AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
IDENTIFICATION
NO.

3 01 30 102

RECORDS CODE SHEET
SND 4535 (Rev. 1-62)

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

GENERAL (Card No. 1)

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ACCIDENT DAMAGE [A] 9

ACCIDENT INJURY [A] 10

FISCAL YEAR [3] 75

Don't Count	Enemy Action	Other Aircraft	
I.D. NO. 3	0 1	3 0 1 0 2	
1 YR	2 3 MO	4 5 DAY	6 7 8 TYP SEQ
		- P 3 A	
		11 12 13 14 15 Model	

SPECIAL ATTN: ("X")

Model Code 5 2 (76 77)

IBM: The above Fields are to be punched in all Coded Code

PERSONNEL STATISTICS (Card No. 3)

File Number → (b) (6) [redacted]

Name	16	17	18	19	20	21	Rank/Rate	Br Service	Age	Yrs Experience	Status	Position	Inj to Ind	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor (involved)	Trainer Utilization	Instr. Card	Total Time All Models	All Models 3 Months	All Series This Model	All Ser Mod 3 Months	CV Landings	Instrument Hours	Nite Hours	Total Time Jet or Hole
03 E B E R	H	A	R	T		R	4	1	D	A	A	1	L	1	2	1 4	3	2 9	1 6	3 6	1 6	-	3 3	6 7	—
22 23 24 25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	35	37	40	42	45	47	49	51	52-53	55	56-57	58-59	62-63	65-66	68	69-70	71-72	73-74
04 W H I T	E		T		C		4	1	8	3	C	2	L	1	4	1 4	2	1 3	1 6	2 5	1 6	-	2 8	5 9	—

Name 16 17 18 19 20 21

File Number → (b) (6) [redacted]

IBM: PERSONNEL CODED ON REVERSE SIDE [X] →

CODED Eh REVIEWED [illegible] LOGGED DR PUNCHED MDK VERIFIED ____ REVIEWED ____ REPUNCHED 1

CODE SHEET REVIEWED BY CLASS DESK ANALYST [illegible] (Initials) 11-5-63 (Date)

OTHER INJURED PERSONNEL
(Modified Card No. 3)

C.C. 79 - 80	FILE NUMBER (16–21)	NAME (22–31)	Rank or Rate (32)	BR Service (35)	Age (37)	Yrs. Exper. (40)	Status (42)	Position (45)	Inj. to Ind. (47)	Abandon A/C (49)
05	(b) (6) [redacted]	SHEPHARD B	5	6	6	-	L	W	L	1
06		BELL F L	5	5	5	-	I	W	L	1
07		CARPENTER	C	1	-	-	I	W	L	1
08		GATLIEF MW	C	1	-	-	I	W	L	1
09		HAHLER J C	C	1	-	-	E	W	L	1
10		GALINDO J	E	1	—		I	W	L	1
11		SYLVE E A	E	1	—		E	W	L	1
12		LESTER D S	D	1	—		I	W	L	1
13		ROARK D B	D	1	—		I	W	L	1
14		AXTRY D R	E	1	—		I	W	L	1
15		HART J R	3	1	E	-	R	W	A	1
16		OCONNER J	E	4	2	8 -	Q	W	L	1
17										
18										
19										
19										
19										
19										
19										
19										

IBM: Place an "X" overpunch in CC80 if these cards are coded.

2

A & R DEPARTMENT NARRATIVE CODE SHEET

3

YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE	NUMBER	DAMAGE	INJURY	MODEL
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
3	0	1	3	0	1	0	2	A	A	-	P	3	A	

BUREAU NUMBER

1	4	9	6	7	2

75	76	77	78
3	5	2	6

16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	79	80
L	o	s	t		A	t		S	E	A		N	/	I	F	R		A	S	W																																						

PREPARED BY J.M. cwm R&S LOG CLERK LD PUNCHED FF VERIFIED D

01 FEB 1963

NARRATIVE BRIEF

A/C ARRIVED OPERATING AREA 2318R. ENROUTE AIR/GRD COM NORMAL. LAST REPORTED POSIT 0110R. NITE VERY DARK. FLEW INTO SEA. OIL SLICK SIGHTED. RECOVERED DEBRIS IDENT AS PARTS MISSING A/C. CAUSE - UNDETERMINED.

PREPARED BY J.M. PUNCHED L 09 APR 1963 VERIFIED D

COMPLETION SHEET

Action on Correction to		Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750 - 1			/
DIR			/
Misc. Items for Action or Correction			
To Code	From Code/Date		
Analyst	423 / 10/2/63	Please note C/S report section C. for possible fatigue coupled with overcast conditions along with the autopilot making disorientation a possibility. Thank you BW.	/
	/		/
	/		/
	/	No close out	/
	/	etc Required	/
	/		/
	/		/

Endorsements Reviewed and Action Completed on All Pages of this Report.

CLOSED 8 NOV 1963

4

F-1231:HHH

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARAGRAPH 70, OPNAVINST 3750.6D

27 SEP 1963

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VP-8 AAR ser 1-63, P-3A, 149672, accident occurring 30 January 1963, pilot EBERHART

From: Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Aircraft Service Change 14 has been incorporated in all P-3A aircraft. This change provides flashing red warning lights in the event of automatic disengagement of the auto-pilot radar altitude hold and a feature to drive the indicator needle of the APN-117 behind the mask in the event of power failure. This change, authorized on 1 August 1962, due to time required to design, manufacture, and deliver the kits, was ready for delivery at about the end of January 1963. A parallel aural warning system was originally planned as a part of this change but was excluded by the Cockpit Standardization Board. This decision is being reappraised in view of the recent CNO requirement for aural warning systems in all aircraft.

2. A concerted effort is being made to obtain an improved radar altimeter for ASW aircraft. A change to the P-3A has been approved to move the APN-117 indicator from the tactical station to the co-pilot's instrument panel. The technical problems of a dual altimeter system are being studied. The APN-141 altimeter with a range from 0-5000' is being evaluated at NATC. Every step is being taken to improve the reliability and accuracy of the APN-117 until an improved and suitable replacement altimeter becomes available.

3. The arrangement of instruments has been discussed frequently. The present relative position of the instruments was approved by the mock-up board. Each pilot's desires for arrangement cannot be satisfied although some improvement is undoubtedly possible. The problem is compounded by the fact that several different sized instruments make interchangeability difficult. Available panel space is also limited. A two inch instantaneous rate of climb indicator is not available and the present barometric type is considered satisfactory.

4. Every effort is being made by the Bureau to keep the aircraft users advised of pertinent information by bulletins, handbook revisions, and messages. It should be noted that early editions of handbooks require revisions and corrections. These changes continue to be made as soon as additional knowledge and experience are gained in the model.

5

F-1231:HHH

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

5. The color of survival suit neck and wrist bands has varied as modification to suits has occurred. In new procurement of quick-don suits the neck and wrist bands will be the same base color as the suit which should eliminate confusion as to whether or not a survivor is in the suit. Present suits will ultimately be replaced on an attrition basis.

Copy to:
CO VP-8
COMFAIRWINGSLANT
COMNAVAIRLANT
BUWEPS REP BURBANK

A. T. PIERENTAL, JR.
By direction

CNAL 3051
Ser: 2417
20 MAR 1963

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 70, OPNAVINST 3750.6D

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VP-8 AAR ser 1-63, P-3A, 149672, accident occurring 30 January 1963, pilot EBERHART

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
To: Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Readdressed and forwarded, concurring in the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. ASC-14 is now being incorporated into production aircraft and being back fitted into fleet aircraft to provide a warning light which flashes if the altitude holding feature becomes inoperative. Also included in the change is a provision to mask the radar altimeter pointer if the signal is lost or unreliable. This altimeter has two indicators, however, the plus or minus tolerance of 165 feet for triggering the warning features still remains. Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet specifically concurs that this tolerance is excessive and is in concert with the second endorsement that a maximum tolerance of 50 feet is desired.

3. It is considered absolutely necessary for this aircraft to have a properly functioning radar altimeter during all flight operations and most specifically during the localization phase of ASW operations. To insure this, two altimeters have been proposed. As an alternate, relocation of component parts of the present system to provide complete in-flight maintenance should be acceptable.

4. Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet has previously strongly endorsed the recommendation to incorporate a low altitude aural warning system in all ASW aircraft. The evidence compiled does not indicate that an aural warning system would have prevented this accident, however, numerous similar accidents occurring to helicopter,

7

CNAL 3081
Ser: 2417
20 MAR 1963

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 70, OPNAVINST 3750.6D

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

S-2, and P-2 aircraft could have been prevented by an aural system. Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet again strongly urges Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons to provide an aural warning system for all ASW aircraft on a priority basis.

Geo. E. Ford
GEO. E. FORD
By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRWINGSLANT
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN
BUWEPSREP BURBANK
CO, VP-8, 44
CO, VX-1
OinC, VP-30 DET A

8

CFAWL/3750
Ser: 312/ 278
5 MAR 1963

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on Patrol Squadron EIGHT Aircraft Accident Report Serial 1-63 P-3A BUNO 149672 Pilot EBERHART

From: Commander Fleet Air Wings, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
To: Commander Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: PATRON EIGHT Aircraft Accident Report Serial 1-63

1. Forwarded.

2. The Bureau of Naval Weapons has approved changes to the P-3A radar altimeter (APN 117) to correct oscillations of the instrument, provide red flashing lights to warn of altimeter disengagements and to position the drive pointer of the APN 117 behind the mask when the radar hold mode is disengaged. These changes are being incorporated into production aircraft at this time and are being back fitted into fleet aircraft on a programmed basis. There is, however, no plan to provide the two complete separate radar altimeters recommended by the accident board, nor are there plans for incorporation of an aural warning system for the autopilot disconnect or radar hold system malfunction. In addition, test procedures for checking the operation of the visual warning system are designed to measure tolerances of plus or minus 165 feet from the engaged radar reference altitude. This command considers that 165 feet tolerance is too great and that the equipment should be designed to operate within tolerances of plus or minus 50 feet from the engaged radar reference altitude.

3. It is recommended that the entire autopilot/radar altimeter installation of the P-3A be re-examined with the view of eliminating once and for all any hazard to flight as a result of malfunction of these equipments. In addition to the changes approved by the Bureau of Naval Weapons for the APN 117, it is recommended that:

a. Two complete separate radar altimeters be installed in all P-3A aircraft.

b. An aural warning system be provided for all P-3A aircraft which will indicate either autopilot disconnect or radar hold system malfunction.

c. All warning systems be designed to function within tolerances of plus or minus 50 feet from the engaged reference altitude.

4. Subject to the foregoing remarks, the comments and recommendations of the Board and the first endorser are concurred in.

Geo. P. Koch

GEO. P. KOCH

3750
Ser: 11/210
20 FEB 1963

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Patrol Squadron EIGHT Aircraft Accident Report Serial 1-63 P-3A BUNO 149672 Pilot Eberhart

From: Commanding Officer, Patrol Squadron EIGHT
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air Wings, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: PATRON EIGHT Aircraft Accident Report Serial 1-63

1. Forwarded.

2. Recapitulation of each Board recommendation, with comment, follows:

a. Recommendation: That the urgent retrofit of all operating P-3A aircraft with the service change pertaining to the PB-20N autopilot and APN-117 be accomplished at the earliest possible date; that this change be extended to include an audio warning of autopilot failure.

Comment: Concur. The Report pin-points the PB-20N/APN-117 installation as a highly suspect area. Retro-fitting of squadron aircraft is scheduled to commence no later than 1 March 1963. Subsequent to change kit installation a fifty flight hour evaluation period will be assigned per aircraft prior to recommending relaxation of present night/IFR ASW altitude restrictions. Concurrence with the recommended installation of an audio warning system is based in the premise that aural reaction to autopilot malfunction can avoid confusion with present multi-installed signal and warning lights (including flashing red).

b. Recommendation: That a dual radar altimeter installation be incorporated into the aircraft with an expanded scale suitable for low altitude work.

Comment: Concur. The Report could support the premise that the single APN-117 installation failed, perhaps leaving the indicator pointer at the last indicated altitude prior to failure, hence misled the pilot. Arguments which support the incorporation of a dual pitot-static system can also support the argument for a dual radar altimeter installation in ASW aircraft.

Predetermination of precise ambient air pressure over the broad ocean area is at best difficult, which mitigates against reliance being placed on pressure altimeters except within controlled airspace. When out of controlled airspace, however, it is incongruous to impose upon the ASW pilot the requirement to determine accurately, by a single instrument, his altitude within 1000 feet of the surface when ambient pressure differences may account for altitude differences in excess of 1000 feet. This problem is aggrevated in the P-3A because of aircraft range capabilities. Consistent with single or multi-plane tactical

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employment, accurate altitude determination to 10,000 feet is required, in addition to the recognized need for precise altitude determination from the surface to 1000 feet. Here it should be noted, however, that the 1000 foot calibration of the APN-117 single-turn indicator, despite bug-pointer, is not fully compatible with tactical employment of the instrument.

c. Recommendation: That the Bureau of Naval Weapons take immediate steps to ensure that all problem areas concerning safety of flight be brought to the attention of operators of the aircraft involved. This recommendation is particularly pertinent to aircraft undergoing contractor testing and fleet introduction.

Comment: Concur. The Report supports the premise that the pilot was not fully informed of serious design defects in the PB20N/APN-117 installation. The pilot and copilot were aware of the fact that the system provides no warning indication of altitude hold-mode loss, they were aware of the fact that the Flight Handbook advises against use of the autopilot below 200 feet; they were probably not aware of each defect to be corrected by Service Change. To be more specific, they were probably not aware of the following: (1) loss of APN-117 AC or DC power leaves the indicator-pointer at its last indicated altitude, (2) a high rate of aircraft descent could develop upon release of roll steering at 58 degrees, (3) in the clutched heading mode, with hardover compass failure, the aircraft could roll to an 80 degree bank angle, (4) in the interim of modification (and contrary to the current Flight Manual), Lockheed California Company, in April 1962 recommended, "under IFR conditions between 200 and 500 feet, operate on barometric altitude hold only." These four points, received 7 February 1963, have been promulgated as flight safety material. Analogous situations may exist in other system or airframe areas.

d. Recommendation: That a review of the aircraft's primary instrumentation be conducted with a view toward improving the size and grouping of primary instruments and to include an instantaneous accelerometer type rate of climb indicator.

Comment: Concur. The Report supports the premise that vertigo, disorientation and/or illusions could have been factors present in the crash. Although not specifically noted by the Board, the possibility of undetected primary attitude reference system failure and/or misinterpretation (including sticking) of installed digital readout pressure altimeters could have been present. In such an instance, grouping, size and characteristics of other instruments are not optimized. An analogous situation faces the P-3A pilot when reduced to Flight Essential DC Bus instrumentation. Squadron instrument training continues to stress difficult partial panel work.

e. Recommendation: That the means for a free interchange of information between users of common instrumentation be developed and implemented.

Comment: The Report supports the premise that flight safety information pertinent to P-3A instrumentation was not made available to the squadron until after the accident. (COMNAVAIRPAC 1417562 FEB)

In this instance it would appear that the Malfunction Reporting Program did not provide common users with timely information. Further, the association of failure data within the Malfunction Reporting Program which results in effort to correct flight safety material deficiencies is of direct interest to common users of such material. Review of the Malfunction Reporting Program feed-back channels is recommended.

f. Recommendation: That inflight recorders be carried in all multi-engine aircraft.

Comment: Concur. The Report supports the premise that had a flight recorder been installed, and recovered, the aircraft's flight profile would have been fact, not conjecture. Re-examination of current flight recorder arguments is proposed, with installation of such recorders in P-3A aircraft specifically recommended.

g. Recommendation: That it be mandatory for all weather briefings preceding flight into oceanic areas below 5,500 feet include a predicted altimeter setting for the intended time and area of operation.

Comment: Concur. Although the Report does not support the premise that ambient area pressure information contributed to the accident, the general problem of precise altitude determination over the broad ocean area is reiterated. Squadron pilots are now required to include, on flight plans, a forecast altimeter setting.

h. Recommendation: That the color of exposure suit neck and wrist bands and aircraft insulation be changed to preclude possible confusion of rescue personnel.

Comment: Known SAR efforts were hampered because of survival color compromise. Revision of applicable specifications by cognizant activities is recommended.

3. As a Naval Aviation Cadet, Lieutenant Eberhart ground-looped an SNJ-5. Class "C" damage resulted. Prior to the crash of P-3A BUNO 149672 no other incidents, or flight violations, are recorded against him. His history as a naval aviator was that of a multi-engine pilot, with the bulk of his 2912 pilot hours having been flown in P-2 aircraft. He was redesignated a Patrol Plane Commander (SP2E) 31 August 1961, after reporting to Patrol Squadron EIGHT from replacement training. He commenced P-3A transition training mid-summer 1962, was functionally assigned as Plane Commander to the squadron's second P-3A in July 1962, flew in this latter capacity during Cuban quarantine operations, and was formally designated a P-3A Patrol Plane Commander in December 1962. His pilot hours in the new aircraft total 364.4. For obtaining a perfect competitive score in VP ASW exercises during FY 1962, LT Eberhart was individually cited by COMNAVAIRLANT; in

December 1962 COMFAIRWINGSLANT recommended him for a Navy Commendation Medal based on achievement in aerial flight during quarantine tasks. A designated squadron instructor pilot, he was one of three pilots specifically selected to receive contractor instructor-pilot training. His administrative background in the Maintenance Department, coupled with demonstrated proficiency in patrol planes led to his assignment as squadron NATOPS officer. Cautious, he is known to have used and advocated a minimum altitude standard of 500 feet in P-2 and P-3 aircraft during night tactical employment. He advocated, and practiced a 500 foot radar altimeter check during climb-out from take-off.

Much of the early effort by the Accident Board centered on the assumption that a serious in-flight emergency faced the pilot. The validity of this assumption could not be substantiated. Although the cause of the accident remains undetermined, limited, structural evidence included in the AAR would not disagree with the premise that the aircraft's left wing made initial contact with the water during night ASW maneuvers.

C. W. COOK

Distribution:
2cc NAVAVNSAFECEN DIRECT
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1cc CO, VX-1

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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (Rev. 12-59) PAGE 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with Para 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6C*

OPNAV REPORT No. 1

PART I - GENERAL

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. A/C ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY: Commanding Officer VP-8
2. DATE OF ACCIDENT: 30 JAN 1963 — TIME (L/Z): 0150R — 3. SERIAL NUMBER: 1 - 63
4. TO: COMMANDER, NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
5. ENCLOSURES: (1a) OVERALL OPERATING AREA; (1b) DD-175; (2) STATEMENT OF LT [redacted] (b) (6); (3) STATEMENT OF LT [redacted] (b) (6); (4) STATEMENT OF ENS [redacted]; (5) CONEASTAIRSA 042114Z FEB 1962; (6) Chart-positions of reporting units at time of crash
6. VIA: (1) CO VP-8; (2) COMFAIRWINGSLANT; (3) COMNAVMARLANT; (4); (5); (6); (7) Commanding Officer, Naval Aviation Safety Center
7. REPORTING CUSTODIAN (If different than item 1. above): SAME
8. ACTIVITY OPERATING A/C (If different than item 7.): SAME
9. KIND OF FLIGHT: AAS
10. TIME OF DAY: ☐ DAWN ☐ DAY ☐ DUSK ☒ NIGHT
11. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT: 38-14N, 70-35W
12. ELEVATION ABOVE SEA LEVEL: AT SEA
13. PLACE OF LAST TAKE-O/F: NAS PATUXENT RIVER
14. CLEARED: FROM NAS PATUXENT TO Control area east of SHAD
15. TYPE CLEARANCE: ☒ IFR ☐ VFR ☐ DVFR ☐ LOCAL ☒ OPERATIONAL ☐ AIRWAYS ☐ DIRECT ☐ OTHER (Specify)
16. TIME IN FLIGHT: 3.2 est.
17. TYPE ACCIDENT: Collision Water Uncontrolled
18. PHASE OF FLIGHT: 4 IN FLIGHT

A/C

19. MODEL: P-3A
20. SERIAL NO.: 149672
21. DAMAGE TO A/C: ☒ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F
22. DOLLAR COST: 5,895,000
23. AIRSPEED (Kts.): UNKNOWN
24. A/C WEIGHT: 96,978 / 88,276 est
25. LIST MODEL, SER. NR. REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete an OPNAV FORM 3750-1 for each A/C involved): NONE

SECTION B - PERSONNEL DATA

1. NAME (Last, first and middle initials)	2. RANK/RATE	3. FILE/SERVICE NO.	4. DESIG. NATOR	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7. YRS OF A/C DNA	8. BILLET	9. POSITION	10. BURDEN CODE
PILOT (at controls at time of accident) EBERHART, ROBERT S.	LT	[redacted] (b) (6)	1310	USN	32	10	PPC	UK	L
CO-PILOT WHITE, THEODORE C.	LT	[redacted]	1310	USN	27	3	C/P	UK	L

PERSONNEL		8. OFT - OPERATIONAL FLIGHT TRAINER AVAILABLE	8. OFT USED	9. CPT - COCKPIT PROC. TRAINER AVAILABLE	9. CPT USED	10. UNIT TO WHICH PERSONNEL ARE ATTACHED	11. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD
PILOT	YES	X	X			Patrol Squadron EIGHT	☐ STANDARD ☒ SPECIAL
	NO			X	X		
CO-PILOT	YES	X	X			Patrol Squadron EIGHT	☒ STANDARD ☐ SPECIAL
	NO			X	X		

12. PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM		PILOT	CO-PILOT
ALL MODELS		2912.4	1368.7
ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		578.0	481.3
ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		161.9	161.7
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL (Item 19)	A/C	364.4	253.3
	OFT / CPT	14/0	14/0
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	364.4	253.3
	OFT / CPT	14/0	14/0
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	162	162
	OFT / CPT	0/0	0/0

ITEM	PILOT	CO-PILOT
CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	6/0	0/0
FCLP LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	61/0	0/0
INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	32.5	27.9
NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	66.5	59.0
TOTAL HELO. HRS (Note: AAR Only)		
TOTAL JET HOURS (In AAR Only)		
LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL — DATE	26 JAN 63	26 JAN 63
DURATION	8.6	8.6

13. OTHER PERS.

NAME (Last, first and middle initials)	DNA	RANK/RATE	FILE/SERVICE NO.	ORG. TO WHICH ATTACHED	SERV. CODE	BILLET	BURDEN CODE
1. SHEPHARD, Bernard W.	YES	LT JG	[redacted] (b) (6)	PATRON EIGHT	L	NAV	UNK
2. BELL, Frederick L.	NO	LT JG		PATRON EIGHT	L	T/O	UNK
3. CARPENTER, Clifford E.	NO	ADR1		PATRON EIGHT	L	F/E	UNK
4. CATLIFF, Marvin W.	NO	ADR1		PATRON EIGHT	L	2 Mech	UNK
5. KAIZER, Jack C.	NO	AT1		PATRON EIGHT	L	1 Tech	UNK

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OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (Rev. 12-59) AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PAGE 2

C. WEATHER

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. [illegible] (SEE INST'S)	4. TEMPERATURE DAT / RUNWAY	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
2500-3000	10+	[illegible] / 10 KTS	45	UNK	UNK

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (*winds aloft, icing levels, sea state, etc., if pertinent to accident*)

SEA STATE 0 - 1 WATER TEMP 47°

D. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
	PILOT		LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		MATERIAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION
	CREW		OTHER PERSONNEL (*Specify*)		DESIGN
	SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		ADMINISTRATIVE		ROLLING AND PITCHING DECK/ ROUGH SEAS
	MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		AIRPORT OR CARRIER FACILITIES	X	UNDETERMINED
	SERVICING PERSONNEL		WEATHER		OTHER (*Specify*)

E. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD DEPLOYED CARRIER (*Complete following Section on Pilot*)

1. DATE DEPLOYED	2. DAY - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	3. DAY - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS
4. INSTRUMENT HRS. LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT	5. NIGHT - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	6. NIGHT - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS

PART II - MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

SECTION A - AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE DATA

	DATE OF MANUFACTURE	SERVICE TOUR	MONTHS IN THIS TOUR	TOTAL NO. OF OVERHAULS	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	TYPE CHECK LAST PERFORMED	FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	NO. OF DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
1. A/C HISTORY	5-25-62	1	6	Ø	N.A.	494.4	30 Day	8.2	9
		ENGINE MODEL	ENGINE SERIAL NO.						
2. ENGINE HISTORY 1	12-13-61	T56-A-10W	AE102852	Ø	N.A.	485.7	30 Day	8.2	9
2	12-20-61	T56A10W	AE102856	Ø	N.A.	499.7	30 Day	8.2	9
3	11-29-61	T56A10W	AE102851	Ø	N.A.	495.5	30 Day	8.2	9
4	12-13-61	T56A10W	AE102854	Ø	N.A.	487.6	30 Day	8.2	9

3. GENERAL

a. DID FIRE OCCUR? ☐ BEFORE ACCIDENT ☒ AFTER ACCIDENT ☐ DID NOT OCCUR

b. DID EXPLOSION OCCUR IN FLIGHT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

c. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ AMP FOR SERIAL

d. HAS DIR BEEN REQUESTED? ☐ YES ☒ NO

e. FAILED COMPONENTS INVOLVED UNK

4. MAINT. AND ENG. FACTORS

CHECK ITEMS PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT

a. ☐ A/C DESIGN
b. ☐ A/C EQUIPMENT
c. ☐ MAINTENANCE
d. ☒ UNDETERMINED
e. ☐ TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
f. ☒ OTHER (*Specify*) AIRCRAFT LOST AT SEA
g. ☐ SURFACE FACILITIES
h. ☐ HUMAN ENGINEERING (*e.g., Cockpit configurations, etc.*)

5. OTHER DATA

a. ALTITUDE AT MALFUNCTION	b. AIR SPEED	c. OPERATING TEMP	d. WEIGHT OF A/C	e. C.G. (% MAC)	f. KIND OF FUEL	g. FUEL PRESSURE
UNKNOWN	UNK Kts.	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	JP-5	UNKNOWN

h. EVIDENCE OF FUEL CONTAMINATION NONE

i. CAUSE OF ENGINE FAILURE OR FLAMEOUT UNKNOWN

j. FUEL CONTROL REGULATOR/CARBURETOR (*List stock and ser. nos., give time since new or overhauled*) NA

k. EXTERNAL STORES ABOARD A/C NONE

(*If additional space is necessary, attach additional sheets*)

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PART II – MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL, AND FACILITIES DATA (Cont'd)

SECTION B – FACILITIES DATA

1. GENERAL: ✓ BASIC FACILITIES INVOLVED. DESCRIBE EFFECT ON ACCIDENT IN THE ANALYSIS SECTION OF THE REPORT

	a. CLEARANCE AUTHORITY		i. WATER LANDING AREA		q. CRASH AND RESCUE
	b. FLIGHT PLANNING INFORMATION SOURCE		j. APPROACH ZONE		r. SEARCH AND RESCUE
	c. LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, etc.)		k. END ZONE (Over run)		s. CATAPULT
	d. TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER (Field or Ship)		l. SHOULDERS		t. ARRESTING GEAR (Carrier)
	e. APPROACH AND ENROUTE AIDS TO NAVIGATION		m. TAXIWAY		u. BARRIER OR BARRICADE (Field or Ship)
	f. RUNWAY WATCH		n. PARKING AREA		v. FLIGHT DECK
	g. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		o. EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR (Runway)		w. MIRROR
	h. RUNWAY		p. A/C SERVICING, HANDLING AND DIRECTING (Field or Ship)		x. OTHER (Specify)

2. SHIPS DATA

a. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR	b. PRESSURE SETTINGS	c. WIND OVER DECK	d. RELATIVE HEADWIND	e. APPROACH SPEED (SPN-12 READING)

f. MARK NUMBER	g. MODEL NUMBER	h. LOCATION ON SHIP	i. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND CONFIGURATION USED

j. CATAPULT / ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

k. THIS PORTION SHALL BE COMPLETED WHENEVER (1) A MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES ARRESTING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT, OR (2) AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES MALFUNCTIONING OF ARRESTING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT. MINOR ACCIDENTS OR ROUTINE DAMAGE TO CABLES, WELDINGS AND OTHER EXPENDABLE COMPONENTS NEED NOT BE REPORTED.

ENGAGED	DECK RUNOUT (FT.)	RAM TRAVEL (IN.)	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE: DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE: RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	COMMENTS (For cable failure specify number of landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER							
BARRIER							
BARRICADE							

PART	SECTION	ITEM	PART III REMARKS (Continue on additional sheets)
I	B	13	Supplemental crew list attached.
I	A	5	Supplemental list of enclosures attached.
			NATOPS Statement attached.

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1cc BUWEP REP BURBANK
1cc ALL P-3A SQUADRONS
1cc CO VX-1

COST DAMAGE TO: GOVERNMENT PROPERTY $ Ø | PRIVATE PROPERTY Ø

DATE SUBMITTED TO C.O.: 17 FEBRUARY 1963

PART IV - SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

(b) (6)

[redacted]

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PART I, SECTION B, ITEM 13 SUPPLEMENTAL CREW LIST

NAME	DNA	RANK/ RATE	FILE/ SERVICE NO.	ORG TO WHICH ATTACHED	INJURY CODE	BILLET POSITION	
GALINDO, Jesse (n)	NO	ATR3	(b) (6) [redacted]	PATRON EIGHT	L	2nd TECH	UNK
SYLVE, Edward A.	NO	ATR3	[redacted]	PATRON EIGHT	L	3rd TECH	UNK
LEMTER, Dayton S.	NO	AT2	[redacted]	PATRON EIGHT	L	RADIO	UNK
ROARK, Donald B.	NO	AE2	[redacted]	PATRON EIGHT	L	ELECT	UNK
AUTRY, Douglas R.	NO	AO3	[redacted]	PATRON EIGHT	L	ORD	UNK
HART, John R.	YES	LCDR	[redacted]	CFAW-5	A	OBSERVER	UNK
O'CONNOR, John F.	NO	LT	[redacted]	PATRON FORTY-FOUR	L	OBSERVER	UNK

PART I, SECTION A, ITEM 5 SUPPLEMENTAL LIST OF ENCLOSURES

7a. Form DD365F (cruise)
7b. Form DD365F (cruise/loiter)
8. Statement LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] USN
9. Statement LT (b) (6) [redacted] USCG
10a. Aerological Officer Statement
10b. Transcript of Weatherviision Weather Briefing for P-3A 149672
11. Inventory of Materials Salvaged from P-3A BuNo. 149672
12.a-g. Phantom Drawing Showing Location of Salvaged Materials
13a-f Photographs
14. Chart - Track of the USS CARP
15. Statement of LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] USN
16. Statement of LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] USCG
17. Statement of Mr. (b) (6) [redacted] LCC
18. Statement of LT (b) (6) [redacted] USN
19. Statement of Mr. (b) (6) [redacted] U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory
20. COMFAIRWINGSLANT MSG 0900142 and 141506Z of February 1963
21. CO VP-8 Letter Ser 11/172 of 30 January 1963 Subj: Aircraft Accident Board, convening of
22. Medical Officer Report

NATOPS STATEMENT

At the present time there is no NATOPS Manual available for the P-3A COMFAIRWINGSLANT Instruction 3710.9, Interim Standard Operating Procedures for the P-3A is effective. This instruction was originally prepared by Patrol Squadron Eight. LT. EDERHART'S primary billet assignment as NATOPS Officer, his acknowledged familiarity with SOP, his assignment as an Instructor Pilot and his past reputation as a cautious, experienced pilot leads to the assumption that in his judgement compliance with SOP was being exercised. COMFAIRWINGSLANT messages 090014Z and 141506Z of February 1963 modify Instruction 3710.9 pertinent to minimum altitude and autopilot utilization under IFR and night conditions. These interim restrictions are concurred in and have been implemented.

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PART V THE ACCIDENT

P-3A BUNO 149672 (Tactical Voice call Pinstripe 2, CW call XU26) was scheduled on the Patrol Squadron EIGHT flight schedule of 29 January 1963 as Event No. 3001 of an ASW Operational Readiness Inspection conducted by COMFAIRWING FIVE. Briefing was scheduled at 2030, taxi at 2215R, ETE 6+00 hours. The pilot was LT. Robert S. EBERHART, USN. The aircraft was fueled with 49,400 lbs of JP-5 giving a gross take-off weight of 115,545 lbs and a C.G. of 31.4% M.A.C.

The crew was briefed by ENS (b) (6) [redacted] to conduct an ASW exercise with the USS CARP (SS-338) in an area approximately 100NM square bounded by coordinates 38-05N, 72-00W, 36-34N, 71-15W, 37-11N, 69-20W, 38-42N, 70-03W; this area being approximately 275 NM East of NAS Patuxent River, Md. (See enclosure 1a). On station time was 0001-0300R, 30 January 1963 with one hour between this event and the previous and succeeding event. The operating area was included in an altitude reservation from the surface to 8000 feet, code name DELTREV 19. The crew was briefed to conduct standard search, localization, and attack procedures in accordance with the COMFAIRWINGSLANT Tactical Doctrine. The exercise was to commence at the on station time of 0001R without signal, and the first hour was to consist of passive JEZEBEL search unless localization was completed prior to the end of the hour. If no contact was obtained at the end of one hour an active search was to commence.

The aircraft taxied at 2224R and took off at 2236R with a clearance out of control areas East of SHAD (37-43N, 73-00W) via Patuxent, direct Snow Hill VOR, thence via flight plan route at 15,000 feet (See enclosure 1b). Air-ground communications were normal with NAS Patuxent tower and departure control on VHF and with COMFAIRWINGSLANT on single side band. COMFAIRWINGSLANT was assigned Communications guard and Patrol Squadron EIGHT Flight Safety guard. Aircraft messages were relayed to the squadron via land line.

Enroute communications, after departing Snow Hill VOR, were with New York Oceanic Control via SSB phone patch through Andrews Airways. The aircraft arrived at the Western edge of the operating area (37-30 N, 72-00W) at 2318R. At this time UHF contact was made with Pinstripe 9, which was departing station. (See enclosure 2). Descent clearance was received from New York Oceanic at 2347R at which time the aircraft descended below 8000 feet into the altitude reservation. An on station report was sent to VP-8 3ØØØØR. The last message from Pinstripe 2 was received by COMFAIRWINGSLANT at 3ØØ11Ø giving the aircraft position at Ø1ØØR as 3740N, 7030W. The next regular position report was due at 0200R.

In compliance with exercise instructions, the CARP was to surface at 0130R to force contact by the aircraft if no prior attack had been made. Having observed no attacks, the CARP surfaced at 0141R. At 0150R (approximately) lookouts on the bridge sighted what was variously described as a white to orange glow on the horizon. (See enclosure 3). A similar glow was observed by lookouts on board the USCGC ABSECON at approximately the same time (See enclosure 4). At 0156R Honey 74, a RC-121 radar picket aircraft, sighted an amber or yellow light lasting 15 seconds. (See enclosure 5). The sightings from these three sources all plot in an area in which the wreckage was subsequently discovered. (See enclosure 6). It is therefore estimated that the accident occured between 0150R and 0156R.

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Exact flight level and tactics in use are unknown but from time on station it may be assumed that the altitude was 500 feet as the aircraft conducted JEZEBEL and JULIE localization. No SUS explosions were heard by the CARP but three (3) SUS were heard in this area between 0145R and 0147R by other sources. It is further assumed that frequent turns up to 30 degrees angle of bank would be in progress at this time. Estimated gross weight at the time of the accident is between 96,978 lbs and 98,976 lbs with a C.G. of 30.7% to 31.8% M.A.C. (See enclosures 7a and 7b). Variations of weight and C.G. allow for cruise vs loiter speed schedule and ordnance expenditures. Squadron SOP does not permit two engine operation when engaged in localization tactics.

The next event was scheduled at 0400R with Pinstripe 9 as the participating aircraft. Pinstripe 9 arrived in the area at 0325R and overheard the CARP giving its maneuvering report for the last event to Pinstripe 2. It was subsequently learned that this report was being sent in the blind. (See enclosure 3). Pinstripe 9 attempted contact with Pinstripe 2 on VHF and UHF with negative results. (See enclosure 8).

At 0420R Pinstripe 9 descended into the operating area and commenced its assigned exercise. The CARP submerged at 0345R and commenced snorkeling for this exercise. No further attempts to communicate with Pinstripe 2 were made by either the CARP or Pinstripe 9.

LT. (b) (6) [redacted] the SDO of Patrol Squadron EIGHT commenced a communications search for Pinstripe 2 at 0315R, two hours and 5 minutes since the last report. At 0500R COMFAIRWINGSLANT directed Pinstripe 9 and the CARP to attempt contact. At approximately 0510R the CARP and Pinstripe 9 commenced visual search for Pinstripe 2. At 0530R Commander Eastern Area declared the distress phase and launched SAR aircraft and directed ABSECON into the area. Pinstripe 6, launched at 0635R for the next scheduled ASW event, arrived in the area at 0737R and joined the search. Pinstripe 4, the VP-8 alert aircraft, was launched at 0724R with an SAR drop kit and arrived in the area at 0824R.

At 0930R an HU-16E, USCG 1316, sighted an oil slick and accompanying debris at 38-14N, 70-35W. (See enclosure 9). The oil slick was generally distributed in an area about one mile long and one-half mile wide. (See enclosures 13a and 13b). All wreckage and one body were recovered within the oil slick. The CARP and ABSECON were directed and arrived on scene at 1110R and commenced recovery of the debris and a search for survivors. These ships were later joined by the USS HALFBEAK (SS-352) and the USS BROWNSON (DD-868). Recovery operations continued until the evening of 31 January at which time COMEASTAREA declared the incident closed. The recovery of only small floatable wreckage and one body precluded the possibility of survivors. Positive identification of the aircraft was established by manufacturers part numbers on the wreckage recovered. Water depth at the accident site is approximately 1800 fathoms.

Weather in the operating area at the time of the accident was approximately 2000-2500 feet broken to overcast and the night was very dark. (Enclosures 2, 3, 8, 10a and 10b).

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PART VI DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT

The aircraft received ALFA damage on impact with the water. No primary structural members or portions thereof were recovered, and the water depths (1800 fathoms) preclude salvage. An inventory of secondary and non-structural material, identified whereever possible by manufacturers part number is contained in enclosure 11. Also, included in enclosure 12 are plans and phantom drawings indicating the location of recovered material.

The complete lack of primary structure makes a reconstruction of the crash impossible, even to the extent of a firm determination of the attitude of the aircraft on impact. The following items, keyed to the inventory list and to photographs where applicable, are considered significant.

MAD-BOOM - A section of the fibreglass MAD Boom, the largest single piece of debris recovered, is shown on the inventory as two sections (items 67 and 68). It is understood from interviews with personnel attached to the recovery vessel that the two sections, badly shattered, effected final separation on recovery. The joint section (enclosures 13c and 13d) shows evidence of having fractured from inertial forces downward, and to the left, in a plane inclined approximately 20 to 30 degrees from the vertical.

AFT RADAR MODULATOR - Item 1 of the inventory, the aft radar modulator was recovered with the outer case torn and the mounting bolts attached. (Enclosures 13e, 13f and 13g). The modulator appears to have been torn from its mounts in a near vertical direction, somewhat to the right.

HRD FIREBOTTLE - One HRD bottle, item 3 on the inventory,was recovered. "Stbd Outbd" was discernable as written on the bottle surface in pencil. Both frangible disks were intact although one elbow containing a firing squib was missing.

AIR CONDITIONING DUCT - The section of fiberglass air conditioning duct recovered, items 7, 23 and 29 of inventory, contains no evidence of smoke or soot in its interior.

DOPPLER ANTENNA ACCESS PANEL - The underside of the doppler antenna access panel, item 49 on the inventory, shows the perfect imprint of the upper face of the cabin outflow valve. (See enclosure 13h). In order to leave such an imprint the cabin outflow valve would have to break cleanly from the mount and ducting clamps and travel vertically upward and slightly to the right, striking the access door with considerable force.

FLOOR PANELS - As indicated in the drawings of enclosure 12 a considerable amount of floor paneling was recovered, both of the plywood and of the heated, vinyl covered honeycomb core types. An attempt was made to determine the direction of screw tear out in order to locate a stress or force pattern, however, the results were inconclusive. Several of the floor panels showed evidence of fire, such as inventory items 9, 31 and 73, however adjacent panels show no such evidence. (See enclosure 13i).

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SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT - Two MkXII life rafts were recovered with the CO_2 cylinder discharged and the armored cable ruptured at the point of attachment to the valve. Both rafts were torn and ruptured in several places, and the contained equipment, such as ration cans, hand pump, solar stills etc. showed evidence of violent impact. One of the two AN/CRT-3A Gibson Girl emergency radios was recovered intact but badly damaged. Fifteen full exposure suits were recovered along with two pieces which were tentatively matched, forming a sixteenth partial suit. (See enclosure 13j). From the location of the tears in the suits it appears that the fifteen complete suits suffered some impact damage while still in their containers. This is based upon the fact that the lower extremites, which constitutes the innermost portion of the rolled and packaged suit, are, almost without exception, undamaged. In at least one instance where the suit and bag could be matched by serial number, rips in the bag match those in the upper extremity of the suit when rolled. (See enclosure 13k). Four life vests were recovered of the twenty-three on board and fourteen in use. One of the life vests had the snaps pulled out and as the vests are not normally stowed with the fasteners snapped, could have been in use. The CO_2 cylinders had not been actuated and the flotation chambers were undamaged. (See enclosure 13l).

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PART VII Investigation

The investigation commenced immediately upon determing that the aircraft was missing. ALL aircraft maintenance records and logs along with the crew-members records and logs were secured by members of the standing board.

LT Robert S. EBERHART

Lt EBERHART entered the Navy in October 1950 and was designated a Naval Aviator in March 1953. From this time until his introduction to the P-3A in July 1962 he had continually operated P-2 type aircraft. This included two squadron tours and a tour as instrument instructor in the advanced training command. On all tours he earned a PPC Designation, the latest in P-2 type aircraft on 31 August 1961. Prior to reporting to VP-8 he had completed the VP-30 replacement training program with excellent grades. He had a special instrument rating which was due to expire 2 March 1963. LT EBERHART's formal training in the P3A was a thorough program consisting of the following:

a. T-56-A-10W, Engine Operations Course at Indianapolis, Indiana.
b. P3A Fam Course NAMTD (pilots). (1 wk)
c. Lockheed Ground Training. (4 wk)
d. OFT (13.7 hrs pilot, 13.8 hrs observer).
e. Lockheed Flight Training (19.7 hrs pilot, 19.7 hrs observer).
f. Lockheed Instructor Training (6.0 hrs pilot, 6.0 hrs observer)

He had a total pilot time of 2912.4 hours, 364.4 of which were P3A hours. The P3A time was all flown in the last six months; of the 71.2 were night hours and 57.0 instrument hours. His last night flight was on the 24th of January and last flight prior to the accident was 26 January. He was designated a PPC in the P3A on 31 December 1962.

LT EBERHART was considered by his superiors and fellow pilots as one of the most skillful, highly motivated, and cautious pilots in the squadron. His skill and experience made him especially qualified to perform his assigned duties as squadron NATOPS and Standardization Officer as well as one of three designated instructor pilots.

LT Theodore C. WHITE

LT Theodore C. WHITE entered the Navy in June 1953 and was designated a Naval Aviator in February 1960. He reported to VP-8 in April 1960 from CNAVANTRA, Corpus Christi. He completed the Lockheed Flight Training Course in October 1963. LT WHITE had a standard instrument rating that was due to expire 23 April 1963.

His P3A training consisted of the following:

a. T-56-A-10W, Engine Operations Course, Indianapolis, Indiana. (2 wk)
b. P3A Fam Course NAMTD (Pilots). (1 wk)
c. Lockheed Ground Training. (4 wk)
d. OFT (10 hrs pilot, 10 hrs observer)
e. Lockheed Flight Training (20.9 hrs pilot, 21.0 hrs observer)

His total pilot time was 1368.7 hours of which 888.2 were in P-2 type aircraft and 253.3 in the P3A. The P3A time was flown in the last five months; of this 62.9 were night hours and 34.5 were instrument hours. A review of his training jacket and past performance reveals that LT WHITE was considered fully qualified for duties as co-pilot in the P3A. He was designated a PP3P in the P3A on 20 October 1962. His last night flight prior to the accident was on 24 January and his last previous flight prior to the accident was on 26 January 1963.

LTJG Bernard W. SHEPHARD

LTJG Bernard W. SHEPHARD, (b) (6) [redacted] Navigator, reported to VP-8 in October 1962. He was a graduate of FAETU and VP-30 replacement pilot syllabus. He had a total of 330.9 pilot hours of which 9.9 were in the P3A. He has a total of 100.3 hours special crew as navigator. He had received no special P3A training.

LTJG Frederick L. BELL

LTJG Frederick L. BELL, (b) (6) [redacted], Tactical Coordinator reported to VP-8 in August 1960. He was a graduate of several FAETU Courses, had completed the P3A NAMTD FAM Course and the LCC Electronic Operations Course (4 wk). He had a total of 733.3 hours as navigator and tactical coordinator of which 241.1 hours were in the P3A.

CARPENTER, Clifford E., ADJ1-P2

CARPENTER, Clifford E., ADJ1-P2, (b) (6) [redacted] entered the Navy in May 1952. Prior to coming to VP-8, in May 1961, he served in several aviation units as jet and reciprocating engine mechanic.

His P3A training consisted of the following:

a. T-56-A-10W, Flight Engineers Course (3 wk).
b. Lockheed F/E Ground Training (10 wk).
c. OFT (17.5 hrs F/E, 17.6 hrs observer).
d. Lockheed Flight Engineer Flight Training (21.6 hrs F/E, 21.3 hrs observer).

He was designated a Patrol Plane Flight Engineer in P3A aircraft after completing the Lockheed Flight Training Syllabus. He had a total of 304.1 hours in the P3A as Flight Engineer at the time of the accident.

GATLIFF, Marvin W., ADJ1-P2

GATLIFF, Marvin W., ADJ1-P2, (b) (6) [redacted] entered the Navy in September 1951. Prior to coming to VP-8 in December 1960, he had completed several tours in aircrew billets in other squadrons and satisfactorily completed VP-30 aircrew training.

His P3A training consisted of the following:

a. NAMTD Power Plants Course (7 wk).
b. T-56-A-10W F/E Course (3 wk).
c. T-56-A-10W Electrical Trouble-shooting Course (2wk).
d. Lockheed F/E Ground Training (10 wk).
e. Squadron F/E Flight Training (22 hrs).
f. Lockheed F/E Flight Training (18.0 hrs F/E, 18.4 hrs observer).

He had completed approximately 90% of Lockheed supervised Flight Engineer Training and would normally have been designated a P3A Flight Engineer on completion.

On taxiing from the line LT EBERHART was observed to be in the left hand seat and LT WHITE in the right hand seat. No further determination of crew position at the time of accident can be made.

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Interviews with squadron personnel, next of kin available, and acquaintences of the crew members revealed that all had apparently had a good night's rest on the evening of 28 January 1963. The entire crew reported to the Squadron by 0830R on 29 January, to take a recognition exam as part of the ORI. LT EBERHART also participated in a PPC exam at 1100R. LT WHITE, as squadron fire marshal, was in charge of a fire drill at 0855 which interupted the recognition exam. LT EBERHART reported for a communications exam at 1300R when the exam was delayed. He was heard to say at tha t time that he was going to get some crew rest. He was, however, seen in the squadron area at 1530R. LT WHITE, LTJG SHEPHARD, and LTJG BELL departed the squadron area for crew rest at approximately 1200R. It is known that both LT EBERHART and LT WHITE were in their quarters at 1630R.

LESTER also participated in a radio operators exam at 1300R. The activities of the crew members between the times stated and 2030R when they arrived for briefing are undertermined. It is presumed they were observing crew rest. At 2130R LT EBERHART and LT WHITE were observed by LTJG (b) (6) [redacted] while they were filing the flight plan. At this time both appeared to be alert with no apparent evidence of fatigue.

MAINTENANCE RECORDS OF THE AIRCRAFT

The Maintenance Records of the aircraft were reviewed by the board. All technical directives pertinent to the aircraft, as contained in BUWEPS Aircraft Configuration Listings of Directives Not Incorporated of January 1963 were incorporated with the following exceptions:

Aircraft Service change No. 2 - Installation of counting accelerometer. (Routine Action)	Not incorporated due to unavailability of change kit.
Hamilton Standard Turbo-Prop - Bulletin No. 18	Corrosion resistant bearing for engine negative torque bracket assembly. Responsibility of Class A Activity.
Hamilton Standard Turbo-Prop - Bulletin No. 31	Dome assembly cam roller needles. Responsibility of Class A Activity.

Two squadron work orders were outstanding at the time of the 29/30 January flight. These work orders were: No. 362 dtd 12-17-62, ASQ-10 needs in-flight compensation. WO 10 dtd 1-3-63, Manual release rod on (sonobuoy) station number 2 missing.

Neither of the two outstanding discrepancies are safety of flight items or are considered by the board to be germane to the accident.

All discrepancies written against the aircraft since it's receipt were reviewed. The following discrepancies from the previous ten flights and the corrective action accomplished were selected from aircraft "B" sheets as possibly pertinent.

1-25-63	APN-117 circuit breaker did not pop but had to be reset three (03) times. /s/ LT R.S. EBERHART. Tightened amplifier assembly in mount, checked for 2 hours, checks good.
1-24-63	OTPI No signal indication. /s/ LT R.S. EBERHART. Repositioned LEDEX (Transfer switch) that was binding, req in-flight check for proper signal light and audio.

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1-11-63 Autopilot does not hold altitude (at 27,000-240 knots ind) fluxuates alt. /s/ LT R.S. EBERHART. Replaced air data sensor.

1-5-63 Extreme oscillations on auto pilot baro hold. Smaller oscillations with baro hold off. Aircraft cannot be flown on auto pilot. /s/ LT (b) (6) [redacted] Exchanged auto pilot computor with LC-10. (Exchanged corrected trouble on LC-2 and computor on LC-10 was FURed.)

1-3-63 Number 1 engine stalled on down shift to low PRM (TIT 920° RPM decaying when chopped). /s/ LT R.S. EBERHART. Changed speed sensitive valve.

In addition to the discrepancies listed on the aircraft "B" sheets as noted above, a review of squadron work orders indicated that the aircraft had undergone repairs for fuel leaks discovered during pre-flight as follows:

1-26-63 WO-47 Fuel leak port wheel well.

The work order indicates that tank number two was resealed, involving ten man hours of work. The work order was properly authorized and supervised and was inspected by a qualified quality control inspector. The aircraft was released for flight on 28 January 1963.

1-15-63 WO-23 Fuel leak port wheel well.

The work order indicates that tank number two was resealed, involving sixteen man hours of work. The work order was duly authorized, supervised and inspected. The aircraft was released for flight on 17 January 1963.

The last maintenance inspection was a thirty day inspection completed on 20 January 1963. The third calendar inspection was completed on 2 December 1962. A review of the inspection work records indicates that the required work was completed, properly supervised and inspected.

The pre flight/daily maintenance record card indicates that the aircraft was properly reflighted and that no discrepancies were noted.

Because of the five "B" sheet discrepancies, which were considered by the board to be significant, involved the PB-20N auto pilot andthe related APN-117 radar altimeter, all work orders on this equipment were re-examined. There were a total of eight discrepancies listed against the auto pilot and four against the radar altimeter since receipt of the aircraft on 27 July 1963. With the exception of those previously listed, these discrepancies are as follows:

AUTOPILOT

12-29-62 Auto-pilot switches when engaging baro hold and oscillates up and down when only engaged switch on. /s/ LT (b) (6) [redacted] Swapped G.L. 14 cards in auto pilot amplifier operated systems, checks ok.

12-20-62 Baro hold will not hold, will engage. /s/ LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] Replaced air data sensor, check next hop.

12-16-62 Lost auto pilot and standby gyro three times in flight. Suspect bad gyro. Could not re-engage /s/ LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] Replaced standby gyro, Checks ok on deck.

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12-2-62	No radar or baro hold on auto pilot, auto trim inoperative /s/ LT (b) (6) [redacted] Adjusted K-3 relay and ground checked.
10-8-62	Auto pilot (Standby) gyro inoperative. /s/ LT R.S. EBERHART. Replaced auto pilot gyro. Auto pilot checks good on systems check.
8-14-62	Auto pilot will not engage. /s/ (b) (6) [redacted] LCC. Replaced standby gyro.

RADAR ALTIMETER

10-30-62	Radar altimeter out. /s/ LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] Replaced blown fuse.
10-26-62	APN-117 Radar altimeter inoperative. /s/ (b) (6) [redacted] LCC. Replaced 3/10 AMP fuse.
10-16-62	APN-117 Radar altimeter inoperative. /s/ (b) (6) [redacted] LCC. Replaced maggie, servo amplifier and repaired broken lead.

The investigation revealed that there are several sources of documented evidence pertaining to long standing autopilot/radar altitude design discrepancies in the P3A. In as much as there is in production a service change to correct these discrepancies it is apparent that both BUWEPS and LOCKHEED were aware of the problem. LOCKHEED Field Service Representatives at Patuxent were notified as early as 27 April 1962 that LOCKHEED was proceeding with a design modification and recommending as an interim procedure that "Under IFR conditions between 200 and 500 feet, operate on barometric altitude hold only." The Preliminary Flight Manual Navy Model P3A Aircraft (NAVWEPS 01-75PAA-1 changed 1 October 1962) presently in use by the squadron states: "At lower altitudes, a safer altitude hold is provided by moving the switch to RADAR ALT. HOLD."

Detailed information pertaining to the auto pilot/APN-117 discrepancies, and recommended interim operating procedures were not made available to fleet users of the P3A until after the accident. See enclosure(20).

The PB-20N auto pilot with the altitude hold feature was designed to provide for the use of auto pilot at low ASW operational altitudes. It is Standard Operating Procedure to use the auto pilot at low altitude because the flight characteristics of the P3A make precise altitude control difficult when manually flown.

A chronology of events known and assumed to have occured from time of take-off to the time of accident are included in PART V and will not be repeated here.

The Weight and Balance Handbook could not be located after the accident and is presumed to have been lost with the aircraft. Due to the requirement of presenting the ORI inspecting officer a copy of the weight and balance form DD-365F this presumption is logical. Two reconstructed forms DD-365F are included as enclosure 7a and 7b. Enclosure 7a is for flight at max range cruise control and expenditure of stores. Enclosure 7b is for cruise at loiter conditions on station and no expenditure of stores.

Weather in the OpArea at the estimated time of the accident was not considered unfavorable to ASW operations. The cloud layer was variously reported by pilots, on the scene close to the time of accident, as from 2500-3000 feet, broken to overcast. Visibility was 8-10 miles, no moon, with surface winds

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northwesterly at 8-10 knots. Sea state was 0-1 and the water temperature 47c and air temperature 45°. This actual weather coincides closely with the predicted weather.

COMMUNICATIONS

Pinstripe 2, maintained normal air-to-ground communications with Air Traffic Control and Commander Fleet Air Wings Atlantic until the last position report at 300100R. HF communications were reported by other aircraft as poor to fair with NYONC via phone patch with Andrews Airways. Air-to-Air communications were good on UHF, allowing "swap" information to be exchanged between Pinstripe 2 and the aircraft leaving station. There is no evidence of communications equipment malfunction.

TIME OF ACCIDENT

The time of the accident was determined by interviews with lookouts on the USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON and by a report from radar picket aircraft in the area. LT (b) (6) [redacted] of the CARP, upon surfacing, proceeded to the conning tower and at a time later estimated to be 0150R he observed a very high white light which dimmed to an orange light and then died out in 15 to 30 seconds. BMS (b) (6) [redacted] of the ABSECON along with a second lookout (b) (6) [redacted] SA, noticed a bright glow that was high and a great distance away at approximately 0145R. This time is also a reconstruction, estimated from surrounding events. A RC121 radar picket aircraft, HOMEY 74, reported sighting an amber or yellow light on or near the surface lasting 15 seconds at 0156R. The bearing of these sightings plot in the general area of the accident. From these reports the time of the accident is estimated to be 0145R-0156R. This is further substantiated by the lack of a 0200R position report. The CARP sighted an aircraft in the area at 0240R and again at 0310R showing a red flashing light. Altitude of this aircraft could not be accurately judged by lookouts on the bridge. Identity of this aircraft could not be determined.

WRECKAGE LOCATION AND RECOVERY EFFORTS

A communications search was initiated at 0315R as Pinstripe 2 became two hours overdue. Active search efforts were commenced in the area at approximately 0500R by Pinstripe 9 and the CARP. At 0530R COMFASTARM declared an alert and launched aircraft and diverted ships into the accident area. At approximately 0725R lookouts on the ABSECON observed a whitish flare off on the horizon. At 0756R lookouts on the CARP sighted an orange flare. Neither of these sightings could be coordinated with any known air or surface unit in the area. The wreckage was sighted at 0930R by CG aircraft number 1316. This aircraft reported seeing as many as five to twelve bodies in exposure suits. (Enclosure 9). The ABSECON upon reaching the scene at 1130R, launched small boats to recover these bodies, but a closer view revealed these "bodies" without exception to be empty survival suits. The only body recovered, that of LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] was by the CARP. This body was without an exposure suit and was sighted and described as such by CG aircraft number 1316. Considerable time was expended by the recovery units in recovering these survival suits under the impression that they were in fact bodies or survivors. LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] of the CARP and LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] of the ABSECON (Enclosures 15 & 16) both commented on how easy it was to be deceived by these suits until they were close aboard. A total of 16 exposure suits were recovered by the two vessels out of a total of 22 on board the aircraft. Recovery operations were continued until the evening of the 31st. A complete inventory of wreckage recovered is contained in Enclosure 11.

On Saturday, 2 February, the Board interviewed members of crew of the CARP and ABSECON at Norfolk. These interviews further established the estimated time of accident, wreckage distribution at the scene, and difficulty in ascertaining that survival suits recovered were empty. Detailed statements of witnesses are attached as Enclosures 3, 4, 15, and 16.

WRECKAGE EXAMINATION

The majority of the wreckage arrived at the NAS Patuxent River on Saturday 2 February from the ABSECON and CARP. Wreckage recovered by the BROWNSON arrived on Tuesday, 5 February from Newport. All identifiable wreckage was then arranged on a full scale layout in its proper position as installed on the aircraft (see enclosure 13(M-R). It was further tagged, inventoried and identified by manufacturer's part number.

All material was examined by members of the Board and the following technical specialists: Mr. John S. LEAK, Senior Structures Analysist with Civil Aeronautics Board. Mr. LEAK has had extensive experience in aircraft accident investigation on all types of aircraft including civilian Electra.

Mr. W.J. CRITCHLOW, Senior Structures Engineer, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, California Division. Mr. CRITCHLOW has worked with the P3A and Electra since their conception. He has further investigated every major Electra accident.

Mr. W.K. FOULKE, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, California, Flight Test Engineer, assigned to Flight Safety Division.

Mr. Frank HAMPTON, Lockheed Field Service Regional Representative, Patusent River, Maryland.

Mr. Darvan H. HORADAM, Lockheed Field Service Regional Respresentative.

Mr. J.R. GIPSON, Lockheed Field Service Representative, attached to Patrol Squadron EIGHT.

LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] USN, Accident Investigator, Naval Aviation Safety Center.

Mr. (b) (6) [redacted] after a thorough investigation of the wreckage, expressed several opinions which are itemized below:

a. There is no evidence of an inflight fire. The most concrete evidence in this respect is the lack of soot in airconditioning ducting and as supported by the lack of scorching on several pieces which mated with sections that were scorched (Enclosure 13i).

b. There is no evidence of inflight explosions, including explosive decompression.

c. There is no evidence of major structural failure inflight.

d. The high order of break-up is not consistent with ditching, even a badly executed one.

These opinions were substantiated by Mr. (b) (6) [redacted] in his more detailed investigation. A plot of the tear-out directions on floor board attachments was conducted by Mr. (b) (6) [redacted] however, no significant pattern or sequence of break-up was discernable. The APS-80 modulator unit normally mounted in the aft cabin area failed by pullout of its rubber shock mounts in an upward direction. The fiberglass MAD-boom tail-cone structure was recovered. This unit showed a fracture plane thru the cylindrical portion as eliptical, and inclined approximately 45° to the cylinder axis and rotated to indicate a down and left bending direction from inertial forces oriented approximately 20-30° from the vertical. (Enclosure 17)

One MK-25 smoke flare was recovered at the scene which had indication of having been fired. Two smoke flares and four sono-buoys recovered were in the aircraft at impact.

A total of 16 exposure suits out of the 22 carried on board were recovered. It is estimated that at least 15 of the suits were in their containers at impact. These suits were the A1-1 quick donning type and are normally distributed in the aircraft with 6 in the forward radio compartment and the remainder in the aft galley area. The containers for these suits are of two types, one, modified with a slit at one end and three snaps to facilitate removal and the other, without this slit and two snaps. The number of containers that were carried on board that were modified or not modified is undetermined. Subsequent test of these suits and containers proved that the suits could free themselves from an un-snapped, modified container in approximately 5 hours in a sea state of 0-1. Further tests by Mr. (b) (6) [redacted] of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory revealed the following as to speeds at which the survival suit containers could be expected to open.

a. An unmodified container opened at 95 knots when fired at a vertical flat surface without the suit being deployed. At 140 knots the suit was expelled, undamaged from the container. On a 2½ inch round surface the snaps popped at 71 knots.

b. Modified containers opened and the suit deployed at 95 knots on impact with a flat surface. On a 2½ inch round surface at 71 knots the container opened and suit was deployed with damage. Completed results of these tests are attached as enclosure 19.

Tears in suit and container were matched on one set which was mated by the comparison of serial numbers.

Five MK II (Mae West) life jackets were recovered out of the 23 on board the aircraft. On one of the five recovered, the fastening snaps were pulled free from the vest and stitching on the back adjustment straps was pulled loose. This is considered a possible indication that the vest had been worn. (See Enclosure 13L).

The two MK-12 life rafts and one AN/CRT-3A Gibson Gi-1 were recovered. Damage to these items was extensive and no evidence of their having been used could be determined.

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PART VIII THE ANALYSIS

GENERAL

The aircraft was on an authorized flight with a physically and technically qualified crew, and was being conducted as scheduled. The aircraft had been properly preflighted and the crew adequately briefed for the flight. The pilot accepted the aircraft with two discrepancies, and although it cannot be established that he was aware of these discrepancies, it is the opinion of the board that they did not effect safety of flight and could not have contributed to the accident.

The weather as forecast in enclosure 10A, was not unfavorable to ASW operations but could have been a contributing factor as discussed below. When the aircraft taxied from the VP-8 line, LT R.S. EBERHART , the PPC, was observed to be occupying the left seat and there is reason to believe he was at the controls at the time of the accident..

The statements of witnesses pertaining to sighting the white-to-orange glow high in the sky might lend credence to an in-flight fire. Due to the short duration of the glow and the analysis of wreckage indicating no prolonged fire, it is believed that these observers actually saw the reflection of the impact explosion off the overcast.

All factors having, or believed to have had, a bearing on the accident will be discussed under the headings of personnel, supervisory, and material.

PERSONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT

There is no conclusive evidence to indicate that any of the personal safety or survival equipment recovered was mis-used or in fact had ever been used. There was sufficient equipment carried on the aircraft to properly equip all crew members. Reports of the units conducting the recovery brought out the fact that certain portions of the aircraft and survival equipment can be mistaken for victims of an accident. The orange colored seats and orange/yellow insulation were mistaken many times for survival equipment or bodies. The pink cuffs and neck seal of the A1-1 quick donning exposure suits is confusing in it's similarity to the head and hands of a survivor. Those suits with black cuffs, when seen in proximity to those with pink cuffs, apparently do not create this impression. Both types were recovered at the scene. This could account for the portion of LT (b) (6) [redacted] statement wherein he described some survival suits as containing bodies and others empty.

PERSONNEL FACTORS

The entire crew was found to have been physically and psychologically qualified for flight. Whereas the investigation revealed the possibility of something less than the desired amount of crew rest available to the pilot and certain members of the crew, there is no evidence to substantiate any undue fatigue factors which could have contributed to the accident. The amount of rest available was consistent with the simulated wartime conditions under which the squadron was operating during the ORI. LT EBERHART had participated in several VP squadron ORI's and thus

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PERSONNEL FACTORS (Cont.)

is considered to have been sufficiently seasoned to preclude any undue emotional stress. He was thoroughly familiar with the characteristics of the P-3A which make difficult the perception of speed and attitude changes by normal sensory means. He was also as well versed as any pilot in the squadron on the effects of longitudinal stability caused by shifting center of gravity during flight, and could be expected to be alert for this condition.

The aircraft is estimated to have weighed between 96,978 and 98,976 lbs with a CG of 30.7% to 31.8% M.A.C. The aft CG limit for this weight is 32%, at which the aircraft approaches an area of neutral longitudinal stability. The co-pilot was observed computing a weight and balance and it is known that LT EBERHART was fully aware of the movement of CG toward the aft limits, under normal load conditions, as tank #5 is emptied, and the resultant tendency toward neutral stability.

None of the foregoing, however, can definitely eliminate the possibility of pilot error resulting in inadvertant contact with the water. LT EBERHART had experienced in-flight emergencies in the P-3A including one which involved an electrical fire in the windshield heater transformer and subsequent temporary loss of control boost, aircraft electrical power and primary attitude reference system while on instruments in turbulence. On this and all other occasions, he handled the emergency situation in a thoroughly professional manner.

The possible psychological attitudes and anxieties of LT WHITE and CARPENTER, as revealed in the MOR, (enclosure 22), although relevant, cannot be considered as directly contributing to the accident.

SUPERVISORY FACTORS.

LT EBERHART was a qualified, experienced and dependable PPC. The crew had operated together for a number of months and had participated in flights where conditions were more exacting and difficult than those which could have been anticipated on this flight. LT EBERHART had considerable pride in his crew and as a result they were a close knit, harmonious and well trained team.

The OPI observer is not considered to have injected any adverse supervisory factors into the flight. All observers were instructed prior to their flights to forego any emergency drills until completion of the ASW portion of the flight.

Of great significance is the lack of positive steps by the Bureau of Naval Weapons and other cognizant authorities to promptly disseminate information on the design deficiencies of the PB-20N autopilot/APN-117 radar altimeter combination. No safety of flight information concerning this problem area in the P-3A was promulgated to the fleet operators of the aircraft, nor were interim restrictions issued regarding use of this equipment, even though the Bureau of Naval Weapons was cognizant of the design deficiencies as early as April 1962.

MATERIAL.

The unincorporated Aircraft Service Changes or Propeller Bulletins could not have been a contributing factor, nor could the two outstanding

(Continued)

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discrepancies concerning the MAD compensation and the manual sonobuoy release rod.

In over 5,000 hours of flight with the P-3A, this squadron has never experienced an engine failure which resulted in a sudden and complete power loss. Although propeller malfunctions have necessitated the feathering of engines, the many safety features incorporated within the propeller have made feathering a deliberate action more nearly termed precautionary. During this same period no instances of complete hydraulic or electrical failure were reported. Two 60 KVA alternators supply more than adequate power, each to separate load groups. A third alternator, also 60 KVA, remains on standby, automatically accepting the load in case of failure. Any one of the alternators could supply the full aircraft load with the exception of de-icing. Two separate and isolated hydraulic systems powered by three electrically driven pumps have proven to be an extremely reliable system.

This accident board was very fortunate in having available an experienced group of accident investigators. Their opinions and statements were highly regarded by the board. The investigation of the limited amount of non-structural material recovered provided little in the way of positive information. The board, aided by the technical specialists previously mentioned, were, however, able to preclude, largely by negative evidence, the possibility of explosive decompression, in-flight structural failure, low and high order fuselage explosion as well as in-flight fire of major intensity. While the frequency of recent fuel leaks (enclosure 18) could be construed to be a possible contributing factor; existing evidence, such as the lack of radio transmissions, the magnitude of break-up, indicated by the extensive shrapnel damage to parts recovered, which tends to preclude attempted ditching, and consolidation of wreckage in a small area, mitigate against a wing fire. The analysis of the MAD-cone breakup, and that of the aft APS-80 radar modulator, although indicative of water entry in a 20-30 degree left wing down attitude, is by no means conclusive due to lack of any other more definite supporting evidence. There is no evidence of material failure of any type.

Due to the universal use by pilots of this squadron of the autopilot in control wheel steering and altitude hold modes while operating at low altitudes, and the recorded failure rate of the autopilot, the board considers this equipment highly suspect even though there is no evidence to indicate that the autopilot was in use at the time of the accident.

On 24 August 1962, Patrol Squadron EIGHT Notice 3710, Subj: P3V-1 Interim Operating Restrictions, established certain operating limitations of squadron aircraft because of the low experience level of pilots while transitioning. Pertinent to this investigation are the following excerpts from the above Notice:

"<u>Altitude Restrictions</u>": Minimum altitude, except when operating in a <u>Control Zone</u>, restricted to 500 feet for all tactical and training maneuvers day/night, VFR/IFR.

"<u>Autopilot Restrictions</u>":

(1) The autopilot (all modes) will not be operated in flight unless complete autopilot preflight has been performed by the pilot in command of the aircraft prior to leaving the flight line.

(2) During any in-flight autopilot operation the pilot in command of the aircraft will ensure that the co-pilot and flight engineer understand that the autopilot is engaged, together with the mode of operation.

(continued)

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(3) During any in-flight autopilot operation below 1000 feet the pilot in command of the aircraft will insure, by positive exchange of signals as appropriate, that either the pilot or co-pilot maintains continuous scan of flight instruments."

This Notice was cancelled on 15 January 1963 as the pilot experience level in the squadron had increased sufficiently to permit the aircraft to be operated within designed parameters and current directives on operation of naval aircraft. Commander Fleet Air Wings Atlantic Tactical Doctrine establishes a minimum of 300' for night operations.

Although the squadron interim restrictions were cancelled, it is considered likely that the section pertaining to autopilot operation were being complied with. This is substantiated by interviews with other squadron pilots which indicate that such a procedure is now standard.

It was only after the accident and during the course of the investigation certain design deficiencies present in the autopilot and the related radar altimeter became apparent. Any malfunction which would prohibit an error signal from reaching the autopilot amplifier/computer such as a broken wire, bad wire or solder joint, etc., would render the altitude hold feature inoperative. The circuit noise could then signal an altitude change. Such a change would not necessarily be violent and would more likely be slight and constant. This is much the case in the event of a slow gyro failure. The verticality monitor circuit will not detect a gyro error of less than 5 to 7 degrees and disengage the autopilot. Though unpredictable, attitude could change at a slight and constant rate.

Perhaps even more important is the failure of the APN-117 radar altimeter to indicate a malfunction. In the event of a DC power failure the indicating needle will remain steady at the last altitude. The radar altitude hold feature will drop out and the autopilot will continue engaged in basic altitude hold at the moment of failure.

During the course of the investigation it was determined by the board that there is a service change in progress which will eliminate the previously discussed deficiencies.

PART IX COMMENTS

1. The cause of this accident is undertermined. Although purely speculative the board considers the following possibilities most likely:

(a) The pilot, operating at low altitude during the localization phase of the ASW problem with radar hold and control wheel steering engaged, failed to note an autopilot malfunction and the resultant loss of radar hold. Abetted by the low sea state and extreme darkness as well as a steady radar altimeter needle indicating altitude at the time of the malfunction, and with a great deal of his attention drawn outside the dockpit by the tactical situation, the pilot allowed the unmonitored autopilot to fly the aircraft into the water.

(b) The autopilot was not available for use by the pilot, having previously been detected in a malfunction. Denied the use of either radar or barometric hold and abetted by the previously mentioned factors of darkness, low sea state, etc., and compounded by the tendency of the aircraft toward neutral stability and the unique lack of speed change sensation characteristic of turbo-prop aircraft, the pilot made an inadvertant contact with the water.

2. The free interchange of information between users of an aircraft and the test activity is considered mandatory when an aircraft is undergoing concurrent testing and fleet introduction.

3. Subsequent to the accident but during the course of the investigation it came to the attention of the board that other activities possibly suspected or had experienced trouble with the APN-117. COMNAVAIRPAC's 141756Z as readdressed by COMNAVAIRLANT states in part as follows: "COMNAVAIRPAC has recently experienced three unexplained cases of aircraft flying into the water (involving) two SH-3A and one UH-2A, ref B, (USS HORNET 180626Z DEC 1962) reports AN/APN-117 indicator needle showing ascending altitude as the aircraft descended." This indicates need for timely exchange of information between users of common instruments and equipment which would cut across the lines of type commanders.

4. The flesh-colored extremeties of the exposure suits and aircraft insulation resulted in a great expenditure of effort by the recovery forces on the presumption that these items were bodies and/or survivors. Had there been survivors, such extraneous efforts could have resulted in fatal delay.

5. Had this aircraft been carrying an in-flight recorder, and had the recorder been recovered, many of the questions, which must be left unanswered by this board and its reviewers, would not exist.

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PART X RECOMMENDATIONS

The cause of this accident is undetermined and thus it is impossible to make positive recommendations for preventing future accidents of this type. In view of the suspect areas and other pertinent factors developed during the investigation it is recommended:

(1) That the urgent retrofit of all operating P-3A aircraft with the service change pertaining to the PB-20N autopilot and APN-117 be accomplished at the earliest possible date; that this change be extended to include an audio warning of autopilot failure.

(2) That a dual radar altimeter installation be incorporated into the aircraft with an expanded scale suitable for low altitude work.

(3) That the Bureau of Naval Weapons take immediate steps to ensure that all problem areas concerning safety of flight be brought to the attention of operators of the aircraft involved. This recommendation is particularly pertinent to aircraft undergoing concurrent testing and fleet introduction.

(4) That a review of the aircrafts primary instrumentation be conducted with a view toward improving the size and grouping of primary instruments and to include an instantaneous accelerometer type rate of climb indicator.

(5) That the means for a free interchange of information between users of common instrumentation be developed and implemented.

(6) That inflight recorders be carried in all multi-engine aircraft.

(7) That it be made manditory for all weather briefings preceding flights into oceanic operating areas below 5,500 feet include a predicted altimeter setting for the intended time and area of operatins.

(8) That the color of exposure suit neck and wrist bands and aircraft insulation be changed to preclude possible confusion of rescue personnel.

STATEMENT OF LT (b) (6) [redacted] USN, (b) (6) [redacted]

4 February 1963

I am the Patrol Plane Commander on crew eight. Crew eight flew in LC-9 on 29 January with an on station time of 2000-2300R, the period immediately preceeding that of LC-2. We arrived on station at 2020R. The weather at this time and until 2100R was as follows. (a) 30 miles west of Point Orion - 3000 scattered, visibility unrestricted, (b) Point Orion - 3000 broken, visibility unrestricted, (c) 045° Point Orion 30 miles - 3000 overcast, visibility unknown. The remainder of the period (from 2100R to 2300R) was spent in the western half of the area. At 2300R the weather 20 miles west of Point Orion was 3000 widely scattered, visibility unrestricted. We flew at 300 feet continually from approximately 2130R to 2300R. No moonlight was available, but the night was not considered "Dark" due to starlight. Very little turbulence was encountered at 300 feet, and little or no turbulance at altitude of greater than 1000 feet. The corrected altimeter setting on station was not recalled, but was in the area of 30.30 inches plus or minus .05 inches. Using an altimeter setting of 29.92 inches, an aircraft would have been considerably higher than indicated altitude. The altimeter setting at NAS Patuxent when we landed at approximately 0115R on 30 January was 30.35 inches.

<u>On Communications with LC-2</u>: We initially heard LC-2 on 6738 SSB talking to New York OAC via Andrews Airways. He was attempting to obtain descent clearance. The time was appriximately 300430Z. NYO advised they were unable to approve descent, but could re-route the aircraft. LC-2 advised to "Standby". About 30 seconds later they came back and said they were requesting no re-route and would hold at present position. NYO later advised LC-2 to expect descent clearance at 0600Z. LC-2 "rogered" this transmission. At 300505Z LC-9 secured the circuit and up until this time no further word was heard from LC-2 on SSB. Communications with Andrews on 6738 were generally poor with static and background noise.

At approximately 300445Z we contacted LC-2 on UHF (273.8). They requested "swap" information and we gave them sonobuoy channels that had been in the water two (2) hours or less. They "rogered" for this transmission. At this time we were approaching Shad intersection.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Certified To Be a True Copy

(b) (6) [redacted]

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ENCLOSURE (2)

U. S. NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK 11, VIRGINIA

NASC/60/hn
Ser: 432
28 Feb 1963

From: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
To: Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons

Subj: NASC investigation 32-63 concerning P-3A (P3V-1) accident, BUNO 149672 occurring 30 January 1963 at 38-11 N 70-41 W

1. The subject aircraft assigned to VP-8 and piloted by LT R. S. EBERHART crashed while on an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) Flight. The flight crew of 12 and ORI team of 2 sustained fatal injuries.

2. The investigation revealed:

a. The aircraft departed NAS Patuxent River at 292240 R for the ASW exercise with the USS CARP (SS-338) and arrived at the operating area at 2318 R. An on station report was received at 2400 R and a normal position report at 0100 R. This was the last report received from the aircraft. The next position report was due at 0200 R.

b. Weather conditions in the operating area were estimated 2000 feet broken to overcast with higher cloud layers, visibility 8 miles, wind north 8 to 10 knots and sea calm on an extremely dark night. Water temperature was 47°F and air temperature 45°F. The barometric pressure was falling slowly at a rate of 2.0 millobars in 3 hours.

c. Radio contact with the USS CARP was not extablished. The operational plan called for no radio contact until a similated attack was started. No attack was made and it is believed the pilot had progressed to the localization phase of the search. His altitude then would be 300 to 500 feet and 30° bank turns would be common. Squadron SOP dictates that all four engines would be utilized during the entire flight. The USS CARP had its UHF antenna up but received no transmissions.

d. At 0150 an officer aboard the USS CARP noted a flash on the horizon in a direction later determined to correspond with the crash site. An air force pilot also reported a flash at 0156 in a direction corresponding with the crash site. When the P-3A 0300 position report was not received SAR operations were started.

e. At 0950 a coast guard UF sighted the wreckage. The USS CARP and USCGC Absecon were vectored to the scene. Two VP-8 P-3A aircraft viewed the wreckage from the air and assisted in the salvage. The coast guard UF reported several bodies floating face down in anti-exposure suits and initial efforts were devoted to their recovery.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6D

Sixteen suits were recovered but all were empty. Recovery personnel stated that the suits appeared to contain bodies until they were along side or until actual contact was made. The body of one member of the ORI team was recovered. He was wearing coveralls which were shredded and no flotation gear remained. All the debris sighted was within a large slick presumed to be floating JP-5 fuel. The USS CARP and USCGC Absecon remained in the area through 31 January recovering debris.

f. The ORI team was instructed prior to the flight not to conduct drills during the ASW exercise.

g. LT EBERHART had 2912 total hours and 358 in type, he had a special instrument rating and in the previous 30 days had 12 instrument and 10 night flight hours. He was the Squadron NATOPS Standardization Officer and considered by his commanding officer as one of the most competent pilots in the Squadron. Several of the Squadron pilots indicated that he never went below 500 feet on similar missions and they considered him a reliable and cautious pilot.

h. The co-pilot, flight engineer and crew members had flown with LT EBERHART as a regular crew sufficient time to preclude any anxieties as to each others ability. All were qualified for the assigned mission.

i. The aircraft maintenance history indicated 7 discrepancies in the previous 25 flights on the automatic pilot system, of which 5 concerned the altitude hold feature. It was further noted that other squadron aircraft also had a high automatic pilot discrepancy rate. For the total squadron aircraft 5046 flight hours resulted in 76 such discrepancies.

j. Due to marginal aircraft longitudinal stability, particularly with the center of gravity near the aft limit, low altitude ASW exercises are flown utilizing the automatic pilot.

k. There is no radar altimeter gauge on the co-pilots panel.

l. A DC power failure to the AN/APN 117 (radar altimeter) while utilizing radar altitude hold would result in a dead radar altimeter needle, with the needle remaining in its present position. The automatic pilot altitude hold feature would drop out but the automatic pilot would remain engaged in basic attitude hold. The radar altitude hold switch would move to the off position but it is highly unlikely that a pilot at night or at anytime while engaged in a low level ASW exercise would note this. The automatic pilot warning light would not be activiated.

m. Technical representatives present during the investigation indicated that starting with P-3A MOD Block III an improved automatic

pilot safety monitor design will be incorporated. It is felt the new design will eliminate present deficiencies.

3. Analysis of the wreckage revealed:

a. Parts recovered were those capable of sustaining buoyancy for several hours. They include fuselage floor boards, 16 exposure suits, 5 mae west life vests, part of the aft radome and MAD boom, 4 pieces of propellor deicer boots, 2 life rafts, 1 emergency radio packet, insulation, fibre structure, APS-80 radar modulator, parts of electronics bay doors, upholstering, 4 sono buoys, 4 smoke flares and one fire bottle.

b. Impact forces were sufficient to cause disintegration of the entire fuselage. Shrapnel of sufficient force to penetrate metal doors was prevalent, particularly in the aft fuselage area. No distinct disintegration pattern could be found and random force moments indicate more than one impact.

c. The aft radome and mad boom were severed from the aircraft as result of a moment which indicated a 20-30° left wing down attitude. This is the most reliable indication found of an impact attitude, however, it cannot be concluded that this is initial impact attitude.

d. One MK 25 smoke flare had been fired from an aircraft launcher. The other smoke flares and sono buoys were in the aircraft at impact.

e. The exposure suits were examined and tests conducted to determine if they had been removed from their containers prior to aircraft impact. It is concluded that 15 of 16 were in their containers upon impact and the 16th is undetermined. A total of 22 were aboard.

f. At least 23 mae west life vests were aboard and it is believed that 14 were being worn. There is no indication that any of the five recovered were being worn.

g. Several aircraft parts were burned. Careful examination and a scaled layout of all parts helped determine that fire damage was sustained after impact.

4. Conclusions:

a. Cause of the accident is undetermined. The following are considered to be the most probable cause factors in the order listed:

(1) a radar altimeter malfunction
(2) an automatic pilot malfunction
(3) pilot inadvertently flew into the water

NASC/60/hm
Ser: 432
28 Feb 1963

b. There was no pre-warning of the impending impact of sufficient time to permit donning exposure suits. Impact forces and subsequent disintegration were of sufficient magnitude to eliminate almost all hope of survival.

c. There was no fire in flight, high order type explosion or mid-air disintegration.

d. The aircraft impacted the water in an upright attitude probably at or close to a normal flying attitude.

5. Comments and recommendations:

a. The safety monitor features for the automatic pilot which are planned for future P-3A aircraft be retro fitted to all P-3A aircraft on a priority basis.

b. The mission of P-3A aircraft dictates the necessity for maximum reliance from the radar altimeter in conjunction with the barametric altimeter. Squadron pilots and the squadron AAR board have indicated a Dual Radar Altimeter, independent of the present system, with indicators on the co-pilot instrument panel would increase reliability. It is strongly believed that any and all means of increasing radar altimeter reliability in all weather aircraft must be urgently pursued.

c. The use of audio warning systems for the P-3A be incorporated as an improved means of notifying the pilot when malfunctions occur.

Ball
T. J. BALL
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
CNO (OP-05F) (5 copies)
BUWEPS (5 copies)
COMNAVAIRLANT
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRWINGSLANT
CG FMFLANT
CG AIRFMFPAC
VP-8
NAS PAX RIVER
BUWEPSREP BURBANK
BUWEPSFLTREADREPLANT
AFFR INDIANAPOLIS

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6D

CLOSURE (1)



OVERALL OPERATING AREA

AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE

(DELIVER DUPLICATE TO BASE OPERATIONS AT DESTINATION)

DATE: 30 JAN 1963

A. OPERATIONS OFFICE: NAS PATUXENT RIVER, MD

AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO.: 149672

B. OCCUPANTS (State whether crew or passenger. List additional passengers on separate sheet and attach.)

DUTY	NAME AND INITIALS	GRADE	SERVICE NO.	ORGANIZATION	HOME STATION
PILOT IN COMMAND	EBERHART RS	LT	(b) (6) [redacted]	VP-8 USN	NAS PATUXENT RIVER
C/P	WHITE, T.C	LT			
NAV	SHEPHARD BW	LTJG			
TC	BILL F.L	LTJG			
F/E	CARPENTER C.E	ADR1			
2 GREEN	GATLIFF M.W.	ADR1			
1 TECH	KAHLER J.C.	AT1			
2ND TECH	GALINDO J	ATR3			
2ND TECH	SYLVE E.A	ATR3			
RADIO	LESTER D.S.	AT2			
ELECT	ROARK DB	AE2			
ORD	AUTRY DR	AO3			
OBS	HART J.R.	LCDR		CFAWS USN	NAS NORFOLK VA
OBS	O'CONNER J.E	LT		VP-44 USN	NAS PATUXENT RIVER

SOB 14

C. FLIGHT PLAN

RADIO CALL: NAVY 49672/B

AIRCRAFT TYPE: P3A (P3V-1)

POINT OF DEPARTURE: NAS PATUXENT RIVER MD

BASE NAME OR DESTINATION: NAS PATUXENT RIVER MD

MILEAGE: 548 NAUT. ETD: 30 0330 Z

EST TRUE A/S: 320 KTS. ETE: 6+30

ALTERNATE: NR ETE TO ALTERNATE: NR

TRANS. FREQ.: ALL UHF, UHF (250) & FHF TO 135.95

PILOT'S LAST NAME: EBERHART

FUEL ON BOARD: 12 HRS. 00 MIN.

ROUTE TO BE FLOWN

IFR	VFR	ALTITUDE	ROUTE	TO
✓		15,000	D	SNOW HILL
✓			D	3800 N 73-41W
✓			CONTREA 1148	SHAD
✓			D	3730 N 7200 W
3+30 Hr DELAY 8000' & BELOW				
IN DILTRIV 19			ETA 0500 Z	
✓		BELOW 8000'	D	3740 N 7115 W
✓		20,000	D	SHAD
✓			CONTREA 1148	3800 N 73-41W
✓			D	SNOW HILL
✓			D	NAS PATUXENT RIVER

INSTRUMENT RATING

NAVY	AIR FORCE	ARMY
SPECIAL INSTR. ✓	PILOT RATING	PILOT RATING
STANDARD PILOT	INST. RATING	INST. RATING

DATE INSTRUMENT CARD EXPIRES: 3-2-63

DD FORM 365F FILED AT: PATROL EIGHT OPERATIONS DATE FILED: 1-29-63

HIGHEST RANK ON BOARD: —

LETDOWN EQUIPMENT ABOARD AIRCRAFT: ILS ✓ VOR ✓ ADF ✓ RADIO RANGE ✓ TACAN

LETDOWN AVAILABLE AT DESTINATION: ILS ✓ VOR ADF ✓ GCA RADIO RANGE ✓ TACAN

NOTAMS CHECKED: ✓ YES NO

REMARKS: ① PINSTRIPE TWO
② AD12 PINETRATION AT 3803N 7445W AT TO+20 (OUTBOUND)
③ AD12 PINETRATION AT 3803N 7445W AT 2910Z (INBOUND)
④ OPERATIONAL — MARSA — DILTRIV 19

(SIGNATURE OF PILOT) 1/30/63

D. WEATHER

EXISTING: DESTINATION	F-010 A6	TIME OF OBS	
EXISTING: ALTERNATE	NR	TIME OF OBS	
FORECAST: DESTINATION (ETA)	1200/008 A6		
FORECAST: ALTERNATE (ETE)	NR		
ROUTE FORECAST: MIN CIG	800 AT	MAX CLD TOPS	8-10M FT MSL
MIN VIS FLT LVL	6+	DUST OR HAZE	X
MIN FRZ LVL	SFC FT MSL	ICING	3000-800 light
WINDS	20M 270/70 15M 225/50		
THUNDERSTORMS	—	TURBC	MOD
SMOKE	X	RAIN	Y Shad
FRZ PCPN	—	SNOW	Y
HAIL	—	FOG	—
BRIEFING GOOD AFTER	0400Z		

SIGNATURE: EAD

E. FLIGHT CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION

SUBMITTED TO: 20F ES TIME: 0325 BY: JD

INSTRUCTIONS AND APPROVAL TRANS. TO TOWER OR PILOT BY: 2BY ES

STATION ARRIVED AT: TIME: NAME: JD

ACTUAL T.O. TIME: 0336

GRADE OR POSITION:

SIGNATURE OF CLEARING AUTHORITY: [illegible] LT. CDR. USN Commanding Officer

DD FORM 1 OCT 56 175 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED.

1100 4-8' North shad NN 10-15
6-9 AW MOS NN 20/30

STATEMENT OF (b) (6) [redacted] LT, USN, (b) (6) [redacted]

2 February 1963

I relieved the watch at about 0000R and commenced snorkeling at that time on course 315°T. I snorkeled until 0130R at which time I secured snorkeling and changed course to 295°T for a sonar search of the area as the visibility was undeterminable at periscope depth. At 0141R I surfaced on course 295°T, speed 12.5 knots. About 0150R I sighted a very high white light which dimmed to an orange light and died out in from 15 to 30 seconds. Bearing of the light was roughly 305°T. Visibility at this time is estimated at 8 miles, completely overcast skies with clouds varying between one and two thousand feet. I reported the light to the Commanding Officer at about 0152R and stated at this time that the light looked like a magnesium photo illumination flare. Estimated distance was difficult to determine, but I would say a minimum range would have been 10 miles and a maximum range of 25 miles considering the weather conditions and the cloud overcast. At 0248R the Officer of the Deck reported an aircraft bearing roughly 030° relative. I went to the bridge and saw only the flashing red light similar to that located on the underside pf the P3A's. I saw the light only for a very short period of time and then it disappeared in to the clouds. At 0300R I had the running lights turned on and started calling the aircraft on UHF (273.8 mcs) and called almost continuously until 0330R. At 0310R the OOD reported an aircraft bearing 280°T approaching CARP showing its running light. At about the same time I called radio and told them to try to contact the aircraft on SECTAC (MHF). They were also unsuccessful. At 0315R I called the Captain and told him that I had not been able to raise the aircraft and told him that I would secure calling him at 0330R to prevent giving away of our position to the aircraft coming out for the next exercise. At this time the Captain told me to go ahead and send the ABC message out in the blind, which I did. At 0345R I submerged to be down and snorkeling for the next exercise. During the times 0000R to 0345R I do not remember having any ECM contacts. Sonar conditions appeared to be good for the same period.

I was awakened at 0550R by the Executive Officer and informed that there was an aircraft missing. I then related the above to him. During the rest of that day and the next I assisted in the rescue operation as OOD on the bridge. Several bodies were reported by the aircraft SAR units but only the body of LCDR HART was recovered or seen. All of the other items reported to us as bodies turned out to be either debris, or empty exposure suits or foul weather jackets. The exposure suits could have been easily mistaken for bodies as could some of the debris, especially the yellow insulation which many times looked like inflated life jackets. At least one of the exposure suits was floating feet up resembling a body. This was found to be due to air pockets in the legs and feet of the suits.

(b) (6) [redacted]

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(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (3)

STATEMENT OF (b) (6) [redacted] ENS, USCG (b) (6) [redacted]

4 February 1963

At 0215Q the ship's position was determined to be 38°24'N 69°08'W by Loran. Loran reception at that time was rather poor. At 0225Q the helm was relieved. The helmsman in turn relieved the lookout, the relieving lookout was (b) (6) [redacted], SA. From approximately 0230 on I was standing forward of the binnacle looking out, a few minutes later, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, we noticed a bright glow ahead of us about ten (10) degrees of the starboard bow. This glow was high and a great distance away in a bank of clouds, appeared light red to light orange in color, occupied about five (5) degrees of the horizon and lasted about three (3) seconds. It appeared similar to lightning that I have seen before.

(b) (6) [redacted]

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(b) (6) [redacted] LCDR USN

ORIGINATOR'S ROUGH DRAFT
PRNC-NATC-2000/14
(Formerly PRNC-NATC-461a)

00 00

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4 FEB 1963

PRECEDENCE
☐ FLASH ☐ EMERGENCY ☐ OP. IMMEDIATE
☒ PRIORITY ☐ ROUTINE ☐ DEFERRED

FROM COMEASTAREA

ACTION NAS PATUXENT RIVER

INFORMATION COMFAIRWINGSLANT/FIVE FIVE ONE ST AEW&C WING OTIS AFB, MASS/USCG GRNC

TEXT

UNCLAS

PASS TO CC VP-8
NAVY P3A NO. 149672 SAR INCIDENT
1. FOLLOWING INFO FORWARDED IN CONNECTION SUBJ INCIDENT
A. RADAR PICKET A/C HOMEY 74 AT 38-40N 70-50W REPORTED SIGHTING AMBER OR YELLOW LIGHT LASTING 15 SECONDS
B. HOMEY 74 AN RC-121 TYPE WAS AT 10000 FEET ON HEADING 253 MAG AND SIGHTED LIGHT OVER PORT WING
C. TIME OF SIGHTING 300656Z

DRAFTED BY

RELEASED BY

THIS SPACE FOR COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL ONLY

TOO

DTG 0[illegible]

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (5)


A/C HOMEY 74
300156 R
MH 253°
USS CARP
300150
ABSECON
300145
270°
HOMEY 74
300156
BODY
RECOVERED
305°
163°
CUE 260°
USCG
38-00N



POSITIONS OF REPORTING UNITS AT TIME OF CRASH

ENCLOSURE (6)

WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE FORM F

TACTICAL

(USE REVERSE FOR TRANSPORT MISSIONS)

FOR USE IN T. O. 1-1B-40 & AN 01-1B-40

DATE: 29 JANUARY 1963	AIRPLANE TYPE: P-3A	FROM: NAS PATUXENT	HOME STATION: NAS PATUXENT
MISSION/TRIP/FLIGHT/NO.: ORI	SERIAL NO.: 149672	TO:	PILOT: LT EBERHART

REMARKS

Estimated landing condition is crash time

1000 lb Start, T/O
1000 lb T/O - 15000'
5750 lb 1 hr cruise at 15000'
5340 lb 1 hr cruise at 5000'
5240 lb 1 hr cruise at S/L
18330 lb fuel used

REF	ITEM	WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM/
1	BASIC AIRPLANE (From Chart C)	61296	36075
2	OIL (35 Gal.)	275	135
3	DISTRIBUTION OF LOAD		

COMPT.	CREW NO.	CREW WEIGHT	BAGGAGE	CARGO AND MISC.	WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM/
B	3	180			540	123
C	4	180			720	240
D	5	180			900	508
F	2	160			360	320

COMPUTER PLATE NO. (If used)

Pertinent instructions to the pilot for shifting load and crew during takeoff and landing should be noted above.

REF	ITEM	WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM/
4	OPERATING WEIGHT	64091	37401
5	AMMUNITION — COMPT. / ROUNDS / CALIBER		
	48 SSQ-23	816	589
	9 SSQ-15	576	415
	54 MK-25	200	185
	60 MK-64	408	332
	52 PHOTO FL	55	69
6	BOMBS, ROCKETS, ETC. — FORWARD		
	AFT		
	EXTERNAL		
	ROCKETS		
7	FUEL — ~~INTERNAL~~ Tank 1 & 4 (Gal.)	20000	12140
	~~BOMB BAY~~ Tank 2 & 3 (Gal.)	20000	12514
	~~EXTERNAL~~ Tank 5 (Gal.)	2400	557
8	WATER INJ. FLUID (Gal.)		
9	JATO OR RATO		
10	TAKEOFF CONDITION (Uncorrected)	115546	59212
11	CORRECTIONS (If required)		
12	TAKEOFF CONDITION (Corrected)		
13	TAKEOFF C. G. IN % M. A. C. OR IN.	31.4	
14	EXPENDABLES — JATO OR RATO		
	BOMBS		
	AMMUNITION 14 SSQ	236	172
	FUEL Tanks 1 & 4	9465	2700
	Tanks 2 & 3	9465	2800
	Tank 5	9400	5567
15	ESTIMATED LANDING CONDITION	96978	57973
16	ESTIMATED LANDING C. G. IN % M. A. C. OR IN. CRASH	30.7	

CORRECTIONS (Ref. 11)

COMPT.	ITEM	CHANGES (+ or −) WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM/
TOTAL WEIGHT REMOVED		−	−
TOTAL WEIGHT ADDED		+	+
NET DIFFERENCE (Ref. 11)			

LIMITATIONS

*GROSS WT. TAKEOFF (lb.) 127,500	*GROSS WT. LANDING (lb.) 91,320	
*PERMISSIBLE C. G. TAKEOFF	FROM 23	TO (% M. A. C. or IN.) 33
*PERMISSIBLE C. G. LANDING	FROM 20	TO (% M. A. C. or IN.) 32

*Enter constant used.
*Enter values from current applicable T. O.
*Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 13).
*Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 15).

COMPUTED BY (Signature) /s/ (b) (6) [redacted]

WEIGHT AND BALANCE AUTHORIZED

PILOT (Signature)

DD FORM 1 SEPT 54 365F

ENCLOSURE (7A)

WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE FORM F

TACTICAL

(USE REVERSE FOR TRANSPORT MISSIONS)

FOR USE IN T. O. 1-1B-40 & AN 01-1B-40

DATE: 29 JANUARY 1963	AIRPLANE TYPE: P-3A	FROM: NAS PATUXENT	HOME STATION: NAS PATUXENT
MISSION/TRIP/FLIGHT/NO.: ORI	SERIAL NO.: 149672	TO:	PILOT: LT EBERHART

REMARKS

Estimated landing condition is crash time

1000 lb Start - T/O
1000 lb T/O - 15000'
5750 lb 1 hr cruise at 15000'
4360 lb 1 hr loiter at 5000'
4460 lb 1 hr loiter at S/L
16570

REF	ITEM	WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM/
1	BASIC AIRPLANE (From Chart C)	61296	36075
2	OIL (35 Gal.)	275	135
3	DISTRIBUTION OF LOAD		

COMPT.	CREW NO.	CREW WEIGHT	BAGGAGE	CARGO AND MISC.	WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM/
B	3	180			540	123
C	4	180			720	240
D	5	180			900	508
E	2	180			360	320

COMPUTER PLATE NO. (If used)

REF	ITEM	WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM/
4	OPERATING WEIGHT	64091	37401

REF	COMPT.	ROUNDS	CALIBER	WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM/
5 AMMUNITION		48	SSQ-23	816	589
		9	SSQ-15	576	415
		54	MK-25	200	185
		60	MK-64	408	332
		52	PHOTO FL	55	69

REF	ITEM	WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM/
6 BOMBS, ROCKETS, ETC.	FORWARD		
	AFT		
	EXTERNAL		
	ROCKETS		
7 FUEL	Tanks 1 & 4 (1 & 4 Gal.)	20000	12140
	Tanks 2 & 3 (2 & 3 Gal.)	20000	12514
	Tank 5 (5 Gal.)	9400	5567
8	WATER INJ. FLUID (Gal.)		
9	JATO OR RATO		
10	TAKEOFF CONDITION (Uncorrected)	115546	69212
11	CORRECTIONS (If required)		
12	TAKEOFF CONDITION (Corrected)		
13	TAKEOFF C. G. IN % M. A. C. OR IN.	31.4	
14 LESS EXPENDABLES	JATO OR RATO		
	BOMBS		
	AMMUNITION		
	FUEL Tanks 1 & 4	3585	2100
	Tanks 2 & 3	3585	2200
	Tank 5	9400	5567
15	ESTIMATED LANDING CONDITION	98976	59345
16	ESTIMATED LANDING C. G. IN % M. A. C. OR IN.	CRASH 31.8	

Pertinent instructions to the pilot for shifting load and crew during takeoff and landing should be noted above.

CORRECTIONS (Ref. 11)

COMPT.	ITEM	CHANGES (+ or −) WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM/
TOTAL WEIGHT REMOVED		−	−
TOTAL WEIGHT ADDED		+	+
NET DIFFERENCE (Ref. 11)			

LIMITATIONS

‡GROSS WT. TAKEOFF (lb.): 127,500	‡GROSS WT. LANDING (lb.): 91,320	
‡PERMISSIBLE C. G. TAKEOFF	FROM 23	TO 33 (% M. A. C. or IN.)
‡PERMISSIBLE C. G. LANDING	FROM 21	TO 32 (% M. A. C. or IN.)

† Enter constant used.
‡ Enter values from current applicable T. O.
§ Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 12).
* Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 15).

COMPUTED BY (Signature): 1st (b) (6) [redacted]

WEIGHT AND BALANCE AUTHORITY (Signature)

PILOT (Signature)

DD FORM 1 SEPT 54 365F

ENCLOSURE (7B)

STATEMENT OF LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] USN, (b) (6) [redacted]

5 February 1963

I was the PPC on LC-9 the night of 29-30 January. Our on-station time was 0400-0700R, the period immediately after LC-2. We arrived at the western edge of the OPAREA at 0327R and attempted first contact with LC-2 on 130.7 mcs. Slightly later I heard PILGRIM giving his ABC report to LC-2 and at this same time period I also heard what sounded like RF keying of the UHF transmitter. Further contact was attempted on both UHF and VHF.

At approximately 0410R clearance was received from NY and a letdown was commenced to 5000 in the OPAREA. At 0500R CAVEMAN requested us to contact PILGRIM to see if they had any contact with LC-2. On receiving a negative reply from PILGRIM and further communications check we returned to the center of the OPAREA and commenced an expanding square search for LC-2. This search was disrupted frequently due to investigating radar targets. At first light we commenced another expanding square search (approximately 0630R) from where PILGRIM estimated he last saw LC-2. This was continued with negative results until 0820R when we were instructed by the OSC to investigate another area. At 0950R a USCG aircraft sighted the debris and we continued the search assigned in the hope of recovering anyone who may have bailed out. At 1045R we abandoned this search, photographed the scene and returned home.

Weather: We operated primarily in the eastern half of the OPAREA. The weather here was from 2500-3000 feet with multi layers up to about 13,000-15,000 feet. There were no stars visible or moon. It was a very black night. There was little or no turbulence and no precipitation.

Communications: HF communications with Andrews airways and NY was poor-fair. With CAVEMAN good. UHF communications with PILGRIM was good. Overall we experienced no communications difficulty.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Certified To Be a True Copy

(b) (6) [redacted] LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (8)

STATEMENT OF LT (b) (6) [redacted] (5433) USCG

I was pilot in command of HU16E Coast Guard Nr. 1260 enroute to search an assigned area. At approximately 0947R, I was directed to proceed to the scene of wreckage sighted by HU16E 1316 and assume the duties of On-Scene-Commander. I altered heading and arrived on the scene about ten (10) minutes later. I dispatched the other HU16E to commence an expanding square, using the wreckage as datum, in an effort to locate any other wreckage or personnel.

On arrival, I observed the following: Two large oil slicks on a line approximately 120/300 degrees magnetic from each other. The Northwestermost of the two was about 500 or 600 feet wide and 1000 feet long, apparently extending southwest from the point of origin. Surface winds at the time were about 280 degrees magnetic, 8 to 10 knots. The second slick, lighter and slightly smaller than the first, was about 2000 feet southeast of the first.

The Northwestern slick was littered with a tremendous amount of debris, contained almost entirely within the slick itself, and all of it within the immediate area. The second slick had no debris in its vicinity.

An inspection of the slick at an airspeed of 110 knots and altitudes of from 50 to 500 feet above the surface of the sea revealed the following: 12 bodies were sighted. It must be understood here that I do not state that each of these were different bodies, with certain exceptions. One of the bodies was only partially dressed (a "T" shirt and something suspended around the ankles which appeared to be khaki trousers). The other 11 sightings were bodies in exposure suits, one of whom was wearing either a red helmet or the exposure suit hood. The largest number seen at one time was four. Therefore, the minimum seen could have been five, the maximum would have been twelve. None of the bodies wore life jackets.

Two inflated life jackets, floating empty.

A portion of the aircraft which at the time I thought might have been a nacelle, but which I now believe was the after section of the fuselage, aft of the rudder.

Numerous small peices of debris which I could not definitely identify.

Two partially inflated liferafts, floating inverted.

Some exposure suits, empty. I did not count the number.

I was relieved of the On-Scene-Command by the Coast Guard Cutter ABSECON, and attempted then to direct that vessel and a submarine to the bodies. By this time, only one body was visible, the partially dressed one. I had directed the submarine to within 50 feet of the body, marking it with smoke lights, when I was forced to secure the operation due to weather, and depart the scene.

Certified To Be a True Copy

(b) (6) [redacted] LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (9)

5 February 1963

From: Weather Service Officer
To: Aircraft Accident Investigation Board

Subj: Weather Conditions In Operating Area Concerning Loss Of P3A Bureau Number 149672 On 30 January 1963.

Encl: (1) Transcript Of Weather Briefing 3/3034

1. The following information for the period of 0500 to 1100Z in the area is based on ship reports and forecast made for the area from the 0600, 0900 and 1200Z surface charts.

2. The surface chart for 0600Z 30 January 1963 showed a small high center located near 37N and 67W. The only ship report in the area was located at 38.1N and 72.9W. This ship was reporting 7/10 stratus at 1200 feet with 10 miles visibility and a wind 330/20 knots. Other ship reports to the East were reporting 1500 feet and 6-10 miles in rain and snow showers with winds 320/20-35 knots. These ships were actually located within the high cell. From the above information and the 0600Z surface chart it could be reasonably assumed that a forecast of weather conditions would include ceilings of 12-1500 feet, visibility 6-10 miles in scattered showers occasionally lowering to 800 feet in heavier showers. Surface winds from the northwest at 20-25 knots. There are no indications of any rapid pressure changes although the pressure should have had a steady falling tendency from the time of arrival in the area. The net three hourly reports along the coast from Cape Hatteras to Patuxent River indicate net three hourly falls of 1.7 to 2.2 mb.

3. The 0900Z chart indicates a weak ridge of high pressure oriented northeast-southwest through the area to the vicinity of Norfolk, with a warm front ending north of Patuxent River, and frontogenesis to the southwest of the area.

ENCL

There was only one ship report located at 36.5N and 68.8W reporting overcast skies at 2000 feet, visibility 10 miles, winds 050/05 knots and sea level pressure of 1030.8 mb, temperature 46, dewpoint 37 and pressure tendency -17 and falling.

4. With the above information a forecast for continued 12-1500 foot ceilings gradually lowering to around 800 feet in 3-5 hours with the approach and formation of the front to the south accompanied by light rain, surface winds from the east to south-east 12-18 knots, visibility 6-10 miles lowering to 3-5 miles in precipitation. There were no indications of any rapid changes in the pressure only a continued steady decrease as the high pressure system moved off to the East and weakened. Again the net three hourly changes in pressure from Cape Hatteras to Patuxent River showed changes of 1.2-to 1.4 mb.

5. At 1200Z the surface chart showed the high pressure maintained about 1028mb and moved more eastward with the actual center off our charts. The low formation to the Southwest was still developing with the center at about 33N and 78W and weak warm frontogensis still taking place up to about 36.2N and 71.9W.

Ship reports in the area indicated a 3000 foot overcast, 90 miles to the Northeast, with winds out of the southeast about 5-10 knots and visibility 8 miles, pressure 1027 temp 46, and pressure tendency of -14 falling steadily. Forecast for this time would not have changed except for the winds being southerly 8-14 knots in the area and lower ceilings on the order of 7-800 feet moving in if the warm front developed (this did not develop as indicated on the 1500Z chart). There still were no signs of any rapid pressure changes or thunderstorms in the area.

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted] LCDR, USN
Weather Service Officer

ENCLOSURE 401a

Transcript of weather briefing 1/3034 as recorded:

Ready to copy over, this will be console briefing number 1/3034 of 30 January 63, P3A, 149672, Patuxent, alternate not required, based on 0330Z take off, ETE 6+30, PC Eberhardt, (TAPE GARBLED HERE) Shad, high pressure no fronts, ship reports we've been getting the last two hours shows that within 100 miles of Shad a few snow showers and rain showers. 100 to 200 miles east of Shad, ceilings out there in local rain showers and snow flurries occasionally under 1000 feet, Shad westward to coast generally VFR, clouds in layers 2-3000 feet, sea condition around Shad east of Shad 100 miles 4-8 feet, direction generally northerly, wave periods 6-8 seconds, you will be able to remain VFR out there except east of Shad occasional rain showers, few snow flurries left, you may have to zig-zag around at lower levels, current weather at Patuxent, high scattered cirrus, 10 miles, winds south 6 knots, forecast 6-8 hours from now 12000 scattered high broken, 8 miles, winds southerly 6 knots, alternate not required, ceilings over water in showers as low as 800 feet, tops of low clouds as high as 8-10,000 feet, thunderstorms none, turbulence 8-15,000 feet occasionally moderate in moderate jet stream, no hail enroute at flight level, flight visibility 6 miles or more, there will be dust and haze some smoke between here and the coast, rain showers Shad east of Shad, no fog, freezing level here deck, over the water Shad east of Shad 2-3000 feet, icing in rain and snow over water between 3-8000 feet, light mixed type, frozen precipitation none, snow flurries over water, winds at 20,000 feet 270 true 70 knots, winds at 15,000 feet 275 true 50 knots, this will be void at 0400Z, I am Echo Alpha Delta, over, This is VP-8 roger (TAPE GARBLED AGAIN) Roger, Shad, near Shad northwest 10-12 Knots. 100 east of Shad northwest 20-30 knots (TAPE GARBLED AGAIN) Standby terminal, repeat, Shad surface wind northwest to north-northwest 10-15 kts,

100 to 200 miles east of Shad increasing 20-30 knots, over, VP-8 Roger, no other questions, thank you very much. This concludes briefing number 1/3034 of 30 January P3A, 149672, PC (b) (6) [redacted] out.

ENCLOSURE 104

INVENTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL SALVAGED FROM P-3A BUREAU NUMBER 149672

Note: The material has been serially numbered with tape and grease pencil in the order in which the inventory was conducted. Where it was immediately possible through Lockheed part numbers or by visual recognition, the installation location of the part or material was noted.

1. Aft Radar Modulator - serial 183 MD 348/APS 80 p/n 405281-1
   Outer case ripped open, wire bundles ripped. Harness p/n 907626-1 J-501

2. Floorboard and support structure p/n 906486-1 (5028) 6' by 4'
   Has sono door manual operation fitting.
   Fig. 4-50 item 26 of illustrated parts breakdown

3. HRD bottle - nameplate missing. "Stbd Outbd" in pencil. Both frangible discs are intact. One elbow containing squib was attached - other elbow broken off.

4. Leading edge piece of propeller cuff - root section.

5. Trailing edge propeller cuff - root section.

6. Door from electronic bay 21. Top end crumpled lower hinge gone.

7. Fiberglass duct with insulating blanket p/n 01-905685-1 X350. One end shattered other end taped joint not mashed. Fig. 4-35 item 10 of IPB

8. Heated floor panel p/n 906438-1 Fig. 4-49 item 30 of IPB Radio operators station. Insulation attached.

9. Floorboard p/n 906500-1 Insulation mostly gone and some blackening. One tiedown ring with rope about 4 feet long, one tiedown ring gone, one empty. Fig. 4-50 item 43 of IPB (galley area)

10. Floorboard 1½' by 2' with structure p/n 905226-1 attached. From FS 553 (bulkhead lower) Fig. 1-33 item 62 of IPB

11. Partial floor structure and panel structure p/n 808511-6 and 906498-1. Insulation mostly gone but no blackening. Two tiedown rings and angle. A piece of 3/32 inch control cable 4 to 5 feet long caught in plywood. Fig. 4-50 item 41. Fuselage station 1015-1072.

12. Headlining from flight station intact. Snaps almost all intact. This piece contains cutout for Flight Station air temp sensor and fire warning horn. Fuel soaked.

13. Floor panel - insulation gone. Aft cabin p/n 906495-1 Fig. 4-50 item 38.

14. Small piece 1' by 2½' floorpanel - insulation missing. p/n 906454-3

15. Portable work table almost intact. p/n 922886-1

16. Floor panel - lavatory. p/n 908889-3 Fig. 4-49 item 72 and contains item 73 cover and item 74 bomb bay viewing door. Insulation gone except on cover.

17. Top end of door to electronics bay 32. About 8 inches wide.

18. Seat cushion - straight front.

19. Top end of door to electronics bay 22 about 12 inches.

20. Door to electronics bay 31. Badly battered.

21. Insulation batt 1¼' by 2½' with ziptape around edges.

22. board 1' by 2'. p/n 913702-1 Structure with grounding studs and one wire about 2 feet. Fig. 8-33 item 38 (item 40)

23. Tubing p/n 918175-5 Fig. 9-67 item 40 Station 1345-1375.

24. Panel from top of forward load center - below circuit breaker panel- no part number.

25. Portion of forward walkaround bottle rack and trim from aft side of 288 bulkhead - R.H. side.

26. Floor Panel - insulation missing. p/n 906456-1 Fig. 4-49 item 50 Aft station 458.

27. Panel and frame. p/n 908578-3 p/n 909067-3 on frame.

28. Section of flight station duct. Probably item 9 Fig. 4-35 of IPB

29. Flight station curtain. Probably R.H. curtain.

30. Galley seat backrest bulkhead.

31. p/n 906493-3 Exhaust fan and outflow valve access door. Fig. 4-50 item 53. Discolored and burned.

32. Leading edge prop cuff root end.

33. Seat pad - lightly burned.

34. Seat pad.

35. Piece of plywood from adjacent to entrance door. (Has red painted area)

36. Part of item 40 Fig. 8-33

37. Heated floor panel p/n 906435-1 Fig. 4-49 item 23 with p/n 906439-1 panel attached. Fig. 4-49 item 31.

38. Electrical load center door badly mangled.

39. p/n 905576-3 Duct Fig. 4-35 item 8

40. p/n 906447-1 floor panel Fig 4-49 item 39.

41. p/n 910355-11 floor panel Fig 4-49 item 19.

(Enclosure 11)

42. Unidentified, probably the galley seat frame.

43. Floor panel. p/n 906467-1 Fig. 4-49 item 60. Aft of R.H. escape hatch. With straps, 1½ seats not broken or torn.

44. Floor panel and sonobuoy rack. p/n 906474-1. Fig. 4-50 item 8.

45. Floor panels two together. p/n 917883-1 (has little one 906453) bomb bay test cable access panel. Fig. 4-49 item 44 and p/n 906451-3 Fig. 4-49 item 45.

46. Bomb bay door emergency panel. p/n 916229-1

47. Heated panel p/n 906497-1 Fig. 4-50 item 40.

48. Floor panel badly crumpled. p/n 906331-1

49. Doppler antenna access panel p/n 906490-1.

50. Stiffener with plywood board. p/n 908216-1

51. Floor panel, no part number.

52. Floor panel p/n 906476-1 Fig. 4-49 item 62.

53. Honeycomb panel with cooling exhaust fiberglass elbow - no part number.

54. Floor panel - no part number.

55. Floor panel - no part number.

56. Plywood panel with fitting. no part number.

57. Piece of floorboard with structure - red paint from near entry door.

58. Plywood floor panel p/n 913694-1

59. Piecd of wingtip fiberglass. Trailing edge port tip lower.

60. Piece of floorboard or bulkhead - no part number.

61. Piece of plywood - no part number.

62. Floor panel plywood. p/n 914450-3

63. Piece of floorboard, unidentified, no part number.

64. Piece of trim with zipstape and snaps.

65. Piece of flight station trim - no part number.

66. Piece of echosorb.

67. Section of MAD boom fwd of joint - 5 to 6 feet long - [illegible] bent along bottom - tube bent and broken inside.

68. Joint section of MAD boom broken about 15 inches fwd of joint and 0 to 15 inches aft of joint.

(Enclosure 11)

69. One channel 14 SSQ 23

70. SSQ 23A Ch. 16

71. SSQ 28 Ch. 2

72. SSQ 23A Ch. 8

73. Floorboard, Burned, no part number.

74. Periscoptic sextant stowage box half.

75. Oil cooler inlet duct plug, normally stowed under galley seat.

76. 10th stage blaed duct plug, normally stowed under galley seat.

77. Prop cuff leading edge.

78. Piece of bulkhead panel.

79. Piece of floor panel.

80. Piece of honeycomb panel.

81. Door from electronics bay 15.

82. Heated floor panel 906448-1 Fig 4-50 item 32 of IPB

83. 15 inch formed angle with floorboard fastener rivets - no part number

84. Small piece of prop cuff - aft root section corner

85. Wooden piece of smoke light

86. Floor panel bent double with some structure no part number - insulation missing.

87. Large pile of insulation. Some hydro soaked.

88. Survival gear:

    15 full exposure suits.
    Two pieces of exposure suits.
    8 exposure suit bags.
    4 life vests, one with snaps pulled out.
    2 Mk. 12 rafts.
    1 Gibson girl radio
    Two first aid kits, upper left snap pulled out of one, lower right on other.
    2 solar stills.

89. Mark 25 Smokelights (3). Two badly dented, one burned.



Fuselage Interior Equipment

ENCLOSURE (11) A



Fuselage Interior Equipment

ENCLOSURE (12)b



Flight Station Air Distribution System

ENCLOSURE



Main Electrical Load Center Enclosure

ENCLOSURE (12) d



FLIGHT STATION

Floor Panels from Fuselage Station 172 to 695

ENCLOSURE (12)





Floor Panels from Fuselage Station 172 to 695

ENCLOSURE (12)f



AFT OBSERVERS AND GALLEY AREA



SONOBUOY STORAGE AREA

Floor Panels from Fuselage Station 695 to 1117

ENCLOSURE (15)



FORWARD OBLIQUE, 700' ALT., SCENE OF ACCIDENT 311045R ENCLOSURE (15

FORWARD OBLIQUE, 700' ALT., SCENE OF ACCIDENT 311045R ENCLOSURE (13B)



INVENTORY ITEM #68, JOINT SECTION MAD BOOM BROKEN ABOUT 15" FWD OF JOINT AND 10 TO 15" AFT OF JOINT . ENCLOSURE (13C)

INVENTORY ITEM 668, JOINT SECTION MAD BOOM BROKEN ABOUT 15" END OF JOINT AND
10 TO 15" END OF JOINT - ENCLOSURE (13D)



AFT APS-80 RADAR MODULATOR AS INSTALLED IN AIRCRAFT ENCLOSURE (13B)



INVENTORY ITEM #1, AFT APS-80 MODULATOR MD 348/APS-80 P/N 405281-1
ENCLOSURE (13P)



INVENTORY ITEM #1, AFT APS-80 MODULATOR MD 348/APS-80 P/N 405281-
ENCLOSURE (15G)

INVENTORY ITEM #49, DOPPLER ANTENNA ACCESS PANEL F/N 906490-1 ENCLOSURE (13H)



INVENTORY ITEMS # 63 & 73, FLOOR PANEL FROM RADIO COMPARTMENT. #73 SCORCHED AND MAGNETIC SECTION #63 BEARING NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE ENCLOSURE (13I)

16 EXPOSURE SUITS AND 8 CONTAINERS ENCLOSURE (13J)



A1-1 QUICK DONNING EXPOSURE SUIT AND CONTAINER ENCLOSURE (13K)



INVENTORY ITEM #33, MK-2 MAY WEST WITH THE LIFT THE DOT FASTENERS FOR THE FRONT
LOSES TURN OUT EXHIBIT (13L)



WRECKAGE LAYOUT FROM F/S 214 AFT TO F/S 363 ENCLOSURE (13M)



WRECKAGE LAYOUT FROM F/S 363 AFT TO F/S 553 ENCLOSURE (13N)





WRECKAGE LAYOUT FROM F/S 920 AFT TO F/S 1072 ENCLOSURE (130)



WRECKAGE LAYOUT FROM F/S 1072 AFT TO MAD BOOM ENCLOSURE (13)

ENCL (14)



ENCLOSURE (14)

STATEMENT OF LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] USN, (b) (6) [redacted]

2 February 1963

The following information pertinent to the crash of Navy 149672 is submitted:

Identification of exposure suits: CARP was vectored in the vicinity of exposure suits by Coast Guard aircraft which identified the suits as bodies. Initial sightings by CARP gave the difinite impression the suits were in fact bodies. This was at a distance of 100-300 yards. However, when the suits were picked up there was no evidence of any body having ever been in the suit. The suits were floating in a "spread eagle" configuration with the feet exposed above the surface.

Sonar Contacts 300001-300450R: No PDS or other explosions were heard by CARP during the period 300001-300450R. CARP's sonar was working satisfactorily to the best of my knowledge as very distant merchant contacts were reported during the ORIEX (but not during the period in question).

ECM Contacts 300001-300450R: There were no ECM contacts during this period.

ENCL (15)

(b) (6) [redacted]
Commanding Officer
USS CARP (SS-338)

Certified To Be a True Copy

(b) (6) [redacted]

ENCLOSURE (35)

STATEMENT OF (b) (6) [redacted] LCDR, USCG, (b) [redacted]

2 February 1963

Aircraft advised they saw several bodies floating in a small area about 1500-1700 yards on port bow. Aircraft described one in detail as floating with head and arms submerged, feet on the surface. I turned the ship at 45 degrees to port and moved ahead slowly, alerting lookouts to be particularly observant for bodies. Ship moved perhaps 1000 feet when several people, myself included saw what at the time appeared to be a body in a red suit floating partially submerged. I directed the recovery detail talker to caution the recovery detail to be sure to use a swimming and rescue basket to pick up the body on the port quarter. Since the small boat was several hundred yards away and sea conditions were calm in the interest of expedience I decided to use ship pick up. I moved the ship ahead slowly bringing the apparent body down the port side. When it passed under the bridge wing, about 20 feet directly below me I could see that it was not a body but only an empty suit of some kind. (Later identified as an exposure suit) The construction of the suit "pink wrist and neck bands" contributed to the illusion of it being a body to all present on the bridge. Since it was floating with feet and legs on the surface, I assumed I had recovered the body that the aircraft reported. Shortly afterwards we retrived several other similar suits floating in much the same manner. I do not know the exact number.

(b) (6) [redacted]
Executive Officer
USCGC ARSECON (WAVP-374)

Certified To Be a True Copy

(b) (6) [redacted] LCDR USN

ENCL (16)

ENCLOSURE (16)

TO: LCDR. (b) (6) [redacted]

FROM: Walter J. Crichlow

SUBJECT: STRUCTURAL EXAMINATION OF THE RECOVERED WRECKAGE OF MODEL P3A BuNo 149672 LAC Serial 5013

1. At the Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Md. on 7-9 Feb. 1963. I have examined the remnants of P3A aircraft BuNo 149672 LAC Serial No. 5013 which was recovered from the accident area in the Atlantic, reported to be approximately 200 miles east of Cape May. These parts consist of approximately 3 dozen pieces of variously damaged and torn floor panels, a mid-portion of the fibre-glas plastic mad-boom, tail-cone and the modulator unit of the APS-80 rear radar unit. Other pieces observed were a number of cushions, survival suits, two large life rafts, along with survival gear, numerous pieces of sound insulation batting and portions of interior trim. These latter items were of no structural significance.

2. Examination of the parts was to determine fracture patterns and if possible to deduce means of failure which might have some contribution toward solution of the cause of the accident.

3. A plot of the tear-out directions of the floor board attachments was made to determine, if possible, any significant pattern or sequence of break-up. Nothing significant could be found. Tear-out of attachments was in general outward on most edges and randomly oriented in total. Floor beams, floor-to-shell shear panels and a structural ring segment, remaining attached to the floor panels were too few to provide any information of significance.

4. The APS-80 modulator unit normally mounted in the aft cabin failed by pullout of its rubber shock mounts in an upward direction.

5. The fibre-glas MAD-boom tail-cone structure recovered included the junction of the aft cylindrical portion with a portion of the forward conical section. The fracture plane thru the cylindrical portion was eliptical, inclined approximately 45° to the cylinder axis and rotated to indicate a down and left bending direction from inertial forces oriented approximately 20°-30° from the vertical. The magnetic compensator torque tube, normally mounted along the top portion of the mad-boom was bent in three places in a downward direction with the aft three feet (approximately) separated at one of the support fittings. This aft piece was recovered and fitted into the fracture face of the forward section in a manner consistent with down bending. Because the torque tube rotates in its support fittings, lateral orientation of the bending plane of the torque tube could not be determined.

6. No evidence of in-flight fire was detected. The few smoke and fire damaged floor panels could be fitted with their adjacent panels which were recovered completely free of any indications of smoke or fire.

7. No evidence of high energy explosive damage was found. All floor boards showed varying degrees of shrapnel type penetrations and scraping marks, however there was no regular pattern; this type of damage was evident on parts recovered throughout the entire length of the cabin.

8. No evidence of explosive decompression nor high altitude break-up was observed.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The fibre-glas plastic mad-boom tail cone fractured from inertial forces downward and to the left in a plane inclined approximately 20° to 30° from the vertical.

2. The APS-80 modulator failed from inertial forces substantially in the upward direction.

3. No evidence was observed to indicate in-flight fire, explosive decompression, high-energy explosion, nor any other specific cause of this accident.

Lockheed-California Company

Walter J. Crichlow

Walter J. Crichlow
Group Engineer-Structures

WJC:dg

STATEMENT OF LT (b) (6) [redacted] USN, (b) (6) [redacted]

5 February 1963

Total Radar Altimeter, Auto Pilot and Fuel Leak discrepancies reported to date (1-29-63):

SIDE NO.	BUNO	RADAR ALTIMETER	AUTO PILOT	FUEL LEAK	TOTAL A/C HRS.
LC-1	149671	7	10	2	524.7
LC-2	149672	4	8	3	471.4
LC-3	148836	6	8	4	499.4
LC-4	149670	4	14	1	457.5
LC-5	149673	4	12	0	465.7
LC-6	149675	2	4	0	381.3
LC-7	149676	4	3	0	292.3
LC-8	149677	1	2	0	331.4
LC-9	149667	1	3	1	681.4
LC-10	148838	1	3	0	644.8
LC-11	150502	5	2	5	142.0
LC-12	150503	1	6	0	154.8

(b) (6) [redacted]

LT USN
QUALITY CONTROL OFFICER

ENCL (18)

U.S. NAVAL ORDNANCE LABORATORY
WHITE OAK
SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND

IN REPLY REFER TO:
TX:JCF:dlt

13 February 1963

From: U. S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak
(Environment Simulation Division)
To: CDR C. W. Cook, Commanding Officer, Patrol Squadron 8,
Patuxent River Naval Air Station

Subj: Bagged Survival Suits; impact tests of

Encl: (1) Table I, Drop Impact Tests of Bagged Survival Suit
(2) NOLTR 62-30, Principal Laboratory Test Facilities of the Environment Simulation Division, NOL
(3) Figure 1, Air Gun Test Set-up
(4) Table II, Air Gun Impact Tests of Bagged Survival Suit

1. Controlled impact tests were conducted to determine the impact surfaces and velocities likely to result in separation of survival suits from their bags without damaging the suits.

2. In an attempt for a prompt answer, one of each type of bagged suit (the old style two-snap Latex Corporation type and the newer three-snap Aviation Equipment Corporation type) was dropped down the east stair well in Building 20 at NOL onto the basement floor (see enclosure (1)). The bags seemed to be more stable in the broadside orientation than when dropped for end-on impact. This was more pronounced from the top level (43 feet) where bags dropped in the longitudinal attitude impacted at orientations closer to broadside. These impacts resulted in opening of a snap on a few drops but in all cases the suits were well secured within their bags after impact.

3. Since the drop tests did not produce sufficient impact velocity, a special piston was made up for the 21-inch air gun (see enclosure (2), pages 18 and 19) where velocities in excess of 250 knots could be produced. The piston was fitted with an aluminum cylinder lining the sides and a 1/4 inch plywood disk on the base for a smooth impact surface to protect the suits from impacting sharp edges. The bagged suits were held to the piston head with 20 pound test thread secured around the bags near their ends (enclosure (3)) for broadside impact. Only broadside impact was investigated because the bagged suits were found to be more stable in

ENCL (19)

broadside flight and expulsion of the suits from the bags was considered more likely from broadside impact. Upon "firing" of the piston in the air gun, the high "g" forces (70 to 1000 g) immediately broke the securing thread and the bag was free in space for a few milliseconds until the piston base collided with it at controlled velocities. Subsequent impacts resulting from piston recovery are estimated to be less that 2% of the initial impact velocity.

4. The results of these tests (enclosure (4)) indicate that the suit in the three-snap bag can become adrift from the bag as a result of impact with a flat surface at about 95 knots, or as a result of impact with a 2 1/2 inch radius cylindrical surface at about 55 knots, without being damaged. Also, that the suit in the two-snap bag can be removed from its bag without damage as the result of an impact with a flat surface at 140 knots. Impact velocities of these bagged suits as a result of a 150 knot aircraft water entry would probably exceed 75 knots and could be as high as 140 knots.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Shock Group Leader

Copy to:
LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] NOL Operations Officer

TABLE I

Drop Impact Tests of Bagged Survival Suit

(Impact surface - concrete floor)

Test No.	Drop Height (ft)	Type of Bag	Approx. Velocity (knots)	Direction	Results
1	26	2 snap	24	broadside, snaps to the side	both snaps still closed
2	26	3 snap	24	"	all snaps still closed
3	26	2 snap	24	axial-on, handle end	one snap opened
4	26	3 snap	24	axial-on, end opposite from handle	all snaps still closed
5	43	2 snap	30	broadside	both snaps still closed
6	43	3 snap	30	about 45° on end opposite handle	all snaps still closed
7	43	2 snap	30	broadside	both snaps still closed
8	43	3 snap	30	about 20° from broadside	one snap opened

Enclosure (1)



IMPACT SURFACES - ¼ INCH PLYWOOD (FLAT) OR 2½ INCH RAD. STEEL PIPE

AIR GUN SET-UP

FIGURE 1

ENCLOSURE 3

TABLE II

Air Gun Impact Tests of Bagged Survival Suit

21" Air Gun Log Shot No.	Type of Bag	Impact Velocity (knots)	Impact Surface	Impact Direction	Results
3954	3 snap	30	flat plywood	broadside, snaps on side	middle snap opened
3955	"	60	"	"	middle snap and snap on end away from handle opened
3956	"	95	"	"	bag opened fully, suit was adrift, slight cut in back of suit under zipper slide
3957	2 snap	75	"	"	both snaps opened but suit still secure inside bag
3958	"	95	"	"	"
3959	"	140	"	"	bag ripped over 90 to 120° of both end seams. suit out of bag and in good condition
3960	3 snap	75	"	"	middle snap opened
3961	"	"	"	"	"
3962	3 snap	70	2 1/2 radius cylinder	broadside, snaps up	bag fully open, suit adrift and in good condition
3963	2 snap	70	"	"	bag fully open, suit still secure inside

TABLE II (cont.)

21" Air Gun Log Shot No.	Type of Bag	Impact Velocity (knots)	Impact Surface	Impact Direction	Results
3964	2 snap	95	2 1/2 radius cylinder	broadside, snaps up	bag fully open, end seams split, suit protruding about 1 inch out of both ends
3965	3 snap	55	"	"	bag fully open, suit protruding about 5 inches

P 0900142
FM COMFAIRWINGSLANT
TO PATRON EIGHT
PATRON FOUR FOUR
PATRON THREE ZERO DET A
INFO BUWEPS AIRDEVRON ONE
CONNAVAIRLANT NAV AV SAFETY CENTER
CONNAVAIRPAC BWR BURBANK
BT
UNCLAS.
P3A RADAR ALTIMETER
1. DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF THE P3A ACCIDENT OCCURING ON 30 JAN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ALL PILOTS FLYING THE P3A WERE NOT COMPLETELY FAMILAR WITH THE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION WHICH CAN OCCUR WITH THE APN-117 RADAR ALTIMETER IN SOME P3A A/C.
2. IF FOR ANY REASON THERE IS A MOMENTARY TOTAL POWER FAILURE TO THE APN-117, THE INDICATOR WILL REMAIN AT THE LAST INDICATED ALTITUDE UNTIL POWER IS RESUMED, AT WHICH TIME THE INDICATOR WILL CAGE UNTIL AN ACCURATE SIGNAL IS RECEIVED. IF THERE IS A

PAGE TWO RUCKDK 003
CONTINUING TOTAL POWER FAILURE TO THE APN-117, SUCH AS POPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS, THE INDICATOR MAY REMAIN AT THE LAST INDICATED ALTITUDE WITH NO INDICATION OF FAILURE TO THE PILOT.
3. IN EITHER A MOMENTARY OR CONTINUING POWER INTERRUPTION TO THE APN-117, THE ALTITUDE HOLD FEATURE OF THE AUTO-PILOT MAY BE DISCONNECTED WITHOUT VISUAL OR AURAL WARNING TO THE PILOT.
4. THIS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL P3A PILOTS AND THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE OPERATED WITH EXTREME CAUTION AT LOW ALTITUDE USING THE APN-117 RADAR ALTIMETER UNTIL A SERVICE CHANGE TO CORRECT THIS SITUATION IS INCORPORATED.
5. AMPLIFYING LETTER FOLLOWS.
BT
09/0056Z

R 1415Z
FM COMFAIRWINGSLANT
TO PATRON EIGHT
PATRON FOUR FOUR
PATRON THREE ZERO DET A
INFO BUWEPS AIRDEVRON ONE NAVAVSAFETYCEN
CONNAVAIRLANT NATC PATUXENT
CONNAVAIRPAC NADC JOHNSVILLE
BT
UNCLAS
P3A LOW ALTITUDE RESTRICTION
A. COMFAIRWINGSLANT 0900142 (NOTAL)
B. COMFAIRWINGSLANTINST 3710.9 SUBJ; INTERIM SOP FOR P3A (NOTAL)
1. IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF WARNING TO PILOT IN EVENT OF FAILURE OF APN-117 RADAR ALTIMETER AND AFCS IN P3A DISCUSSED IN REF A, REF B IS CHANGED TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:
2. CHAPTER III PARA 304 - ALTITUDE RESTRICTION. P3A IS RESTRICTED TO 500 FT MINIMUM ALTITUDE WHILE CONDUCTING ASW MANEUVERS AT NIGHT OR IN IFR WEATHER AND BARO HOLD WILL BE USED IN LIEU OF RADAR HOLD WHEN AIRCRAFT IS FLOWN ON AFCS.
3. ABOVE RESTRICTIONS TO REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL P3A NFO SLOT III EOP 4004 IS INCORPORATED.
BT
14/1749Z

3750
Ser: 11/
30 JAN 9163

From: Commanding Officer, Patrol Squadron EIGHT
To: LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] USN

Subj: Aircraft Accident Board, convening of

Ref: (a) Patrol Squadron EIGHT Instruction 3750.2A of 1 NOV 1960
(b) OPNAV Instruction P3750.6D of 11 June 1959

1. In accordance with reference (a), an Aircraft Accident Board shall be convened at 1000 this date, or as soon thereafter as practicable, on board Patrol Squadron EIGHT, U.S. Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland for the purpose of investigating the events surrounding the loss of P-3A BUNO 149672 on 30 January 1963. The board shall determine all contributing factors involved in the mishap, reveal actual facts and obtain information which can be used as a basis for corrective action.

2. The board shall be composed of the following:

LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] USN - Senior Member
LCDR [redacted] USN
LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] USN
LT (b) (6) [redacted], (MC), USNR

C.W. COCK

Copy to:
All members

Certified To Be a True Copy
(b) (6) [redacted]
LCDR USN

Enclosure (21)

OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 1
OPNAV 3750-8 (Rev. 5-58) See OPNAVINST. 3750 for instructions - SPECIAL

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

FROM (Name and mailing address of activity): PATROL SQUADRON EIGHT(VP-8),USNAS,PATUXENT RIVER, MARYLAND	2. MOR NUMBER: 1-63(VP-8)
3. REPORT FILED BY (Name and Signature of Medical Officer): (b) (6) [redacted] C USNR — DATE: 18 Feb. '63	4. FORWARDED (Name and Signature of Appointing Authority): (b) (6) [redacted] CDR, USN — DATE: 18 Feb. '63

5. TYPE OF MISHAP	6. TIME AND ZONE	7. DATE	8. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
[X] ACCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT [ ] INCIDENT	Approx. 0150R	30 Jan 1963	200 mi East of Cape May,New Jersey

9. MODEL A/C	10. BUNO	11. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	12. TYPE ACCDT.	13. DAMAGE CODE	14. UNIT OPERATING A/C
P3A	149 672	14	Y	A	VP-8, Crew #2

15. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED - USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED. NAME (Last, first and middle initials)	16. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	17. RANK, RATE	18. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR	19. BILLET	20. BRANCH OF SERVICE	21. INJURY CODE	22. DISPOSITION
IN CONTROL OF A/C			(b) (6)				
a. EBERHART, Robert S.	VP 8	LT	[redacted]	Pilot	USN	L	Z
b. WHITE, Theodore C.	VP 8	LT	[redacted]	Co-pilot	USN	L	Z
c. SHEPHARD,Bernard W.	VP 8	LTJG	[redacted]	Navig.	USNR	L	Z
d. BELL, Frederick L.	VP 8	LTJG	[redacted]	Tactical Coordin.	USNR	L	Z

23. CLARIFICATION OF ITEMS 15-22 WHEN NECESSARY: 19e. Aboard to observe the nature of the in-flight phase of oper.readiness inspection for VP-44 info.; 19f. Aboard to evaluate proficiency of crew #2 for actual low-level ASW Tactics.

24. MODEL - OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	25. BUNO	26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	27. UNIT OPERATING A/C	28. DAMAGE CODE	29. REPORT NO.
//	//	//	//	//	//

30. DETAILED NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF ACCIDENT (Use additional 8 X 10½ plain sheets if required)

(See addendum to page 1, section"A", No. 30)

SECTION B - MEDICAL OFFICER'S QUESTIONNAIRE

YES	NO	DID THE FLIGHT SURGEON:	(If "NO" state reason in space below.)
	X	1. VISIT THE SCENE OF THE MISHAP?	Small amount of wreckage sited far from base at sea. Photographs were made.
	X	2. PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE FIELD INVESTIGATION?	I was absent from the single autopsy, but discussed it carefully with CDR (b) (6) [redacted] MC, USNR,flight surgeon present.
X		3. PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD?	

GIVE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF HOURS SPENT BY THE FLIGHT SURGEON:	4. IN FIELD INVESTIGATION	5. IN BOARD DELIBERATIONS	6. IN PREPARATION OF THIS REPORT
	20.5	19	120

7. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST
[X] ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED [ ] SURVIVORS' NARRATIVES [X] PHOTOS [X] CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS [X] REQUIRED COPIES FURNISHED

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—498195

ITEM 15, Section A, (cont.)

NAME	UNIT	RANK/ RATE	FILE/SERV.NO. DESIGNATOR	BILLET	BR.of SERV.	INJ. CODE	DIS-POSITION
e. O'CONNER,John E.	VP 44	LT	(b) (6) [redacted]	Tact.Coord. & Observer	USNR	L	Z
f. HART, John R.	C FAWL STAFF	LCDR		Oper.Read. Insp.	USN	A	Y
g. GALINDO,Jesse	VP 8	ATR3		2nd Elect. Tech.	USN	L	Z
h. AUTRY,Douglas R.	VP 8	AO3		Ord.man	USN	L	Z
i. CARPENTER,Clifford E.	VP 8	ADR1		F/Eng.	USN	L	Z
j. GATLIFF,Marvin W.	VP 8	ADR1		2nd Mech Elect.	USN	L	Z
k. ROARK,Donald B.	VP 8	AE2		Elect.	USN	L	Z
l. LESTER,Dayton S.	VP 8	ATN2		Radioman	USN	L	Z
m. SYLVE,Edward A.	VP 8	ATR3		3rd Elect. Tech.	USN	L	Z
n. KAHLER,Jack C.	VP 8	AT1		1st Elect. Tech.	USN	L	Z

ADDENDUM to PAGE 1, Section "A", No. 30

Completion of aircraft inventory transition to P-3A in December 1962, left the squadron, VP-8, with the necessity to effect numerous alterations in ground operations and tactics appropriate to this new aircraft. The Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI), scheduled to commence on 28 January 1963, and annual Administrative Inspection, to be conducted near the end of February, in recent weeks added elements of tension to the enthusiastic atmosphere of this squadron, anxious to maintain its high standard of overall performance evidenced through its recent "E" award.

Particularly emphasized of late by the squadron have been perfection of ASW tactics and ship recognition involving flights occasionally exceeding nine hours in duration. The ORI also included, in addition to the above, testing of communications proficiency of each crew. With all this prior to 29 January 1963, VP-8 had no record of flight violations, incidents, or aircraft accidents since operating the P3A.

The night of 28 January 1963 found all the officers of Crew 2 in quarters early, so far as information supports. Lieutenant's EBERHART and WHITE, pilot and co-pilot respectively, lived together in a house six and one-half miles from Patuxent River Naval Air Station, and LT WHITE was last seen that evening at 2030 by a female acquaintance, and was believed to be going directly home at this time. Whether time was spent in final preparations for ORI tests the following day in lieu of sleep is unknown. Many reports concur that both were conscientious about securing proper amounts of sleep prior to flights, and particularly that Lieutenant EBERHART was always most safety conscious in flight to the point that the tactical coordinator frequently could not carry out necessary maneuvers because Lieutenant EBERHART would not consent to exceed his conservative estimates of limitations of P3A flight characteristics.

On this evening Lieutenant SHEPHARD had been seen at supper in the BOQ by another squadron officer, and it is believed that he remained at the BOQ the remainder of the night. A minor disagreement was noted between Lieutenant EBERHART and Lieutenant (Junior Grade) SHEPHARD concerning an error of 40+ miles in a recent on-station position plot by the latter. No hostile feelings existed, but what division of attentions took place in the pilot's mind on the ORI flight due to recollection of this cannot be defined.

All enlisted personnel serving as aircrewmen were relieved of duty at the Naval Air Station 24 hours before this flight, but were on one (1) hour call during this period. Of some interest in this respect, was the fact that three young children of the flight engineer, ADR1 CARPENTER received antibiotics at the station pediatric clinic on 28 January 1963. Two developed a rash on the following day and were seen again that afternoon, diagnosed as a sulfa allergy.
(b) (5) [redacted]

The entire crew was in the squadron area by 0830, on 29 January 1963 for the ship recognition examination. At 0855 a fire drill was conducted in realistic fashion at two sites in the hangar area, demanding the supervision of fire marshall officer, Lieutenant WHITE, which several others have suggested was a very responsible and somewhat stressful ground duty for the co-pilot.

(Continued)

Lieutenant EBERHART and Lieutenant (Junior Grade) SHEPHARD attended the PPC examination at 1000; Lieutenant WHITE penned his critique of the fire drill during this time. He was also seen at 1200 when he stated that he was leaving the area for crew rest. At 1300, radioman LESTER attended the communications examination which was delayed until 1330, and which kept him in the squadron area until 1500. Lieutenant EBERHART attended the communications examination at 1330, but left for crew rest without mustering. However, he was last seen in the squadron area at 1530. At 1630, Lieutenant EBERHART and Lieutenant WHITE were found in thier off-station quarters by their Land-Lord. Considering time in transit and dinner this allowed at most three and a half (3½) hours rest for Lieutenant EBERHART and six (6) hours rest for Lieutenants WHITE, SHEPHARD, and BELL, all at an uncommon time of day, in the twelve (12) hours prior to this flight.

Briefing for the entire crew was conducted on 29 January 1963 at 2030R at which no outward symptons of fatigue or disinterest were evident to the Briefing Officer. Flight of P3A, BuNo. 149672, commenced about 2240R for standard authorized ASW maneuvers two hundred to three hundred miles east of Patuxent River, Maryland, with PPC Lieutenant EBERHART occupying the left seat on take-off. Shortly after 0001R on 30 January clearance from New York was granted to BuNo 149672 for IFR descent through several cloud layers to less than 2000 feet. At 0100R a routine hourly report to VP-8 and FAW-5 was made with no indications of distress. The aircraft was on-station conducting ASW tactics, undoubtly at altitudes below 2000 feet.

At approximately 0145R-0152R three separate sightings of an orange-yellow glow lasting 30 seconds were recorded, one by two (2) officers of USS CARP, a second by two (2) officers of USCGC ABESCON, and a third by a USAF Constellation Crew. The bearings of each cross in the near vicinity of wreckage sighted shortly after sun-rise by a USCG SAR plane.

At 0310R aircraft running lights were sighted by USS CARP. No contact was made. This aircraft is unidentified and therefore was trespassing through a restricted flight zone. At about 0200R USCGC ABESCON and USS CARP reported sighting a white arcing flare in the same general area on the horizon. Investigation of the site of origin was fruitless.

During SAR operations several reports of bodies in exposure suits (see enclosure 1) which follow up proved in every case to be only empty suits, although this was apparent to rescue teams only when within a few feet of the suit. Most misleading about these partially airfilled suits were the flesh colored wide wrist and neck bands. Our own experient, throwing four unsnapped, encased exposure suits into Chesapeake Bay with five inch waves prevailing, found one completely free of its case and floating, one partially free, and two yet encased six hours later. Those that became separated were cases modified by an end slit for ease of suit removal. Those that remained intact were unmodified cases.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

(Continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 1, Section "A", No. 30 (Continued)

(b) (5)

[redacted]

All members of this crew had been medically cleared for duty involving flying within prescribed time limits.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 2
OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (Rev. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT

SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): EBERHART, Robert S.

MODEL A/C: P-3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS	E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:				SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight				29. Expeditings/Delays
		X	2. "G" forces			X	30. Weather
			3. Environmental stress - External		X		31. Mechanical Problems
			4. - Internal			X	32. Social and working relationships
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression				33. Personal comfort
			6. Diet				34. Regulations
		X	7. Fatigue				35. Facilities
			8. Hypoxia				36. Navigation
			9. Related illness			X	37. Duty assignment
		X	10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions				38. Personality traits
			11. Hyperventilation				NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			12. Drugs				39. Faulty attention
			13. Physical state		X		40. Poor judgement
			14. OTHER:				41. Forgetfulness
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:				42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			15. Personal equipment				
			16. Displays and/or controls				
			17. Work arrangement				
			18. Working environment				
			19. Habit interference				TRAINING FACTORS:
			20. OTHER:				43. Physiological training
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)				44. Emergency Procedures training
			21. Pregnancy				45. Survival and rescue training
			22. Illness or death				46. Refresher training
			23. Arguments				47. Transition training
			24. Elated/Depressed state				48. OTHER:
			25. Personal habits - Drinking				
			26. - Sex				
			27. - Gambling				
			28. - Debts				

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	61.8	7. Total time in model Pilot time	363.3
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	0
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1		
4. Time at controls this flight	3.5	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	None
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	11.0		
6. Total flight time	3900.1		

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. D and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

(See section "E" addendum)

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—478194

LT Robert S. EBERHART

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

10. This subject had considerable experience with a particular characteristic of such turbo-prop aircraft as the P-3A which renders very difficult the perception with instruments of changes in speed, direction, and attitude by the usual sensory modalities of pressure, sight, sound, proprioception and vestibular stimuli.

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000' to 2,000', complete overcast condition, mild surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

32. A mild disagreement concerning a position plot on a previous flight was observed between this subject and navigator, Lt. Bernard Shephard; however, no ill feelings were noted.

10, 31. Currently the auto-pilot radar altimeter hold lacks any device for quickly warning the pilot of a malfunction in the system. Furthermore a malfunction with loss of altitude registers as a constant altitude on the radar altimeter instrument. This instrument is located only on the pilot's instrument panel. Thus determination of a malfunction in the radar altimeter hold without a visible horizon requires a cross-check with the barometric altimeter by the pilot, and/or monitoring of the barometric altimeter by the co-pilot. On BUNO149672 alone there are registered eight past auto-pilot complaints and four radar altimeter complaints. Other P-3A maintenance records contain similar complaints.

7, 37. On the day of the flight, which commenced with take-off at 2240 and was planned for 8+ hours, this subject took ship recognition exam at 0830 and PPC exam at 1000. He excused himself from communications exam for crew-rest delayed until 1330, but was seen last in squadron area at 1530. He was briefed at 2030. The entire flight was being conducted under the very scrutinous observation of an Operational Readiness Inspector, LCDR John Hart. This subject's last previous flight was on 26 Jan, 7+ hrs; 1030; and before that on 24 Jan, 8+ hrs, 1030; and 25 Jan, 7 hrs, 0200. His collateral squadron duties as Senior Watch Officer and NATOPS officer have not been recently pressing. At most, subject could have received 3-½ hours rest in 12 hours prior to flight, considering time spent dining and in transit. He did not stay at base BOQ this afternoon. It is believed he obtained adequate rest on night prior to flight unless time was then devoted to final preparations for tests and inspection flight.

LT ROBERT S. EBERHART

Section E Addendum

Extract of Part I Section D, and Part VIII of A.A.R.

All members of the A.A.R. Board concur that the cause of the accident is undetermined. Factors believed to have a bearing on the accident are discussed under survival, personnel, supervisory and material.

SURVIVAL

Sufficient survival gear was on board to equip all crew members. That which was recovered revealed no evidence of misuse, or, in fact , that it had been used.

PERSONNEL

Something less than the required amount of crew rest was made available to pilot and certain of the crew members, consistent with the simulated war time conditions of the ORI. That LT EBERHART had participated in several such VP squadron ORI's suggests that he was sufficiently seasoned to preclude any undue stress due to circumstances of the inspection. LT EBERHART was well versed in all flight characteristics of the P-3A, as well as effects of shifting center of gravity on longitudinal stability of aircraft. Nevertheless, the possibility of pilot error cannot be definitely eliminated. The pilot had experienced in the past in-flight emergencies including electrical fire with subsequent temporary loss of control boost, and aircraft electrical power while on instruments in turbulence. On this and all other occasions he handled the emergency situation in a thoroughly professional manner.

SUPERVISORY

LT EBERHART was a qualified, experienced, and dependable PPC. The crew had operated together several months and had participated in flights under conditions more demanding than those anticipated on this flight. They were a close knit, harmonious, and well trained team. There is strong concern among members of the AAR Board about the failure of prompt dissemination of information by responsible authorities on known problem areas of safety in flight for this aircraft which is concurrently undergoing a test program and fleet introduction.

MATERIAL

In over 5,000 flight hours with the P-3A, VP-8 has never experienced an engine failure resulting in sudden and complete power loss, nor have there been instances of complete hydraulic or electrical failure. There are two separate and isotated hydraulic systems powered by these electrically driven pumps. Three 60KVA alternators are available for electrical power, one remaining on standby. Any one of these could supply the full A/C electrical load except de-icing.

A very able and experienced group of accident investigators was available to the AAR Board. With the small amount of wreckage recovered the possibilities of explosive decompression, in-flight structural failure, low and high order fuselage explosion, and in-flight fire of major intensity were precluded. The magnitude of break-up and confinement of wreckage to a small area mitigate against a wing fire.

The flaws of the auto-pilot and radar altimeter hold described elsewhere in the H.O.R. are highly suspected as a cause of this accident, although there is no evidence to verify that this equipment was indeed in use at the time of the accident. It is almost universally employed by VF-8 during low altitude operations.

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SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): EBERHART, Robert S.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness	X		S/N:R1680-516-8132-GF50	UNKNOWN			
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445 LF50	X		Unknown	
3. Inertia reel (Lockheed)	X		P/N:0027-0121-023	UNKNOWN			
4. G-Suit		X					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		X					
6. Exposure suit	~~X~~	(2)	A1-1		X		X
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N:D8415-543-xxxx	X		UNKNOWN	
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes, Flying Safety	X		S/N:D8430-656-xxxx	X		UNKNOWN	
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579 xxxx	X		UNKNOWN	
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		UNKNOWN	
13. Life raft (2) MK-12	X		(2) MK-12		X		X
14. OTHER: ~~Contents of rafts~~	X		~~Packed in accordance with~~ ~~B-A-C-S-E-B 35-59~~				
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK13-MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK13-MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
17. - Dye marker	X		SN:R6850-27-9966-9500	UNKNOWN			
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT -3A		X	X	
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N 9CF6230-255-0166	UNKNOWN			
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465 -254 -8803	UNKNOWN			
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N:R7340-098-4327-S231	UNKNOWN			
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650	UNKNOWN			X
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		X
25. - Food	X		(12) S/N:M8970-132-6359		X		X
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT

F.6;One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it, corresponding to those in its cover. A second was missing right torso and right sleeve and right leg was separated.
F.11;Flight deck personnel - pilot, co-pilot, flight engineer always wear gloves.
F.12; One VP-8 life vest recovered with its two eyelets pulled from rubber flap and clamped in place by snaps,indicating it had been worn. Waist strap stitching also pulled. Two CO_2 cartridges of another and one of a third were fired.
F13,14; Both recovered
F15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from 4 vests recovered
F18; One of two "Gibson Girl" radios recovered,battered.
F.23; Both A/C first aid kits recovered with contents of corner pocket missing. One kit was split and some contents missing.Both were safety wired.

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: Scott Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke - O_2 -combination mask ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: MD-1 regulator ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (3 available in flight station) ( )
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? [X] YES [ ] NO ( )
6. IF NO, WHY NOT: - -
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK: a - -
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS (Liquid) 1800 P.S.I. (Gas); TIME OF ACCIDENT ____ LITERS (Liquid) ____ P.S.I. (Gas) Unknown ( )
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCDT. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY. [X] YES [ ] NO
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO [X] YES Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A. ( )

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard Snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect RS-22018-IFC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-8C)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1960-[illegible]

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): EBERHART, Robert S.

MODEL A/C: P3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE:

20. INTEGRATED: [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON:

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown (Ø)

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET:

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS:

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM:

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: NC-3 (22 available) ( )

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 15 Jan 1963 ( )

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN:

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type): [X] NONE ( )

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY? [ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION: [ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC Unknown ( )

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. SUIT ATTITUDE AT OPENING:

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING:

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. STATE CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (Wind in knots): Moonless Night; no surface wind. Several overcast cloud layers. ( )

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Water; Sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY:

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS: [ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type): [X] NONE ( )

53. WAS PARARAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills.

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARARAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON:

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS: [ ] NO ( ) [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from recovered life vests. 16 of 22 exposure recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachute and harnesses recovered.

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD: [ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

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SECTION H - EMERGENCY-EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): EBERHART, Robert S.

MODEL A/C: P3A

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
		1. EJECTION - Attempted	
		2. - Accomplished	
		3. - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		4. - Prior to	
		5. - During	
		6. - Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
		8. BAILOUT - Attempted	
	X	- Accomplished	

Unknown ( )

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet) ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown ( )

11. AIRSPEED: 160 knots ( )

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED? [ ] YES [X] NO (2) [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C FLOATED: unknown ( )

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT: 0

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown ( )

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:		MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:	
X	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
	31. Witnesses at scene	X	51. Items used as clothing
X	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
X	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
X	34. Auditory signal devices	ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:	
X	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
TRAVEL:			55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
X	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
SHELTER:		MORALE:	
X	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
X	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
WATER SOURCE:		FOOD SOURCE:	
X	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.	SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:	
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67.
	49. OTHER:		

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ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
EBERHART, Robert S.	P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0152R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of PDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 5 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO_2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
EBERHART, Robert S.	P3A

H.33 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two NC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as ORI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

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SECTION I - PATHOLOGICAL FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for POST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): EBERHART, Robert S.

MODEL A/C: P3A

2. AGE: 32

3. HEIGHT: 72-1/2 INCHES

4. WEIGHT: 159

5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown

6. INJURY CODE: L

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						

DIS-LOCATION

		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE	
															HAND						FOOT	

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. ☐ DROWNED

19. ☐ ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

22. ☐ BURNS ☐ FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD

AREA	HEAD (ventral	Dorsal)	TRUNK (ventral	Dorsal)	ARMS	LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: ☐ NONE ☐ COMPLETE

ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS ☐ YES ☐ NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1234)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS

27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON ☐ YES ☐ NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1234) NO. 8661

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ YES ☒ NO

32. PROTOCOL ☐ ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY ☐ PATHOLOGIST ☐ FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", AFIP-1957.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1			TISSUE: (CNS)		
2			- MUSCLE		
3			- VISCERA		
URINE			OTHER:		
G-I CONTENTS					

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—498198

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SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL *(Last, first, middle)*: WHITE, Theodore C.

MODEL A/C: P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS	E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:				SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: *(Emotional stress from duty sources)*
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight				29. Expeditings/Delays
		X	2. "G" forces			X	30. Weather
			3. Environmental stress - External		X		31. Mechanical Problems
			4. - Internal				32. Social and working relationships
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression				33. Personal comfort
			6. Diet				34. Regulations
		X	7. Fatigue				35. Facilities
			8. Hypoxia				36. Navigation
			9. Related illness			X	37. Duty assignment
		X	10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions				38. Personality traits
			11. Hyperventilation				NON-STRESS FACTORS
			12. Drugs				39. Faulty attention
			13. Physical state				40. Poor judgement
			14. OTHER:				41. Forgetfulness
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:				42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			15. Personal equipment				
			16. Displays and/or controls				
			17. Work arrangement				
			18. Working environment				
			19. Habit interference				TRAINING FACTORS:
			20. OTHER:				43. Physiological training
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: *(Emotional stress from non-duty sources)*				44. Emergency Procedures training
			21. Pregnancy				45. Survival and rescue training
			22. Illness or death				46. Refresher training
			23. Arguments				47. Transition training
			24. Elated/Depressed state				48. OTHER:
			25. Personal habits - Drinking				
			26. - Sex				
			27. - Gambling				
			28. - Debts				

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA *(fill in where applicable)*

1. Flight time past 30 days	27.8	7. Total time in model Pilot time	238.8 hrs
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1	0	
4. Time at controls this flight	3.5	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	8.0	None	
6. Total flight time	2072.1		

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES *(As condensed from Part I, Sect. B and Part VIII of the AAR)*

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

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LT Theodore C. W[illegible]E

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding 1.5 "G's".

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000' to 2,000', overcast condition, frequent showers, with surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

7, 37. On the day of the flight, which commenced with take-off at 2240 and was planned for 8+ hours, this subject took recognition exam 0830 and PPC exam 1000, but refused to take communications exam at 1300, choosing to take several hours for pre-flight crew rest. This subject's collateral squadron duty as Fire Marshall holds him totally responsible in this area. He was tested with a "fire drill" at 0855, attended by considerable mental stress for him, apparently, although it was logged secure at 0900; it was conducted by Operational Readiness Inspectors on day of flight accident. This subject's last previous flight was 26 January, 1830, for 7+ hours; and before this, 23 January, 1030, for 8+ hours; 23 January, 0200, for 7 hours. At most subject could have received 6 hours rest in 12 hours prior to flight, considering time spent dining and in transit. He did not stay at base BOQ this afternoon. It is believed he obtained adequate rest on night prior to flight, unless time was devoted to final preparations for tests and inspection flight.

10. This subject had considerable experience with a particular characteristic of such turbo-prop aircraft as the P-3A which renders very difficult the perception without instruments of changes in speed, direction and attitude by the usual sensory modalities of pressure, sight, sound, proprioception and vestibular stimuli.

10, 31. Currently the auto-pilot radar altimeter hold lacks any device for quickly warning the pilot of a malfunction in the system. Furthermore, a malfunction with loss of altitude registers as a constant altitude on the radar altimeter instrument. This instrument is located only on the pilot's instrument panel. Thus determination of a malfunction in the radar altimeter hold without a visible horizon requires a cross-check with the barometric altimeter by the pilot, and/or monitoring of the barometric altimeter by the co-pilot. On BUNO 149672 alone there are registered eight past auto-pilot complaints and four radar altimeter complaints. Other P-3A maintenance records contain similar complaints.

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OPNAV FORM 3750-8B (5-58)

SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): WHITE, Theodore C.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness	X		S/N:R1680-516-8132-GP50	UNKNOWN			
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445-LF50	X			
3. Inertia reel (Lockheed)	X		P/N:0027-0121-023	UNKNOWN			
4. G-Suit		X					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		X					
6. Exposure suit	X	(2)	(22) A1-1		X		X
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N:D8415-543-xxxx	X		UNKNOWN	
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes, Flying safety	X		S/N:D8415-056-xxxx	X		UNKNOWN	
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx	X		UNKNOWN	
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		UNKNOWN	
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		X
14. OTHER: ~~Contents of raft XX packed in accordance with B-A-c-S-E-R 35-59~~							
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK13 -MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N:R6850-270-9986-5500	UNKNOWN			
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT-3A		X		X
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N:9CF6230-255-0166	UNKNOWN			
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803	UNKNOWN			
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N:R7340-098-4327-5251	UNKNOWN			
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650	UNK.	X		
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		X
25. - Food	X		(12)S/N:M8970-132-6359		X		X
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT

F.6; One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it, corresponding to those in its cover. A second was missing right torso and right sleeve and right leg was separated.
F.11; Flight deck personnel - pilot, co-pilot, flight engineer always wear gloves.
F.12; One VP-8 life vest recovered with its two eyelets pulled from rubber flap and clamped in place by snaps, indicating it had been worn. Waist strap stitching also pulled. Two CO_2 cartridges of another and one of a third were fired.
F13,14; Both recovered.
F.15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from 4 vests recovered.
F.18, One of two "Gibson Girl" radios recovered, battered.
F.23; Both A/C first aid kits recovered with contents of corner pocket missing. One kit was split and some contents missing. Both were safety wired

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke-O_2 combination mask. ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: MD-1 regulator ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (3 available in flight station) ( )
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? [X] YES [ ] NO
6. IF NO, WHY NOT:
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK:
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS (Liquid) 1800 P.S.I. (Gas); TIME OF ACCIDENT ____ LITERS (Liquid) unknown P.S.I. (Gas) ( )
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCIDT. unknown [ ] YES ( ) [ ] NO
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY. [X] YES [ ] NO
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO [X] YES - ( ) Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 masks in P3A.

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect MS-22018-1FC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WHEN ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3110-8C)

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SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): WHITE, Theodore C.

MODEL A/C: P3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE:

20. INTEGRATED? [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON:

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET:

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS:

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM:

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: NC-3 (22 available) ( )

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 15 Jan 1963 ( )

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN:

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type): [X] NONE ( )

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY? [ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION: [ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC? Unknown ( )

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING:

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING:

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED? ( )

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (List in sequence): Moonless night; no surface wind. Several overcast cloud layers.

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Water; Sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY:

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS: [ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type): [X] NONE ( )

53. WAS PARARAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills.

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARARAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON:

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS. [ ] NO [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from recovered life vests. 16 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses recovered. ( )

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD. [ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

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MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5

OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (REV. 5-58) — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION H - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): WHITE, Theodore C.

MODEL A/C: P3A

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
		1. EJECTION - Attempted	
		2. - Accomplished	
		3. - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		4. - Prior to	
		5. - During	
		6. - Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
		8. BAILOUT - Attempted	
	X	- Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet) — ABOVE SEA LEVEL ____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY ____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown ( )

11. AIRSPEED: 160 knots

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED: [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C FLOATED: Unknown ( )

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT: 0

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown ( )

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS. Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:

- X 30. Communicated position prior to mishap
- X 31. Witnesses at scene
- X 32. Electronic signal devices
- X 33. Visual signal devices
- X 34. Auditory signal devices
- 35. OTHER:

TRAVEL:

- 36. LAND
- X 37. WATER

SHELTER:

- X 38. Life raft
- X 39. Parachute
- 40. A/C structure
- 41. Natural shelter
- 42. Man-made shelter
- 43. OTHER:

WATER SOURCE:

- X 44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still
- 45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.
- 46. Processed beverages
- 47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.
- 48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.
- 49. OTHER:

MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:

- 50. Items used as shelter
- X 51. Items used as clothing
- 52. Fire
- 53. OTHER:

ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:

- 54. Exposure to natural forces
- 55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
- 56. Unfriendly native population
- 57. OTHER:

MORALE:

- 58. Isolation
- 59. Psychological shock
- 60. Lack of motivation to survive
- 61. Boredom
- 62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
- 63. OTHER:

FOOD SOURCE:

- 64. Prepared survival rations
- 65. Animals/plants
- 66. OTHER:

SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:

- 67. Dilbert Dunker
  Survival, swimming

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ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
WHITE, Theodore C.	P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0152R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of PDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 5 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle) Model A/C

WHITE, Theodore Co. P3A

H.33 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two NC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as CRI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

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OPNAV FORM 3750-GE (Rev. 5-58)

SECTION I - PATHOLOGICAL FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for POST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): WHITE, Theodore C.

MODEL A/C: P3A

2. AGE: 27
3. HEIGHT: 69 INCHES
4. WEIGHT: 153
5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown
6. INJURY CODE: L
7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (give time)
8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL
10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)
11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES
12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT
13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						

DIS-LOCATION

	JAW	SHOULDER	ELBOW	WRIST	HAND	HIP	KNEE	ANKLE	FOOT

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)
16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. ☐ DROWNED
19. ☐ ASPHYXIATED
20. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE
21. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

22. ☐ BURNS ☐ FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD

AREA	HEAD (ventral	Dorsal)	TRUNK (ventral	Dorsal)	ARMS	LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: ☐ NONE ☐ COMPLETE
ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: ☐ YES ☐ NO
25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1294)
26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS
27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON: ☐ YES ☐ NO
28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS
29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1294) NO. 8601
30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH: NO.
31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ YES ☒ NO
32. PROTOCOL: ☐ ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED
33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: ☐ PATHOLOGIST ☐ FLIGHT SURGEON
IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", AFSP-1957.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1			TISSUE: (CNS)		
2			• MUSCLE		
3			• VISCERA		
URINE			OTHER:		
G-I CONTENTS					

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—498170

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OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (Rev. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): SHEPHARD, Bernard W.

MODEL A/C: P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight
		X	2. "G" forces
			3. Environmental stress - External
			4. - Internal
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression
			6. Diet
		X	7. Fatigue
			8. Hypoxia
			9. Related illness
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions
			11. Hyperventilation
			12. Drugs
			13. Physical state
			14. OTHER:
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:
			15. Personal equipment
			16. Displays and/or controls
			17. Work arrangement
			18. Working environment
			19. Habit interference
			20. OTHER:
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)
			21. Pregnancy
			22. Illness or death
			23. Arguments
			24. Elated/Depressed state
			25. Personal habits - Drinking
			26. - Sex
			27. - Gambling
			28. - Debts

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			29. Expeditings/Delays
		X	30. Weather
			31. Mechanical Problems
		X	32. Social and working relationships
			33. Personal comfort
			34. Regulations
			35. Facilities
			36. Navigation
		X	37. Duty assignment
			38. Personality traits
			NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			39. Faulty attention
			40. Poor judgement
			41. Forgetfulness
			42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			TRAINING FACTORS:
			43. Physiological training
			44. Emergency Procedures training
			45. Survival and rescue training
			46. Refresher training
			47. Transition training
			48. OTHER:

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (Fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	44.9	7. Total time in model Pilot time	9.9 (2)
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	0
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1		
4. Time at controls this flight	0	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	None
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	8.0		
6. Total flight time	598.5		

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. D and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

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LTJG Bernard W. SHEPHARD

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000' to 2,000', complete overcast condition, mild surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

32. A mild disagreement concerning a position plot on a previous flight was observed between this subject and plane commander, LT Robert Eberhart; however, no ill feelings were noted.

7, 37. On the day of the flight, which commenced with take-off at 2240 and was planned for 8 hours, this subject took recognition exam at 0830, PPC exam at 1000, communications exam at 1300 and was briefed at 2030. The entire flight was being conducted under the very scrutinous observation of an Operations Readiness Inspector, LCDR John Hart. This subject's last previous flight was on 26 Jan, 1830, for 7+ hours; and before this 24 Jan, 1030, for 8+ hours; 23 Jan, 0200, for 7 hours. Subject was seen dining at BOQ at 1830, and could have received no more than 6 hours of once interrupted rest. It is believed he obtained adequate rest on night prior to flight, unless time was devoted to final preparations for tests and inspection flight.

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SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): SHEPHARD, Bernard W.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness		X					
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445-LF50	UNKNOWN (1)			
3. Inertia reel		X					
4. G-Suit		~~X~~					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		~~X~~					
6. Exposure suit	X	(2)	A1-1		~~X~~		~~X~~
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N: D8415-543-xxxx	X		UNKNOWN (6)	
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes	X		S/N: D8430-656-xxxx	X		UNKNOWN (6)	
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx		X		
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		UNKNOWN (6)	~~X~~
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		~~X~~
14. OTHER: ~~Contents of raft~~	~~X~~		~~Packed in accordance with B-AC-S-L-B35-59~~		~~X~~		~~X~~
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK-13- MOD-0	UNKNOWN (9)			
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK-13- MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N: R6850-270-9985-0500	UNKNOWN			
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT-3A		X		X
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N:9CF6230-255-0166	UNKNOWN			
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803	UNKNOWN			
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N:R7340-098-4327-5233	UNKNOWN			
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650	UNKNOWN			
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		~~X~~
25. - Food	X		(12)S/N:M8970-132-6359		X		~~X~~
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

F6.One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it,corresponding to those in its cover.A second was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve, and right leg was separated.
F.11; Personnel other than flight deck personnel - pilot, co-pilot,F/E - seldom wear gloves due to nature of duties.
F.12;One VP-8 life vest recovered with its two eyelets pulled from rubber flap and clamped in place by snaps,indicating it had been worn. Waist strap stitching also pulled. Two CO_2 cartridges of another and one of a third were fired.
F.13,14, Both recovered.
F.15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from vests recovered.
F.18; One of the "Gibson Girl" radios recovered battered.
F.23; Both A/C first aid kits recovered with contents of corner pocket missing.One kit was split and some contents missing.Both were safety wired.

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke-O_2 - combination mask. ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: 2858 Walk-around ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (7 available in fore starboard observation station)
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? ☐ YES ☒ NO
6. IF NO, WHY NOT: No squadron policy regarding this check. ( )
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK: - -
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS (Liquid) ____ P.S.I. (Gas) 1800; TIME OF ACCIDENT ____ LITERS (Liquid) ____ P.S.I. (Gas) Unknown ( )
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCIDT. ☐ YES ☐ NO Unknown ( )
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING ☐ 100% ☐ NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY: ☐ YES ☒ NO 4 masks, O_2 bottles, regulators short. This is standard supply. ( )
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON: ☐ NO ☒ YES Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A. ( )

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect MS-22018-IFC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE: ☐ YES ☐ NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE: ☐ YES ☐ NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? ☐ YES ☐ NO Unknown ( )

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-8C)

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SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): SHEPHARD, Bernard W.

MODEL A/C: P3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE:

20. INTEGRATED? [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON:

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown (Ø)

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET:

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS:

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM:

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: NC-3 (22 available) ( )

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 15 Jan 1953 ( )

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN:

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type): [X] NONE ( )

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY? [ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION [ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC? Unknown ( )

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING:

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING:

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (List in sequence): Moonless night; no surface wind. Several overcast cloud layers.

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Water; Sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY:

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS [ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type): [X] NONE ( )

53. WAS PARARAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills.

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARARAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON:

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS. [ ] NO (Ø) [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from recovered life vests. 18 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses recovered.

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD. [ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

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MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5

OPNAV FORM 3750-80 (REV. 5-58)

SECTION II - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, First, Middle): SHEPHARD, Bernard W.

MODEL A/C: F3A

S	E		REMARKS
		S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	
		1. EJECTION : Attempted	
		2. : Accomplished	
		3. : Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		4. : Prior to	
		5. : During	
		6. : Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
Unknown		8. BAILOUT : Attempted	
( )	X	: Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (Feet)

ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown ( )

11. SPEED: 160 knots ( )

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED: [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN ( )

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C MOVING: unknown ( )

22. TIME IN WATER

23. TIME IN BOAT: 0 ( )

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown

25. IS THIS THE ALLOWANCE EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE: [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., item 30, item 31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:

- X 30. Communicated position prior to mishap
- X 31. Witnesses at scene
- X 32. Electronic signal devices
- X 33. Visual signal devices
- X 34. Auditory signal devices
- 35. OTHER:

TRAVEL:

- 36. LAND
- X 37. WATER

SHELTER:

- X 38. Life raft
- X 39. Parachute
- 40. A/C structure
- 41. Natural shelter
- 42. Man made shelter
- 43. OTHER:

WATER SOURCE:

- X 44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still
- 45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.
- 46. Processed beverages
- 47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.
- 48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.
- 49. OTHER:

MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:

- 50. Items used as shelter
- X 51. Items used as clothing
- 52. Fire
- 53. OTHER:

ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:

- 54. Exposure to natural forces
- 55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
- 56. Unfriendly native population
- 57. OTHER:

MORALE:

- 58. Isolation
- 59. Psychological shock
- 60. Lack of motivation to survive
- 61. Boredom
- 62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
- 63. OTHER:

FOOD SOURCE:

- 64. Prepared survival rations
- 65. Animals/plants
- 66. OTHER:

SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:

67. Survival,swimming & Dilbert Dunker Para-raft,Parachute Drag & release

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
SHEPHARD, Bernard W.	P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0152R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of PDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 5 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO_2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
SHEPHARD, Bernard W.	P3A

H.33 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two NC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as CRI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

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OPNAV FORM 6750-6E (Rev. 5-58)

SECTION I - PATHOLOGIC... FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for ...T MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

MODEL A/C: P3A

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): SHEPHARD, Bernard W.

2. AGE: 24 | 3. HEIGHT: 69 INCHES | 4. WEIGHT: 150 | 5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown | 6. INJURY CODE: L

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						
DIS-LOCATION		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST / HAND		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE / FOOT	

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. ☐ DROWNED

19. ☐ ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

22. ☐ BURNS ☐ FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD
AREA	HEAD (ventral)	(Dorsal)		TRUNK (ventral)	(Dorsal)		ARMS		LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: ☐ NONE ☐ COMPLETE

ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: ☐ YES ☐ NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1294)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS

27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON: ☐ YES ☐ NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1294) NO.

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ YES ☒ NO

32. PROTOCOL: ☐ ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: ☐ PATHOLOGIST ☐ FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", NAVP. 1887.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1		
2		
3		
URINE		
G.I. CONTENTS		

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
TISSUE: CHEST		
• MUSCLE		
• VISCERA		
OTHER:		

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

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SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): BELL, Frederick L.

MODEL A/C: P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS	E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:				SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight				29. Expeditings/Delays
		X	2. "G" forces			X	30. Weather
			3. Environmental stress - External				31. Mechanical Problems
			4. - Internal				32. Social and working relationships
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression				33. Personal comfort
			6. Diet				34. Regulations
		X	7. Fatigue				35. Facilities
			8. Hypoxia				36. Navigation
			9. Related illness			X	37. Duty assignment
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions				38. Personality traits
			11. Hyperventilation				NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			12. Drugs				39. Faulty attention
			13. Physical state				40. Poor judgement
			14. OTHER:				41. Forgetfulness
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:				42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			15. Personal equipment				
			16. Displays and/or controls				
			17. Work arrangement				
			18. Working environment				
			19. Habit interference				TRAINING FACTORS:
			20. OTHER:				43. Physiological training
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)				44. Emergency Procedures training
		X	21. Pregnancy				45. Survival and rescue training
			22. Illness or death				46. Refresher training
			23. Arguments				47. Transition training
			24. Elated/Depressed state				48. OTHER:
			25. Personal habits - Drinking				
			26. - Sex				
			27. - Gambling				
			28. - Debts				

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (Fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	25.5	7. Total time in model	Flight time 230.9
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1		0
4. Time at controls this flight	0	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	8.0		None
6. Total flight time	1349.2		

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. B and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

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LTJG Frederick L. [illegible]

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

21. Wife was believed about 2 months pregnant, but no problems were evident. A healthy 6 month old baby was similarly no source of apparent stress.

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000 to 2,000', complete overcast condition, mild surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

7, 37. On the day of the flight, which commenced with take-off at 2240 and was planned for 8 hours, this subject took recognition exam at 0830, communications exam at 1300 and was briefed at 2030. The entire flight was being conducted under the very scrutinous observation of an Operations Readiness Inspector, LCDR John Hart. This subject's last previous flight was on 26 Jan, 1830, for 7+ hours; and before this 24 Jan, 1030, for 8+ hours; 23 Jan, 0200 for 7 hours. Subject could have obtained at most 6 hours of rest in 12 hours prior to flight.

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SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): BELL, Frederick L.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness		X					
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445	UNKNOWN			
3. Inertia reel		X					
4. G-Suit		X					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		X					
6. Exposure suit	X		A1-1		X		X
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N: D8415-543-xxxx	X		UNK	
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes	X		S/N:D8430-656-xxxx	X		UNK	
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx		X		
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		UNK	
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		X
14. OTHER: Contents of rafts	X		Packed in accordance with U-A-C-S-E-B 85-59		X		X
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N:R6850-270-9986-9505	UNKNOWN			
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT-3A		X		X
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N:9CF6230-255-0166	UNKNOWN			
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803	UNKNOWN			
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N:R7340-098-4327-2831	UNKNOWN			
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6550	UNKNOWN			
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		X
25. - Food	X		(12)S/N:M8970-132-6359		X		X
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT

F.6;One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it, corresponding to those in its cover. A second was missing right half of torso and right sleeve, and right leg was separated.
F.11; Personnel other than flight deck personnel - pilot, co-pilot, F/E - seldom wear gloves due to nature of duties.
F.12; One VP-8 life vest recovered with its two eyelets pulled from rubber flap and clamped in place by snaps,indicating it had been worn. Waist strap stitching also pulled. Two CO_2 cartridges of another and one of a third were fired.
F.13,14; Both recovered.
F.15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from vests recovered.
F.18; One of the "Gibson Girl" radios recovered battered.
F.23; Both A/C first aid kits recovered with contents of corner pocket missing.One kit was split and some contents missing.Both were safety wired.

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke -O_2 combination mask ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: 2858 Walk-around ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (7 available in fore starboard observation station)
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? [ ] YES [X] NO ( )
6. IF NO, WHY NOT: No Squadron policy regarding this check. ( )
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK: - -
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS (Liquid) 1800 P.S.I. (Gas); TIME OF ACCIDENT Unknown LITERS (Liquid) ( ) P.S.I. (Gas)
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? Unknown [ ] YES [ ] NO
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY. [ ] YES [X] NO 4 masks,O_2 bottles, regulators short. This is standard supply. ( )
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO [X] YES Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A. ( )

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect MS-22018-1FC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-8C)

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SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): BELL, Frederick L.

MODEL A/C: P3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE:

20. INTEGRATED? [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON:

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET:

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS:

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM:

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: NC-3 (22 available) ( )

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 15 Jan 1963 ( )

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN:

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type): [X] NONE ( )

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY? [ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION: [ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC? Unknown ( )

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING:

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING:

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (List in sequence): Moonless night; no surface wind. Several overcast cloud layers. ( )

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Water; Sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY: [ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY:

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS: [ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type): [X] NONE ( )

53. WAS PARARAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills. ( )

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARARAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON:

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS: [ ] NO [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from recovered life vests. 16 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses recovered.

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD: [ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

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MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5

OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (REV. 5-58) — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION H - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (*Last, first, middle*): BELL, Frederick L.

MODEL A/C: P3A

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
		1. EJECTION - Attempted	
		2. - Accomplished	
		3. - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		4. - Prior to	
		5. - During	
		6. - Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
		8. BAILOUT - Attempted	
	X	- Accomplished	

Unknown ( )

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (*feet*): ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown ( )

11. AIRSPEED: 160 knots ( )

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED? [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [X] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1 (1)

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C FLOATED: unknown (X)

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT: 0

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:		MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:	
X	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
X	31. Witnesses at scene	X	51. Items used as clothing
X	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
X	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
X	34. Auditory signal devices	ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:	
X	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
TRAVEL:			55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
X	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
SHELTER:		MORALE:	
X	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
X	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
WATER SOURCE:		FOOD SOURCE:	
X	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.	SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:	
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67. Dilbert dunker
	49. OTHER:		Survival, swimming

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ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
BELL, Frederick L.	P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0152R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of PDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 5 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
BELL, Frederick L.	P3A

H.33 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two NC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as ORI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

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OPNAV FORM 3750-5E (Rev. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION I - PATHOLOGIC... FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for ...T MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): BELL, Frederick L.

MODEL A/C: P3A

2. AGE: 24

3. HEIGHT: 68 INCHES

4. WEIGHT: 138

5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown

6. INJURY CODE: L

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS
- [ ] SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE
- [ ] OTHER (give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION
- [ ] MINOR
- [ ] SERIOUS
- [ ] CRITICAL
- [ ] FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES
- [ ] RIGHT
- [ ] LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES
- [ ] RIGHT
- [ ] LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						

DIS-LOCATION

	JAW	SHOULDER	ELBOW	WRIST	HIP	KNEE	ANKLE
				HAND			FOOT

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. [ ] DROWNED

19. [ ] ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK
- [ ] MILD
- [ ] MODERATE
- [ ] SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE
- [ ] MILD
- [ ] MODERATE
- [ ] SEVERE

22. [ ] BURNS [ ] FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD

AREA	HEAD (ventral)	Dorsal)	TRUNK (ventral	Dorsal)	ARMS	LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION:
- [ ] NONE
- [ ] COMPLETE

ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE?
- [ ] YES
- [ ] NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS
- [ ] YES
- [ ] NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1294)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS

27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON
- [ ] YES
- [ ] NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1294) NO.

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED?
- [ ] YES
- [X] NO

32. PROTOCOL
- [ ] ATTACHED
- [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY
- [ ] PATHOLOGIST
- [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", AFIP, 1957.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1			TISSUE: (CNS)		
2			• MUSCLE		
3			• VISCERA		
URINE			OTHER:		
G-I CONTENTS					

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—498199

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 2

OPNAV FORM 3750-6A (Rev. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): O'CONNER, John E.

MODEL A/C: P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS	E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:				SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight				29. Expeditings/Delays
	~~X~~		2. "G" forces			X	30. Weather
			3. Environmental stress - External				31. Mechanical Problems
			4. - Internal				32. Social and working relationships
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression				33. Personal comfort
			6. Diet				34. Regulations
			7. Fatigue				35. Facilities
			8. Hypoxia				36. Navigation
			9. Related illness				37. Duty assignment
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions				38. Personality traits
			11. Hyperventilation				NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			12. Drugs				39. Faulty attention
			13. Physical state				40. Poor judgement
			14. OTHER:				41. Forgetfulness
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:				42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			15. Personal equipment				
			16. Displays and/or controls				
			17. Work arrangement				
			18. Working environment				
			19. Habit interference				TRAINING FACTORS:
			20. OTHER:				43. Physiological training
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)				44. Emergency Procedures training
		X	21. Pregnancy				45. Survival and rescue training
			22. Illness or death				46. Refresher training
			23. Arguments				47. Transition training
			24. Elated/Depressed state				48. OTHER:
			25. Personal habits - Drinking				
			26. - Sex				
			27. - Gambling				
			28. - Debts				

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (Fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	68.2	7. Total time in model Flight time	305.7
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1		
4. Time at controls this flight	0	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	10.5		
6. Total flight time	633.7	0	

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. D and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—498194

LT John E. O'CONNOR

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000' to 2,000', complete overcast condition, mild surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

21. Wife was 6 months pregnant with no obstetrical complications evident.

SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): O'CONNER, John F.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness		X					
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445-LF50		UNKNOWN (2)		
3. Inertia reel (Lockheed)		X					
4. G-Suit		X					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		X					
6. Exposure ~~suit~~	X	(2)	(22) A1-1		X		X
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N:D8415-543-xxxx	X	UNKNOWN (6)		
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes, S Flying safety	X		S/N:D8415-656-xxxx	X	UNKNOWN (6)		
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx		X		
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		X (6)	
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		X
14. OTHER: ~~Contents of raft~~	~~X~~		~~Packed in accordance with~~				
			~~B-A-D G-E-835-50~~		X		X
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK-13 MOD-0		UNKNOWN		
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK13-MOD-0		UNKNOWN		
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N:R6850-270-9886-9500		X		
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT-3A		X	X	
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N:9CF6230-255-0166	UNKNOWN			
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803	UNKNOWN			
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N:R7340-098-4327-5331	UNKNOWN			
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650	UNKN.		X	
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		X
25. - Food	X		(12)S/N:M8970-132-6339		X		X
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT

F.6;One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashed in it,corresponding to those in its cover. A second was missing right torso and right sleeve and right leg was separated.
F.11;Personnel other than flight deck group - Pilot, co-pilot, F/E - seldom wear gloves, due to nature of duties.
F.12;Subject's life vest recovered with its flashlight missing. CO_2 cartridges still safety wired and not fired.
F.13,14; Both recovered.
F.15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from 4 vests recovered.
F.18; One of two "Gibson Girl" radios recovered battered.
F.23; Both A/C first aid kits recovered with contents of corner pocket missing. One kit was split and some contents missing. Both were safety wired.

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke-O_2 combination mask ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: 2858 Walk-around ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (7 available in fore starboard observation station) ( )
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? [ ] YES [X] NO ( )
6. IF NO, WHY NOT: No Squadron policy regarding this check. ( )
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK:
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT: ____ LITERS (Liquid) 1800 P.S.I. (Gas); TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown ( ) ____ LITERS (Liquid) ____ P.S.I. (Gas) Unknown
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCDT. [ ] YES [ ] NO
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY. [ ] YES [X] NO ( ) 4 masks and O_2 bottles,regulators shor.This is standard supply.
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO [X] YES Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A ( )

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard Snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quiet disconnect MS-22018-IFC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4
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OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

SECTION B - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): O'CONNER, John E.

MODEL A/C: F3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

33. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE

34. INTEGRATED: [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

35. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON

36. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [ ] YES

37. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] SEAMAN [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

38. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [ ] LOOSE [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] BLANK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown

HELMET

39. TYPE HELMET

40. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS

41. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM

42. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

43. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] SEAMAN [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

44. TYPE CHUTE: NC-3 ( ) (22 available)

45. LAST PACKING DATE: 15 Jan 1963 ( )

46. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN

47. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type): [X] NONE ( )

48. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY: [ ] NO

49. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION: [ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC Unknown ( )

50. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

51. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

52. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

53. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

54. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING

55. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING

56. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

57. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

58. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (Wind, etc.): Moonless night; no surface wind. Several overcast cloud layers. ( )

59. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Water; Sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

60. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

61. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY: [ ] YES [ ] NO

62. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

63. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY

64. WAS CHUTE HARNESS: [ ] TIGHT [ ] OKAY [ ] LOOSE

65. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING ATTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY: [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

66. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type): [X] None ( )

67. WAS PARACHUTE LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY: [ ] NO [ ] YES

68. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills.

69. IF STUDENT WAS GIVEN TO RELEASE PARACHUTE DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISHED? [ ] YES [ ] NO

70. IF NO, GIVE REASON

71. IF A SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] YES [ ] NO

72. WAS A SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

OTHER

73. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED

74. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS: [ ] NO [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from recovered life vests. 16 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses recovered.

75. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD: [ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5

OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (REV. 5-58) — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION H - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): O'CONNER, John E.

MODEL A/C: P3A

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
		1. EJECTION - Attempted	
		2. - Accomplished	
		3. - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		4. - Prior to	
		5. - During	
		6. - Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
Unknown		8. BAILOUT - Attempted	
	X	- Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet): ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown ( )

11. AIRSPEED: 160 knots ( )

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED: [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C FLOATED: Unknown ( )

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT: 0

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

	COMMUNICATIONS:		MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:
X	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
X	31. Witnesses at scene	X	51. Items used as clothing
X	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
X	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
X	34. Auditory signal devices		ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:
	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
	TRAVEL:		55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
X	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
	SHELTER:		MORALE:
X	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
X	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
	WATER SOURCE:		FOOD SOURCE:
X	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.		SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67 Dilbert Dunker, Swimming, Underwater O_2, Parachute release
	49. OTHER:		

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 585528

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
O'CONNER, John E.	P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0152R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of PDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 5 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
O'CONNER, John E.	P3A

H.38 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two NC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as ORI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

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OPNAV FORM 3750-8E (Rev. 5-58)

SECTION I - PATHOLOGIC[illegible] FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for [illegible]ST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): O'CONNER, John E.

MODEL A/C: P3A

2. AGE: 26
3. HEIGHT: 72 INCHES
4. WEIGHT: 178
5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown
6. INJURY CODE: L

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						
DIS-LOCATION		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST / HAND		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE / FOOT	

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. ☐ DROWNED

19. ☐ ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

22. ☐ BURNS ☐ FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD
AREA	HEAD (ventral)	Dorsal)		TRUNK (ventral)	Dorsal)		ARMS		LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: ☐ NONE ☐ COMPLETE

ANC TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: ☐ YES ☐ NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1194)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS

27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON: ☐ YES ☐ NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1194) NO.

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ YES ☒ NO

32. PROTOCOL: ☐ ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: ☐ PATHOLOGIST ☐ FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", AFIP, 1957.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1			TISSUE: (DNS)		
2			MUSCLE		
3			VISCERA		
URINE			OTHER:		
G-I CONTENTS					

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—498178

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 2

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SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): HART, John R.

MODEL A/C: P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight
		X	2. "G" forces
			3. Environmental stress - External
			4. - Internal
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression
			6. Diet
			7. Fatigue
			8. Hypoxia
			9. Related illness
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions
			11. Hyperventilation
			12. Drugs
			13. Physical state
			14. OTHER:
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:
			15. Personal equipment
			16. Displays and/or controls
			17. Work arrangement
		X	18. Working environment
			19. Habit Interference
			20. OTHER:
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)
			21. Pregnancy
			22. Illness or death
			23. Arguments
			24. Elated/Depressed state
			25. Personal habits - Drinking
			26. - Sex
			27. - Gambling
			28. - Debts

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			29. Expeditings/Delays
		X	30. Weather
			31. Mechanical Problems
			32. Social and working relationships
			33. Personal comfort
			34. Regulations
			35. Facilities
			36. Navigation
		X	37. Duty assignment
		X	38. Personality traits
			NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			39. Faulty attention
			40. Poor judgement
			41. Forgetfulness
			42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			TRAINING FACTORS:
			43. Physiological training Night vision training
			44. Emergency Procedures training ~~Low pressure breathing~~
			45. Survival and rescue training Survival swimming
			46. Refresher training
			47. Transition training
			48. OTHER:

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	0
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1
4. Time at controls this flight	0
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	
6. Total flight time	2871 hrs

7. Total time in model Crewmember 3-1/2

8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason

2 days, 1-3-63/1-5-63 URI

9. Number of and dates of previous accidents

None

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. B and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

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LCDR John R. HART

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

18. The assignment of the subject required his repeated travel throughout the fuselage and therefore he had no fixed position in the aircraft at any time.

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000' to 2,000', complete overcast condition, mild surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

37. Subject apparently remained in the squadron area after 0830 until briefing at 2030, although no specific statements verify this

(b) (5)

[redacted]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 3

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SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): HART, John R.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness		X					
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445-LF50	UNKNOWN			
3. Inertia reel		X					
4. G-Suit		X					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		X					
6. Exposure suit	X		(22) A1-1		X		*
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N:D8415-543-xxxx	X		*	(6)
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes, Flying safety	X		S/N:D8430-656-xxxx	X			(6)
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx	UNKNOWN			
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		*	(6)
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		*
14. OTHER: ~~Contents of raft~~	~~X~~		~~Packed in accordance with~~ ~~H-A-C-8aE-885-59~~		~~X~~		~~X~~
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK-13- MOD-0		X		
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK-13 MOD-0		X		
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N:R6850-270-9986-8500		X		*
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT - 3A		X		
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N:9CF6230-255-0166		X		
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803	UNKNOWN			
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N:R7340-098-4327-5231	UNK.		X	
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650	UNK.		X	
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		
25. - Food	X		(12)S/N:M8970-132-5359		X		
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT

F.6;One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it,corresponding to those in its cover.A second was missing right torso and right sleeve and right leg was separated.
F.7;Portion of flight suit found about subject's ankles. Suit was markedly frayed and right torso and right sleeve were missing.
F.11;No gloves found on subject
F.12;No life vest on body,although all surely donned them before take-off.
F.13;Both recovered.
F.15,16,19;Some flare & flashlights were noted torn from vests recovered.
F.22;Knife missing from torn case sewn to flight suit.
F.18;One of two "Gibson Girl" radios found battered.
F.23;Both A/C first aid kits found with contents of corner pocket missing and corner open. One kit was split and some contents missing.Both were safety wired.

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke-O_2 combination mask ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: 2858-Walk-around ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (7 available at starboard fore observer station) ( )
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? [ ] YES [X] NO
6. IF NO, WHY NOT: No Squadron policy regarding this check. ( )
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK:
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS (Liquid) 1800 P.S.I. (Gas); TIME OF ACCIDENT Unknown LITERS (Liquid) ____ P.S.I. (Gas) ( )
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? Unknown [ ] YES [ ] NO
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY. [ ] YES [X] NO 4 masks, O_2 bottles, and regulators short. This is standard supply. ( )
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO [X] YES Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A. ( )

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect. MS 22018-1FC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-8C)

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SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): HART, John R.

MODEL A/C: P3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE:

20. INTEGRATED? [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON:

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown (Ø)

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET:

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS:

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM:

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE (22) ( ): NC-3 (available)

31. LAST PACKING DATE ( ): 15 Jan 1963

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN: None ( )

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type): [X] NONE ( )

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY? [ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION: [ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC?

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING:

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING:

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (List in sequence): Moonless night, no surface ( )

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE ( ): Water sea state: 0 to 1

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY:

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS: [ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type): [X] NONE ( )

53. WAS PARARAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE Unknown ( )

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARARAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON:

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS. [ ] NO [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from life vests, 16 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of two "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses.

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD. [ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

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MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5 [illegible]
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SECTION H: EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, First, Middle): HART, John R.

MODEL A/C: F3A

YES	NO		REMARKS
X	X	1. SUSPECTED, X ESTABLISHED	
		2. EJECTION : Attempted	
		3. : Accomplished	
		4. : Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		5. : Prior to	
		6. : During	
		7. : Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
	X	8. BAILOUT : Attempted	
	X	: Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet): SEATS SEA LEVEL ____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY ____

10. ATTITUDE OR MOVEMENT OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown

11. SPEED: 160 knots

12. POSITION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED: [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. GEARS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] NEUTRAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C FLOATED: Unknown

22. TIME IN WATER: - -

23. TIME IN KEPT: 0

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown

25. IS THIS THE SECONDARY EXIT IN AN STATE ROOM FOR EXIT: [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE REASON OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are applicable for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., item 31). etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:
- X 30. Communicated position prior to mishap
- X 31. Witnesses at scene
- X 32. Electronic signal devices
- X 33. Visual signal devices — dye
- X 34. Auditory signal devices
- 35. OTHER:

TRAVEL:
- 36. LAND
- X 37. WATER

SHELTER:
- X 38. Life raft
- X 39. Parachute
- 40. A/C structure
- 41. Natural shelter
- 42. Man-made shelter
- 43. OTHER:

WATER SOURCE:
- X 44. Dessalter kit; seawater or solar still
- 45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.
- 46. Processed beverages
- 47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.
- 48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.
- 49. OTHER:

MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:
- 50. Items used as shelter
- X 51. Items used as clothing
- 52. Fire
- 53. OTHER:

ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:
- 54. Exposure to natural forces
- 55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
- 56. Unfriendly native population
- 57. OTHER:

MORALE:
- 58. Isolation
- 59. Psychological shock
- 60. Lack of motivation to survive
- 61. Boredom
- 62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
- 63. OTHER:

FOOD SOURCE:
- 64. Prepared survival rations
- 65. Animals/plants
- 66. OTHER:

SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:
- 67. Survival, swimming 9-21-61
- Ejection seat indoctrination 5-14-59.

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ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
HART, John R.	P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0152R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of PDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 5 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO_2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
HART, John R.	P3A

H.33 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two MC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as ORI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

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OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION I - PATHOLOGICAL FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for POST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): HART, John R.

MODEL A/C: P3A

2. AGE: 33 | 3. HEIGHT: 72 INCHES | 4. WEIGHT: 220 | 5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT | 6. INJURY CODE: A

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: [ ] SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE [ ] OTHER (give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: [ ] MINOR [ ] SERIOUS [ ] CRITICAL [X] FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.s.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES: Fracture mandible bilateral

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: [X] RIGHT Orbital contusion [ ] LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: [ ] RIGHT [ ] LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE			X	X																		
COMPOUND	X																					
COMMINUTED		X							X													
DIS-LOCATION		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE	
															HAND						FOOT	

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION: Posterior & superior scalp avulsed, 50%; Obesity, 11 lbs over maximum weight

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.s.)	VENTRAL	X					X	X		
	DORSAL			X						X
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL	X				X				
	DORSAL								X	
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL		X			X				
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER	X						X		
	LOWER									

18. [ ] DROWNED

19. [X] ASPHYXIATION: Instant death respiratory arrest.

20. SHOCK: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

22. [ ] BURNS [ ] NONE FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD

AREA	HEAD (ventral	Dorsal)	TRUNK (ventral	Dorsal)	ARMS	LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: [ ] NONE [ ] COMPLETE

ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? [ ] YES [ ] NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: [ ] YES [ ] NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1294)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS

27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1294): Multiple Inj. Extreme. NO. #8615

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH: NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? [X] YES [ ] NO

32. PROTOCOL: [X] ATTACHED [XX] WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: [X] PATHOLOGIST [X] FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", NFIP-1957.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1			TISSUE: (CNS)		
2			• MUSCLE		
3			• VISCERA		
URINE			OTHER:		
G-I CONTENTS					

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—498195

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

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SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): GALINDO, Jesse

MODEL A/C: P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight
			2. "G" forces
		X	3. Environmental stress - External
			4. - Internal
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression
			6. Diet
			7. Fatigue
		X	8. Hypoxia
			9. Related illness
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions
			11. Hyperventilation
			12. Drugs
			13. Physical state
			14. OTHER:
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:
			15. Personal equipment
			16. Displays and/or controls
			17. Work arrangement
			18. Working environment
			19. Habit interference
			20. OTHER:
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)
			21. Pregnancy
			22. Illness or death
			23. Arguments
			24. Elated/Depressed state
			25. Personal habits - Drinking
			26. - Sex
			27. - Gambling
			28. - Debts

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			29. Expeditings/Delays
		X	30. Weather
			31. Mechanical Problems
			32. Social and working relationships
			33. Personal comfort
			34. Regulations
			35. Facilities
			36. Navigation
			37. Duty assignment
			38. Personality traits
			NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			39. Faulty attention
			40. Poor judgement
			41. Forgetfulness
			42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			TRAINING FACTORS:
		X	43. Physiological training
			44. Emergency Procedures training
			45. Survival and rescue training
			46. Refresher training
			47. Transition training
			48. OTHER:

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	38.7
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1
4. Time at controls this flight	0
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	6.5
6. Total flight time Since 1/62	536.3
7. Total time in model Air crewmember	296.9 hrs
8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	0
9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. B and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

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Jesse GALINDO, ATR3

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

7. Although all aircrewman are given day free of duty prior to night flight, subject's rest was interrupted by 1300 exam in communications.

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000' to 2,000', complete overcast condition, mild surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

43. Subject was lacking night vision training.

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SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): GALINDO, Jesse

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness		X					
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445-LF50	UNKNOWN (1)			
3. Inertia reel		X					
4. G-Suit		~~X~~					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		~~X~~					
6. Exposure suit	X	(2)	A1-1		~~X~~		~~X~~
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N:D8415-543-xxxx	X		UNK (6)	
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes	X		S/N:D8430-656-xxxx	X		UNK (6)	
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx		X		
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		UNK (6)	
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		~~X~~
14. OTHER: ~~Contents of rafts~~ ~~with B-A-C-S-E-D95-59~~	X		~~Packed in accordance~~		X		~~X~~
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN (3)			
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N:P6850-270-9986-9500	UNKNOWN			
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT-3A		X		X
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N:9CF6230-255-0166	UNKNOWN			
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803	UNKNOWN			
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N:R7340-098-4887-9281	UNKNOWN			
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650	UNKNOWN			
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-286-2145		X		X
25. - Food	X		S/N:M8970-132-6359(12)		X		X
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT

F.6; One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it, corresponding to those in its cover. A second was missing right half of torso and right sleeve, and right leg was separated.
F.11; Personnel other than flight deck personnel - pilot, co-pilot, F/E - seldom wear gloves due to nature of duties.
F.12; One VP8 life vest recovered with its two eyelets pulled from rubber flap and clamped in place by snaps, indicating it had been worn. Waist strap stitching also pulled. Two CO_2 cartridges of another and one of a third were fired.
F.13,14; Both recovered.
F.15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from vests recovered.
F.18; One of the "Gibson Girl" radios recovered battered.
F.23; Both A/C first aid kits recovered with contents of corner pocket missing. One kit was split and some contents missing. Both were safety wired.

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke-O_2 combination mask ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: 2858 Walk-around ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (7 available in fore starboard observation station) ( )
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? YES [ ] NO [X] ( )
6. IF NO, WHY NOT: No Squadron policy regarding this check. ( )
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK: - -
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS (Liquid) 1802 P.S.I. (Gas); TIME OF ACCIDENT Unknown ____ LITERS (Liquid) ____ P.S.I. (Gas) ( )
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? Unknown [ ] YES ( ) [ ] NO
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? [ ] YES [X] NO IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY: 4 masks, O_2 bottles, regulators short. This is standard supply.
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO [X] YES ( ) Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A.

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect MS-22018-1FC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-8C)

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SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): GALINDO, Jesse

MODEL A/C: P3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE:

20. INTEGRATED? [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON:

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown (Ø)

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET:

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS:

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM:

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: NC-3 ( ) (22 available)

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 15 Jan 1963 ( )

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN:

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type): [X] NONE ( )

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY? [ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION [ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC? Unknown ( )

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING:

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING:

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (List in sequence): Moonless night;no surfacewind. Several overcast cloud layers. ( )

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Water; Sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY:

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS [ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type): [X] NONE ( )

53. WAS PARARAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills.

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARARAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON:

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR. [ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS. [ ] NO [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from recovered life vests. 16 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses recovered. ( )

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD. [ ] NO [ ] YES ( ) Unknown

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OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (Rev. 5-58)

SECTION H - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): GALINDO, Jesse

MODEL A/C: P3A

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED
		1. EJECTION - Attempted
		2. - Accomplished
		3. - Through canopy
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED
		4. - Prior to
		5. - During
		6. - Subsequent to
		7. Give type and model of seat used
Unknown		8. BAILOUT - Attempted
( )	X	- Accomplished

REMARKS

IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet): ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown ( )

11. AIRSPEED: 160 knots ( )

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED: [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C [illegible]: unknown ( ) °C

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT: 0

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown ( )

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE: [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:		**MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:**	
X	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
X	31. Witnesses at scene	X	51. Items used as clothing
X	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
X	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
X	34. Auditory signal devices	**ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:**	
X	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
TRAVEL:			55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
X	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
SHELTER:		**MORALE:**	
X	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
X	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
WATER SOURCE:		**FOOD SOURCE:**	
X	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.	**SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:**	
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67. Survival
	49. OTHER:		Swimming

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ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
GALINDO, Jesse	P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0152R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of PDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 5 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
GALINDO, Jesse	P3A

H.33 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable portion. Paddles, food packages, poulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two MC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as CRI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

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SECTION I - PATHOLOGICAL FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for POST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): GALINDO, Jesse

MODEL A/C: P3A

2. AGE: 22

3. HEIGHT: 69 INCHES

4. WEIGHT: 185

5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown

6. INJURY CODE: L

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: [ ] SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE [ ] OTHER (give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: [ ] MINOR [ ] SERIOUS [ ] CRITICAL [ ] FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: [ ] RIGHT [ ] LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: [ ] RIGHT [ ] LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						
DIS-LOCATION		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE	
															HAND						FOOT	

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. [ ] DROWNED

19. [ ] ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

22. [ ] BURNS [ ] FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD

AREA	HEAD (ventral)	Dorsal)	TRUNK (ventral)	Dorsal)	ARMS	LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: [ ] NONE [ ] COMPLETE

ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? [ ] YES [ ] NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: [ ] YES [ ] NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1234)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS

27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1234) NO. 3601

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? [ ] YES [X] NO

32. PROTOCOL: [ ] ATTACHED [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: [ ] PATHOLOGIST [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", AFIP-1957.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1			TISSUE: (CNS)		
2			• MUSCLE		
3			• VISCERA		
URINE			OTHER:		
G-I CONTENTS					

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—490196

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SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): AUTRY, Douglas Raymond

MODEL A/C: P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight
		X	2. "G" forces
			3. Environmental stress - External
			4. " - Internal
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression
			6. Diet
			7. Fatigue
			8. Hypoxia
			9. Related illness
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions
			11. Hyperventilation
			12. Drugs
			13. Physical state
			14. OTHER:
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:
			15. Personal equipment
			16. Displays and/or controls
			17. Work arrangement
			18. Working environment
			19. Habit interference
			20. OTHER:
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)
			21. Pregnancy
			22. Illness or death
			23. Arguments
			24. Elated/Depressed state
			25. Personal habits - Drinking
			26. - Sex
			27. - Gambling
			28. - Debts

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			29. Expeditings/Delays
		X	30. Weather
			31. Mechanical Problems
			32. Social and working relationships
			33. Personal comfort
			34. Regulations
			35. Facilities
			36. Navigation
			37. Duty assignment
			38. Personality traits
			NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			39. Faulty attention
			40. Poor judgement
			41. Forgetfulness
			42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			TRAINING FACTORS:
			43. Physiological training
			44. Emergency Procedures training
			45. Survival and rescue training
			46. Refresher training
			47. Transition training
			48. OTHER:

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	28.8	7. Total time in model Air crewmember	291.1
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1		
4. Time at controls this flight	0	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	6.5		
6. Total flight time Since 1/62	552.6		

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. D and Part VIII of the AIR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

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Douglas R. AUTRY, AO3

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000' to 2,000', complete overcast condition, mild surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 3

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SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): AUTRY, Douglas R.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness		X					
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445 CF58	UNKNOWN			
3. Inertia reel		X					
4. G-Suit		~~X~~					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		~~X~~					
6. Exposure suit	~~X~~	(2)	A1-1		~~X~~		~~X~~
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N:D8415-543-xxxx	X		UNK	
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes	X		S/N:D8430-656-xxxx	X		UNK	
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx		X		
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		UNK	
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		
14. OTHER: ~~Contents of rafts~~	~~X~~		~~Packed in accordance with B-A-C-G-E-805-59~~		~~X~~		
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N:R6850-270-9986-9500	UNKNOWN			
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT-3A		X		
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N:9CF6230-255-0166	UNKNOWN			
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803	UNKNOWN			
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N:R7340-098-4327-5251	UNKNOWN			
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650	UNKNOWN			
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		~~X~~
25. - Food	X		(12)S/N:M8970-132-6359		X		~~X~~
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT

F.6;One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it,corresponding to those in its cover. A second was missing right half of torso and right sleeve, and right leg was separated.
F.11; Personnel other than flight deck personnel - pilot, co-pilot, F/E - seldom wear gloves due to nature of duties.
F.12; One VP-8 life vest recovered with its two eyelets clamped in place by snaps,indicating it had been worn. Waist strap stitching also pulled. Two CO_2 cartridges of another and one of a third were fired.
F.13,14; Both recovered.
F.15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from vests recovered.
F.18; Oee of the "Gibson Girl" radios recovered battered.
F.23;Both A/C first aid kits recovered with contents of corner pocket missing.One kit was split and some contents missing.Both were safety wired.

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke-O_2 combination mask ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: 2858 Walk-around ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (7 available in fore starboard observation station) ( )
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? ☐ YES ☒ NO ( )
6. IF NO, WHY NOT: No Squadron policy regarding this check. ( )
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK: - -
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS (Liquid) 1800 P.S.I. (Gas) ( ); TIME OF ACCIDENT ____ LITERS (Liquid) ____ P.S.I. (Gas) Unknown ( )
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO Unknown
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING ☐ 100% ☐ NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY. ☐ YES ☒ NO ( ) masks, O_2 bottles, regulators short. This is standard supply.
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. ☐ NO ☒ YES Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A. ( )

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect MS-22018-1FC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. ☐ YES ☐ NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. ☐ YES ☐ NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? ☐ YES ☐ NO Unknown ( )

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-8C)

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OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): AUTRY, Douglas R.

MODEL A/C: P3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE

20. INTEGRATED? [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR
[ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY:
[ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT:
[ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON
[ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY:
[ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: NC-3 ( ) (22 available)

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 15 Jan 1963 ( )

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type)
[X] NONE ( )

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY?
[ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION Unknown
[ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC? ( )

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON
[ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS:
[ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT:
[ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (List in sequence)
Moonless night; no surface wind. Several overcast cloud layers. ( )

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE
Water; sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED?
[ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY
[ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED?
[ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS
[ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY?
[ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type)
[X] NONE

53. WAS PARARAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RINGS IF NOT, WHY?
[ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL
[ ] NONE All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills.

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARARAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY?
[ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR.
[ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON
[ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS.
[ ] NO [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from recovered life vests. 16 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses recovered. ( )

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD.
[ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

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OPNAV FORM 3750.8D (Rev. 9-58) OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION H: EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): AUTRY, Douglas R.

MODEL A/C: P3A

YES	NO		REMARKS
		1. SUSPECTED, 2. ESTABLISHED	
		1. EJECTION - Attempted	
		2. - Accomplished	
		3. - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		4. - Prior to	
		5. - During	
		6. - Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
Unknown		8. BAILOUT - Attempted	
	X	- Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet): ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown ( )

11. AIRSPEED: 160 knots

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER *

13. CONTROLLED: [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. GEARS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP: 47 °F

21. A/C SINKING: Unknown

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT: 0

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN PASSING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., 1130, 1131, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:		MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:	
X	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
X	31. Witnesses at scene	X	51. Items used as clothing
X	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
X	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
X	34. Auditory signal devices	ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:	
	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
TRAVEL:			55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
X	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
SHELTER:		MORALE:	
X	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
X	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
WATER SOURCE:		FOOD SOURCE:	
X	44. Theater kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.	SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:	
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67. Survival, swimming
	49. OTHER:		

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ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
AUTRY, Douglas R.	P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0152R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of PDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 5 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
AUTRY, Douglas R.	P3A

H.38 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two MC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as ORI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

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OPNAV FORM 3750-8E (Rev. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION I - PATHOLOGIC FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for POST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): AUTRY, Douglas R.

MODEL A/C: P3A

2. AGE: 26

3. HEIGHT: 67 INCHES

4. WEIGHT: 137

5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown

6. INJURY CODE: L

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						
DIS-LOCATION		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST / HAND		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE / FOOT	

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. ☐ DROWNED

19. ☐ ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

22. ☐ BURNS ☐ FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD

AREA	HEAD (ventral)	Dorsal)	TRUNK (ventral)	Dorsal)	ARMS	LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: ☐ NONE ☐ COMPLETE

ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: ☐ YES ☐ NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1294)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS

27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON: ☐ YES ☐ NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1294) NO. 8661

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ YES ☒ NO

32. PROTOCOL: ☐ ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: ☐ PATHOLOGIST ☐ FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", AFIP, 1957.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1			TISSUE: (CNS)		
2			- MUSCLE		
3			- VISCERA		
URINE			OTHER:		
G-I CONTENTS					

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—496198

SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): CARPENTER, Clifford Eugene

MODEL A/C: P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight
		X	2. "G" forces
			3. Environmental stress - External
			4. - Internal
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression
			6. Diet
			7. Fatigue
			8. Hypoxia
			9. Related illness
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions
			11. Hyperventilation
			12. Drugs
			13. Physical state
			14. OTHER:
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:
			15. Personal equipment
			16. Displays and/or controls
			17. Work arrangement
			18. Working environment
			19. Habit interference
			20. OTHER:
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)
			21. Pregnancy
		X	22. Illness or death
			23. Arguments
			24. Elated/Depressed state
			25. Personal habits - Drinking
			26. - Sex
			27. - Gambling
			28. - Debts

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			29. Expeditings/Delays
		X	30. Weather
			31. Mechanical Problems
			32. Social and working relationships
			33. Personal comfort
			34. Regulations
			35. Facilities
			36. Navigation
			37. Duty assignment
			38. Personality traits
			NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			39. Faulty attention
			40. Poor judgement
			41. Forgetfulness
			42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			TRAINING FACTORS:
			43. Physiological training
			44. Emergency Procedures training
		X	45. Survival and rescue training
			46. Refresher training
			47. Transition training
			48. OTHER:

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	51.6
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1
4. Time at controls this flight	0
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	6.5
6. Total flight time Since 8/62	283.8

7. Total time in model Air crewmember 312.6

8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason: 0

9. Number of and dates of previous accidents

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. D and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

Clifford E. CARPENTER, ADR2

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

22. On 28 January 1963, 3 children were seen in pediatric clinic and one received penicillin for an upper respiratory infection. The other two were placed on triple sulfa, but the next day these latter two were seen again in the afternoon for this which was considered a sulfa sensitivity. Nevertheless

(b) (5)

[redacted]

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000' to 2,000', complete overcast condition, mild surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

45. Subject was lacking survival, swimming, and rescue training.

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SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): CARPENTER, Clifford E.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness	X		S/N:R1680-516-813-CF50	UNKNOWN			
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445-CF50	X		UNKNOWN	
3. Inertia reel (Lockheed)	X		S/N:0027-0121-023	UNKNOWN			
4. G-Suit		X					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		X					
6. Exposure suit	X	(2)	(22) A1-1		X		X
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N:D8415-543-xxxx	X		UNKNOWN	
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes, Flying safety	X		S/N:D8430-656-xxxx	X		UNKNOWN	
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx	X		UNKNOWN	
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		UNKNOWN	
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		X
14. OTHER: ~~Contents of rafts~~	~~X~~		~~Packed in accordance with~~				
			~~B-A-C-S-E-B35-59~~		X		X
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK13-MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK13-MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N:R6850-270-9986-9500	UNKNOWN			
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT-3A		X		
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N: 9CF6230-255-0166	UNKNOWN			
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3m		X	X	
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803	UNKNOWN			
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N:K7340-098-4327-5231	UNKNOWN			
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650	UNKNOWN		X	
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		
25. - Food	X		(12)S/N:M8970-132-6359		X		
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

F.6;One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it,corresponding to those in its cover. A second was missing right torso and right sleeve and right leg was separated.
F.11;Flight deck personnel - pilot, co-pilot, flight engineer always wear gloves.
F.12;One VP-8 life vest recovered with its two eyelets pulled from rubber flap and clamped in place by snaps,indicating it had been worn. Waist strap stitching also pulled. Two CO_2 cartridges of another and one of a third were fired.
F.13,14; Both recovered.
F.15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from 4 vests recovered
F.18; Oee of two "Gibson Girl" radios recovered,battered.
F.23; Both A/C first aid kits recovered with contents of corner pocket missing. One kit was split and some contents missing.Both were safety wired

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke- O_2 - combination mask ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: MD-1 regulator ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (3 available in flight station) ( )
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? [X] YES [ ] NO
6. IF NO, WHY NOT:
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK:
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS (Liquid) 1800 P.S.I. (Gas); TIME OF ACCIDENT ____ LITERS (Liquid) Unknown ( ) P.S.I. (Gas)
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCIDT. Unknown [ ] YES [ ] NO
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY. [X] YES [ ] NO ( )
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO [X] YES Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A.

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard Snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect MS-22018-1FC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-8C)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1960-[illegible]

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SECTION B - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, First, Middle): CARPENTER, Clifford E.

MODEL A/C: F9A

INSTRUMENTS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE

20. INTEGRATED? [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] SEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown (Ø)

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET

26. LIST FORBIDDEN MODIFICATIONS

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] SEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: Vo-3 (22 available) ( )

31. LAST PACKING DATE

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and Type): [X] NONE ( )

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY: [ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATED: [ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATICALLY Unknown ( )

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (Also in Remarks): Moonless night; no surface wind. Several overcast cloud layers. ( )

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Water; sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY: [ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS: [ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING SEATING DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY: [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type): [ ] NONE [X] NONE ( )

53. WAS PARACHUTE LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY: [ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills.

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARACHUTE DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTUATED SUCCESSFULLY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON

57. IF SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT COUPLING? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED

60. ARE ANY ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES, LIST THEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS: [ ] NO [X] YES XII Flares and 4 Flashlights were missing from recovered life vests. 16 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses recovered. ( )

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD: [ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

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SECTION H - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): CARPENTER, Clifford E.

MODEL A/C: P3A

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
		1. EJECTION - Attempted	
		2. - Accomplished	
		3. - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		4. - Prior to	
		5. - During	
		6. - Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
Unknown		8. BAILOUT - Attempted	
( )	X	- Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet) ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown ( )

11. AIRSPEED: 160 knots ( )

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED? [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C FLOATED: Unknown ( )

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT: 0 ( )

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown ( )

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:		MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:	
X	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
X	31. Witnesses at scene	X	51. Items used as clothing
X	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
X	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
X	34. Auditory signal devices	ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:	
	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
TRAVEL:			55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
X	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
SHELTER:		MORALE:	
X	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
X	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
WATER SOURCE:		FOOD SOURCE:	
X	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.	SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP	
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67.
	49. OTHER:		

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ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
CARPENTER, Clifford E.	P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0153R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 foot ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of FDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 3 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
CARPENTER, Clifford E.	P3A

H.38 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two NC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as ORI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

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SECTION I - PATHOLOGIC... FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for POST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): CARPENTER, Clifford E.

MODEL A/C: P3A

2. AGE: 27
3. HEIGHT: 66 INCHES
4. WEIGHT: 127
5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown
6. INJURY CODE: L

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (Give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						
DIS-LOCATION		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE	
															HAND						FOOT	

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. ☐ DROWNED

19. ☐ ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

22. ☐ BURNS ☐ FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD

AREA	HEAD (ventral	Dorsal)	TRUNK (ventral	Dorsal)	ARMS	LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: ☐ NONE ☐ COMPLETE

ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: ☐ YES ☐ NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1294)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS

27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON: ☐ YES ☐ NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1294) NO: 3601

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ YES ☒ NO

32. PROTOCOL: ☐ ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: ☐ PATHOLOGIST ☐ FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", AFSP. 1967.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1			TISSUE: (CNS)		
2			+ MUSCLE		
3			+ VISCERA		
URINE			OTHER:		
G-I CONTENTS					

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

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SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): GATLIFF, Marvin William

MODEL A/C: P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS	E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:				SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight				29. Expeditings/Delays
	X		2. "G" forces		X		30. Weather
			3. Environmental stress - External				31. Mechanical Problems
			4. - Internal				32. Social and working relationships
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression				33. Personal comfort
			6. Diet				34. Regulations
			7. Fatigue				35. Facilities
			8. Hypoxia				36. Navigation
			9. Related illness				37. Duty assignment
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions				38. Personality traits
			11. Hyperventilation				NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			12. Drugs				39. Faulty attention
			13. Physical state				40. Poor judgement
			14. OTHER:				41. Forgetfulness
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:				42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			15. Personal equipment				
			16. Displays and/or controls				
			17. Work arrangement				
			18. Working environment				
			19. Habit interference				TRAINING FACTORS:
			20. OTHER:				43. Physiological training
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)				44. Emergency Procedures training
			21. Pregnancy				45. Survival and rescue training
			22. Illness or death				46. Refresher training
			23. Arguments				47. Transition training
			24. Elated/Depressed state				48. OTHER:
			25. Personal habits - Drinking				
			26. - Sex				
			27. - Gambling				
			28. - Debts				

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	75.7	7. Total time in model Air crewmember	89.4
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1	0	
4. Time at controls this flight	0	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	6.5		
6. Total flight time Since 11/62	89.4		

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. B and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

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Marvin W. GATLIFF, ADR1

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000' to 2,000', complete overcast condition, mild surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

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SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL *(Last, first, middle)*: GATLIFF, Marvin W.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness		X					
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445-LF50	UNKNOWN (4)			
3. Inertia reel		X					
4. G-Suit		~~X~~					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		~~X~~					
6. Esposure suit	~~X~~	(2)	A1-1		~~X~~		~~X~~
7. Flight suit *(Other than above)*	X		S/N:D8415-543-xxxx	X		UNK (6)	
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes	X		S/N:D8430-656-xxxx	X		UNK (6)	
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx		X		
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		UNK (6)	
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		
14. OTHER: ~~Consente in rafts~~	X		~~Packed in accordance with B-A-C-3-E-B35-69~~		X		~~X~~
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare *(Night)*	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN (4)			
16. - Flare *(Day)*	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N:R6850-270-9288-9500	UNKNOWN			
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT-3A		X	~~X~~	
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N:9CF6230-255-0166	UNKNOWN			
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803	UNKNOWN			
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N:R7340-098-4327-5231	UNKNOWN			
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650	UNKNOWN			
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		~~X~~
25. - Food	X		S/N:M8970-132-6359(12)		X		~~X~~
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

F.6;One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it,corresponding to those in its cover. A second was missing right half of torso and right sleeve, and right leg was separated.
F.11;Personnel other than flight deck personnel - pilot, co-pilot, F/E - seldom wear gloves due to nature of duties.
F.12; One VP-8 life vest recovered with its two eyelets pulled from rubber flap and clamped in place by snaps,indicating it had been worn. Waist strap stitching also pulled. Two CO_2 cartridges of another and one of a third were fired.
F.13,14; Both recovered.
F.15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from vests recovered.
F.18; One of the "Gibson Girl" radios recovered battered.
F.23; Both A/C first aid kits recovered with contents of corner pocket missing.One kit was split and some contents missing.Both were safety wired.

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke-O_2 combination mask. ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: 2850 Walk-around ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: ( ) (7 available in fore starboard observation station)
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? [ ] YES [X] NO
6. IF NO, WHY NOT: No Squadron policy regarding this check. ( )
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK: - -
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS *(Liquid)* 1800 P.S.I. *(Gas)* ( ); TIME OF ACCIDENT ____ LITERS *(Liquid)* ( ) P.S.I. *(Gas)* Unknown
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCIDT.? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING? [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, WHY ITEMS AND REASON NOTED: [ ] YES [X] NO 4 masks, O_2 bottles, regulators short. This is standard supply. ( )
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO [X] YES Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A. ( )

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect MS-22018-1FC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-3C)

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OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): GATLIFF, Marvin W.

MODEL A/C: P3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE

20. INTEGRATED? [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR
[ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY:
[ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT:
[ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown (✓)

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON
[ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY:
[ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: NC-3 (22 available) ( )

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 15 Jan 1968 ( )

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type)
[X] NONE ( )

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY?
[ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION
[ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC? Unknown ( )

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON
[ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS:
[ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT:
[ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED? ( )

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (List in sequence): Moonless night; no surface wind. Several overcast cloud layers.

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Water; sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED?
[ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY
[ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED?
[ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS
[ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY?
[ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type)
[X] NONE ( )

53. WAS PARARAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY?
[ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills.
[ ] NONE

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARARAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY?
[ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR.
[ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON
[ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS.
[ ] NO [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from recovered life vests. 16 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses recovered. ( )

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD.
[ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—496197

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SECTION H - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): GATLIFF, Marvin W.

MODEL A/C: P3A

S	E	S:SUSPECTED, E:ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
		1. EJECTION : Attempted	
		2. : Accomplished	
		3. : Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		4. : Prior to	
		5. : During	
		6. : Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
Unknown		8. BAILOUT : Attempted	
( )	X	: Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet): ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown ( )

11. AIRSPEED: 160 knots ( )

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED: [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C FLOATED: Unknown ( ) ***

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT: 0

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown ( )

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:		MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:	
X	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
X	31. Witnesses at scene	X	51. Items used as clothing
X	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
X	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
X	34. Auditory signal devices	ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:	
	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
TRAVEL:			55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
X	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
SHELTER:		MORALE:	
X	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
X	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
WATER SOURCE:		FOOD SOURCE:	
X	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.	SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:	
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67. Survival, Swimming
	49. OTHER:		

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 [illegible]

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
GATLIFF, Marvin W.	P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0152R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of FDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 5 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO_2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
GATLIFF, Marvin W.	P3A

H.38 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two NC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as ORI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

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SECTION I - PATHOLOGIC FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for POST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

MODEL A/C: P3A

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): GATLIFF, Marvin W.

6. INJURY CODE: L

2. AGE: 30
3. HEIGHT: 69-1/2 INCHES
4. WEIGHT: 143
5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						

DISLOCATION

	JAW	SHOULDER	ELBOW	WRIST	HAND	HIP	KNEE	ANKLE	FOOT

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. ☐ DROWNED

19. ☐ ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

22. ☐ BURNS ☐ FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD

AREA	HEAD (ventral)	Dorsal)	TRUNK (ventral	Dorsal)	ARMS	LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: ☐ NONE ☐ COMPLETE

ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: ☐ YES ☐ NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1254)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS

27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON: ☐ YES ☐ NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1254) NO. 2661

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ YES ☒ NO

32. PROTOCOL: ☐ ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: ☐ PATHOLOGIST ☐ FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", AFIP-1957.

34.

SPECIMEN		TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD:	1		
	2		
	3		
URINE			
G.I. CONTENTS			

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
TISSUE: (CNS)		
• MUSCLE		
• VISCERA		
OTHER:		

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—498196

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SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): ROARK, Donald Benjamin

MODEL A/C: P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight
		X	2. "G" forces
			3. Environmental stress - External
			4. - Internal
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression
			6. Diet
			7. Fatigue
			8. Hypoxia
			9. Related illness
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions
			11. Hyperventilation
			12. Drugs
			13. Physical state
			14. OTHER:
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:
			15. Personal equipment
			16. Displays and/or controls
			17. Work arrangement
			18. Working environment
			19. Habit interference
			20. OTHER:
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Sectional stress from non-duty sources)
			21. Pregnancy
			22. Illness or death
			23. Arguments
			24. Elated/Depressed state
			25. Personal habits - Drinking
			26. - Sex
			27. - Gambling
			28. - Debts

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Sectional stress from duty sources)
			29. Expeditings/Delays
		X	30. Weather
			31. Mechanical Problems
			32. Social and working relationships
			33. Personal comfort
			34. Regulations
			35. Facilities
			36. Navigation
			37. Duty assignment
			38. Personality traits
			NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			39. Faulty attention
			40. Poor judgement
			41. Forgetfulness
			42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			TRAINING FACTORS:
			43. Physiological training
			44. Emergency Procedures training
			45. Survival and rescue training
			46. Refresher training
			47. Transition training
			48. OTHER:

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (Fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	53.6	7. Total time in model Air crewmember	351.7
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1		
4. Time at controls this flight	0	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	6.5		
6. Total flight time Since 1/62	633.6		

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. B and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

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Donald B. ROARK, AE2

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000' to 2,000', complete overcast condition, mild surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

OPNAV FORM 3750-8B (5-58)

SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): ROARK, Dsnald B.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness		X					
2. Lap belt	X		S/N: R1680-543-3445 LF50		(1) UNKNOWN		
3. Inertia reel		X					
4. G-Suit		~~X~~					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		~~X~~					
6. Exposure suit	~~X~~	(2)	A1-1		~~X~~		X
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N:D8415-543-xxxx	X		UN	(6)
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes	X		S/N:D8430-656-xxxx	X		UN	(6)
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx	X	X		
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2			UN	(6)
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		
14. OTHER: ~~Contents of raft~~	~~X~~		~~Packed in accordance~~		~~X~~		
			~~with B-A-C-S-E-535-59~~				
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK-13 MOD-0		(4) UNKNOWN		
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK-13 MOD-0		UNKNOWN		
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N:R6850-270-9500-9985-		UNKNOWN		
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT-3A		X	~~X~~	
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N:9CF6230-255-0166		UNKNOWN		
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803		UNKNOWN		
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N:R7340-098-4327-5231		UNKNOWN		
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650		UNKNOWN		
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		
25. - Food	X		S/N:M8970-132-6359(12)		X		
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT

F.6; One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it, corresponding to those in its cover. A second was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve, and right leg was separated.
F.11; Personnel other than flight deck personnel - pilot, co-pilot, F/E - seldom wear gloves due to nature of duties.
F.12; One VP-8 life vest recovered with its two eyelets pulled from rubber flap and clamped in place by snaps, indicating it had been worn. Waist strap stitching also pulled. Two CO_2 cartridges of another and one of a third were fired.
F.13,14; Both recovered.
F.15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from vests recovered.
F.18; One of the "Gibson Girl" radios recovered battered.
F.23; Both A/C first aid kits recovered with contents of corner pocket missing. One kit was split and some contents missing. Both were safety wired.

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke-O_2 combination mask ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: 2858 Walk-around ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (7 available in fore starboard observation station) ( )
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? [ ] YES [X] NO
6. IF NO, WHY NOT: No Squadron policy regarding this check. ( )
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK: - -
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS (Liquid) 1800 P.S.I. (Gas) ( ); TIME OF ACCIDENT Unknown LITERS (Liquid) ____ P.S.I. (Gas) ( )
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? Unknown [ ] YES ( ) [ ] NO
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY: [ ] YES [X] NO 4 masks, O_2 bottles, regulators short. This is standard supply. ( )
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO [X] YES ( ) Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A.

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect MS-22018-1FC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-8C)

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MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4
OPNAV FORM 3750-8C (5-58)

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): ROARK, Donald B.

MODEL A/C: P3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE:

20. INTEGRATED? [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON:

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown (Ø)

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET:

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS:

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM:

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: NC-3 (22 available) ( )

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 15 Jan 1963 ( )

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN:

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type): [X] NONE ( )

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY: [ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION: [ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC? Unknown ( )

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING:

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING:

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (Wind, cloud cover): Moonless night; no surface wind. Several overcast cloud layers. ( )

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Water; sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY: [ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY:

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS: [ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type): [X] NONE

53. WAS PARARAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills.

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARARAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON:

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS: [ ] NO [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from recovered life vests. 16 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses recovered. ( )

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD: [ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5

OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (REV. 5-58) — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION H - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): ROARK, DOeald B.

MODEL A/C: P3A

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
		1. EJECTION - Attempted	
		2. - Accomplished	
		3. - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		4. - Prior to	
		5. - During	
		6. - Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
Unknown		8. BAILOUT - Attempted	
( )	X	- Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet): ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown ( )

11. AIRSPEED ( ): 160 knots

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED?: [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C FLOATED: unknown ( ) SEC.

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT: 0

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown ( )

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:		**MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:**	
X	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
X	31. Witnesses at scene	X	51. Items used as clothing
X	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
X	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
X	34. Auditory signal devices	**ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:**	
	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
TRAVEL:			55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
X	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
SHELTER:		**MORALE:**	
X	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
X	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
WATER SOURCE:		**FOOD SOURCE:**	
X	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.	**SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:**	
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67. Survival, swimming
	49. OTHER:		Underwater O_2, Parachute release

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 905528

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
ROARK, Donald B.	P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0152R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of PDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 5 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained, was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
ROARK, Dinald B.	P3A

H.38 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two NC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as ORI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 6

OPNAV FORM 3760-8E (Rev. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3760-7

SECTION I - PATHOLOGICAL FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for POST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): ROARK, Donald B.

MODEL A/C: F3A

2. AGE: 23 | 3. HEIGHT: 67 INCHES | 4. WEIGHT: 159 | 5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown | 6. INJURY CODE: L

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ NONE ☐ DURATION ☐ TRUCE ☐ FATAL (Yes)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Due-total cause)

9. HEAD INJURIES: CEREBRAL CONCUSSION ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (m.s.n.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE / DISLOCATION

	SKULL: CRAN.	SKULL: FACIAL	VERTEBRAE (Specify No.): CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX	SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM R	UPPER ARM L	LOWER ARM R	LOWER ARM L	HAND R	HAND L	UPPER LEG R	UPPER LEG L	LOWER LEG R	LOWER LEG L	FOOT R	FOOT L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						
DIS-LOCATION		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST / HAND		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE / FOOT	

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS-(State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS: MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN: MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	ABRASIONS: MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (m.s.n.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. ☐ DROWNED

19. ☐ ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

22. ☐ BURNS ☐ FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD
AREA	HEAD (neck)	Percent		TRUNK (neck)	Percent		ARMS	LEGS	

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: ☐ NONE ☐ COMPLETE

ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS CONTAINING: ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: ☐ YES ☐ NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NATSIG F-2274)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS

27. DRUNKEST IF YES GIVE REASON: ☐ YES ☐ NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, Manual F-2274): NO. 8641

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH: NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

32. PROTOCOL: ☐ ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: ☐ PATHOLOGIST ☐ FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON WAS PRESENT WHEN PATHOLOGIST WAS UNAVAILABLE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES, APR. 1957.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1			TISSUE: (CHEST)		
2			MUSCLE		
3			VISCERA		
URINE			OTHER:		
G.I. CONTENTS					

35. IF UNIVERSITY LIST OF OTHER POSSIBLE INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES NOT DONE AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST HERE IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1957—[illegible]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 2
OPNAV FORM 3750-6A (Rev. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle)
LESTER, Dayton Stanley

MODEL A/C
P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight
		X	2. "G" forces
			3. Environmental stress - External
			4. " - Internal
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression
			6. Diet
		X	7. Fatigue
			8. Hypoxia
			9. Related illness
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions
			11. Hyperventilation
			12. Drugs
			13. Physical state
			14. OTHER:
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:
			15. Personal equipment
			16. Displays and/or controls
			17. Work arrangement
			18. Working environment
			19. Habit interference
			20. OTHER:
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)
			21. Pregnancy
			22. Illness or death
			23. Arguments
			24. Elated/Depressed state
			25. Personal habits - Drinking
			26. " - Sex
			27. " - Gambling
			28. " - Debts

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			29. Expeditings/Delays
		X	30. Weather
			31. Mechanical Problems
			32. Social and working relationships
			33. Personal comfort
			34. Regulations
			35. Facilities
			36. Navigation
		X	37. Duty assignment
			38. Personality traits
			NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			39. Faulty attention
			40. Poor judgement
			41. Forgetfulness
			42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			TRAINING FACTORS:
		X	43. Physiological training
			44. Emergency Procedures training
			45. Survival and rescue training
			46. Refresher training
			47. Transition training
			48. OTHER:

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	53.6	7. Total time in model Air crewmember	296.3
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1		
4. Time at controls this flight	0	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	8		
6. Total flight time Since 1/62	435.2		

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. B and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1957—498194

Dayton S. LESTER, ATN3

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

7. Although all aircrewman are given day free of duty prior to night flight, subject's rest was interrupted by 1300 exam in communications.

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000' to 2,000', complete overcast condition, mild surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

37. Subject was required to attend communications exam at 1300.

43. Subject was lacking night vision training.

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OPNAV FORM 3750-8B (5-58) OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): LESTER, Dayton S.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness		X					
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445-LF50	UN	(6)	WN	
3. Inertia reel		X					
4. G-Suit		~~X~~					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		~~X~~					
6. Exposure suit	~~X~~	(2)	A1-1		~~X~~		~~X~~
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N:D8415-543-xxxx	X		UN	(6)
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes	X		S/N:D8430-656-xxxx	X		UN	(6)
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx		X		
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		UN	(6)
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		~~X~~
14. OTHER: ~~Contents of Rafts~~	~~X~~		~~Packed in accordance with B-A-C-S-E-B35-59~~		~~X~~		~~X~~
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UN	(6)	WN	
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UN	KN	WN	
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N:R6850-270-9986-9500	UN	KN	WN	
18. - Radio (D)	~~X~~		AN/CRT-3A		~~X~~		~~X~~
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N:9CF6230-255-0166	UN	KN	WN	
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803	UN	KN	WN	
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N:7340-098-4327-5331	UN	KN	WN	
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650	UN	KN	WN	
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		~~X~~
25. - Food	X		(12)S/N:M8970-132-6359		X		~~X~~
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT

F.6; One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it, corresponding to those in its cover. A second was missing right half of torso and right sleeve, and right leg was separated.
F.11; Personnel other than flight deck personnel - pilot, co-pilot, F/E - seldom wear gloves due to nature of duties.
F.12; One VP-8 life vest recovered with its two eyelets pulled from rubber flap and clamped in place by snaps, indicating it had been worn. Waist strap stitching also pulled. Two CO_2 cartridges of another and one of a third were fired.
F.13,14; Both recovered.
F.15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from vests recovered.
F.18; One of the "Gibson Girl" radios recovered battered.
F.23; Both A/C first aid kits recovered with contents of corner pocket missing. One kit was split and some contents missing. Both were safety wired.

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke O_2 Combination mask ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: 2858 Walk-around ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (7 available in fore starboard observation station) ( )
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? [ ] YES [X] NO ( )
6. IF NO, WHY NOT: No Squadron policy regarding this check ( )
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK: - -
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS (Liquid) 1800 P.S.I. (Gas) ( ); TIME OF ACCIDENT Unknown LITERS (Liquid) ( ) P.S.I. (Gas)
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF Unknown? [ ] YES [ ] NO ( )
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY. [ ] YES [X] NO 4 masks, O_2 bottles, regulators short. This is standard supply. ( )
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO ( ) [X] YES Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A.

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect MS-22018-IFC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

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OPNAV FORM 3750-8C (5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 6750-1

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): LESTER, Dayton S.

MODEL A/C: P3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

18. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE:

19. INTEGRATED: [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON:

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION: Unknown (Φ)

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET:

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS:

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM:

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: NC-5 (22 available) ( )

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 15 Jan 1963 ( )

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN:

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type): [X] NONE

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY: [ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATED: [ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATICALLY Unknown ( )

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING:

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING:

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (List in sequence): Moonless night; no surface wind. Several overcast cloud layers. ( )

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Water; sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

46. WAS CHUTE JETTISONED: [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY: [ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY:

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS: [ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/type): [X] NONE ( )

53. WAS PARAMAT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills.

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARAMAT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON:

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS: [ ] NO [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from recovered life vests, 16 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses recovered. ( )

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD: [ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—498197

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5

OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (REV. 5-58) OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION H - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): LESTER, Dayton S.

MODEL A/C: P3A

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
		1. EJECTION - Attempted	
		2. - Accomplished	
		3. - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		4. - Prior to	
		5. - During	
		6. - Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
Unknown		8. BAILOUT - Attempted	
	X	- Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet): ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown

11. AIRSPEED: 160 knots

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED? [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C ICING: Unknown °C

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT: 0

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:		MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:	
X	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
X	31. Witnesses at scene	X	51. Items used as clothing
X	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
X	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
X	34. Auditory signal devices	ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:	
	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
TRAVEL:			55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
X	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
SHELTER:		MORALE:	
X	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
X	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
X	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
WATER SOURCE:		FOOD SOURCE:	
X	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.	SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:	
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67.
	49. OTHER:		

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 545528

ADDENDUM to PAGE 3, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle) Model A/C

LESTER, Dayton S. P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0153R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-20 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of PDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 3 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 13 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0736R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
LESTER, Dayton S.	P3A

H.33 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two NC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as ORI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 6

OPNAV FORM 3750-6E (Rev. 5-58)

SECTION I - PATHOLOGIC[illegible] FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for [illegible]T MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

MODEL A/C: P3A

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): LESTER, Dayton S.

2. AGE: 25 | 3. HEIGHT: 73 INCHES | 4. WEIGHT: 178 | 5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown | 6. INJURY CODE: L

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: [ ] SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE [ ] OTHER (give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: [ ] MINOR [ ] SERIOUS [ ] CRITICAL [ ] FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: [ ] RIGHT [ ] LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: [ ] RIGHT [ ] LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						
DIS-LOCATION		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE	
															HAND						FOOT	

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. [ ] DROWNED

19. [ ] ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

22. [ ] BURNS [ ] FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD
AREA	HEAD (ventral)	(dorsal)		TRUNK (ventral)	(dorsal)		ARMS		LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: [ ] NONE [ ] COMPLETE

ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? [ ] YES [ ] NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: [ ] YES [ ] NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1194)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS

27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1194) NO. 8601

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? [ ] YES [X] NO

32. PROTOCOL: [ ] ATTACHED [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: [ ] PATHOLOGIST [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", NAVMED 1497.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1			TISSUE: (CNS)		
2			, MUSCLE		
3			, VISCERA		
URINE			OTHER:		
G.I. CONTENTS					

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—496179

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 2

OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (Rev. 5-58)

SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): SYLVE, Edward Anthony

MODEL A/C: P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight
		X	2. "G" forces
			3. Environmental stress - External
			4. - Internal
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression
			6. Diet
		X	7. Fatigue
			8. Hypoxia
			9. Related illness
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions
			11. Hyperventilation
			12. Drugs
			13. Physical state
			14. OTHER:
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:
			15. Personal equipment
			16. Displays and/or controls
			17. Work arrangement
			18. Working environment
			19. Habit interference
			20. OTHER:
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)
			21. Pregnancy
		X	22. Illness or death
			23. Arguments -
			24. Elated/Depressed state
			25. Personal habits - Drinking
			26. - Sex
			27. - Gambling
			28. - Debts

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			29. Expeditings/Delays
		X	30. Weather
			31. Mechanical Problems
			32. Social and working relationships
			33. Personal comfort
			34. Regulations
			35. Facilities
			36. Navigation
			37. Duty assignment
			38. Personality traits
			NONSTRESS FACTORS:
			39. Faulty attention
			40. Poor judgement
			41. Forgetfulness
			42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			TRAINING FACTORS:
		X	43. Physiological training
			44. Emergency Procedures training
		X	45. Survival and rescue training
			46. Refresher training
			47. Transition training
			48. OTHER:

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (Fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	46.8
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1
4. Time at controls this flight	0
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	6.5
6. Total flight time Since 1/62	233.1

7. Total time in model Air crewmember 233.1

8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason

0

9. Number of and dates of previous accidents

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. B and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—498194

Edward A. SYLVE, ATR3

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

7. Although all aircrewman are given day free of duty prior to night flight, subject's rest was interrupted by 1300 exam in communications.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

43. Subject was lacking night vision training.

45. Subject was lacking survival, swimming, and rescue training.

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OPNAV FORM 3750-8B (5-58)

SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): SYLVE, Edward A.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness		X					
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445 LF50	UNKNOWN			
3. Inertia reel		X					
4. G-Suit		~~X~~					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		~~X~~					
6. Exposure suit	X	(2)	A1-1		~~X~~		X
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N:D8415-543-xxxx	X		UNK	(6)
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes	X		S/N:D8430-656-xxxx	X		UNK	(6)
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx		X		
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		UNK	(4)
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		
14. OTHER: ~~contents of raftex~~	~~X~~		~~Packed in accordance~~		~~X~~		~~X~~
~~with~~			~~B-A-C-S-E-B35-50~~				
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N: R6850-270-9288-9500	UNKNOWN			
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT-3A		X	~~X~~	
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N:9CF6230-255-0166	UNKNOWN			
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803	UNKNOWN			
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N: R7340-098-4327-5221	UNKNOWN			
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650	UNKNOWN			
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		X
25. - Food	X		(12)S/N:M8970-132-6359		X		X
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT

F.6;(2) of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it,corrresponding to those in its cover. A second was missing right half of torso and right sleeve, and right leg was separated.
F.11; Personnel other than flight deck personnel - pilot, co-pilot, F/E - seldom wear gloves due to nature of duties.
F.12; One MP-8 life vest recovered with its two eyelets pulled from rubber flap and clamped in place by snaps,indicating it had been worn. Waist strap stitching also pulled. Two CO_2 cartridges of another and one of a third were fired.
F.13,14; Both recovered.
F.15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from vests recovered.
F.18;One of the "Gibson Girl" radios recovered battered.
F23; Both S/C first aid kits recovered with contents of corner pocket missing.One kit was split and some contents missing.Both were safety wired.

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Modal (1)
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke O_2 Combination mask (1)
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: 2858 Walk-around (1)
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (7available in fore starboard observation station) (1)
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? [ ] YES [X] NO
6. IF NO, WHY NOT: No Squadron policy regarding this check. (1)
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK: - -
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS (Liquid) 1800 P.S.I. (Gas); TIME OF ACCIDENT Unknown LITERS (Liquid) ____ P.S.I. (Gas)
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? Unknown [ ] YES [ ] NO
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY. [ ] YES [X] NO 4 masks, O_2 bottles, regulators short. This is standard supply. (3)
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO [X] YES Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A.

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Standard snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect MS-22018-1FC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-8C)

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SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): SYLVE, Edward A.

MODEL A/C: P3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE:

20. INTEGRATED? [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON:

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown (Ø)

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET:

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS:

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM:

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: NC-3 ( ) (22 available)

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 15 Jan 1963 ( )

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN:

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type): [X] NONE ( )

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY? [ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION: [ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC? Unknown

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING:

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING:

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (Give in sequence): Moonless night; no surface wind. Several overcast cloud layers. ( )

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Water; sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY:

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS: [ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type): [X] NONE

53. WAS PARAKAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills.

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARAKAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON:

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS: [ ] NO [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from recovered life vests. 16 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses recovered. ( )

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD: [ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

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SECTION H - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): SYLVE, Edward A.

MODEL A/C: P3A

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
		1. EJECTION - Attempted	
		2. - Accomplished	
		3. - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		4. - Prior to	
		5. - During	
		6. - Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
Unknown		8. BAILOUT - Attempted	
( )	X	- Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet): ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown ( )

11. AIRSPEED: 160 knots ( )

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED: [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C FLOATED: unknown ( )

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT: 0

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown ( )

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:		MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:	
X	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
X	31. Witnesses at scene	X	51. Items used as clothing
X	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
X	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
X	34. Auditory signal devices	ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:	
	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
TRAVEL:			55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
X	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
SHELTER:		MORALE:	
X	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
X	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
WATER SOURCE:		FOOD SOURCE:	
X	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.	SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:	
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67.
	49. OTHER:		

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ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle) | Model A/C
SYLVE, Edward A. | P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0152R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of PDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 5 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle) | Model A/C

SYLVE, Edward A. | P3A

H.33 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two NC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as ORI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

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SECTION I - PATHOLOGI[illegible] FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for [illegible]ST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle)	MODEL A/C
SYLVE, Edward A.	P3A

2. AGE	3. HEIGHT	4. WEIGHT	5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT	6. INJURY CODE
21	71 INCHES	140	Unknown	L

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE

	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (Specify No.)					SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM		LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG		LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRAN.	FACIAL	CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX				R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						

DIS-LOCATION	JAW	SHOULDER	ELBOW	WRIST	HAND	HIP	KNEE	ANKLE	FOOT

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS		
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. ☐ DROWNED

19. ☐ ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

22. ☐ BURNS ☐ FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD

AREA	HEAD (ventral)	Dorsal)	TRUNK (ventral	Dorsal)	ARMS	LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: ☐ NONE ☐ COMPLETE

ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS ☐ YES ☐ NO

25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1234)

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST ____ DAYS

27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON ☐ YES ☐ NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION ____ DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1234) NO. 3601

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO. ____

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ YES ☒ NO

32. PROTOCOL ☐ ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY ☐ PATHOLOGIST ☐ FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", AFIP, 1957.

34.

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD: 1			TISSUE: (CNS)		
2			• MUSCLE		
3			• VISCERA		
URINE			OTHER:		
G-I CONTENTS					

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

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SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): KAHLER, Jack Clark

MODEL A/C: P3A

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8x10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight
		X	2. "G" forces
			3. Environmental stress - External
			4. - Internal
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression
			6. Diet
		X	7. Fatigue
			8. Hypoxia
			9. Related illness
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions
			11. Hyperventilation
			12. Drugs
			13. Physical state
			14. OTHER:
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:
			15. Personal equipment
			16. Displays and/or controls
			17. Work arrangement
			18. Working environment
			19. Habit interference
			20. OTHER:
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)
	X		21. Pregnancy
			22. Illness or death
			23. Arguments
			24. Elated/Depressed state
			25. Personal habits - Drinking
			26. - Sex
			27. - Gambling
			28. - Debts

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			29. Expeditings/Delays
		X	30. Weather
			31. Mechanical Problems
			32. Social and working relationships
			33. Personal comfort
			34. Regulations
			35. Facilities
			36. Navigation
			37. Duty assignment
			38. Personality traits
			NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			39. Faulty attention
			40. Poor judgement
			41. Forgetfulness
			42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			TRAINING FACTORS:
		X	43. Physiological training
			44. Emergency Procedures training
			45. Survival and rescue training
			46. Refresher training
			47. Transition training
			48. OTHER:

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (Fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	28.8	7. Total time in model Air crewmember	264.2
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.5	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	0
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	1		
4. Time at controls this flight	0	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	6.5		
6. Total flight time Since 9/62	264.2		

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Sect. B and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

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Jack C. KAHLER, AT1

Section C (continued)

2. The mission of this aircraft involves frequent changes in altitude and direction, producing "G" forces seldom exceeding +1.5 "G's".

7. Although all aircrewman are given day free of duty prior to night flight, subject's rest was interrupted by 1300 exam in communications.

21. Wife delivered normally 6 weeks before accident.

30. Dense clouds from about 1,000' to 2,000', complete overcast condition, mild surface winds, and no moon prevailed.

43. Subject was lacking high altitude pressure breathing and night vision training.

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SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): KAHLER, Jack C.

MODEL A/C: P3A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO
1. Shoulder harness		X					
2. Lap belt	X		S/N:R1680-543-3445-LF50	UNKNOWN (6)			
3. Inertia reel		X					
4. G-Suit		X					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		X					
6. Exposure suit	X (2)		A1-1		X		X
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		S/N:D8415-543-xxxx	X		UNK (6)	
8. Helmet		X					
9. Goggles/Eyeshield		X					
10. Shoes	X		S/N:D8430-656-xxxx	X		UNK (6)	
11. Gloves	X		S/N:D8415-579-xxxx		X		
12. Life vest	X		(22) MK-2	X		UNK (6)	
13. Life raft	X		(2) MK-12		X		X
14. OTHER: ~~Contents of rafts~~	~~X~~		~~Packed in accordance with B-A-C-8-B-B35-59~~		~~X~~		~~X~~
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN (6)			
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK-13 MOD-0	UNKNOWN			
17. - Dye marker	X		S/N: R6850-270-9986-9500	UNKNOWN			
18. - Radio	X		AN/CRT-3A		X		
19. - Flashlight	X		S/N:9CF6230-255-0166	UNKNOWN			
20. - Mirror	X		MK-3		X		
21. OTHER: WHISTLE	X		S/N:8465-254-8803	UNKNOWN			
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife	X		S/N: R7340-098-4327-4281	UNKNOWN			
23. - First aid kit	X		S/N:6545-919-6650	UNKNOWN			
24. - Shelter	X		S/N:DM8340-285-2145		X		X
25. - Food	X		(12)S/N:M8970-132-6959		X		X
26. OTHER:							
27. RESCUE - Vehicle							
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher							
29. OTHER:							

F.6;One of sixteen exposure suits found with several slashes in it,corresponding to those in its cover. A second was missing right half of torso and right sleeve, and right leg was separated.
F.11; Personnel other than flight deck personnel - pilot, co-pilot, F/E - seldom wear gloves due to nature of duties.
F.12; One VP-8 life vest recovered with its two eyelets pulled from rubber flap and clamped in place by snaps,indicating it had been worn. Waist strap stitching also pulled. Two CO_2 cartridges of another and one of a third were fired.
F.13,14; Both recovered.
F.15,16,19; Some flares and flashlights were noted torn from vests recovered.
F.18; One of the "Gibson Girl" radios recovered battered.
F.23; Both A/C first aid kits recovered with contents bf corner pocket missing.One kit was split and some contents missing,Both were safety wired.

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: SCOTT Model ( )
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: Smoke O_2 Combination mask ( )
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: 2858 Walk-around ( )
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: (7 available in fore starboard observation station) ( )
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? [ ] YES [X] NO
6. IF NO, WHY NOT: No Squadron policy regarding this check ( )
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK: - -
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT ____ LITERS (Liquid) 1800 P.S.I. (Gas); TIME OF ACCIDENT Unknown ____ LITERS (Liquid) ____ P.S.I. (Gas) Unknown ( )
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? [ ] YES [ ] NO
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY. [ ] YES [X] NO 4 masks,O_2 bottles,regulators short. This is standard supply. ( )
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO [X] YES ( ) Normal flight conducted without wearing O_2 mask in P3A.

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE/DEVICE: Standard snaps ( )
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Quick disconnect MS-22018-1FC-60 ( )
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED?
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4
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SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): KAHLER, Jack C.

MODEL A/C: P3A

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE:

20. INTEGRATED? [ ] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON:

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] NO [ ] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT: [ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION Unknown (Ø)

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET:

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS:

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM:

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY: [ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [ ] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: NC-3 (22 available) ( )

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 15 Jan 1963 ( )

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN:

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type): [X] NONE ( )

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY? [ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION: [ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC? Unknown ( )

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO Unknown ( )

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Unknown ( ) FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS: [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING:

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING:

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT: [ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (List in sequence): Moonless night; no surface wind. Several overcast cloud layers. ( )

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Water; sea state: 0 to 1 ( )

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [X] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY: [ ] YES [ ] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED? [ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY:

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS: [ ] TIGHT [ ] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type): [X] NONE ( )

53. WAS PARARAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY? [ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL: [ ] NONE All crew members are given experience donning harness and pack before crew assignment, followed by A/C non-jumping drills.

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARARAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY? [ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON:

OTHER

57. IF G-SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR: [ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G-SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED:

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS: [ ] NO [X] YES All flares and 4 flashlights were missing from recovered life vests. 16 of 22 exposure suits recovered; 5 of 22 life vests recovered; one of 2 "Gibson Girls" recovered. None of 22 parachutes and harnesses recovered.

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD: [ ] NO [ ] YES Unknown ( )

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OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (REV. 5-58) OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION H - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): KAHLER, Jack C.

MODEL A/C: P3A

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
		1. EJECTION - Attempted	
		2. - Accomplished	
		3. - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		4. - Prior to	
		5. - During	
		6. - Subsequent to	
		7. Give type and model of seat used	
Unknown		8. BAILOUT - Attempted	
( )	X	- Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet) ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Unknown ( )

11. AIRSPEED: 160 knots ( )

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [X] WATER

13. CONTROLLED? [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [ ] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE: 0 to 1

19. AIR TEMP.: 45 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: 47 °F

21. A/C FLOATED: unknown ( ) SEC.

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT: 0

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Unknown

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. [ ] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:		**MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:**	
X	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
X	31. Witnesses at scene	X	51. Items used as clothing
X	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
X	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
X	34. Auditory signal devices	**ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:**	
	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
TRAVEL:			55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
X	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
SHELTER:		**MORALE:**	
X	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
X	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
WATER SOURCE:		**FOOD SOURCE:**	
X	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.	**SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:**	
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67.
	49. OTHER:		

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ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H"

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
KAHLER, Jack C.	P3A

H.30) Aircraft due on Station 01-30 0001R to 0300R. He received clearance from New York to descend IFR through cloud layers a few minutes past 0001R, and also reported routine one hour interval check at 0100R to VP-8, Patuxent River, Md. and FAW-5 Norfolk, Va. No further communications were received by any of the above, nor by USS CARP, USCGC ABSECON, both monitoring ship and aircraft emergency frequencies within 200 miles.

H.31) Two officers of USS CARP reported sighting an illumination at 01-30 0149-0152R on bearing approximately 310° from their position. It was distinctly different from the illumination of a search light. Reflecting off the 2,000 feet ceiling at an estimated distance of 10 to 25 miles, it lasted 15-30 seconds. Also aboard USCGC ABSECON, two officers reported an orange or whitish-yellow glow off a bearing approximately 200° to 220° from their position, at 01-30 0145R estimated time. Finally an Air Force Constellation travelling west also reported an illumination at the same approximate time. All extended bearings cross in the near vicinity of the wreckage sighted about six hours later.

H.32) This aircraft's mission included localizing a submarine by detecting the echo of PDC's. No such charges were detected by USS CARP during the time BuNo 149672 was scheduled on station. Six such changes set off rapidly would have indicated to others participating in the exercise that an aircraft were in difficulty. One of two "Gibson Girls" was recovered battered and inoperable.

H.33) All day-night flares were intact in both MK-12 life rafts recovered. Those in the 5 recovered life vests were unaccounted for, and two right-sided and one left-sided vest pockets were completely missing from the life vests and one was restrained at only one corner. All life vest flares were missing, possibly discarded by SAR ships for safety. Two CO2 cartridges of one vest and one of a second were fired. Four out of the 15 flotation chambers were lacerated. Four of five flashlights were missing. That one retained was barely secured.

H.34) The whistle was retained on three life vests. There is no evidence that electronic, visual, or auditory signal devices were employed; however, one arcing white flame was reported at 0756R by USS CARP and USCGC ABSECON. Subsequent investigation of apparent origin was fruitless.

H.37) Travel was over a smooth sea on a very dark, moonless night with several cloud layers, reported as solid by USCGC ABSECON.

(continued)

ADDENDUM to PAGE 5, Section "H" (cont.)

Name of Individual (Last, first, middle)	Model A/C
KAHLER, Jack C.	P3A

H.38 & 44) Two MK-12 life vests are attached to the aircraft fuselage bulkhead aft of the wing through a 25 foot length of 100 lb. test line, which connects to a raft boarding line. Both rafts were recovered with fastening lines broken. All gear was retained in raft pockets and both accessory packages were recovered intact. The cylinder walls of two hand pumps were partially fragmented. A few MK-2 desalter kits demonstrated broken seals. The remainder were intact as were solar stills, although two of latter containers showed small splits less than one inch long. One raft had several lacerations in the inflatable protion. Paddles, food packages, paulin shelter were undamaged. There was absolutely no evidence of occupancy of rafts.

H.39) Twenty-two NC-3 parachutes were aboard aircraft, but none were recovered.

H.51) Flight suits, safety flying shoes and life vests were worn routinely. Also available, however, were wool-lined leather gloves, flight jackets, and twenty-two exposure suits with mittens and inflatable hoods. Sixteen exposure suits were recovered, several had small slices in them. One such suit's slices were matched with those of its corresponding numbered container. Another suit was missing right half of torso, and right sleeve. The right leg was separated from the remainder of the suit, and the pocket was missing from this right leg segment. Seven of the exposure suits were oil stained, including the torn one. They are stowed six fore, and sixteen aft. There is no evidence that anyone donned these and likewise it is extremely unlikely that a ditching drill was in process as ORI inspectors were specifically instructed to order such only on the return flight at conclusion of mission, which would have been after 0300R for this flight.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 6

OPNAV FORM 3750-6E (Rev. 5-58)

MODEL A/C: P3A

SECTION I - PATHOLOGIC FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for POST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): KAHLER, Jack C.
2. AGE: 25
3. HEIGHT: 69 INCHES
4. WEIGHT: 149
5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Unknown
6. INJURY CODE: L
7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (give time)
8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)
9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL
10. FACIAL INJURIES (n.e.c.)
11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES
12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT
13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☐ LEFT

HEAD INJURIES

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE / DIS-LOCATION

	SKULL CRAN.	SKULL FACIAL	VERTEBRAE (Specify No.) CERV.	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX	SHOULDER GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM R	UPPER ARM L	LOWER ARM R	LOWER ARM L	HAND R	HAND L	UPPER LEG R	UPPER LEG L	LOWER LEG R	LOWER LEG L	FOOT R	FOOT L
SIMPLE																						
COMPOUND																						
COMMINUTED																						
DIS-LOCATION		JAW									SHOULDER		ELBOW		WRIST		HIP		KNEE		ANKLE	
															HAND						FOOT	

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)
16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

		LACERATIONS MILD	LACERATIONS MODERATE	LACERATIONS SEVERE	CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN MILD	CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN MODERATE	CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN SEVERE	ABRASIONS MILD	ABRASIONS MODERATE	ABRASIONS SEVERE
HEAD (n.e.c.)	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
NECK										
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES	UPPER									
	LOWER									

18. ☐ DROWNED
19. ☐ ASPHYXIATED
20. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE
21. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

22. ☐ BURNS ☐ FROST BITE

DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD
AREA	HEAD (ventral)	Dorsal)		TRUNK (ventral	Dorsal)		ARMS		LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: ☐ NONE ☐ COMPLETE
ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS ☐ YES ☐ NO
25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-1234)
26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: DAYS
27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON ☐ YES ☐ NO
28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS
29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1234) NO. 8661
30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO.
31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ YES ☒ NO
32. PROTOCOL: ☐ ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED
33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: ☐ PATHOLOGIST ☐ FLIGHT SURGEON
IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", NAVMED P-1197.

34.

SPECIMEN		TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	1		
	2		
	3		
URINE			
G.I. CONTENTS			

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
TISSUE: (CNS)		
• MUSCLE		
• VISCERA		
OTHER:		

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—498175

Enclosure #1. Ref: OPNAV P-3750.6D para. 60e

STATEMENT OF (b) (6) [redacted] LCDR, USCG, 3732

2 February 1963

Aircraft advised they saw several bodies floating in a small area about 1500-1700 yards on port bow. Aircraft described one in detail as floating with head and arms submerged, feet on the surface. I turned the ship at 45 degrees to port and moved ahead slowly, alerting lookouts to be particularly observant for bodies. Ship moved perhaps 1000 feet when several people, myself included saw what at the time appeared to be a body in a red suit floating partially submerged. I directed the recovery detail talker to caution the recovery detail to be sure to use a swimming and rescue basket to pick up the body on the port quarter. Since the small boat was several hundred yards away and sea conditions were calm in the interest of expedience I decided to use ship pick up. I moved the ship ahead slowly bringing the apparent body down the port side. When it passed under the bridge wing, about 20 feet directly below me I could see that it was not a body but only an empty suit of some kind. (Later identified as an exposure suit) The construction of the suit "pink wrist and neck bands" contributed to the illusion of it being a body to all present on the bridge. Since it was floating with feet and legs on the surface, I assumed I had recovered the body that the aircraft reported. Shortly afterwards we retrived several other similar suits floating in much the same manner. I do not know the exact number.

(b) (6) [redacted]
Executive Officer
USCGC APSHCON (WAVP-374)

Certified to be a True Copy

(b) (6) [redacted]

Recommendations for Corrective Action

1. All exposure suits now in fleet operation should be modified by less misleading color on the wide neck and wrist bands than the current flesh color, so that in the future extraneous pursuit for such misleading suits during SAR will not result in possible fatal delays recuing survivors.

2. Cylinders on hand pumps stowed in life raft equipment packages should be constructed of a more durable material.

3. Currently the auto-pilot radar altimeter hold lacks any device for quickly warning the pilot of a malfunction in the system, although a proposed modification of this will have such warning, soon to be retrofitted to all operational P3A aircraft. Furthermore a malfunction with loss of altitude registered as a constant altitude on the radar altimter instrument and this is located only on the pilot's side. Thus determination of a malfunction in the radar altimeter hold without a visible horizon requires a cross check with the barometric altimeter by the pilot only and/or barometric altimeter monitoring by the co-pilot. Therefore it is urged that at least a visible warning device for the auto-pilot radar altimeter hold including a bulb check switch be installed on both the pilot and co-pilot instrument panels SOON, and that a radar altimeter instrument be installed on the co-pilot's panel to provide dual monitoring of this critical flight condition on all flights.

Summary of Socio-psychological and Physiological Findings

In summary the results of the socio-psychological and physiological aspects of this investigation reveal a rapid pace of squadron activity in recent weeks, which has been adequate to induce at least a low level of chronic fatigue among the squadron members, not at all uncommon in fleet operations. One phase of all this culminated in the operational readiness inspection attended by a physiologicallly and psychologically acceptable level and stress of diversions of attention. These factors could be counted as contributing psychological elements, in the etiology of this accident, but doubtfully were responsible solely in themselves.

#1. Oil slick photographed after sunrise, approximately 8 hours following accident. Note down wind feathering and calm sea state.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)

#2. Oil slick photographed after sunrise, approximately 8 hours following accident. Note down wind feathering and calm sea state.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)

#3. Life Vests recovered. Note that eyes of upper left vest are pulled out of rubber flap. Top center shows still unpacked and intact raft equipment package.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)

#4. Life raft inflation bottle with D-ring completely lost and seal broken.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)

(b) (6)

[redacted]

#6. Inflation bottle of second life raft with D-ring missing, seal broken, and damaged around cable at nozzle.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)

#7. Contents of one life raft equipment package, basically intact, but particularly showing hand pump cylinders damaged. A similar pump in the second raft package was likewise damaged. The container of the one recovered "Gibson Girl" shows its cleanly sheared off top.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)

#8. The one recovered "Gibson Girl" is shown battered and inoperable.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)

#9. Stowage of six exposure suits is shown here vertically in the rear bulkhead of the forward port observation station. Sixteen are stowed aft over the galley on the port side.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)



#1. Oil slick photographed after sunrise, approximately 8 hours following accident. Note down wind feathering and calm sea state.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)

Ø2. Oil slick photographed after sunrise, approximately 8 hours following accident. Note down wind feathering and calm sea state.
Enclosure Ø3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)

#3. Life Vests recovered. Note that eyes of upper left vest are pulled out of rubber flap. Top center shows still unpacked and intact raft equipment package.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 6Cd)



Ø4. Life raft inflation bottle with D-ring completely lost and seal broken.
Enclosure Ø3, OPNAVINST 3740.6D (para. 60d)

(b) (6)

[redacted]

#6. Inflation bottle of second life raft with D-ring missing, seal broken, and damaged around cable at nozzle.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)

#7. Contents of one life raft equipment package, basically intact, but particularly showing hand pump cylinders damaged. A similar pump in the second raft package was likewise damaged. The container of the one recovered "Gibson Girl" shows its cleanly sheared off top.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)

#8. The one recovered "Gibson Girl" is shown battered and inoperable.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)



#9. Stowage of six exposure suits is shown here vertically in the rear bulkhead of the forward port observation station. Sixteen are stowed aft over the galley on the port side.
Enclosure #3, OPNAVINST 3750.6D (para. 60d)