1	0	2	0	1																													

Landings																																							
This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days				This Individual in Acft.			Name (Instr. Plt. in Other Acft.)																				Number of Personnel Records							Trans. Code	Card Number		
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
									(b) (6) [redacted]																				0	1						A	1	5	0

CARD 16

P								File or Serial Number (All Persons)										Name												Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Card Code 65				
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
P								(b) (6) [redacted]							E	M	M	E	T	T		M		C	5	2	6	0	E	1	A	1	6	5			

Equip 1						Equip 2						Equip 3						Equip 4																	
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data		Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number							
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80					
Z	0	5	3	A	A	L	5					S	A					D	C						0	1	A	1	6	0					

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 7 OF 11

811021102

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 17

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 5						Equip 6						Equip 7						Equip 8						Equip 9					
Date																																								
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report		Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	8	1	1	0	2	1	0	2	0	1	F	0					E	A					E	2					A	1					I	4				

Equip 10								Equip 11						Equip 12						Equip 13						Equip 14											
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data				Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data			Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
M	8																																0	1	A	1	7	0

CARD 18

Equip 15						Equip 16						Equip 17						Equip 18						Equip 19						Equip 20						
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

Equip 21						Equip 22						Equip 23						Equip 24											
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data			Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												1	8	0

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 8 OF 11

811021102

R&DP-20-11(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 21

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 45						Equip 46						Equip 47						Equip 48						Card Code 66		ACFT DESCRIPT	MISHAP DESCRIPTOR	Topog.at Mishap
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data						
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day																																			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	8	1	1	0	2	1	0	2	0	1																									6	6	A	F	B

Type of Egress	Eject. Info.								Egress Problems: Prior			During			Subsequent			Type/Mod. Eject. Seat		Firing Method Seq. Eject.	Seat Position	Attitude/Maneu. A/C at Exit	Altitude When Ejected		Airspeed		Weight		Alt. Chute Open	In Crash Area	Time In Water		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
									Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob																						
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
N	B																																	0	1	A	2	1	0

CARD 22

Time in Raft		Vertebral Fractures				Eject. Fatal Causes: Pri.	Sec.	Injury	Combat Zone								Card Code 67		Wind Velocity in Knots		Wave Height	Wave Interval in Seconds	Visibility	Air Temperature		Water Temperature		Alerting Factors: 1st Factor	2nd Factor	3rd Factor	Located Site	Survivor Left Site	Means of Locating			
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
								A										6	7					5	9	0			E			H		A	D		

Survival Factors		Fatals Time Lapse From: Mishap to Site Locat.	Site Locate to Victim	Mishap to Death	Time Lapse Last Training: Low Press. Chamber	Eject. Tower	Eject. Seat	Survival	Training Factors																		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
		A	A	A	D	D	D	B	A																0	1	A	2	2	0

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 9 OF 11

811021102

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 25

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Survivor's																																		
Date											Problems			Condit.																														
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report		Log Line Number		Aircraft Number				During		After		Time Lapse Reach to Rescue		Time Lapse Mishap to Rescue Completion		Rescue Recommend		CARD CODE 73		Weight		Height		Age		Sitting Height Nearest 1/4 Inch		Trunk Height Nearest 1/4 Inch		Functional Reach Nearest 1/4 Inch	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	8	1	1	0	2	1	0	2	0	1													7	3	1	4	4	6	6	2	5	3	5	1	2	4	3	3	3	

Buttock Knee Nearest 1/4 Inch			Leg Length Nearest 1/4 Inch					Bideltoid Nearest 1/4 Inch			CARD CODE 74		Role of Indiv. in Cause	Supervisory Factors: Inadequate Briefing	ORD/LEFT ON FLT BEY CAP	Poor Crew Coordination	Other	Pre-Flight Factors: Faulty Flight Plan	Faulty A/C Pre-Flight	Faulty Prep. Pers. Equip.	Hurried Departure	Delayed Departure	Inadequate Wx. Analysis	Other	Experience Trng. Factors: Inadequate Transition	LIMITED TOTAL EXPERIENCE	LIMIT RECENT EXPERIENCE	FAIL TO USE ACCEPT PROC.	Other					Person Sequence Number		Trans. Codes	Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
2	2	3	4	0	3			1	6	2	7	4		1	2										1	2	3	4					0	1	A	2	5	0

CARD 27

Design Factors: Design of Inst/Controls	Location of Inst/Controls	Failure of Inst/Controls	COCKPIT LIGHTING	Runway Lighting	Lighting Other A/C	PERSONAL EQU INTERFERENCE	WORK SPACE IN-COMPAT. W/MAN	Other	Communication Problems: MISINTERPRET COMM	DISRUPTED COMM	Language Barrier	Noise Interference	Other	Environmental Factors: ACCELERATION FOR IN FLIGHT	DECOMPRESSION	Vibration	Glare	Smoke Fumes	Heat	Cold	Wind Blast	VISIBILITY RESTRICTIONS: Wx Haze Dark	Icing Window Fog	DUSTWIND SMOKE	WX OTHER THAN VISIBILY	Other	CARD CODE 75		Psycho Physiological Factors: Food Poisoning	Motion Sickness	Other Acute Illness	OTH PRE EXIST DISEAST/DEFECT	Get "Homeitis"	Hangover	Sleep Deprivation	FATIGUE, OTHER	Missed Meals
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
																											7	5							7	8	9

Psycho Physiological Factors (cont'd): DRUGS PRESCR MEDICAL DR.	Drugs, Other	Alcohol	Visual Illusions	HALLUCATIONS	UNCONSCIOUS NESS	DISORIENTAT ION VERTIGO	Hypoxia	Hyper-Ventilation	Dysbarism	CO Poisoning	Boredom	Inattention	Channelized Attention	Distraction	PREOCCUPATIN PERS. PROB.	EXCESSIVE MOT ATION TO SUC	Over Confidence	Lack of Self-Confidence	LACK OF CONF ENCE IN EQUIP	Apprehension	Panic	Other			Person Sequence Number		Trans. Codes		Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																S									0	1	A	2	7	0

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 10 OF 11

811021102

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED ____

CARD 29

Record Identification: Date: Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Other Factors To Be Considered: Habit Interfe Wrong Cont.	Confus of Contr. Other	Misread Instruments	Misinterpret Instruments	Misled by Faul Instrum.	Vis. Rest. by Equip. Struct.	Task Over-Saturation	Inadequate Good/Timing	Misjudged Speed/Dist.	Wrong Cours of Action	Delay Taking Nec Action	Violation of Flt. Discip	Navigational Error	Inadvertant Operation	Other	CARD CODE 77		Disposition	Body Position	Direction Facing	Physical Defects Post Crash Exam.: Visual Acuity or None	Hearing	Cardio-Vascular	Neuromscul Skeletal	Gastro-Intestinal	Respiratory	Urogenital	Other Abnormal	Reason for Grounding
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	8	1	1	Ø	2	1	Ø	2	Ø	1											B					7	7	4	1	1		2		4					

Estimated Duration of Grounding		Pri. Cause of Death Diagnosis Number				Autopsy: Preformed	Protocol	Conducted By	Blood or None	Lab Toxicological Test On: Urine	GI Contents	CNS Contents	Muscle Tissue	Visceral Tissue	Other	Ultra-Viol or Oth Special Investig	CARD CODE 78		Unconsciousness	Internal Injury: Head, Neck or None	Thorax	Abdomen	Other	Cerebral Concussion	Facial Injuries	Intra Oral Injuries	Eye Injuries							Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
		8	6	5	1	1	1	1								8	7	8																Ø	1	A	2	9	Ø

CARD 30

Fractures Group A: Cranial or None	Facial	Cervical	Thoracic	Lumbar	Sacral	Coccygeal	Shoulder Girdle	Rib	Group B: Pelvis or None	Upper Arm	Lower Arm	Hand Incl. Fingers	Upper Leg	Lower Leg	Foot Incl. Toes	Other Fractures	Dis-Locations Group A: Jaw or None	Cervical Vertebral	Thoracic Vertebral	Lumbar Vertebral	Saccral Vertebral	Coccygeal Vertebral	Shoulder Girdle	Ribs	Pelvis	Group B: Shoulder or None	Elbow	Wrist	Hand Fingers	Hip	Knee	Ankle	Foot Toes	Other Dislocations	CARD CODE 79		
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
																																			7	9	

Amputations/Avulsions: Head, Neck or None	Trunk	Upper Extrem.	Lower Extrem.	Other	Soft Tissue Injuries Group A: Lacerations or None	C.S.S. Head	Abrasions Head	Lacerat Neck	C.S.S. Neck	Abrasions Neck	Lacerat Thorax	C.S.S. Thorax	Abrasions Thorax	Group B: Lacerations Abdom/None	C.S.S. Abdomen	Abrasions Abdomen	Lacerat Up Extr	C.S.S. Up Extreme	Abrasions Up Extr	Lacerat Low Extr	C.S.S. Low Extreme	Abrasions Low Extr	Other S.T. Injuries	Asphyxiation Suspected	Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												3	Ø	Ø

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 11 OF 11

8110210202

EMMETT

R&DP-30(6/68)

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD
OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: R&DP DEPT

DATE 4/14/69

TO: (1) CODING SECT [illegible]
(2) REC CONT BRANCH PS 10/20/69
(3) ADPE DIV PR 20 OCT 1969
(4) REC CONT BRANCH 10/20/69

No log entered to be made. Per Mr. Bryson 10/20/69 PS

TRANSACTION CODES
D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).
M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen Data Sect of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.										
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYP-RPT	LOG NUMBER		AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
1	5	1	1	0	2	1	0	2	0	1

Emmett

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL OF FLD START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS				PERSON SEQ NUMBER		FIELD LENGTH		DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)										TAPE REC DIV NO.	TRANS CODE
				12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29		
1	(b) (6) [redacted]			1	2	1	3	1	1	1	2	2	1										
				30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47		
2	(b) (6) [redacted]			0	2	3	3	1	4	4	2	A	6										
				48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	77
3	(b) (6) [redacted]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	7	9	5	1	1	1	9	0	[illegible]	2	1	7	1	2	4	1		0	1	7

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6) [redacted]

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

81102102

R&DP-30(6/68)

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD
OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: [illegible] DEPT

DATE [illegible]

TO: (1) CODING SECT [illegible]
(2) REC CONT BRANCH PS 10/20/69
(3) ADPE DIV [illegible] 20 OCT 1969
(4) REC CONT BRANCH _____

TRANSACTION CODES
D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).
M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen Data Sect of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.										
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYP-RPT	LOG NUMBER		AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL OF FLD START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS				PERSON SEQ NUMBER		FIELD LENGTH		DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)												
				12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29			
(b) (6) [redacted]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	5	H	D	G	1	3								
				30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47			
2	OTHER PILOT'S NAME	15	50	Ø	8	4	9	Ø	Ø	1	Ø	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]		[redacted]		(b)		
				48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	77
3																						[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6) [redacted]
ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

8110210 2

R&DP-20-16(1/68)

I.D. Number	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Typ	Log	Typ Brief	Narr File I.D.	Cls	Orig. Ute	Tot Cds	Trans. Code
	68	11	02	10	2	1	N N N	1		~~14~~ 15	A

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf.

TYPE BRIEFS CODES
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. CODED REVIEWED KEY PUNCHED VERIFIED

STALL/SPIN ACFT WAS ENGAGED IN 2ND ACM WHICH STARTED
WITH INSTRUCTOR AT 23M FT & FRP AT 25M FT. AFTER 2ND
PASS (HEAD-ON), INSTRUCTOR PULLED UP AS BOTH ACFT PAS
SED & FRP ALSO PULLED UP. INSTRUCTOR REVERSED HIS TUR
N & STARTED DESCENDING-LEVELING OUT AT 12M FT. INSTR
THEN STARTED A CLIMBING TURN & OBSERVED OTHER ACFT 1M
TO 1.5M FT ABOVE HIM & AFT. INSTR THEN MADE A HARD H
IGH G ROLL TO LEFT & LOST SIGHT OF FRP. NEXT TIME INS
TR SPOTTED FRP'S ACFT, IT WAS IN A SPIN. ACFT REVERSE
D DIRECTION OF SPIN 2-3 TIMES. INSTR TRANSMITTED "EJE
CT" 4-5 TIMES. ACFT IMPACTED A ROCKY HILLSIDE WITH NO
APPARENT ATTEMPT TO EJECT. PRI-PLT (INADEQUATE EVALUA
TION OF EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES-GOT ACFT INTO SPIN & F
AILED TO RECOVER FROM THE SPIN). CONTRIB-INSTRUCTOR P
LT-FAILED TO COMPLY WITH PUBLISHED BRIEF.

CARD NO.

8 11 02 10 2

R&DP-20-16(1/68)

I.D. Number	68	11	02	1	02	2	N N N	1		A
	Yr.	Mo.	Day	Typ	Log	Typ Brief	Nat File I.D.	Cl.	Orig. Use	Tot-Cds	Trans. Code

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf.

TYPE BRIEFS
CODES
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. CODED _____ REVIEWED _____ KEY PUNCHED _____ VERIFIED _____

CARD NO.	
01	PLT WAS ENGAGED IN AN AGGRESSIVE COMBAT MANEUVERS TRA
02	INING FLT. THE ACFT WAS OBSERVED TO ENTER SPIN WHICH
03	CHANGED DIRECTION DURING DESCENT & IMPACT THE GND. TH
04	ERE WAS NO ATTEMPT TO EJT. THE PLT SUSTAINED SEVERE I
05	MPACT INJ. THE MOR INDICATES THAT IN ADDITION TO BEIN
06	G EXCESSIVELY MOTIVATED THE PLT'S ACTIVITIES DURING T
07	HE 48 HOURS PRIOR TO THE MISHAP MAY HAVE INTRODUCED A
08	N ELEMENT OF FATIGUE WHICH POSSIBLY INFLUENCED HIS DE
09	CISION TO STAY WITH ACFT.
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	

CARD NO.

811 02 102

NAVAL SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

111A1/gr
3750/2
Ser 627
2 Apr 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR

Subj: VF-124 AAR ser 5-69A concerning F-8J BuNo 150850 accident occurring 2 November 1968, pilot EMMETT

1. The subject report and all endorsements have been reviewed. Concur with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers with the following remarks: The instructor pilot did not comply with the published briefing guide for the assigned mission in that he changed the minimum altitude during the brief. He also failed to position the flight during the first engagement so that the fleet replacement pilot would be required to demonstrate the prescribed maneuvers The instructor leader's actions during the second engagement effectively changed the mission from a basic tactics to an advanced tactics mission and established the conditons leading to the mishap. Therefore, the action of the instructor pilot is considered to be a cause factor in this mishap.

2. The cause factors contributing to this accident have been recorded as follows:

a. INSTRUCTOR PILOT (failed to comply with published brief).

*b. PILOT (permitted aircraft to spin at too low an altitude to effect recovery).

*Primary

W. CARMAN
By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E) (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
COMRCVW-12
NAVPRO DALLAS
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN
DIR AFIP

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

81102102

R&DP-7 (11-67)

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to: Correction to:		Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1			/
DIR			/
Misc Items for Action or Correction			
To Code	From Code/Date		
	511 / 11-25-68	Will not be made a sensitive document per Mr. Lott today's date S. Ewing	/
	511 / 1-30-69	Hard-coded 12/17/68 bgs ORIGINAL REC'D c/s Mr Lott Please add instructor Pilot to cause factor & Narative. Petry	/
511	512 / 10-18-69	Final Review & close out completed. Please file in closed file. VR BTB	/

18 OCT 1969 CLOSED

811021 02

R&DP-8 (11-67)

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE-OUT" LETTER
ON ORIGINAL REVIEW

NOTE: 1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DPEARTMENT: None

INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPARTMENT:

None - 2

INITIAL/CODE

81102102

R&DP-27(4/68)

UNIT VF-124
MODEL F8J
BUNO 150850

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING:
	M&M		3.19.69		
	AERO-MED	3-24			

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS:
REMARKS:

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NAVAVNSAFECEN 2 APR 1969
EXTENSIONS

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
AOA	19 March ~~1 April 69~~		1 April 69	Lgg	

NAVAVNSAFECEN ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT
1	R&DP			
2	M&M			
3	ADMIN			

ROUTING AFTER CLOSE-OUT

DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
AERO-MED				

NOTES: 1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder.

2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch.

3. Any department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

81102102

3750
80/ 551

20 JAN 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 AAR ser 5-69A concerning F-8J
BuNo 150850 accident occurring 2 Nov 68, pilot EMMETT

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center

Subj: VF-124 AAR ser 5-69A

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements.

2. All aspects of spin training are being reviewed, and as of the date of this endorsement, contrary to comments in paragraph 3 of the third endorsement, no change in RAG training is being initiated. However, spin training in the training command should be reviewed for improvement.

3. The comments of the board and the first endorser relative to the "hot fighter pilot" in paragraph 3 of part IX of the AAR are noted.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Force Aviation Safety Officer

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMREDATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
CO FITRON ONE TWO FOUR
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN, PAX RIVER
DIR AFIP

811021102

ORIGINAL

80
3750
Ser 1348
18 December 1968

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 serial 5-69A concerning F8J BuNo 150850, accident occurring 2 November 1968, pilot [redacted]

From: Commander Fleet Air Miramar
To: Commander Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VF-124 Aircraft Accident Report serial 5-69A: forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements.

2. This is the second F8J lost in a spin accident the past month. During the remanufacturing of the F8 aircraft, the "J" series has had extensive redesign features not incorporated in previous F8 models. It is recommended that consideration be given to subjecting the F8J aircraft to spin tests, including an evaluation of the wing up configuration for low altitude recovery from uncontrolled flight.

C N Conatser
C. N. CONATSER

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
RCVW-12
VF-124
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
NATC PAX RIVER
DIRAFIP

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

811021 02

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

CO RCVW-12:sn
3750
Ser 80/ 832
10 DEC 1968

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 Accident, serial 5-69A, concerning F8J BuNo 150850 of 2 November 1968, Pilot EMMETT

From: Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air, Miramar
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VF-124 Aircraft Accident Report serial 5-69A

1. Forwarded, concurring with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks of the first endorser, with the following additional comments.

2. Concur with paragraph 3 of the first endorsement. LT (b) (6) is considered to be fully qualified to instruct in the tactics phase of VF-124's training syllabus.

3. Recommendation 1 Part IX

a. RCVW TWELVE fully recognizes the requirement for jet spin training within the CRAW community. Actual spin training, in the T-1A, will be included in the instrument syllabus of VF-126 and VA-127 within one month. All students undergoing training in RCVW TWELVE will be exposed to jet spins and recovery prior to commencing training in operational aircraft.

(b) (6)
[redacted]

Chief Staff Officer

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E)
COMNAVSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
CO FAIRMIRAMAR
NAVPLANTREPO, DALLAS
CO, FITRON ONE TWO FOUR
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN, PAX RIV
DIRECTOR ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

81102102

VF-124/20:rkg
3750
Ser 1058
27 NOV 1968

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VF-124 AAR Serial 5-69A, 2 November 1968, F8J BUNO 150850, pilot EMMETT

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron 124 (VF-124)
Naval Air Station, Miramar, California 92145
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE
(2) Commander Fleet Air Miramar
(3) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VF-124 Aircraft Accident Report Serial 5-69A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Board with the following exceptions and comments.

2. Commencing with the arrival of the student at VF-124 and his training as a Crusader pilot, spin avoidance and spin recovery techniques are stressed. During the familiarization briefings prior to flight the students are given a very comprehensive 90 minute presentation on spins in the Crusader. The presentation includes a lecture, a movie, and a written examination. The student must demonstrate a satisfactory knowledge of spins by passing the written examination prior to flying the airplane. In addition, prior to each flight during which the student may be required to approach the maneuvering limits of the airplane he is thoroughly briefed on techniques for recovery from uncontrolled flight and spins. LTJG EMMETT received the presentation on spins, satisfactorily passed the written examination on the subject and received detailed briefings prior to this and his other flights in the basic tactics phase.

(b) (5)
[redacted]

3. The Board raises the question as to the qualifications of LT (b) (6) to instruct this particular flight. It is the normal procedure in VF-124 that prospective instructors be required to attend certain lectures and receive standardization flights prior to instructing a given phase. Shortly after his arrival at VF-124 LT (b) (6) was nominated for a classified project involving tactics flights. Because of an urgent requirement for LT (b) (6) to commence flying in the tactics phase immediately, the ground lecture phase of his training was abbreviated. He received personal counseling from the squadron Training Officer, CDR (b) (6) on the philosophy of training given at VF-124. Additionally, LT (b) (6) reviewed the

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

811021102

detailed notes maintained by the tactics phase leader. He also studied the F8 tactics manual in order that he be thoroughly familiar with and instruct standard procedures. In the flight phase of standardization LT (b) (6) received two F8 flights as an instructor under training in advance tactics. Under present procedures a pilot with LT (b) (6) background is supposed to receive two instruction flights in F8's and one in the back seat of the T2J prior to being certified for instruction in the tactics phase. LT (b) (6) therefore was deficient in only the back seat instruction flight in the T2J. (b) (5) [redacted] (b) (5), (b) (6) [redacted] Prior to this accident he had instructed three flights in the basic tactics phase and 10 flights in the advance tactics phase without incident.

LT (b) (6) is a very mature and experienced aviator. As of 2 November 1968 he had 3839 hours total flying time of which 1185 were in the F8. Immediately prior to reporting to VF-124 he completed a combat tour with VF-194.

LT (b) (6) is no beginner in the art of flight instruction. Prior to assignment to VF-194 he completed a tour of duty with VT-9 as a flight instructor in the T2J. During this tour he logged 2200 hours in a 21 month period. After reporting to VF-124 he satisfactorily completed the RCVW-12 instructor training school.

In view of the foregoing I take exception to the statement of the board that LT (b) (6) was not fully qualified to instruct this flight. (b) (5) [redacted] (b) (5) [redacted] The briefing card for this flight directs that the flight disengage from air combat maneuvering at 15,000 feet. LT (b) [redacted] erred in that he briefed that the flight would disengage at 15,000 feet if in slow speed flight and at 10,000 feet if in high speed flight. It is difficult to determine from the available evidence if this error contributed to the accident. From LT (b) (6) [redacted] estimate of his position (Enclosure (1)) it would appear that LTJG BIGETT entered the spin about 15,000 feet MSL. (b) (5) [redacted] (b) (5) (b) (5), (b) (6) [redacted] There is always the strong possibility that the trainee may be engaged in combat with enemy fighters upon his reporting for duty with a fighter squadron on "the line". To prepare him for this eventuality he must have realistic and aggressive training at VF-124. The brief card directs that the instructor pilot turn into the attack to maintain high angle off and that the student counter to maintain the offensive. Considering the demonstrated ability of LTJG BIGETT the instructor reacted to the attack in a normal manner.

811021102

4. The following comments apply to the recommendations in Part IX.

1. I strongly concur. The present aircraft losses to spin accidents makes better spin training mandatory. This training should be given in the Advanced Training Command.

2. (a) Fighter Squadron 124 is presently updating NATAC briefing cards. The new cards will more clearly define the limits of each maneuver and specify the amount of time and fuel that the flight is expected to spend in performing them.

(b) FITRON 124 Instruction 3740.2B is currently under revision. In its present form it requires extensive training of prospective flight instructors. The revised instruction will more realisticly reflect the training required considering instructor background and aircraft assets. All instructors will be required to comply with the updated instruction prior to being assigned as instructor pilots.

3. The "Hot Fighter Pilot" procedures allegedly clandestinely circulated from sources in the Advanced Training Command are absurd. If such recommendations do exist they certainly are not the product of professional combat pilots from South East Asia, but rather the muddled thinking of the Ready Room "expert" who wishes he could win dogfights but does not have the ability. It is strongly recommended that any person caught promulgating such dangerous and erroneous information be the subject of severe disciplinary action.

5. The last safety survey in VF-124 was completed on 7 April 1968.

H. J. Post

H. J. POST

Copy to:
NAVSAFECEN (2)
NAVAIRSYSCOMHDQ (404)
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMRCVW-12
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
CO, NATC PAX RIVER
DIRAFIP

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

81102102

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAVFORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-62) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with*
Para. 6c, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART I GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY	2. SERIAL NO	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT	5. BUREAU NUMBER
CO, VF-124	5-69A	021217Z NOV 68	F8J	150850

6.	9. LOCATION OF MISHAP	10. DAMAGE
TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center	059 DEG/43FM NAS MIRAMAR	ALFA

7. VIA	8.	11. TIME OF DAY	12. TIME IN FLIGHT	13. FLIGHT CODE
CO, VF-124		DAY	0 + 32	1A6
COMFAWW-12				
COMFAT MIRAMAR				
COMFAWINPAC				

14. CLEARED FROM NAS MIRAMAR TO NAS MIRAMAR

15. TYPE CLEARANCE	16. AIRSPEED	17. A/C WEIGHT
VFR	170 E	24,000

18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP: SPIN

19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP: S L 2300 (FT) TERRAIN 0

20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

#	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
	x	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL		17. WEATHER
		2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
		3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11. OTHER PERSONNEL *(Specify)*		19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
		4. PILOT OTHER *(Specify)*		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER *(Specify)*
		5. CREW		13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
		6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (VOR, DME, ILS, MIRROR)		22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
		7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR *(Ship or field)*		23. UNDETERMINED
	x	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER *(Specify)* Flight Leader		16. FACILITIES OTHER *(Specify)*		24. OTHER *(Specify)*

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2. RANK	3. TYPE NAVAL NO.	4. DESIG. NATOR	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7. HOURS OF SLEEP	8. BILLET	9. POSITION	10. INJURY CODE
PILOT (Complete at time of mishap) EMERY, MICHAEL C.	LTJG	(b) (6) [redacted]		USNR	25	1½	Pilot	Cockpit	ALFA
CO-PILOT (Identify & submit separate page 1) NONE									

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS		319.0	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	7 / 0
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		184.4	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	63 / 18
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		23.0	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	0.4 / 5.9
				IN MODEL	0.4 / 5.9
14. F8 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	21.3	20. FLIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	3.7 /
	OFT/CPT	7.5		IN MODEL	3.7 /
15. F8 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	21.3	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap) HELOS (if helo mishap)		292.6
	OFT/CPT	7.5			
16. F8 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	21.3	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	1 NOV 1968
	OFT/CPT	7.5		DURATION	1.3
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK FLEET REPLACEMENT PILOT			24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		Standard

OTHER PERS.

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. RANK	27. NAVAL NO.	28. DESIG. NATOR	29. BRANCH OF SERVICE	30. FOR SERVICE NO.	31. UNIT	32. INJURY	33. BILLET	34. POSITION

811021102

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 2

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition*

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL, AND FACILITIES DATA

A. A/C HISTORY

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST/PAR OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK

B. ENGINE HISTORY

1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)									
(2)									
(3)									
(4)									

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OV-HAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. FUR/AMPEUR
(1)							
(2)							
(3)							
(4)							

D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS

1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED	
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURES

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE
8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT ☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED	10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL ☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL		14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS
INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS		16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS				

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/BMEP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE
INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS		26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS				

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. AMPFUR SERIAL NUMBER _____
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP _____ *Info NASC on DIR report. See para. 30 OPNAVINST F3750.6E*
3. OTHER Preliminary/Supplementary MSG 030051Z NOV 68
4.

8110210 2

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition*

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

G. SHIPS DATA

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR	2. PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH/END SPEED
6. MARK NUMBER	7. MODEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION OF SHIP	9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDLE ARRESTER	

10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOSIDGRAMS USED

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS *(for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)*
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDING LAST 30 DAYS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY / OUTSIDE AIR	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS *(winds aloft, icing level, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate)*

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS	2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
				2ND NAVAVNSAFECN DIRECT (AAR)
				NAVAIRSYSCOMHDQ (404)
				COMNAVAIRPAC
				COMFAIRMIRAMAR
				COMRCVW-12
				NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
				CO, NATC PAX RIVER
				DIRAFIP

COST DAMAGE TO:	3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	4. PRIVATE PROPERTY	5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO
	NONE	NONE	22 November 1968

PART IV SIGNATURES OF THE [redacted]

1. SENIOR MEMBER	2. MEMBER
CDR [redacted] USN NATOPS/Standardization Officer — UNIT BILLET	LCDR [redacted] USN Aviation Safety Officer — UNIT BILLET
3. FLIGHT SURGEON MEMBER	3. MEMBER
LT [redacted], USNR Flight Surgeon	LCDR [redacted], USN Ass't Maintenance Officer — UNIT BILLET

When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

F-05r

811021102

PART V - THE ACCIDENT

Following a proper brief (including spin recovery procedures) and preflight inspection LT [redacted] and LTJG EMMETT launched at 1145 (U), 2 November 1968 in F8J [illegible] 150297 (MODEX MJ 401) and F8J [illegible] 150850 (MODEX MJ 402), from MAS MIRAMAR, California, on an authorized basic tactics (BATAC-3) flight.

The flight proceeded to the [illegible] VALLEY tactics area and practiced combat spread and tracking maneuvers. LTJG EMMETT then assumed a wide gunnery perch and made an attack on LT [redacted] followed by high "G" tracking. A climb back to altitude was made and a second attack commenced. LT [redacted] countered the attack with a hard break and both aircraft passed nearly head on. Both aircraft continued to maneuver for the advantage until LT [redacted] lost sight of LTJG EMMETT. The next time he spotted him the aircraft was in a spin and below 10,000 feet. LT [redacted] transmitted "EJECT" four or five times. It appeared that an attempt was being made to recover from the spin as the aircraft reversed direction two or three times. However, the aircraft impacted nose low on a rocky hillside and exploded. At no time did LT [redacted] hear a transmission nor did he see a chute. LT [redacted] reported the crash and left the scene after the arrival of a Coast Guard rescue plane.

PART VI - DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT

The aircraft impacted on a rocky hillside close to the desert floor about 43 NM northeast of MAS MIRAMAR, California. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and the wreckage was contained in a small circular area on the side of the hill. This same area was blackened by the explosion and fire from the aircraft fuel. All parts of the wreckage were relatively small, the largest pieces being two sections of the wing. The engine had broken up and rolled down the hill. The ejection seat was located within the center of the area and was removed for inspection. The airframe was disintegrated to the point that salvage was impracticable. Damage to the aircraft was classified as ALFA.

PART VII - INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

The Aircraft Accident Board was convened immediately upon Squadron notification of the mishap. Two members of the Board, the Safety Officer and Flight Surgeon, arrived at the crash site approximately three hours after the accident occurred. They investigated the accident and removed the pilot's body. The Senior Member and Safety Officer spent the following day at the crash site. Small sections of the wing, fuselage and cockpit were closely

8 1 1 0 2 1 0 2

examined. The seat was located in the center of the burned out area with the canopy close by. A technical representative of the Martin Baker Company inspected the recovered seat and could not find any discrepancies other than impact damage. The pilot was out of the seat and attached to the seat pan by his left rocket jet fitting, the right rocket jet fitting and the two top koch fittings were unattached. A maintenance crew was sent to the scene to recover the droop actuating pistons from two relatively intact sections of the wing. Investigation of the droop pistons indicate cruise droop was extended and the leading droop had not been blown down (procedural step for spin recovery). The Board initially believed that the pilot had unhooked his three fittings in order to obtain more freedom of movement in the cockpit. Interviews with classmates of LTJG EMMETT stated this practice had been directely mentioned in Advance Training and that the information was available to LTJG EMMETT. The two recovered koch fittings had definite failure marks on them and by failing several other sets of koch fittings in various stages from fully closed to partially open the failure marks were duplicated. It is believed that LTJG EMMETT was properly attached to the seat.

A. PERSONAL FACTORS.

1. PILOT FACTOR.

The pilot erred in allowing his aircraft to enter a spin, then not recovering from the spin, and finally not ejecting when reaching an altitude from which recovery was impossible.

LT(b) (6) was the only witness to the accident and even he did not see the stall/spin develop. The Board believes that the pilot over extended the aircraft while attempting to maneuver for an advantage. LTJG EMMETT had a growing reputation of being a sharp officer and aggressive pilot. It is generally the more aggressive pilot who will depart the F8 in the early stages of tactics.

It is not understood why recovery was not effected or why proper procedures were not at least initiated. LTJG EMMETT was briefed on spin recovery that morning and also on the previous morning for a NATAC-2. It appeared that he was making an attempt to recover without blowing the land droop. His aggressive attitude could explain this rash action.

His failure to eject can not be explained. (b) (5)
(b) (5)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

81102102

2. MAINTENANCE, SERVICING, AND GROUND HANDLING PERSONNEL FACTORS.

Not considered to be a factor in this accident. The plane captain distinctly remembers helping the pilot strap into the seat and accounting for all seat pins.

3. SUPERVISORY FACTORS.

The flight leader did not remain within the guide line boundaries as set forth by the Squadron for a BATMC-3 instruction flight. Enclosure (6) is the briefing guide used for BATMC 2/3 flights. The guide intends that a good part of the time be initially spent in combat spread practice to give the FRP (Fleet Replacement Pilot) practice in this area and to burn down to a good maneuvering weight. This initial practice also increases the flight time since a 1.5 hours is desired. The maneuvers themselves are basic demonstrations at this stage of instruction. A base altitude of 15M feet is set forth as a minimum.

Combat spread maneuvering was practiced but less than desired as indicated by the fuel states of both aircraft which were about 3200# and 3500# after 30 minutes of flight. The maneuvers conducted after the second and final attack were a little beyond basic demonstration in that a full stage head on fight had developed, however, the maneuvers should not have been beyond the capability of LTJG EMMETT as they were a combination of those previously practiced. The flight leader briefed a minimum altitude of 10M feet, and the maneuvers of the second engagement were carried down to about 12M feet which was about 10,000 feet above ground level. The engagement had commenced over the BORNEO VALLEY area which is at sea level but the fight had drifted 2-3 miles westward near some 3,000 foot hills. LT (b) (6) had not completed all the tactics lectures and had not been briefed by the Tactics Phase Leader, which is a Squadron IUT (Instructor under training) requirement.

8. MATERIAL FAILURES OR MALFUNCTIONS.

Not considered to be a factor in this accident. There is always the possibility that some failure could have caused the aircraft to enter the spin or once in the spin a malfunction preventing recovery; however, the Board considers this unlikely. BUNO 150850 had been flown on a tactics hop prior to the accident with no discrepancies. It had properly performed several maneuvers prior to the spin and furthermore it was operating in the flight area where a stall/spin would occur with improper pilot technique.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

8 1 1 0 2 1 0 2

C. FACILITIES.

No facility was utilized which influenced the accident.

D. NATOPS.

1. NATOPS requirements or procedures were not a factor in the accident.

2. The NATOPS manual directs the pilot to eject if descending out of control below 10,000 feet.

3. Two changes to the NATOPS manual are being considered for the next NATOPS Conference.

(a) Under spin recovery procedure after "retard throttle to IDLE" add new step "lock shoulder harness".

(b) Add WARNING - "If the aircraft enters a spin below 10,000 feet (AGL) do not attempt recovery-eject immediately".

Both recommendations have been submitted in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9 series (the second change was submitted by Fleet Composite Squadron TWO).

In addition, the Aviation Safety Center and LTV have been approached as to the feasibility of recovering from spins by raising the wing, either as a standard procedure or as a low altitude emergency procedure.

PART VIII - CONCLUSIONS

In every accident in which there are some unknown elements present there is always the remote possibility that a material failure occurred or the pilot was somehow incapacitated.

The Board in evaluating all possibilities believes the primary cause of the accident was pilot error in technique and judgement. The pilot induced the aircraft to spin, failed to recover from the spin, and did not eject while out of control below 10,000 feet.

A contributing cause of the accident was that the flight leader was not fully qualified to conduct this training hop.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

811021102

PART IX - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is strongly recommended that spin training be taught and demonstrated to all aviators transitioning to high performance type jets. A specially configured TA, F9, A6, or F4 should be used, in order to indoctrinate the student to the violent uncontrolled flight experienced in jet aircraft as compared to the T-34 aircraft. Spin briefings and movies are not enough to prepare the student for his first unexpected spin in the F8.

2. It is recommended that Fighter Squadron 124:

(a) Review and update the NATAC briefing cards.

(b) Ensure all Instructor Pilots meet the requirements of FITRON 124 INSTRUCTION 3740.2B (Subj: Combat Flight Instructor; qualification of) prior to flights with FRP's.

3. The Board, during its investigation, discovered that improper "hot fighter pilot" procedures were being circulated from Advance Training Command to "Happy Hour" (Fleet Squadrons). These procedures included unhooking koch fittings for cockpit freedom, removing helmet in a dogfight, wearing lip mikes vice oxygen masks, etc. The young, inexperienced, aggressive fighter pilot might put some value on these ideas. It is recommended that the Safety Center possibly publish an article (APPROACH, CROSSFEED) dealing with the serious consequences of such rash acts. Much has already been written along this line but perhaps a new tact could be taken.

81102102

INDEX OF ENCLOSURES

VF-124 AAR Serial 5-69A, 2 November 1968, F8J, BUNO 150850, Pilot EMMETT.

ENCLOSURES:

1. Statement of Instructor Pilot LT (b) (6) [redacted] USN
2. Statement of Plane Captain (b) (6) [redacted] USN
3. Resume of pilot's flying experience
4. Photograph of crash site
5. Photograph of crash site
6. ATAC-2&3 Squadron briefing card
7. Rescue Report
8. Maintenance Officer's statement
9. Medical Officer's Report

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

811021102

Statement of LT (b) (6), (b) (5) [redacted] USN, concerning VF-124 AAR Serial 5-94, 2 November 1968, F8J, BUO 150850, Pilot EMMETT

NOV 2, 1968 1411

At about 1217 P.M. on NOV 2, 1968 I was flying a MTAC-3 hop with LTJG EMMETT. We had been airborne about .6 and his fuel state was just over 3200#, mine was 3500#. We had already had a tracking exercise and one engagement. Mr. EMMETT was doing extremely well.

We started our second engagement at 23M and I broke into him enough so that we were almost head on as we passed. We met about head on at the bottom of our next pass and he pulled up and to the left, I started up and right--then I had leveled off and was looking up high to my 4 o'clock when he started back in, I was only slightly turning and accelerating until he was out about 6,000' and still up around 1000' or 2,000'. My speed was back up to 450 and I came out of burner and pulled up hard right and started a roll to the left. I expected him to be slightly low and at my 8 o'clock but he wasn't, so I turned back right looking for him at my six, he wasn't there either. I turned hard back left and still couldn't see him. Then I saw his A/C out about 3-4 miles extremely nose low and it appeared to be rolling. I called for him to level his wings and I thought he did-then he rolled (I thought) again. I yelled level your wings again and then I was close enough to see the A/C was spinning and his altitude must have been down to 5,000' or below even, so I called EJECT!, EJECT, DEVIL EJECT!, EJECT, and then it was apparent that if he didn't eject he'd crash. The plane seemed to nearly straighten out two times, but would snap back in the other direction. It hit nose low and exploded. I never saw a chute or heard a transmission. I called the base on base radio, informed them of the crash and then went to tower. The Coast Guard plane got there as I reached 1400' and spotted the wreckage before I left.

I made two low passes W/O seeing any signs of life or a chute.

(b) (6), (b) (5) [redacted]

LT USN

Enclosure (1)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

811021102

AMPLIFICATION OF ORIGINAL STATEMENT DATED NOV 2, 1968

Mr. EMMETT and I had briefed about an hour early-around 10:30 in anticipation of aircraft coming up early. Our brief lasted around thirty-five minutes and spin recovery was covered with emphasis being placed on not asking the A/C to perform past its limits. Mr. EMMETT knew the limiting "G" figures and seemed aware of all aspects of the brief. Our ground limit was 15M slow or 10M if we were just cutting across the circle on the bottom and were fast. (I believe the number 400KTS was mentioned here, but I'm not positive).

We got A/C about 1115-just a few minutes after we finished briefing and went down to man our A/C.

After take off and our switch to channel 18 Mr. EMMETT checked in and we proceeded to climb out to our briefed altitude of 23M. He was having some trouble keeping in position on the uncalled turns, so we made two 360° turns at altitude until he seemed better able to react to the turns. On the last turn away from him I had him stay at my six o'clock when he passed aft and got into tracking range (about 1500 ft). I set my throttle at 93%, as briefed, and started gentle maneuvering. After about four thousand feet of altitude loss I did two high-"G"-rolls underneath and with speed-brakes he stayed locked on at 6 o'clock. I lowered my nose then to pick up enough speed to start a high-"G"-barrell roll over the top at around 15M. I purposely did it into the sun, but Mr. EMMETT was too far aft for it to be effective because he'd left his speed brakes out during our descent. We climbed back up to 23M and I had Mr. EMMETT move out and up around 2,000' prior to his commencing his first run. I waited until he was reversing his run prior to starting about a 60° bank descending turn into him. He didn't need to Yo'ye off and settled right into tracking position. I continued to spiral down to about fourteen thousand feet and then we leveled our wings and started to climb back up to altitude. At this time I was getting pretty impressed with Mr. EMMETT's ability, and he was staying in good combat spread position on the climbing turns.

Our next encounter started with a fuel state of about 4200# for Mr. EMMETT and 400# heavier for me.

We started our second engagement with me at 23M and Mr. EMMETT out wider than the first engagement and around 25M. As soon as he turned into me I broke and we passed nearly head on with him about 1,000' above me. We both pulled up and towards each other as we passed and our next pass was still about head-on with lots of speed. He pulled up as he passed and I started up toward him (to my left), but then I reversed and stayed level, descending and accelerating, somewhat, until he was coming back in on me. I had bottomed out at 12,000' 450kts and was climbing to the right. I was around 13-14,000' and still climbing to my right as he approached 5-6000' aft and with 30-45° angle off and 1-1500' above me. He was too fast to settle behind me and didn't appear to be yo-yoing, so I rolled it (HI-"G") to my left and looked out to my 7-8 o'clock posit low then high ..

Enclosure (1)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

811021102

and couldn't see him. I thought he might have stayed behind me, so I rolled rapidly back to the right, and pulled, then seeing nothing-I rolled back left and was continuing my turn to the left when I saw his A/C way out and down, nose low, and it appeared he was tightly rolling and descending. At this time I thought he might have thought I was behind him. He was losing altitude rapidly though and I told him twice to level his wings. By then I was closer, or he was lower, so I could tell from the plan view that he was spinning. I checked my altimeter at this time and I was right at 10,000'. It was obvious he was spinning, well below me and I called four or five times for him to eject. From the time I knew he was spinning, his plane completely rotated five times. It reversed twice and was about to reverse again as it hit. From my recognition of its spin it rotated twice left, paused, reversed for two turns right and reversed again left and appeared to pause straight away just prior to impact.

My altitude at his impact was about 8,000' and my fuel state was 3500#.

Enclosure (1)

811021102

Statement of [redacted] USN, concerning VP-124 AAR 5-69A, 2 November 1968, F8J, BUNO 150850, Pilot EMMETT

I was the plane captain on NOV 2, 1968 for A/C 402. I remember very distinctly handing the pilot the two shoulder straps, and pulling all his pins. We took our time in doing the launch signals and everything went very well. I gave him BLC and channel 1 and 2 on T handle. After we were done I gave him an additional wipe out before he left the spot where he was parked. Everything checked out o'kay.

[redacted]

The Board considers AN [redacted] USN, to be a creditable witness.

Certified to be a True Copy

[redacted]

CDR, USN
Senior Member AAR Board

Enclosure (2)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

81102102

VF-124 AAR Serial 5-694, 2 November 1968, F8J, BUNO 150850, Pilot EMMERT

RESUME OF PILOT's FLYING EXPERIENCE

COMMAND ATTACHED	PERIOD ASSIGNED	MODEL A/C	FLT HRS	CV LDS D/N	OPER/ PROFIC.
BAS TRA	3/67-4/67	T-34	26	0/0	OPER
BAS TRA	5/67-12/67	T2A/B	91	4/0	OPER
ADV TRA	3/68-5/68	F9J	136	5/0	OPER
VF-124	8/68-11/68	TA4F	19	0/0	OPER
		F8	21	0/0	OPER

Enclosure (3)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

81102102

VF-124 AAR 5-69A, 2 NOVEMBER 1968
F8J, BUNO 150850, PILOT EMMETT

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

(ENCLOSURE 4)



8 1 1 0 2 1 0 2

811|02|102

VF-124 AAR 5-69A, 2 NOVEMBER 1968
F8J, BUNO 150850, PILOT EMMETT

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

(ENCLOSURE 5)



VF-124 AAR Serial 5-69A, 2 November 1968, F8J, BUO 150850, Pilot EMMETT

VF-124 OPS FORM 1542/5
BATAC-2&3 TRIM TIME 30 MI

REVISED 8/68
ROUTE FLT TIME
1.5 hrs

IP_____ F8J____ A/C_____ _____
FRP_____ F8J____ A/C_____ DEPART_____
BINGO VFR_____
IFR_____

FLIGHT PROCEDURES:

1. LAUNCH: A. IP lead section MRT T.O. (CRT BATAC-3)
   B. FRP assume Combat Spread on signal from IP climbing to 25M.
   C. Call out all bogies.

2. MANEUVERING: A. Practice Combat Spread at 20-25M, airspeed .80-.90. Stress uncalled turns.
   B. On BATAC-2, at a comfortable fuel state, set a base course at 25M. FRP commence attack from a wide gunnery perch. IP turn slightly nose down allowing FRP to track for 360° turn. On second attack, IP maintain enough 'G' to force FRP to high YO-YO. On subsequent attacks continue turn until FRP demonstrates a proper YO-YO, their commence maximum maneuvering, IP execute at least one hi-"G" barrel roll. Brief counter-tactics for hi-"G" rolls.
   C. On BATAC-3 conduct flight as in item (A). At a comfortable fuel state, allow FRP to make (2) attacks from the perch. IP turn into the attack to cause high angle off. FRP should demonstrate proper maneuvers to maintain the offensive. (ie. high & low YO-YO, barrel rolls etc.) On subsequent engagements the IP will make the attack with FRP turning to cause high angle off. Review maneuvers used to gain the offensive.
   D. Maintain minimum off 200kts and disengage at 15M.

PREFLIGHT BRIEFING IP:
1. Specify lost communications procedures.
2. Review offensive and defensive maneuvers.
3. Explain gunnery perch.

PREFLIGHT BRIEFING IP:

1. Explain positioning of Fire Control switches.
2. Review flight restrictions and spin recovery.

Enclosure (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

81102102

RESCUE REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-13 (3-63)

SPECIAL [illegible]ING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST P37[illegible]E
INSTRUCTIONS: SEE REVERSE

OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL 3750-14

1. FROM: Commanding Officer, Coast Guard Air Station, San Diego	2. DATE OF MISHAP: 2 Nov 1968	2A. DATE OF RESCUE: 2 Nov 1968
3. LOCATION AND DUTIES OF RESCUE VEHICLE: CGAS San Diego	4. RESCUE VEHICLE (Type/model): HH52A HU16E	
5. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: 5	5A. IN RESCUE VEHICLE OR IN RESCUE TEAM: 3	5B. TO BE RESCUED: 0 / 5C. RESCUED: 0
6. RESCUE BACK UP MEANS: NONE		

7. TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Local Date Time Group)

7A. Alert Received: 02/1225U	Method: SARTEL from NAS Miramar
7B. Vehicle Departed: 02/1235U	Distance to Scene: 48 miles
7C. Arrived on Scene: 02/1314U	Search Required: NO
7D. Located Survivor: NO	Method of Locating:
7E. Began Retrieval:	What Was Sighted First:
7F. Ended Retrieval:	Subsequently:
7G. Survivor(s) Disembarked:	Location (If different from Item 3):

8. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RESCUE SITE

8A. WATER TEMPERATURE	AIR TEMPERATURE	WIND VELOCITY
°F	75 °F	5

8B. SEA STATE/WAVE HEIGHT/FREQUENCY, TERRAIN DESCRIPTION
Crash site East side of a 2000 ft hill approximately 250 ft up slope from valley floor.

9. EQUIPMENTS ACTUALLY USED DURING RESCUE
No rescue performed. Crash site located by HU16E, HH52A landed to talk with Sheriff ground party on scene. Later transported accident investigation team to scene.

10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final outcome of rescue attempt, i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATING, RETRIEVING, POST-RETRIEVAL)
Crash fatal to Pilot

11. PERSONNEL REQUIRING RESCUE NAME-LAST FIRST INITIAL	GIVE REASON FOR RESCUE	FACTORS COMPLICATING RESCUE ATTEMPT Physical condition, ignorance of equipment, sea state, etc.

12. REMARKS: (Training of rescue teams or crews, communication equipments/technique, retrieval equipments/techniques, rescue vehicle)

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: Narratives of search, location and retrieving—Survivor's statements

14. NAME AND TITLE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL: (b) (6) [redacted] CDR, USCG
(b) (6) [redacted]

15. NAME AND TITLE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL
SIGNATURE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL

Enclosure (7)

8110210 2

Statement of the Squadron Maintenance Officer, concerning VF-124
AAR Serial 5-694, 2 November 1968, F8J, BUNO 150850, Pilot EMMETT

F8J BUNO 150850 completed F8E/J modification program on 8-28-68 with 1337.4 flight hours since new. It subsequently flew 123.6 hours, including 78.3 hours during October 1968. This aircraft was accepted by VF-124 on 8-31-68 and the acceptance inspection was completed 9-3-68.

Martin-Baker ejection seat type F5A, Serial No. 1066 was installed on 8-19-68 after a calendar inspection, while the aircraft was in the F8E/J modification process. This ejection seat was inspected by VF-124 during the aircraft acceptance inspection completed 9-3-68. All ejection seat cartridges and the canopy removal cartridge were installed between 8-17-68 and 8-19-68 at LTV DALLAS and were of the proper type. All seat cartridges had expiration dates of DEC 1969 and the canopy removal cartridge had an expiration date of JUNE 1970. All applicable changes, bulletins and inspections to the ejection seat and its parachutes had been incorporated.

A review of the maintenance history of this aircraft reveals no malfunctions which would have had a bearing upon this accident.

(b) (6) [redacted]

CDR (b) (6) [redacted] USN

Enclosure (8)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

81102102

ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON D. C. 20305

A 0.3

REPORT OF POST-MORTEM BIOCHEMICAL FINDINGS ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT FATALITY

IDENTIFICATION	TO
UF 124 11-2-68 150850 BRUFF, MICHAEL CASEY 25/68 (b) (6) LT JG (b) (6) [redacted] US NAV HOSP SAN DIEGO CALIF 8 NOV 68 S-68-438 AF FROZEN T BUSH LAG	Chief, Laboratory Service US Naval Hospital San Diego, California 92134 cc CO, USNASC, Norfolk, Va. 23511 CNO OP-05F, Wash., D. C. 20360

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA:

Crash Site:	Aircraft Type:	Aircraft Serial Number:
Near Julian, Calif.	Crusader	F-8 "J"

2. TOXICOLOGY:

A. CARBON MONOXIDE

BLOOD OR TISSUE CONCENTRATION EXPRESSED AS CARBOXYHEMOGLOBIN SATURATION IS . . . . . LUNG - None found %

TEST NOT PERFORMED (SEE REMARKS BELOW) . . . . . [ ]

CARBOXYHEMOGLOBIN SATURATIONS OF 10% OR ABOVE ARE CONSIDERED ELEVATED VALUES.

B. LACTIC ACID

THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM LACTIC ACID CONCENTRATION IS . . . . . MGM%

TEST NOT PERFORMED (SEE REMARKS) . . . . . [*]

VALUES OVER 200 MGM% ARE CONSIDERED TO BE INDICATIVE OF CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM HYPOXIA. THIS MAY BE DUE TO ONE OF SEVERAL CAUSES: (1) HIGH ALTITUDE EXPOSURE TO LOW OXYGEN TENSION; (2) REDUCED OXYGEN SUPPLY; (3) PROLONGED SHOCK; (4) TRAUMATIC INJURIES WHICH IMPAIR ADEQUATE OXYGENATION AND/OR CIRCULATION OF BLOOD TO THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM.

NON ELEVATED VALUES DO NOT RULE OUT HYPOXIA AS A CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT

C. ALCOHOL

ETHYL ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION IS . . . . . LUNG AND MUSCLE - None found MGM%

TEST NOT PERFORMED (SEE REMARKS) . . . . . [ ]

D. DRUGS

DETERMINATION FOR DRUGS OR POISONS WILL BE DONE ON REQUEST FROM THE SUBMITTING FACILITY.

E. REMARKS

*Submitted material not suitable for lactic acid determination.

NOTE: FROZEN TISSUE WILL BE HELD FOR TWENTY (20) DAYS. IF SPECIAL STUDIES OR FURTHER INFORMATION ARE DESIRED, SUBMIT REQUEST BY MOST EXPEDIENT MEANS. CONSULTATION SERVICE FROM THE AEROSPACE BRANCH, AFIP, IS AVAILABLE ON 24 HOUR BASIS. CALL WASHINGTON, D. C., RANDOLPH 3-1388 OR RANDOLPH 3-1000, EXTENSION 22.2921.

3. EXAMINATION AND REPORT BY:	5. APPROVED BY:	6. SIGNATURE
Col. Edward H. Johnston, MC, USA	FOR THE DIRECTOR: (b) (6) [redacted] Captain, MC, USN	(b) (6) [redacted]
4. DATE OF REPORT: 18 November 1968		

AFIP FORM 64 (1 OCT 66)

811021102

AFIP FORM 84 (1 OCT 66)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C A[redacted]ENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PA[redacted]

OPNAV FORM 3750-8 (REV. 3-63) — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.* — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM *(Name and mailing address of activity)*: FIGHTER SQUADRON ONE TWO FOUR, NAVAL AIR STATION, MIRAMAR
2. MOR NUMBER: 5-69A
3. LEAVE BLANK:
4. TYPE OF MISHAP: [X] ACCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT [ ] INCIDENT
5. TIME & ZONE: 1217 (U)
6. DATE: 2 NOV 68
7. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION: Thirty eight nautical miles Northeast NAS Miramar
8. MODEL A/C: F-8 J
9. BUNO: 150850
10. NO. OF OCCUPANTS: One
11. DAMAGE CODE: Alpha
12. UNIT OPERATING A/C: FIGHTER SQUADRON ONE TWO FOUR

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED NAME (Last, first and middle initial)	14. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	15. RANK/RATE	16. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT ABOARD A/C	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT AT MISHAP	18. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL	19. PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED FOR FLIGHT	20. BRANCH OF SERVICE	21. INJURY CODE	22. DISPOSITION
A. EMMETT, Michael Casey	VF-124	LTJG	(b) (6) [redacted]	Pilot		20CT68	Yes S.G.I	USNR	"A"	"F"
B.										
C.										
D.										

23. CLARIFICATION OF ITEMS 13-22 WHEN NECESSARY: -----

24. MODEL-OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	25. BUNO	26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	27. UNIT OPERATING A/C	28. DAMAGE CODE	29. MOR NO.
(none)	--------	--------	----------	------	------

30. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP *(Use additional 8 x 10½ sheets if required)*

See enclosure I for Narrative Account of Mishap.

See enclosure II for Witness's Statement.

31. PRIMARY CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD: Pilot error

32. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD: Incomplete standardization of flight leader

33. POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD: None

34. HAVE ALL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD? IF NO, EXPLAIN. YES [X] NO [ ]

35. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST: [X] ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED [ ] DRAWINGS SKETCHES, PHOTOS [ ] SURVIVORS NARRATIVES [X] WITNESS STATEMENTS [X] CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS [X] REQUIRED COPIES FURNISHED

36. REPORT FILED BY *(Name & signature of medical officer)*: (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted] LT MC USNR — DATE: 19 NOV 68

37. FORWARDED *(Name & signature of responsible authority)*: (b) (6) [redacted] — DATE: 27 NOV 1968

DF-059

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—685974

Enclosure (4)

811021102

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C A[illegible]ENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAG[illegible] OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. — *See OP[illegible]/INST 3750.6E for instructions.*

SECTION B - FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OR RELATING TO MISHAP BY PHASE OF MISHAP *(List in order in accordance with Section B of inst.)*

1. FACTORS	2. PHASE OF MISHAP (See code at right) A	E	S	R	PHASE CODE: A - ACCIDENT, E - ESCAPE/EGRESS, S - SURVIVAL, R - RESCUE	FACTOR WEIGHT: M - MAJOR, C - CONTRIBUTING, Q - QUESTIONABLE OR POSSIBLE
Aircraft Stall and Spin	M				REMARKS	
Failure to recover	M					
Failure to eject	M					
Ground Impact	M					

SECTION C AIR CREW DATA

1. FLIGHT TIME LAST 30 DAYS *(All models)*	12.3 hrs.
2. FLIGHT TIME LAST 24 HOURS *(All models)*	1.8 hrs.
3. NO. FLIGHTS LAST 24 HOURS *(Include present flight)*	2
4. TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	0.5 hrs.
5. TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ALL MODELS	319.0 hrs.

FLIGHT TIME THIS MODEL	6. TOTAL	7. LAST 30	8. 60 DAYS	9. 90 DAYS
	21.3	12.3	21.3	31.3

10. NO. GROUNDINGS PAST YEAR	None
11. NO. DAYS GROUNDED PAST YEAR	(none)
12. DATES AND TYPES OF PRIOR MISHAPS	None
13. NO. HRS. IN A DUTY STATUS LAST 24 HRS.	14.0
14. DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF MISHAP	forward
15. LOCATION AT TIME OF MISHAP	Seated in cockpit

SECTION D ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (Compare with health record)



AGE	25 yrs.
HEIGHT	66.5 IN.
WEIGHT	144 LB.
A. SITTING HEIGHT	35.2 IN.
B. TRUNK HEIGHT	24.8 IN.
C. FUNCTIONAL REACH	33.0 IN.
D. BUTTOCK - KNEE	22.8 IN.
E. LEG LENGTH	40.9 IN.
F. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID)	16.4 IN.

16. LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	Not Available		TISSUE: (CNS)	Spinal cord specimen submitted	
2.			MUSCLE	to A.F.I.P.; results not yet	
3.			VISCERA	available.	
URINE	Not Available		OTHER:	By administrative oversight	
G.I. CONTENT				muscle and G.I. content specimens not submitted.	

17. X-RAY RESULTS ...an extensive soft tissue injury involving the entire body with comminuted fractures involving most of the bony structures, with the pelvis completely shattered.

MCR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
5-69A	F-8 J	150850	(b) (6) [redacted] Pilot

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

EMMETT, Michael Casey

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—713563

811021102

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 3

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-88 (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — See O[redacted]PINST 3750.6E for instructions.

SECTION E INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE 8 PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION
TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP

TIME	
	31 October 1968
1230 to 1415	Lecture, VF-124
1415 to 1800	Relaxing at home
1800 to 1830	Local drive-in for light dinner
1830 to 1900	Dressed for date
1900 to 1930	Rode with friend to local university to pick up dates
1930 to 2400	Danced at several clubs, returned to San Diego
	1 November 1968
0130 to 0430	Visited w/3 room-mates before going to sleep Slept, apparently soundly
0430 to 0500	Arose, showered, dressed
0500 to 0550	Brief for hop
0550 to 0630	Start, ground checks
0630 to 0745	Basic Tactics "2" flight
0745 to 0900	Duty as S. D. O.
0900 to 1100	Examination, VF-124
1100 to 1130	Lunch, relaxed at VF-124
1130 to 1330	To Dental Department, NAS MIRAMAR
1330 to 2230	Duty as S. D. O.
2230 to	Signed out to H.O.Q. to maintain telephone watch as S. D. O.
	2 November 1968
0700 to	Back aboard VF-124 as S. D. O.

TIME	
0800 to 1030	Relieved as S.D.O., relaxed around squadron spaces Briefed by LT (b) (6) for HATAC-3 hop
1030 to 1105	Awaiting aircraft
1105 to 1115	Start, ground checks
1115 to 1145	Take-off, normal early phases of HATAC-3 hop
1216	Aircraft stall, spin
ACCIDENT PHASE	
1217	Ground impact
ESCAPE PHASE	None Attempted
SURVIVAL PHASE	(Does not apply)

TIME OF RESCUE (Does not apply)

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
5-69A	F-8J	150850	(b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL SMITH, Michael Casey

OP-05F

S/N 0107-731-8200

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1966-235-393

811021102

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4 — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8C (REV. 3-63) — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.*

SECTION F — **PATHOLOGICAL DATA** — *(Refer to Section F of instructions.)*

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION: Injury code "A"/Disposition Code "F"

2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS:
1. Mild lumbar scoliosis convexity to left.
2. High-tone hearing loss, left.

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: [X] NO [ ] YES DURATION:

4. DROWNED: [ ] NO

5. ASPHYXIATED: [ ] NO

6. SHOCK (Does not apply): [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

7. EXPOSURE (Does not apply): [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: Mild-Moderate

9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: (Does not apply)

10. PLACE OF HOSPITALIZATION: (Does not apply)

11. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE REASON: [ ] NO [ ] YES (Does not apply)

12. DURATION *(See instruction)*: (Does not apply)

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: "Multiple Injuries"

14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH: None

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: [X] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT [ ] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT [ ] MEDICAL OFFICER

16. (See Enclosure (3)) [X] PROTOCOL ATTACHED [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED P5065" USED? [X] YES [ ] NO

18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON: (Does not apply)

19.

INJURIES	PHASE SUSTAINED A	E	S	R	CAUSE AND MECHANISM *(If unknown, theorize)*
(b) (6) [redacted]					Impact with aircraft wreckage and ground

20. REMARKS

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
5-69A	F-8J	150850	(b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: EMMETT, Michael Casey

OP-01F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—713067

811021102

(b) (6)

[redacted]

8 1 1 0 2 1 0 2

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C A[illegible]DENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - [illegible]E 48 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7
OPNAV FORM 3750-8E (Rev. 3-63) SPECIAL [illegible]ANDLING REQUIRED See OPNAVINST 3750-6E fo[illegible]structions.

SECTION F (Continued) SKELETAL INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING
ALL FRACTURES BY TYPE (Simple, compound, comminuted, etc.) AND DISLOCATIONS INDICATING DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT.

Naval Hospital San Diego
Radiographic Report (b) (6) [redacted]
Full Body X-ray:
(b) (6) [redacted]



DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY: 1. ALL FRACTURES OF SPINAL COLUMN (Simple, compressed, etc.)
2. DISLOCATION AND DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT. 3. SITES OF CORD DAMAGE, IF ANY.

DETAILS OF SPINAL INJURIES



NOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
5-69A	F-8J	150850	(b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL
EMMETT, Michael Casey

NP-00F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—713336

811021102

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C A[illegible]DENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - [illegible]E 4B
OPNAV FORM 3750-8E (Rev. 3-63) SPECIAL [illegible]ANDLING REQUIRED See OPNAVINST 3750-6E fo[illegible]structions.

OPNAV REPORT 3750-F

SECTION F (Continued) SKELETAL INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING
ALL FRACTURES BY TYPE (Simple, compound, comminuted, etc.) AND DISLOCATIONS INDICATING DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT.

Naval Hospital San Diego
Radiographic Report [redacted]
Full Body X-ray:
[redacted]



DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY: 1. ALL FRACTURES OF SPINAL COLUMN (Simple, compressed, etc.)
2. DISLOCATION AND DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT. 3. SITES OF CORD DAMAGE, IF ANY.

DETAILS OF SPINAL INJURIES

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
5-69A	F-8J	150850	[redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL
EMMETT, Michael Casey

02-00F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—[illegible]

811 02 102

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5 OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

OPNAV FORM 3750-6F (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION G — ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 3 OF INSTRUCTION: PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE S-SURVIVAL R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. REQUIRED	4. AVAILABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10½ plain paper if needed.)
MHEU-4002 PA Parachute	All current directives complied with	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
Martin-Baker F-5A Ejection Seat	"	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
RSSK-6 Seat Pan	"	Y	Y	N	N	N	
MA-2 Torso Harness	"	Y	Y	N	N	N	
APH-5 Hard Hat	"	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
Leather Gloves	NONE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
Steel Toed Boots	NONE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
Standard Flight Suit	NONE	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
Leg Restrainers	NONE	Y	Y	N	N	N	

SECTION H — NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

No indication of pilot ejection, or sign of life on the ground, could be seen by LT (b) (6) from the air; LTJG EMMETT's largely intact body was found among the parts of the aircraft wreckage.

Examination of the ejection seat mechanism established with very little question that no effort had been made to fire the seat. No material failure could be found.

Curiously, both "Koch" fittings (and one "Rocket Jet" fitting) were found closed but component parts separated by considerable distances in the wreckage. (b) (5) [redacted] (b) (5) [redacted] Careful analysis of the latching mechanism of LTJG EMMETT's "Koch" fitting and comparison with others tested by application of forces sufficient to pull the two halves apart (4,000-8,000 lbs) convincingly demonstrated that LTJG EMMETT's had been closed and were broken in the ground impact.

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
5-69A	F-8J	150850	(b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: EMMETT, Michael Casey

OP-4555 © U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—O-736-8

81102102

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C CCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCI T — PAGE 6

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-6G (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION I — DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

☐ WATER ☒ LAND ☐ OTHER

2. TYPE OF EGRESS (None)

☐ EJECTION ☐ BAILOUT ☐ UNDERWATER ☐ NORMAL ☐ OTHER *(State type)*

S	E		REMARKS
	X	3. NOT ATTEMPTED	
		4. ATTEMPTED	
		5. ACCOMPLISHED	
		6. THRU CANOPY	
YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	
		8. DURING EGRESS	
		9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED: Martin Baker F-5A

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT (None) ☐ PRIMARY ☐ SECONDARY ☐ OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION (Unknown) ☐ UP ☐ DOWN ☐ FORWARD ☐ AFT ☐ OTHER

14. METHOD OF PARACHUTE OPENING: Maneuver: spin, uncontrolled; Eject not attempted

15. SPEED: Unknown; Estimated 170kts

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET) (no exit) ABOVE SEA LEVEL 2300 ft ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY zero

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING (None)

18. WEIGHT 144 lbs

19. TIME IN WATER (does not apply)

20. TIME IN RAFT (does not apply)

21. WIND VELOCITY negligible

22. WAVE HEIGHT (does not apply)

23. WAVE INTERVAL (does not apply)

24. AIR TEMPERATURE 90° F.

25. WATER TEMPERATURE (does not apply)

26. VISIBILITY unrestricted

27. ALERTING FACTORS: Visual observation by companion F-8 Instructor pilot.

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE: (Same as "27")

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR: (Remains in area of wreckage)

30. (does not apply)

31. (does not apply)

32. (does not apply)

33. (does not apply)

34. (does not apply)

35. (does not apply)

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE? *(If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue)*

☐ NO ☐ YES (does not apply)

SECTION J — TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC 14 FEB 68 EJECTION TOWER 14 FEB 68 EJECTION SEAT 14 FEB 68 SURVIVAL July, 1968

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? *(If yes, explain)*

☐ NO ☒ YES

See Enclosure (4)

MOB NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
5-69A	F-8 J	150850	(b) (6) [redacted] Pilot

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: EMMETT, Michael Casey

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964-712564

8 1 1 0 2 1 0 2

NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP

At approximately 1145 2 NOV 68 Fleet Replacement Pilot LTJG M. C. EMMETT and Instructor Pilot LT (b) (6) [redacted] departed NAS MIRAMAR in individual F-8J ("Crusader") aircraft and proceeded eastward for LTJG EMMETT's third basic tactics (air-to-air combat) practice flight. There was no reported aircraft discrepancy noted before takeoff.

The flight proceeded without incident for the tracking phases and the first engagement. The second engagement began at 23,000 feet and LT (b) (6) bottomed out at about 12,000 feet (all altitudes here are M.S.L.). LT (b) (6) reports that as he climbed through 13,000 to 14,000 feet LTJG EMMETT was ". . . 5000-6000 feet aft and with 30-45° angle off and about 1000-1500 feet above me. He was too fast to settle behind me and didn't appear to be yo-yoing". LT (b) (6) momentarily lost sight of LTJG EMMETT's aircraft and when next seen the latter was " . . . way out and down, nose low, and it appeared he was tightly rolling and descending." Soon it was obvious to LT (b) (6) that the other aircraft was spinning out of control well below his altitude then of 10,000 feet. LT (b) (6) " . . . called four or five times for him to eject . . . " but neither saw nor heard any response. The plane reversed spin direction two times after LT (b) (6) recognized the nature of the problem and was apparently about to do so a third time on impact; this observation suggests LTJG EMMETT was attempting to recover the aircraft throughout the course of his spin.

LTJG EMMETT impacted the side of rocky desert mountain at about 2,300 feet MSL; surrounding peaks are perhaps 1,500 feet higher. No evidence of ejection or of life on the ground was seen from the air.

Enclosure (1)

811021102

Enclosure II

See enclosure 1 of the AAR.

811021102

Standard Form 503
Revised August 1954
Bureau of the Budget
Circular A-32 (Rev.)

Enclosure (3) - Autopsy Protocol

CLINICAL RECORD	AUTOPSY PROTOCOL

DATE AND HOUR DIED	DATE AND HOUR AUTOPSY PERFORMED	CHECK ONE		
18 hours previous to autopsy (est) A. M. P. M.	11/3/68 1145 A. M. P. M.	FULL AUTOPSY	HEAD ONLY	TRUNK ONLY
PROJECTOR (b) (6) [redacted] LCDR MC USN	ASSISTANT (b) (6) [redacted]			

CLINICAL DIAGNOSES (Including operations)

Aircraft accident DOA

PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSES (GROSS)

CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple injuries

(b) (6) [redacted] CAPT MC USN db

MILITARY ORGANIZATION (When required)	AGE	SEX	RACE	IDENTIFICATION NO.	AUTOPSY NO.
		M			A68-438

PATIENT'S IDENTIFICATION (For typed or written entries give: Name—last, first, middle; grade; date; hospital or medical facility)	REGISTER NO.	WARD NO.
EMMETT, Michael Casey NHSD, CALIF. A68-438	DOA	DOA

AUTOPSY PROTOCOL
Standard Form 503
503-104
0109-201-1603

8110210 2

(b) (6)

[redacted]

811021102

Enclosure (4)

There are no deficiencies in LTJG EMMETT's record. Indeed both LT (b) (6) and the Instructor Pilot who flew with LTJG EMMETT on his hop on 1 NOV 68 specifically discussed spin recovery and established policy of ejecting at 10,000 ft. above the ground in uncontrolled flight. Both Instructors were impressed that LTJG EMMETT was an above average student and that he knew spin recovery procedures.

Unquestionably this flight had advanced beyond the basic procedures outlined for it and had become an outright "dogfight". Perhaps the Instructor erred in permitting this, but LTJG EMMETT was recognized as an "impressive" student, and "dogfighting" does normally enter only one flight after this hop.

A more experienced aviator may not have allowed the spin to develop, possibly could have recovered the aircraft, and probably could have controlled his panic and ejected if necessary.

Training was deficient, as pointed out in the AAR, in the Standardization of the Instructor Pilot. LT (b) (6) had not been Instructed fully in the Basic Tactics syllabus as Instructor under training. This is not a general situation in VF-124 and definitive measures are being taken to eliminate it completely.

811 02 102

Enclosure (5) SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In summary, LTJG EMMETT erred in allowing a stall-spin to develop, in not utilizing the means at his command to correct the spin promptly, and finally making no effort to exit the aircraft.

There are several factors which may be relevant to this accident which could not be introduced elsewhere in this Report. The element of fatigue may have entered (see page 3 of this Report), but certainly the work for which LTJG EMMETT was being prepared is often far more demanding than this, and this schedule is felt not to be unreasonable (had this accident occurred 24 hours previously my feelings here would have to be quite different in this respect).

It is psychodynamically interesting to consider the possible effect of LTJG EMMETT's family background on his motivation for entering the Crusader program. We are told that his father was a many-times decorated World War II Fighter Pilot who had downed many enemy aircraft and was himself shot down and presumed killed late in the war. Apparently LTJG EMMETT grew up surrounded by the legend of his father's heroism. His mother subsequently married an Air Force Flight Surgeon.

With this background LTJG EMMETT pursued the Crusader program with much enthusiasm and had indeed distinguished himself as an outstanding Aviator with much potential.

On 2 November 68 he flew air-to-air combat practice with a much more experienced Instructor Pilot who permitted the flight to advance slightly beyond LTJG EMMETT's stage of training and to descend out of the airspace established for safe conduct of this flight. LTJG EMMETT overextended his aircraft in trying to maintain an advantage and entered a spin, for which he had recited the recovery procedures for two Instructors in the 24 hours preceding his crash.

The reversal of spin direction suggests he was alert and at the controls all the way down; failure to extend the droops suggests he was prevented from acting effectively to recover the aircraft, most likely by panic in this emergency.

(b) (5)

[redacted]

The recommendation to enforce strict adherence to Instructor Pilot standardization and prescribed airspace boundaries is respectfully offered.

(b) (5)

[redacted]

811021102

Mike

NNNN
ZCNASCA212779
PTTUZYUW RUMJAPA0648 3080051-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P 030051Z NOV 68
FM FITRON ONE TWO FOUR
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCEN
INFO RUEBBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUMJHEA/COMELEVEN
RUMJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
ZEN/COMFAIRMIRAMAR
RUEBJFA/CHNAVPERS
RUEBNVA/CGFMFLANT
RUMHFMA/CGFMFPAC
RUMTATB/NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO EAST HARTFORD
RUEBBHB/CHNAVMAT
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
ZEN/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUEDCGA/CNARESTRA
RUEBFDA/DIRAFIP
BT
UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

A212/68

AAR

PAGE TWO RUMJAPA0648 UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NAVY PRELIMINARY/SUPPLEMENTARY MSC REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6F
1. 2 NOVEMBER 1968, 1217 (U) DAY
2. APPROX 057 DEGREES 38NM NORTHEAST NAS MIRAMAR
3. F8J BUNO 150850
4. VF-124 AAR 5-69A
5. ALPHA
6. EMMETT, MICHAEL C., LTJG, (b) (6), USNR, 1315, ACTIVE, ALPHA, TOT FLT HRS 317 TOT HRS F8 21, TOT HRS LAST 90 DAYS 38. PILOT DID NOT EJECT
7. NA
8. NA
9. TACTICS TRAINING, ZERO PLUS THIRTY-TWO VFR, LOCAL, NAS MIRAMAR
10. TACTICS
11. SPIN, PILOT DID NOT EGRESS
12. CLEAR, VIS UNLIMITED
13. UNK
14. UNK
15. NONE, GOV PROPERTY
16. WREACKAGE ACCESSIBLE
17. (b) (6) [redacted] LCDR, SAFETY OFFICER, AUTOVON 959-271-3381/2/3/4.
BT

81102102 11-2-68 NOV
0300512

F8J/150850 VF-124 5-69A

81102102